Countering ideological narratives, effective communication of developmental measures to the people, and adherence to the principle of judicious use of force should form integral elements of India's strategy to counter insurgent and terrorist groups.
Though fuzzy, there are linkages between Indian and Nepalese Maoists and these have been either admitted or downplayed by all sides –– the Nepalese Maoists, the Indian Maoists and the Indian government.
The Naxal problem has become the biggest internal threat to the country. Especially after the comments of the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2007, it has become a matter of concern as well as a subject of academic debate. The new thought, innovative ideas and fresh planning have been developed to address this issue extensively and intensively. In this backdrop, a case study of Central Bihar becomes relevant to focus the light on this issue. It is an established fact that Naxalism in Bihar had made its route through Central Bihar.
Left Wing Extremism (LWE) presents a serious internal security challenge to India that needs careful and coordinated policy response from both the security front and the development front. For the CPI (Maoists) (Communist Party of India), the main outfit propagating LWE, the plan and execution of this style of people's war against the state is like the Churchillian ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’. At one level, the LWE can be described as a ‘Democratic revolution through tactical offensive with tactical speed in the protracted people's war of strategic defensive’.
There are no shortcuts to overcoming the grave Naxal threat to our democratic way of life. Broadening the mandate by handing over the problem to the army is neither fair nor efficacious.
The Grid-Guard-Govern strategy would do away with the sequential application of socio-economic solutions by undertaking security-led governance cum development action.
The hard lesson of Chintalnar is that the police are simply not investing enough in their frontline leadership and training to tackle the situation. Even when attempts have been made to bring in competence, the efforts to acquire required counterinsurgency skills have been marginal.
