Kargil War Archives - Page 2 of 3

Line on Fire: Ceasefire Violations and India–Pakistan Escalation Dynamics, by Happymon Jacob

While contending the prevailing realists’ explanation of war happening because of power struggle, John Vasquez argues in his book, The War Puzzle Revisited, that a majority of wars are fought over territory, either to defend or occupy it. According to Vasquez, territorial disputes between two countries are ‘much more war-prone’ than others.

Restraining Kargil: Nuclear Caution in the Shadow of Kashmir

The debate surrounding the stability of nuclear weapons has been a critical issue for the last half century. On the one hand, realists like Kenneth Waltz argue that the proliferation of nuclear weapons will foster greater stability due to the intrinsic deterrent logic associated with these weapons. The nuclear pessimists, on the other hand, argue that the accidental use of nuclear weapons and unstable regime types are a greater concern for the outbreak of nuclear war.

Managing the 3Ms of Military Readiness

Money, manpower and material (3Ms) determine a state's capacity to leverage its hard power for fulfilling its national security objectives.

Harinder Singh
January 28, 2011
Issue Brief

Political Dimensions of Limited War

While limitation in aims set is acknowledged as the primary way of conflict limitation, the point lost sight of usually on the politico-military facet is war termination.

Ali Ahmed
March 29, 2010
IDSA Comments

The Army’s decade in review

Over the short term, events in Pakistan dictate higher order readiness. In the middle term, equations have to be managed with China so as to gain time to get the second strike capability and infrastructure organised.

Ali Ahmed
November 30, 2009
IDSA Comments

Conventional War in the Presence of Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear weapons cannot obviate wars, but can change its complexion and influence the manner of its conduct. In order to keep nuclear weapons from entering into real warfare, it is important to intelligently judge an adversary's nuclear thresholds and to calibrate one's own conventional strikes. For India, the exploration of this space is particularly important in order to deny Pakistan a free hand to indulge in sub-conventional conflict even as it holds the threat of an all-out nuclear war against an Indian conventional response.

Kargil War: Reflections on the Tenth Anniversary

Ten years later, the Kargil War still arouses deep emotions turning around Pakistan's gross perfidy, an intelligence failure, great heroism, military improvisation and innovation, a national upsurge, a most open inquiry leading to a comprehensive review of vital issues long closed to scrutiny and reform. Its report, prepared in record time, was uniquely presented to the nation as a commercial publication. (From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report, Sage, New Delhi, December 1999.)

Reflections on the Kargil War

The Kargil conflict can be categorized as a 'limited war'. It was initiated by Pakistan to achieve mixed military and political objectives, but made important misjudgments that doomed the enterprise to failure. The questions discussed in this article are: why was India surprised; why did both countries observe such great restraint; did the Kargil conflict have a nuclear dimension; and is 'limited war' a viable concept with nuclear deterrence obtaining in South Asia. It also argues that the Kargil conflict was an exception, in some dimensions, to the 'stability-instability paradox'

India’s Nuclear Doctrine: A Critical Analysis

Although the broad contours of India's nuclear doctrine were announced within the days of May 1998 nuclear tests, the formal doctrine was made public only five years later. This article will critically examine the evolution of India's nuclear doctrine in terms of the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001-2002 military confrontation with Pakistan. This article concludes that the one-page nuclear doctrine of 2003 remains sketchy and subject to varied interpretations.

The 1962 India-China War and Kargil 1999: Restrictions on the Use of Air Power

The paper examines the utilisation of air power in the 1962 India-China war and in the 1999 Kargil conflict. The study reveals a certain continuity in the attitudes to the use of offensive air power in limited conflicts. Both in 1962 and in 1999, the use of air power was hedged about with various restrictions. Underlying these appears to be the belief that the use of offensive air power is fundamentally escalatory. Hence there is a hesitation to commit offensive air power assets.