India-China War Archives - Page 2 of 3

Remembering 1962 Sino-Indian Border War: Politics of Memory

How does India remember the 1962 border war with China? The article argues that there are two ways in which the war is recalled in the country and both of them are betrayal narratives, one blaming the Chinese alone and the second blaming the Chinese expansionism as well as the naive leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The main focus of the article will be on a critical analysis of the three primary assumptions made by the betrayal narratives: the legitimacy of Indian claims; the unexpected Chinese aggression; and the singular failure of Indian political leadership.

Sino-Indian War, 1962 and the Role of Great Powers

The easy availability of Indian Government documents allowed early commentators to focus on the policies pursued by India to counter the relentless advance by China in the Western border region, and the prospect of a similar thrust in the Eastern region in 1962. The spotlight settled on the inadequacy of the ‘Forward Policy’, which was a response to Chinese military pressure on the ground.

The Great Divide: Chinese and Indian Views on Negotiations, 1959-62

When will states bargain while fighting and when will they evade intrawar negotiations? This article addresses this question with respect to the 1962 Sino-Indian War and provides insight into the question of why talks did not occur for the duration of the war. To do so, I analyse Chinese and Indian strategic thinking regarding the prospects of talks in the lead up and throughout the short war, with information gathered through archival work at the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives, interviews with former Indian political and military leaders as well as scholars and secondary sources.

A Game of Chess and a Battle of Wits: India’s Forward Policy Decision in Late 1961

In spring 1962, small numbers of lightly armed Indian troops proactively established presence in the disputed border areas between Chinese Tibet and India, despite intense sabre-rattling in Beijing. What was originally intended as a ‘game of chess and a battle of wits’ in late 1961, eventually ended in war in October 1962. This article discusses the long-term and short-term factors that can help explain why the Government of India opted for the ‘Forward Policy’ in late 1961.

‘We Over-imagined the Threat from China in 1962’ : Interview with Marshal of the Indian Air Force

Fifty years since the 1962 war, reams have been written and multiple perspectives have come to the fore. Yet, the oral history of the time, the leaders and the politics, passed down to us by the generation of officers who saw these events unfold, has never been more valuable. Shruti Pandalai had the privilege of interviewing the highly decorated veteran officer and Marshall of the Indian Air Force (IAF), Arjan Singh, on his recollections of the war.

Enduring Legacy of 1962: Cementing the Conflict of Perceptions in Sino-Indian Ties

Fifty years since the 1962 war, India and China have moved on to become world powers with engagement and competition characterizing their relationship in keeping with the rules of realpolitik. Both sides argue that the past has been forgotten, yet the border dispute remains unresolved. Despite the rapprochement and robust economic engagement undertaken, the relationship has a constant undercurrent of tension and is often described as fragile.

The Legacy of 1962 and China’s India Policy

This article will argue that the legacy of the 1962 Sino-Indian War continues to affect China’s policy towards India even today. The three factors that led to China’s decision in 1962 to attack India—the status of Tibet, the militarization of their unresolved border and fears of containment—are present even today, albeit in slightly modified forms. This is not to argue that another Sino-Indian War is imminent because the larger strategic context within which China’s leaders took the decision to attack India in 1962 has changed.

From the Managing Editor

This issue of the Journal of Defence Studies is being published 50 years after China attacked India across the Himalayas. A majority of Indians and Chinese today do not have any personal memories of the war. Since the war was seen as a victory for China and a defeat for India, it naturally evokes different sentiments in the two countries. For China, it was a punitive strike to teach India a lesson, to make it accept a lower position in the hierarchy of nations and, perhaps, an opportunity to convey its strength to the world at large, and particularly to the two superpowers of the day.

Defence Reforms after 1962: Much Ado about Nothing

How have commentators perceived India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962? What were its underlying reasons? Can the entire blame be cast on China for its surprise attack? Or, were India’s thoughtless actions also responsible? After touching on these questions, this article describes the defence reforms undertaken by India after the border conflict in 1962 in the light of the shortcomings and deficiencies highlighted.

Strategic Lessons of 1962: A Contemporary Retrospective

The 1962 India–China War is one of the most debated subjects in India’s recent military history. The discussion has been enriched by accounts of the war by a large number of principal Indian military protagonists, some to justify their own role which had come up for criticism in perspective.