The July 7 attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul which left 58 people dead including four Indians and more than 140 wounded was a highly provocative act. Those responsible for the attack are well known, and their objectives are also not a matter of speculation. It is understood that the Indian government should be taking far more stringent security measures to minimise the recurrence of such attacks on its embassy, consulates, and reconstruction projects in Afghanistan.
Kabul has for long been wary of Pakistan’s idea of negotiating ‘peace’ deals with Taliban militants operating out of its north-western tribal areas. Pakistan’s earlier peace deals in 2004 and in 2006 were short-lived and had helped the Taliban emerge stronger. Moreover, the 2006 North Waziristan Pact had led to a notable surge in Taliban attacks west of the Durand Line.
The Taliban are proving to be increasingly irrepressible. They seem to be adapting, faster than expected, to the challenges confronting them. Although in terms of weaponry they cannot match the vastly superior Western forces, in terms of propaganda, psyops and operational reach they are proving to be a force to reckon with. In retrospect one can say that the Taliban made good use of the time made available to them by the United States when it shifted its focus towards Iraq in late 2002.
The rise of a militant Islamist group calling itself Pakistani Taliban has drawn wider international attention in recent years. It has appeared as a serious internal security threat for the Pakistani state and as an external challenge for the Afghan government facing a resurgent Taliban in southern Afghanistan. This article seeks to trace the evolution of 'Pakistani Taliban' and to isolate and analyse its ideological moorings and its political aspirations.
A commentator of Pakistani origin in the US, writing in The Wall Street Journal in September 2006, coined a new name for Pakistan, i.e., Musharrafistan. He fell short of saying ‘Musharraf is Pakistan and Pakistan is Musharraf’. At one level, Musharraf had until now established his reputation as the best bet for the US and the West, as a liberal dictator and better-than-the-rest leader within Pakistan, who pulled Pakistan successfully away from the brink.
That the Taliban power stands resurrected is a fact now. At the same time, the 'war on terror' is also showing signs of fatigue. It has already come to a halt in the north-western tribal expanse of Pakistan, the cradle of the Taliban's resurrection. Dubbed as 'remnants' until recently, the Taliban today are a power to reckon with, effectively redrawing the power equations within Afghanistan.
Condoleeza Rice's visit to Pakistan on June 27-28, 2006 before she proceeded to Kabul indicated abundant concern on the part of the US government about the increasing strength of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the expectation that Pakistan would pull its weight to ensure better results in combating terrorism. This was made apparent in her clearly enunciated statement which emphasised the need for increased cooperation between Pakistan and the Afghan government on the one hand, and among the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan on the other.
Pakistan is a frontline ally of the US in its Global War on Terrorism. After the 9/11 terrorist attack, the military regime was compelled by Washington to join the US effort to dismantle the Taliban-Al Qaida terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan and Pakistan that successive regimes had nurtured. While the Pakistani military regime’s cooperation is deemed to be crucial for the success of the US counter-terrorism strategy, there appear to be growing strains and challenges that give rise to fundamental questions about the outcomes of such cooperation.
The tribal terrain in Pakistan is in a state of turmoil. As the Pakistani Taliban gradually emerge, many analysts have pointed out that the terrain has traditionally been home to orthodoxy over the centuries and nourished rebels like Sayiid Ahmad, Faqir of Ippi, Nek Muhammad, Abdul Mehsud and now Mullah Dadullah.
