Left-Wing Extremism

At one point there were an estimated 800 children in the ranks of the Maoists. Variously known as Bal Dasta, Bal Sangh and Bal Sangham, they are used for intelligence gathering, carrying food and arms, and serving extortion notes.

• P. V. Ramana
• August 06, 2015
• IDSA Comments

In the wake of the Sukma attack, it is apparent that the CPI-Maoist's weather- and surrender-induced operational frailty is a matter of the past.

• Gurmeet Kanwal , Bibhu Prasad Routray
• January 08, 2015
• IDSA Comments

The Urban Movement has a defined role in the political strategy and military strategy of the CPI (Maoist). In the Maoist schemes, Urban Movement is to broadly to mobilise and organise the basic masses and build the party on that basis ; build the United Front ; and military tasks .

• P. V. Ramana
• May 12, 2014
• IDSA Comments

Jeeram Ghati area is part of the Maoist's annual Tactical Counter Offensive Campaign. 2014 is a significant year on two counts: one, it is the tenth year of formation of CPI (Maoist) that requires a show of its strength and lethal prowess, and two, that general elections, scheduled in April-May, need to be disrupted. It, therefore, does pose a serious challenge to the security forces in the immediate future.

• V.K. Ahluwalia
• March 27, 2014
• IDSA Comments

Citing IDSA Report, the Minister of State for Home Affairs, RSN Singh said in the Rajya Sabha recently that “…the CPI(Maoist) party has been collecting not less than Rs 140 crores annually from a variety of sources. Further, the possibility of certain front organizations of the CPI (Maoist) … clandestinely getting foreign funds cannot be ruled out.”

• P. V. Ramana
• February 17, 2014
• IDSA Comments

The CPI (Maoist) is fully aware that a movement of this magnitude cannot sustain on its own for long without any external support; be it in terms of funding, weaponry, training, refuge or ideological support. Given India’s geopolitical location, it would come as no surprise if the CPI (Maoist), through its aggressive efforts, is able to garner substantive resources for its disposal.

• V.K. Ahluwalia
• January 27, 2014
• IDSA Comments

The internal security situation in India reflected a marked improvement in 2012-2013 relative to previous years. This Issue Brief offers an assessment of the major trends in 2013 for Jammu and Kashmir, the land borders of India, Naxalism, the Northeast, terrorism and radicalism in India. It also offers a prognosis for the year ahead.

• Untitled
• January 24, 2014
• Issue Brief

Compared to the worst Maoists-affected state of Odisha, in the neighbouring states of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, the level of violence has come down substantially. In the coming years, Malkangiri and other south-western border districts of Odisha will continue to bleed because of the Maoist quest for safe havens in these districts during hot pursuit by the Chhattisgarh police.

• Nihar R. Nayak
• January 23, 2014
• IDSA Comments

Foremost on the government’s defence and national security reforms agenda should be the formulation of a comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS), including that for internal security. The NSS should be formulated after carrying out an inter-departmental, inter-agency, multi-disciplinary strategic defence review and must take the public into confidence.

• Gurmeet Kanwal
• January 16, 2014
• IDSA Comments

In a document entitled ‘Our Financial Policy’, the Maoists mention that they have three types of economic needs, viz. the needs of war, political propaganda and the people. To cater to these needs there are three broad categories of resources, viz. (a) membership fee, levy and contributions from the people; (b) confiscation of the wealth and income of the enemy; and (c) ‘revolutionary taxes’ collected in guerrilla zones and base areas.

• P. V. Ramana
• December 27, 2013
• IDSA Comments