Naxal

A Critical Evaluation of the Union Government’s Response to the Maoist Challenge

The Union Government took notice of the current phase of the Naxalite challenge with concern, for the first time, in 1998. Since then, it has been playing a coordinating role among the various affected states to address the challenge. It has also been advising the affected states on ways to deal with the challenge. By 2003, the Union Government had put in place a two-pronged approach to address the Maoist challenge - that of a development response and a security response. However, all along, the Union Government's response has largely been security-centric.

Tackling the Naxal Threat

With the killing of three women and a nine-year old girl, absurdly described as a police informer, the Naxals have lost any moral justification that they may have had to wage war against India. This heinous crime proves that their acts are much worse than the so-called police atrocities against which the Naxals claim they protect the people. This may be the last straw on an already overloaded government camel reeling under the burden of procrastination, confusion, weak governance and plain indecision.

Countering the Naxalites: Is there a need to ‘bring in’ the Army?

As the Prime Minister and the Union Home Minister emphasized in the Chief Minister's Conference on Internal security in August and again in the Conference of the Director Generals of State Police Forces in September 2009, on the need to modernize the Police force of the country as an anti-dote to the problem of terrorism/ insurgency/ left-wing extremism, the task remains enormous and Herculean.

Partisanship can hurt India’s Internal Security Management

It is perhaps a truism that issues concerning India’s internal security like terrorism, Naxalism and insurgencies in the North East require a dynamic multi-pronged approach spread across states to manage and resolve them. Such a management and resolution package would possibly require crafting a national strategy capable of bypassing local political divisions and enabling India’s multiple political parties to work towards a consensus on issues concerning the nation.

Naxalite Mayhem in Nayagarh

In a meticulously planned offensive, reminiscent of the February 2004 attack at Koraput in Orissa, around 360 highly trained armed cadres belonging to the outlawed Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) also known as Naxalites, including women cadres, carried out simultaneous attack on district armory, police training school armory, and the police stations of Nayagarh town, Nuagoan, Dasapalla and the Mahipur police outpost in Nayagarh district in Orissa. Nearly 15 police personnel including a civilian were killed and 5 others injured in the attack.

Railway a Soft Target for Maoists

A little before dawn on December 12, 2007, Naxalites of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) blew up railway track at two different places in Bihar – the first one near Bhalui halt station on Jhajha-Kiul section of East Central Railway, disrupting train services on the Patna-Howrah main line and the other on the single line between Kajra and Urain stations on Kiul-Jamalpur section of Eastern Railway.

Unabated Maoist Violence: Ignoring Is Not Bliss

The Maoists continue to advance their violent campaign to capture political power through armed revolution. In the current year, till October 31, 571 lives have been lost in Maoist violence. Another 12, including two civilians and 10 personnel of the Mizo Battalion, were killed in an ambush on November 29 near Konta in Chhattisgarh. Correspondingly, the state response has been inadequate in containing the Maoists’ campaign and their influence. Strikingly various authorities continue to hold a widely divergent perception of the spatial spread of the Maoist movement.

Naxalites resolve to focus on urban areas

In response to the government-organised National Naxalite Co-ordination Committee meeting held in December 2006 at Bhubaneswar, Naxalites have enunciated their counter-strategy. The Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist), which accounts for 98 per cent of left-wing extremist violence in India, decided to intensify the people's war by increasing its mass base across the country and strengthening its armed cadres. The decision, taken at a leadership conclave held somewhere in the forests along the Jharkand-Orissa border sometime in January or February 2007, was unanimous.