# Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

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Statecraft and Intelligence Analysis in the Kautilya-Arthashastra
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Statecraft and Intelligence Analysis in the *Kautilya-Arthashastra*

*Michael Liebig**

In the Kautilya-Arthashastra, *espionage and other 'operational' activities of the secret service—notably 'active measures' and 'covert action'— are addressed often and in detail. In contrast, Kautilya seems to say very little about intelligence analysis, assessment and estimates which provide the basis of strategic planning and grand strategy—and are key components of statecraft. However, the central proposition of this article is that 'ideas' (or meanings) underlying these modern intelligence terms are very much present in the* Arthashastra. *Moreover, Kautilya does submit key methodological and theoretical ideas and concepts for intelligence analysis, assessment, estimates and strategic planning. Therefore, the* Kautilya-Arthashastra *is quite relevant for the history of ideas of the political science sub-discipline, intelligence studies.*

An arrow, discharged by an archer, may kill one person or may not kill (even one), but intellect operated by a wise man would kill even children in the womb.[1]

As Dr. Mandelbaum would say, he has assembled the information, but where is the knowledge?[2]

The ancient Indian *Kautilya-Arthashastra* is a classical work of political theory and theorized statecraft and a foundational text of the theory of international relations.[3] And, one must add, the *Arthashastra* is also a pioneering text of intelligence studies. As a work of statecraft, it is

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'cognition-centric' and features 'intelligence' prominently, but the terms 'intelligence', 'intelligence analysis', 'intelligence estimate', 'strategic planning' and 'grand strategy' are absent in the text. Before we dig a bit deeper into the text of *Arthashastra* with respect to the aforementioned terms, let us first—for the purpose of terminological clarity—briefly untangle the term 'intelligence'. A good basic definition is provided by Adda B. Bozeman:

> Intelligence in its primary or generic sense is everywhere a property of the mind. It stands for human beings' inborn capacity to come to terms with life by engaging in thought and acquiring, developing, and investing knowledge... Intelligence in its derivative political sense is a component of statecraft that centers upon the need of one politically unified community to have reliable information, knowledge, or 'intelligence' about other societies in its environment. Intelligence '2', then, is by no means a wayward offspring of intelligence '1'. The records suggest rather that the elementary idea was nowhere and at no time expunged, it was drafted into the vocabularies of domestic and international politics to serve the security interests of any given politically independent organism.[4]

Bozeman's definitions of the term intelligence, in both its generic and derivative (political) meaning, have in common that *generating knowledge* is the central issue. Intelligence '2' refers to the *process* of generating knowledge by collecting and analysing open and secret data/information relevant for 'national security'. This operational and cognitive process takes the form of an 'intelligence cycle': tasking > collection > analysis > estimates > dissemination. Intelligence '2' also refers to the *products* of these activities: assessments and estimates based on analysed data information.

In this article, I will concentrate on the components 'analysis', 'assessment' and 'estimates' of the intelligence cycle.[5] The focus is intelligence as the cognitive activity of sorting out, analysing, co-relating and synthesizing 'raw' data or information on capabilities and intentions of foreign actors. The products of such analytical work are 'assessments of the situation' and intelligence 'estimates'. The latter include inferences derived out of the analysis of data/information—pointing into the future. Intelligence estimates try to generate 'scenarios' of future developments pertaining to the external security of the state. The term intelligence is mostly used with respect to inter-state relations; and that is what I do in this article as well, leaving aside intelligence dealing with internal security.

I also leave aside here 'active measures' and 'covert actions', which are often seen as an integral part of intelligence.[6]

Intelligence in the *Arthashastra*: Methodological Hurdles and Approaches

Dealing with the question of intelligence analysis and estimates in the *Arthashastra*—in the context of political science—means facing daunting methodological hurdles. We have to rely on Sanskrit philologists translating the text: R.P. Kangle[7] into English and J.J. Meyer[8] into German. Neither scholar is an intelligence expert, or political scientist, and thus is unfamiliar with the concepts and vocabulary of the political science sub-discipline of intelligence studies.

Also, with regard to questions of intelligence, Kautilya often uses euphemisms and metaphors. One cannot even exclude the possibility that the intelligence virtuoso Kautilya might have had no interest to explicitly disclose the cognitive methodology of intelligence analysis and estimates which are at the heart—or more precisely, at the 'brain'—of statecraft. Kautilya might have viewed intelligence analysis and estimates as exclusive *Herrschaftswissen* (to use a term of Max Scheler), that is, restricted knowledge of ruling elites which is not deemed fit for popular consumption.

In spite of these serious methodical problems, I believe that it is possible to identify and reconstruct Kautilya's core concepts of intelligence analysis and estimates—even though they are mostly *not explicitly stated* and elaborated in the *Arthashastra*. That means, when we deal with Kautilya's understanding of intelligence beyond its dimensions of collection, organization and covert actions, we mostly *cannot* rely on 'self-evident' quotes from the text of the *Arthashastra*. Instead, we have to 'read between the lines' in identifying latent ideas and concepts with respect to intelligence analysis and estimates. Thus, we follow Max Weber's approach of the reconstruction of latent meanings and complexes of meaning with respect to intelligence analysis in the *Arthashastra*.[9]

Instead of a strictly hermeneutic methodology of interpreting the *Arthashastra*, I use an heuristic approach oriented on Helmuth Plessner's concept of 'covariance', which assumes that intrinsically (or genetically) related ideas can be generated in historically and culturally distant spaces.[10] Such ideas are not identical, but structurally homologous. I, therefore, start from the working assumption that in regard to intelligence analysis and estimates, there is a 'structural homology' between central ideas in the

Kautilya-Arthashastra and key concepts in Sherman Kent's 1948 study, *Strategic Intelligence*—the foundational work on intelligence analysis.[11] I think this assumption is reliable because Kautilya and Kent engaged in the same area of investigation and tackled the same problematic. And both concentrated on the essentials of this problematic—not secondary attributes and derivative issues.

Kent's categories and terminology can help us in the conceptional reconstruction of latent ideas with respect to intelligence analysis, assessments and estimates in the *Kautilya-Arthashastra*. To re-emphasize the crucial methodological point: in assuming conceptional 'covariance' or homology between Kautilya and Kent, I do not mean projecting modern concepts backwards onto the *Arthashastra* as a means to subsume or 'swallow up' its original idea contents. I do not intend to present Kautilyan ideas as 'inchoate approximations' to the much later concepts of the modern, Western author Sherman Kent. The originality and eigenvalue of Kautilya's ideas should be obvious as they were generated 2,300 years ahead of Kent's homologous categories.

Who is Sherman Kent? Kent (1903–86) was a Yale Professor of European History. In World War II, he joined the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was a first attempt to centralize the United States' intelligence capabilities, even though the intelligence activities of various government departments and the army and navy were continued. The OSS, under its Chief, 'Wild Bill' Donovan, is mostly portrayed as an 'action'-oriented intelligence organization, but it also developed an outstanding analytical capacity by recruiting first-class academics—historians, economists, political scientists, sociologists and geographers. In the OSS Research and Analysis branch, Kent served as the head of the Europe–Africa Division till end of World War II. After returning to academia and writing *Strategic Intelligence*, Kent joined the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1950, where he became the head of the Office of National Estimates (ONE) from 1952 to 1967.[12]

'THE EASY PART': INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, ORGANIZATION AND COVERT ACTION IN THE *ARTHASHASTRA*

In the (ideal-type) 'Kautilyan state' of the *Arthashastra*, the secret or intelligence service is a central and indispensable component of state capacity. This applies to both the internal and external security of the state.[13] However, we must keep in mind that the Kautilyan state is a 'patrimonial state' (Max Weber) in which the ruler and the state still form

a symbiosis—albeit one that begins to loosen up. The government and the state bureaucracy have not yet gained their (abstract) eigenvalue but are still attached to the ruler's court/household. Consequently, the Kautilyan secret service has not yet evolved into the differentiated bureaucratic apparatus which became established in the early twentieth century. For didactic purposes, the Kautilyan secret service might be compared with the intelligence services of the Republic of Venice or the Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) between the twelfth and eighteenth centuries, or with Sir Francis Walsingham's (1532–90) Secret Intelligence Service in Tudor England.[14]

Internally, the Kautilyan secret service is used for comprehensive surveillance of the people and the elites, especially within the state apparatus. There is a dense network of stationary and mobile secret agents and informants collecting information about treasonous activities, corruption, serious crime and the popular mood. In addition, the secret service acts as a 'secret police' with executive powers and engages in various forms of 'active measures':

1. Tracking down suspected treasonable individuals and groups, infiltrating and manipulating them.[15]
2. Tracing corruption, embezzlement and abuse of office in the state apparatus, including 'sting operations'.[16]
3. Silent liquidation of enemies of the state, whose extra-judicial killing is disguised as accident, normal crime or natural death.[17]
4. Staging political public relations (PR) operations to influence public opinion.[18]
5. Counter-espionage, including the use of double agents, and operations against foreign subversion and sabotage.[19]

The Kautilyan secret service is also vital and indispensable for the external security of the state. Again, there are two prime tasks: collecting information about foreign states—friendly, hostile or neutral; and covert actions against adversary states. The activities of the Kautilyan intelligence service in foreign states include:

1. Information gathering on the political, military and economic situation in order to identify strengths and weaknesses and political intentions. Of paramount importance is the identification of political factions, conspiracies and popular discontent. This is done by secret agents operating in a foreign country and by the recruitment of local informants.[20]

2. Diplomatic personnel in foreign countries must collect information, recruit agents of influence and participate in subversive operations—independently and in collaboration with secret agents operating in the host country.[21]

3. Whenever political tensions and instability are ascertained, the secret service should use local agents of influence to exacerbate tensions and give covert support to treasonous persons and groups as to further weaken and discredit the established governance. Political figures who stand in the way of one's own interests should be targeted for (covert) assassinations.[22]

4. If an armed conflict looms, the secret service should weaken the will to fight of the leadership and people as well as the combat power of the armed forces through sabotage operations, 'psychological warfare' and covert assassinations of key political and/or military leaders.[23]

Kautilya's remarks about the secret service in the *Arthashastra* demonstrate that his understanding of intelligence affairs is profound to an extent that necessitates his personal and practical experience in this milieu. Thus, the picture drawn of Kautilya and his intelligence activities in the classical Indian play, *Mudrarakshasa*, by Vishakhadatta (ca. sixth century AD) seems quite insightful.[24] Kautilya obviously knows what he talking about when addressing intelligence issues like:

1. what are the professional requirements for different categories of secret service agents;[25]

2. which covers are suitable for secret agents;[26]

3. what are the psychological, social and political dispositions to be exploited for the recruitment of informers and agents of influence;[27]

4. how can the secret service be controlled by organizational segmentation and mutual surveillance within the service;[28]

5. how are secret agents rewarded for special achievements and punished for misconduct;[29] and

6. what forms of subversion and covert actions are most suitable for achieving foreign policy objectives.[30]

When reading through the *Arthashastra*, one gets the impression that the Kautilyan intelligence service is very much 'collection-centric', 'operator-centric' and particularly 'action-centric'—and is to a large

degree operating as a secret police. Hence, the secondary literature on the intelligence dimension of the *Arthashastra* almost *exclusively focuses on intelligence collection*, *organization* and *covert action* in the Kautilyan intelligence service. Such a focus requires only modest methodological–theoretical efforts in the interpretation of the text. And, on matters pertaining to intelligence collection, organization and covert action, Kautilya can be generously quoted and paraphrased.[31]

In contrast, the literature pays little or no attention to intelligence analysis, assessment and estimates in the *Arthashastra*. That's not surprising because Kautilyan intelligence *appears* not to be 'cognition-centric'. But by digging deeper into the *Arthashastra*, it can be shown that Kautilya has much to offer on intelligence analysis, assessments and estimates as well as strategic planning. One may add, it could not be otherwise because intelligence analysis and estimates are decisive factors in Kautilya's understanding of statecraft and grand strategy.

Kautilya: Knowledge is the Foundation of Statecraft

Adda Bozeman refers to intelligence as a 'component of statecraft'. The latter she defines as follows: 'The term "statecraft"…stands for the sum total of human dispositions, doctrines, policies, institutions, processes, and operations that are designed to assure the governance, security, and survival of a politically unified human group.'[32] As mentioned earlier, she sees intelligence as a form of knowledge and concludes: '*successful statecraft is always and everywhere dependent on good intelligence* [emphasis added]'.[33] As we shall see, the triad, statecraft–knowledge–intelligence, is a key concept in the *Kautilya-Arthashastra*.

'Knowledge is Power' is an idea usually attributed to Francis Bacon (1561–1626), and sometimes to the Persian poet Firdausi (940–1020). However, the idea that *knowledge constitutes power* is already a leitmotif of the *Arthashastra*. In statecraft, Kautilya sees three forms power at work: the 'power of knowledge'; the 'power of the treasury [economy] and the army'; and the 'power of [the ruler's personal] valor'.[34] In Kautilyan statecraft, the power of knowledge takes the first place. '[T]he king with the eyes of intelligence and [political] science' can overcome rival kings even if they possess greater economic and military resources and personal valour.[35]

Knowledge has two dimensions of meaning. One is 'content-oriented': knowing things as opposed to not knowing them; acquiring and storing 'information' instead of being ignorant or ill-informed. The

other dimension of knowledge is 'method-oriented': the way of thinking, the cognitive 'processing' of acquired and stored information, that is, self-reflective or scientific thinking versus the non-reflective, mere intuitive or magical correlation of things perceived.[36]

For Kautilya, the knowledge underpinning statecraft has to be *substantive in content* and *scientific in method*. The fundamental importance of (double-sided) knowledge in statecraft is emphasized right at the beginning of Book I of the *Arthashastra*: no ruler is a 'born ruler', but has to acquire the knowledge that will qualify him to be a ruler.[37] Acquiring knowledge is a lifelong task and an integral part of the daily routine for ruler.[38] No 'power instinct', no leadership talent, no personal valour and no religious and/or magical dignity can substitute knowledge in Kautilyan statecraft.

What kind of knowledge[39] does the ruler have to acquire to gain the necessary competence in statecraft? Kautilya's selection criteria are: knowledge—in terms of 'information content' and methodology—that will enable the ruler to maintain and expand (a) the power of the state and (b) the welfare of the people; and that includes particularly security-relevant knowledge about internal and external threats to the power of the state (and thus, in Kautilya's view, also the welfare of the people). Knowledge so defined is the foundation and essence of statecraft. The ignorant, ill-informed and uneducated ruler is a danger to himself, the state and the people.

Kautilya demands of the ruler a lifelong *thirst for knowledge*, that is, the 'desire to learn, listening (to the teacher), learning, retention, thorough understanding, reflection, rejection (of false views) and intentness on truth'.[40] The ruler

> should learn new things and familiarize himself with those already learned, and listen repeatedly to things not learned. For, from (continuous) study ensues a (trained) intellect, from the intellect (comes) practical application, (and) from practical application results self-possession; such is the efficacy of sciences.[41]

And, to repeat what was said earlier: for Kautilya, the knowledge required for statecraft has to be both substantive in content and scientific in method.

A ruler's lack of knowledge is a cardinal sin—and that should be understood quite literally: ignorance is the breeding ground for defective character formation, which means the ruler's policymaking remains

dominated by instincts and affective impulses. 'Lust, anger, greed, pride, arrogance and fool-hardiness'—Kautilya calls them the ruler's 'six enemies'—cannot be controlled and/or sublimated without knowledge: 'the practice of (this) science (gives such control). For, the whole of this science means control over the senses.'[42] As only 'science imparts discipline', ignorant and uneducated rulers being driven by passion have ruined themselves and their states.[43] 'These and many other kings, giving themselves up to the group of six enemies, perished with their kinsmen and kingdoms, being without control over their senses.'[44] Kautilya backs up this conclusion with references to historical and mythological examples.

Knowledge—in terms of 'information content' and scientific analysis—is the supreme factor in statecraft. The ruler, after 'casting out the group of six enemies', should '*cultivate his intellect...[and] keep a watchful eye by means of his spies*' (emphasis added).[45] Therefore, *intelligence* as the cognitive activity of analysing information relevant for the state's external security is necessarily *a constitutive element of the knowledge underlying statecraft*. Receiving and cognitively 'digesting' security-relevant information takes up a significant part of the Kautilyan ruler's daily schedule.[46] The information supplied by spies and diplomats gets analysed by the ruler and his staff and transformed into intelligence assessments, which, in turn, provide the basis for strategic planning. So, Kautilya writes about intelligence and statecraft: 'For, the king, trained in the sciences...enjoys the earth alone without sharing it with any other ruler, being devoted to the welfare of all beings.'[47] This means that statecraft based on knowledge which significantly incorporates intelligence can empower the ruler to become the political unifier—the *chakravartin*—of the whole Indian subcontinent. And that is the ultimate—strategic and normative—goal of Kautilyan statecraft.

INTELLIGENCE MEANS GENERATING KNOWLEDGE

Following the sketched methodological approach of 'covariance' or structural homology, I now use Sherman Kent's concept of intelligence as heuristics for explicating the cognitive/analytical dimension of Kautilya's treatment of intelligence. Kent gives us a basal definition of intelligence:

> Intelligence is a simple and self-evident thing. As an activity it is *the pursuit of a certain kind of knowledge*; as an phenomenon it is the *resultant knowledge*...And strategic intelligence, we might call knowledge upon which our nation's foreign relations, in war and peace, must rest (emphasis added).[48]

Or as Stephen Marrin puts it half a century later: 'Properly understood, the role of intelligence is to collect information and to analyse it as a way *to produce knowledge* about a competitor or adversary (emphasis added).'[49] Or, to quote Kent once more: intelligence 'can be thought—indeed it often is—as an organisation engaged in the *manufacture of a product (knowledge) out of raw materials (all manner of data)* and labor (highly skilled, but not practical in the business sense of the word)' (emphasis added).[50]

Kent's definition of intelligence, I argue, is *homologous* to Kautilya's because of the centrality of knowledge and knowledge generation in both Kautilya's and Kent's understanding of intelligence. For both, knowledge is the key factor in statecraft and this knowledge is, to a significant extent, generated out of intelligence analysis, assessments and estimates.

Intelligence means generating knowledge about what is unknown and not-yet-known in a principally contingent political environment. At all times, human life and the existence of states are characterized by a latent but pervasive sense of looming dangers. Human life and history demonstrate beyond doubt that the security of individuals as well as political communities is always precarious and threats are very real. The precariousness of human existence—individually and collectively—is a fact of life. That is self-evident for the sober realist Kautilya whose political anthropology rests on two basic assumptions: (a) lust and affects like striving for domination lead inevitably to conflicts of interests and power struggles; and (b) man's political world is one of anarchy and insecurity within and among political communities, that is, *matsya-nyaya*.[51] In the world of *matsya-nyaya*, your security, if not survival, depends on gaining knowledge through intelligence collection and analysis.

An adequate understanding of Kautilya's concept of intelligence—in terms of collection and analysis—must take into account that it is rooted in his political anthropology. Kautilya's linkage of intelligence and political anthropology is quite similar to what Adda Bozeman observes: '[T]he world is divided, conflicted, and anarchical…Security-conscious governments in all ages and places appear to have accepted these persistent complexities as standing challenges in their conduct of foreign affairs by collecting, processing, and institutionalizing their own political intelligence.'[52]

Ignorance about the surrounding world means uncertainty or a sense of 'false security'. Knowledge derived from intelligence reduces (political) uncertainty. Thus, intelligence-cum-knowledge is intrinsically linked

to security. Knowledge does not *eo ipso* create security, but knowledge enables human beings and communities to do something about their security. If you lack intelligence-cum-knowledge—that is, 'groping in the dark'—you are up for 'nasty surprises'. If you know 'what's going on', you have a chance to protect yourself and to exploit the situation to your advantage. However, simply collecting and storing information won't tell you 'what's going on'—exceptions merely confirm the rule. The information collected has to analysed and assessed, that is, turned into intelligence which provides the knowledge for political action conducive to your security and interests.

Approaching the question of intelligence analysis and assessment in the *Arthashastra* necessitates that we step back from the cliché that intelligence is foremost a matter of spies and espionage. At all times, most of the intelligence which is vital for the security of a state has *not* come from the clandestine collection of secret information, but from 'open sources' of information. You don't need espionage and secret agents to find out what is the geography, the climate, the raw materials, the economy, the language, the religion, the culture, the social organization, the elites' mentality or the political tradition of a foreign country. This information can be obtained by travelling in a foreign country, keeping your eyes open and talking to people from all walks of life. And Kautilya recommends that exactly this should be done by diplomats and intelligence informants like long-distance traders or wandering monks and artists.[53] You don't have to be trained, skilful spy, but you must be open-minded and curious. Not the paraphernalia of the spying trade, but brainpower matters. Then, the multifarious impressions and information collected in a foreign country can be cognitively synthesized. Thus, you have gained what Kent calls *basic descriptive intelligence* which is the foundation of all sound intelligence. Basic descriptive intelligence comes from 'unromantic open-and-above-board observation and research'.[54] Basic descriptive intelligence provides the indispensable precondition for assessing the capabilities and the dispositions of other political actors.

Individuals and states are 'curious' because they know or at least feel that—at any given point of time—their knowledge of the surrounding 'world' is inadequate. Collecting new data/information and *generating new knowledge* increases political certainty and self-assuredness. As the political world is ever-changing, new data/information turned into intelligence/knowledge are needed all the time, because existing intelligence/knowledge becomes outdated or even obsolete. Your knowledge about

the surrounding world has to be constantly 'up to date'. This type of knowledge and knowledge generation Kent calls *current-reportorial intelligence* or simply 'current intelligence'. The core quality of current-reportorial intelligence is 'a high capacity to detect the significant and *a high sensitivity to changes* [emphasis added]'.[55] That means 'spotting the unusual, the really unusual', identifying 'the three things per week of the thousands it observes and the millions that happen which are really of potential moment'.[56]

> As the reporting element carries out its task it constantly adds freshness to the content of the basic descriptive element. It does more than this, for in keeping otherwise static knowledge up-to-date it maintains a bridge between the descriptive and what I have called the speculative-evaluative elements—a bridge between past and future.[57]

Throughout the *Arthashastra*, Kautilya tells us that there is no standstill in the political world. *Change is what is constant in politics*. States always go into a certain direction: they may drift towards weakness or march towards strength: 'decline, stability and advancement'.[58] States may stagnate, but it won't take long before decline or ascend becomes discernible. There are no permanent friends, foes or neutrals. Inter-state relations are fluid: today's friend is tomorrow's enemy and vice versa. Kautilya insists that the ruler must know about the changes in the political situation, preferably before they have fully manifested themselves. 'He, who is well versed in the science of politics, should employ all the means, viz. advancement, decline and stable condition as well as weakening and extermination.'[59]

INTELLIGENCE AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

As noted earlier, in Kautilya's view, the knowledge required for statecraft has to be both substantive in content and scientific in method. As intelligence is an integral and essential component of the knowledge underpinning statecraft, the question arises what is the relationship of intelligence—that is, intelligence analysis and assessment—to science.

Let us first take an *e contrario* approach to the relationship between science and intelligence. The lack of knowledge—both in terms of aggregated data/information and scientific method—means falling back on 'gut feelings', 'hunches' or magic when engaging in foreign policy. The uneducated ruler disinterested in intelligence is inclined to base his assessment of the situation and strategic planning on some miraculous personal aptitude or magical powers: astrology, oracles, omen or *fatum*.

Magical 'data' and rituals are apt to take the place of intelligence. The secular Kautilya takes an indifferent (but also instrumental) attitude towards magic (and religious issues generally). He who believes in magic might do so, but *magic should not be mixed up with intelligence* and strategic planning.[60] If we look at ancient Greece and Rome, we see how closely magic and strategic planning were interwoven in foreign policy and warfare. So, Kautilya draws a demarcation line between intelligence and statecraft on the one side, and magic on the other: 'The object slips away from the foolish person, who continuously consults the stars.'[61]

The very first step in the intelligence cycle—collecting information—already means a turning away from magic. For Kautilya, it is of decisive importance to gain *reliable empirical data* and *reality-based information* about the capabilities and intentions of other political actors. For him, intelligence and statecraft have to be based on factual data/information. It is intelligence versus magic.

The mere collection of factual information or data, however, does *not* tell you 'what's going on'. Nor does an aggregate of such data/information in itself constitute intelligence: 'Facts don't speak for themselves'—rare exceptions merely confirm the rule.[62] The (collected) information has to be analysed, and 'analysis, by definition, means *going beyond the facts*'.[63] It is through analysis that 'raw' data are turned into intelligence. In order to generate the knowledge needed for effective statecraft, information or data have to be cognitively processed according to certain methodological—at minimum, logical—principals. That is true even for 'common sense' knowledge, albeit with rather lax and semiconscious methodological standards. Scientifically valid knowledge is generated by cognitively processing information or data and applying strict and testable methodological standards as well as verifiable theoretical concepts in a coherent setting.

Kautilya states that in the realm of statecraft, there are three types of knowledge:[64]

1. immediate knowledge, based on what the ruler himself sees and hears;
2. mediated, indirect knowledge, based on what the ruler is being told by ministers, spies, diplomats or other 'experts' about occurrences which are distant in space and time, that is, intelligence respectively the product of intelligence analysis; and
3. knowledge inferred from immediate and mediated knowledge with respect to future developments and the ruler's own intended

actions, that is, intelligence assessments respectively estimates. 'Forming an idea of what has not [yet] been done from what is [has been] done in respect of undertakings is inferred.'[65]

This statement about the three variants of knowledge in statecraft in the *Arthashastra* is most significant with respect to the *methodology* of intelligence analysis, assessment and estimate*s* as well as strategic planning. First, Kautilya tells us that the ruler does depend on *exogenous sources of knowledge*—others collect information and disseminate intelligence to him. We see here a quite important parallel between political intelligence and science: neither the ruler (and his political/intelligence advisers) nor the scientist can be 'self-sufficient'. In both fields, there cannot be an autarchy of knowledge: 'Rulership can be successfully carried out only with the help of associates. One wheel alone does not turn. Therefore, he should appoint ministers and listen to their opinion.'[66] And: 'Indra indeed has a council of ministers consisting of a thousand sages. He has that as his eye. Therefore, they call him "the thousand-eyed one", though he is two-eyed.'[67] Without intelligence, the ruler—that is, the state—is blind in terms of statecraft.

Second, Kautilya emphatically argues that all three types of political knowledge need to be deliberated by the ruler in conclave with his close advisers. The incoming information must be reviewed. Is it reliable? Only 'when there is agreement in the reports of three spies, credence should be given'.[68] But that is only the baseline criterion of reliability of intelligence reports and, as such, insufficient for intelligence analysis and assessments. Kautilya insists that adequate analysis of intelligence reports depends on *collective deliberation*. And he consistently and vehemently rejects 'lonely decisions' of the ruler. Instead, he should consult with advisers and 'should ascertain their different opinions along with their reasons for holding them'.[69] Thus, with respect to intelligence analysis, assessments, estimates and strategic planning, we see here an exposition that reminds us of the principle of a Socratic dialogue or Platonic discourse. Or, the other way round, Kautilya demands with respect to intelligence and strategic planning, the exact opposite of what Kent calls an actor's autistic 'communion with his intuitive self'.[70]

For Kautilya, statecraft is more than a 'craft'. The ruler's talent, experience and intuition do not suffice for assuring the maintenance and expansion of the power of the state and the welfare of the people. The knowledge on which statecraft has to be based must have scientific character. This is quite relevant for Kautilya's understanding of intelligence

as a key component of statecraft. The knowledge underpinning statecraft is (significantly) derived from intelligence and more precisely, from intelligence analysis and assessments. Ergo, intelligence analysis and assessments must apply strict methodological standards as well as verifiable theoretical concepts. In other words, there is an intrinsic relation between intelligence analysis/assessment and political science (and also other science branches). *It is through political science that information gets transformed into intelligence.*

I will first take up the *methodological* principles of political science set forth by Kautilya in the *Arthashastra* and then, in the next section, turn to his *theoretical* concepts of political science. Both are of critical importance for Kautilya's understanding of intelligence with respect to intelligence analysis.

For Kautilya, philosophy is the ordering principle of political science. He defines philosophy as the science of the realistic, logical–rational cognition articulated in the ancient Indian philosophy schools of *samkhya*, *yoga* and *lokayata*. 'Philosophy is ever thought of as the lamp of all sciences, as the means of all actions and as the support of all laws and duties.'[71] Structured by philosophy, political science can empirically verify its validity by facilitating the maintenance and growth of the power of the state and the welfare of the people.

'A king knowing the science of politics, acquiring in this manner an ally, money and land with men and without men, over-reaches the confederates.'[72] But, a ruler 'deviating from the science, with his mind firmly fixed on what is contrary to science, ruins the kingdom and himself'.[73]

Kautilya views his *Arthashastra* as *the* foundational work of political science, transcending qualitatively all previous texts of this subject area: 'Easy to learn and to understand, precise in doctrine, sense and word, free from prolixity of text, thus has this (work on the) Science been composed by Kautilya.'[74] In Book XV of the *Arthashastra*, Kautilya expounds the methodological principles that give his work scientific quality. In this book, *The Methods of the Science*, he outlines 32 methodological categories.[75] Among these categories, one can distinguish four category clusters which, I think, have a particular methodological significance:

1. Category Cluster: *The Principle of Causality*
   (i) proof: explanation of the cause of a thing (5);
   (ii) comprehensive explanation: statement of several causes converging in effecting a thing (6);

    (iii) differentiated explanation: statement of the different factors that are causing a thing (7); and

    (iv) *e contrario* explanation: explaining a thing by its opposite (16).

2. Category Cluster: *Preliminary Explanations*
   (i) point of doubt: conflicting explanations for the cause of a thing (14);
   (ii) analogy: explanation of a thing not yet understood by a fact of experience (12);
   (iii) adoption: accepting the assessment of a thing by another author (18); and
   (iv) restriction: reference to exceptions to a rule (22).

3. Category Cluster: *Explanations and Conclusions*
   (i) necessity: logically and factually only possible conclusion from the data (29);
   (ii) alternative: mutually exclusive conclusions from the data—either/or (30); and
   (iii) combination: multiple, coexisting conclusions from the data—as well as (31).

4. The Category: *Inference and Prognostics*
   (i) inferring from empirical data prognostic conclusions (32).

If Kautilyan statecraft is based on political science and intelligence is a vital component of statecraft, then the methodological principles of political science are necessarily applicable to (and mandatory for) intelligence analysis. Between statecraft, political science and intelligence exists an intrinsic connectivity. That means that the methodological category clusters of causality, preliminary explanation and conclusion are to be applied to the discursive analysis/assessment of incoming intelligence data. And the same goes for the methodological category of inference. Therefore, *the scientific methodology laid down in Book XV of the Arthashastra must also be applied to intelligence analysis, assessments, estimates and strategic planning*.

However, it is not only Book XV of the *Arthashastra* that is methodologically relevant for intelligence assessment and strategic planning. The methodology of political science which has to be applied in discursive intelligence analysis and strategic planning must not be limited to the methodological 'instruments' and categories (of Book XV) but must be oriented on the *methodological structure of the Kautilya-Arthashastra as a whole*.

'Just as a person not learned in the Veda does not deserve to eat the *sraddha*-meal of good persons, so a king who has not learned the teaching of the science of politics is unfit to listen to counsel.'[76] Meyer's translation is: he who has not studied 'this shastra'—Kautilya's *Arthashastra*—is unfit for the discourse of statecraft. In other words, intelligence analysis, assessments and estimates following the methodology of Kautilya's *Arthashastra* are the precondition of strategic planning and effective statecraft.

The methodological principle with which Kautilya composes and structures the *Arthashastra* is a *holistic* and *comprehensive* approach: matters of domestic as well as foreign policy have to be seen in their connectivity with economic, technological, fiscal, administrative, judicial and military affairs. Kautilya seems intent to avoid a selective, reductionist approach to the state and statecraft in which there is a one-sided focus on one or two elements while neglecting the rest. Consequently, the full-spectrum approach—as typified by the *Kautilya-Arthashastra* as the ideal-type textbook of political science—must also be adopted for intelligence analysis, assessment and estimates. When making an intelligence assessment of a foreign actor, not just one or two power factors—for example, military strength alone—must be considered. Both material and non-material factors need to be taken into account. For example: a state has large peasant population and much fertile land, but excessive taxation by the state is depressing agricultural output and impoverishing the farmers. An inefficient and corrupt state bureaucracy can paralyze the apparent military strength of state. Therefore, the (intelligence) assessment of the situation must be based on the 'total picture' of a state's resources and capabilities.[77]

Here, we come back to the homology between Kautilya's and Kent's understanding of intelligence, particularly its cognitive dimension of analysis and assessment. Intelligence analysis requires 'the best professional training, the highest intellectual integrity and a very large amount of worldly wisdom'.[78] Of the intelligence analyst, Kent says:

> The job of synthesis upon which he is embarking is one which requires of him *the very highest competence in one or more of the sciences of politics, economics, geography, and the military art*. He [the intelligence analyst] should not undertake it unless he has an easy familiarity with the literature and techniques of the relevant disciplines (emphasis added).[79]

And:

In a sense, intelligence organizations must be not a little *like a large university faculty*. They must have the people to whom research and rigorous thought are the breath of life, and they must accordingly have tolerance for the queer bird and the eccentric with a unique talent. They must guarantee a sort of academic freedom of inquiry and must fight off those who derogate such freedom by pointing to its occasional crackpot findings (emphasis added).[80]

Like Kautilya long before him, Kent pays close attention to the question of methodology in intelligence analysis and assessment: '"formulation of the method", [as] it would be called in formal terms, is itself an act of intelligence and an essential part of the whole intelligence process'.[81] And:

The knowledge at issue is produced by the process of research...a certain kind of research must accompany the surveillance activity. This *research is a systematic endeavor to get firm meaning out of impressions*. Surveillance without its accompanying research will produce spotty and superficial information...[R]esearch is the only process which we of the liberal tradition are willing to admit is capable of giving us the truth, or a closer approximation to truth than we now enjoy... truth is to be approached, if not attained, through *research guided by systematic method*. In the social sciences which very largely constitute the subject matter of strategic intelligence, there is such an method, it is much like the method of physical sciences. It is not the same method but it is a method none the less (emphasis added).[82]

And on the inference problematic, Kent states: 'Are so called "estimates" of intelligence of any value? My answer is Yes, they are of very great value if they are soundly based in reliable descriptive data, reliable reporting, and processed from careful analysis.'[83] The basic idea underlying this sentence by Kent has been expressed by Kautilya some 2,300 years earlier. In conclusion, we need to re-emphasize the fact that Kautilya's understanding of statecraft and intelligence, while being methodologically and theoretically based upon political science, is *firmly grounded in empirical experience*. Kautilya himself says that he wrote the *Arthashastra* 'after going through all the sciences in detail *and after observing the practice*' (emphasis added).[84] The Kautilyan state, while being an ideal-type theoretical construction, is not a utopian construction in the sense of Thomas Morus or Campanella. Kautilya does know the empirical reality of intelligence and he analyses and conceptionalizes this reality with scientific methodology.

Kautilya's Theoretical Instruments for Intelligence Analysis: The *Saptanga* Theory

I now turn from the methodological side of intelligence analysis to *theoretical* concepts in the *Arthashastra* that are applicable for intelligence analysis and assessment. One of the two basic questions in intelligence analysis is about *capabilities* of states—those of foreign states, but also one's own. The second key intelligence question is: what are the intentions of competitors or adversaries? How do we identify state capabilities and how do we operationalize them in terms of relative strength or weakness? If we use the terminology of Hans J. Morgenthau, we would say: what is the 'national power'—the material and immaterial resources—of a state?

Kautilya had the idea of 'national power' 2,300 years ago with the *saptanga* theory: the seven 'state factors (*prakriti*)' constitute (state) power: 'The king and his rule [state], this is the sum-total of the constituents'.[85] The seven 'constituent elements of the state' (Kangle) or seven 'state factors' (Meyer) are: '1) *swamin*: the ruler; 2) *amatya*: the Minister [government and administration]; 3) *janapada*: the people [in the countryside]; 4) *durga*: the fortress [capital]; 5) *kosa*: the treasury [economy]; 6) *danda*: armed might; 7) *mitra*: the ally [in foreign policy]'.[86]

With the *saptanga* theory, Kautilya transcends the idea that state power is primarily defined by armed might. The state is no longer defined solely by its monopoly of the use of force. Beyond *danda*, the state has six other power factors at its disposal. How powerful a state is, is determined by the status (and the development trend) of *all* the seven *prakriti*s. This new understanding of state power is one of the outstanding theoretical achievements in the *Arthashastra*.

Moreover, Kautilya's *saptanga* theory means that state power is no longer an abstract, relational magnitude, but an aggregate of material and immaterial variables. Simultaneously, state power can be operationalized by breaking it down into its seven components.[87] Thus, state power can, if not precisely measured, at least be adequately evaluated and estimated. That includes assessing the positive or negative *development trends* of each of the seven *prakriti*s: decline, rise or stagnation.[88]

For example, *janapada*: how many peasants produce what agricultural output, what is their surplus product, what tax revenue do they generate; what mines produce, what output, what type of ore; what is timber production, etc.? Is the trend of these economic indices positive or negative? The state factor, *amatya*, can be evaluated using qualitative criteria: administrative competence, efficiency or level of corruption of the

state bureaucracy. What is the size of the armed forces? In what condition are weapons systems, equipment, logistics or combat morale? So, Kautilya provides a *substantive concept of state power*, which is comprehensive as well as differentiated in itself. The seven *prakriti*s are logically and practically interrelated and their sequence constitutes a *hierarchy* of importance in the sense that the higher-order state factor determines the performance of successive factors. This is important to avoid an over-fixation and overestimation of one or two state factors in assessing state power, that is, ignoring their quasi-genetic dependency on other state factors.

As mentioned earlier, Kautilya's concept of state power as the aggregate of the seven state factors is homologous with Morgenthau's concept of 'national power', whose components are population size, raw materials, agriculture, industrial potential and the armed forces of a state. Morgenthau also includes immaterial factors to 'national power', that is, 'national character', 'national morality' and the 'quality' of government and diplomacy.[89]

Kautilya's concept of state power as an aggregate of seven *prakriti*s provides excellent *theoretical tools* for intelligence analysis. The assessment of the situation with respect to one's own state and foreign states can rest on *objective parameters*: the given status and the development trend of the seven *prakriti*s. Thus, Kautilya rendered possible not only a theoretical quantum leap in political science, but equally so for intelligence analysis. *The intelligence assessment of state capabilities can be based on substantive, objective criteria.*

The power of a state is determined by the totality and the connectivity of the seven *prakriti*s. When we look at the power potential of a particular state, we may find that the military power factor of this state appears to be very strong: its armed forces are quantitatively large. But intelligence analysis may uncover that this same state is rather weak in economic power and financial resources, which translates into missing pay, low-grade equipment and insufficient supplies, thereby atrophying the army's combat power. Conversely, a territorially and demographically small state with modest armed forces might become a powerful state in a relatively short time span. That can happen if the state factors, *swamin* and *amatya*, are of excellent quality, which means promoting and expanding the economy in the countryside (*janapada*) and in the city (*durga*), and thus increasing tax revenues (*kosa*), allowing the armed forces to be upgraded (*danda*) and conducting a wise foreign policy (*amatya*).

Kautilya is not only interested in the given status of a state's *prakriti*s,

but the trend of their development. The status of the *prakriti*s is fluid: they can grow and improve or they can deteriorate. A state's power potential might stagnate for a while, but sooner than later, it will either increase or shrink. Identifying *the trend of a state's power potential* is a central task of intelligence analysis and assessment. The directionality of five of one's own state factors can be determined, or at least influenced, by the ruler and the state administration: *janapada*, *durga*, *kosa*, *danda* and *mitra*. For Kautilya, the *optimization* of one's *prakriti* is raison d'etat.[90] In other words, priority is to be given to 'internal balancing' via the strengthening and improvement of the seven state factors.

For an objective assessment of one's own *prakriti*s, the secret service is not needed because in the Kautilyan state, there is a comprehensive census system. The state bureaucracy collects and documents the demographic, economic, fiscal and other data. Thus, the state factors, *janapanda*, *durga*, *Kosa* and *danda*, can be estimated fairly accurately. For evaluating the quality of the state bureaucracy, however, Kautilya advises the ruler to use the secret service. Kautilyan statecraft requires that the ruler must judge soberly and self-critically his own performance, particularly with respect to foreign policy. Whatever results the assessment of the given status of one's own *prakriti*s may yield, Kautilya insists: they must be strengthened and improved—that is demanded by raison d'etat.

To assess the capabilities—and intentions of—foreign states, intelligence is indispensable. Intelligence operatives and diplomatic envoys (which are supposed to work closely together) are needed. They must collect as much data/information as possible on the current status and trend of the *prakriti*s of the foreign state in which they operating. Doing that does not necessarily mean clandestine intelligence collection. Much information about the political, economic and even the military situations of a foreign country can collected by diplomats and intelligence operatives by keeping their eyes open and by talking to both ordinary people and senior officials. However, collecting *secret political and/or military information* necessitates the recruitment of local agents by one's own intelligence operatives—the higher their position in the political and social system, the better will be the intelligence they yield—as well as other methods of clandestine collection. Kautilya describes rather extensively how secret agents and diplomats can collect open and secret intelligence in a foreign country.[91] Their intelligence reports then must be analysed and assessed at home with the methodology sketched earlier and with the theoretical tools provided by the *saptanga* theory. Doing that allows

a realistic and objective assessment of the status and the development trend of each *prakriti* and the aggregated power potential of foreign states. Thus, an objective assessment of the correlation of forces between one's own state and competing states becomes possible.

So, Kautilya offers not only the methodological but also the theoretical framework for sober and unbiased intelligence analysis and assessment. *Again, science and intelligence form a symbiosis.*

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND GRAND STRATEGY

The term 'grand strategy' was coined by B.H. Liddell Hart.[92] His understanding of grand strategy can be summarized as follows. Grand strategy is the 'holistic' or 'synoptic' alignment of strategic thinking on the overall constellation of the political, social, economic and military resources available to a state directed towards the realization of fundamental state goals. That is also the approach taken by Kautilya in the *Arthashastra*. Grand strategy means that strategic thinking and action is aimed to bring about a *context-adequate, optimal mix of a state's capabilities for the realization of 'strategic' state interests and goals*. Like intelligence, grand strategy is both a cognitive process and the result of this process—a 'master plan' for state action which is co-relating the 'estimate of the (strategic) situation' with state interests and goals.[93]

The concept of grand strategy is very close to Kautilya's holistic and synoptic idea of statecraft. The components of grand strategy can rather easily be identified in the *Arthashastra*:

1. resources and *capabilities* in terms of the seven *prakriti*s;
2. *power potential* in terms of the aggregated *prakriti*s;
3. the *correlation of forces* in terms of *prakriti*s—one's own and that of competitors/adversaries;
4. *state interests* derived from: (a) the correlation of forces and (b) the actors' respective intentions; and
5. *'strategic' and normative state goals* in accordance with raison d'etat: the maintenance and expansion of the power of the state, the welfare of the people and the political unification of the Indian subcontinent.

The *necessary condition* of the possibility of designing a grand strategy is intelligence analysis and estimates. The foundation of grand strategy is the analysis and assessment of one's own resources and capabilities on the one side, and the capabilities and intentions of external actors on

the other side. The result is an 'estimate of the situation', the bottom of which is the correlation of forces between states 'ascertaining the relative strength or weakness of powers', as Kautilya puts it.[94] The concept of correlation of forces is central in the *Arthashastra* and the *saptanga* theory makes it so expedient by establishing substantive and objective criteria for intelligence analysis and assessment. Through the intelligence assessment of the correlation of forces, *a reality-based identification of state interests* becomes possible. But that is not all. The correlation of forces between states is linked by Kautilya with *strategic planning*: 'The circle of constituent elements [the seven *prakriti*s] is the basis of the six measures of foreign policy [*shadgunya*]'.[95]

Depending, first and foremost, on the assessment of the correlation of forces (in terms of the respective *prakriti*s), Kautilya submits a set of *six action strategies in foreign policy (shadgunya)* for enforcing one's state interests and realizing one's state goals:

1. *samdhi*, peace > the rival state is stronger and will remain so in the foreseeable future;
2. *vigraha*, war > the rival is vastly inferior in power;
3. *asana*, neutrality > the correlation of forces is balanced;
4. *yana*, war preparation, coercive diplomacy > one's own power is rising vis-à-vis the rival state;
5. *samshraya*, alliance building > the rival state's power is rising faster than one's own; and
6. *dvaidhibhava*, diplomatic double game > the constellation among rivals and allies is very fluid.

'"These are really six measures, because of differences in the situation", say[s] Kautilya.'[96] What is of critical importance with respect to the *shadgunya* theory is its intrinsic connectivity with the *saptanga* theory. The *saptanga* theory provides the benchmark for the correlation of forces between rival states. And the correlation of forces *preselects, if not determines*, which of the six action strategies is to be chosen in foreign policy: 'Situated within the circle of [the seven] constituent elements, he [the ruler] should, in this manner, with these six methods of [foreign] policy, seek to progress from decline to stable condition and from stable condition to advancement in his own undertakings.'[97] Kautilya wants to eliminate non-reflective, impulsive and arbitrary action in foreign policy. For him, sober, thorough and objective intelligence analysis, assessment and estimates are the *conditio sine qua non* for a foreign policy which meets

his strategic and normative requirements. 'He who sees the six measures of policy as being interdependent in this manner, plays, as he pleases, with the [rival] kings tied by the chains of his intellect.'[98]

In Kautilya's understanding, intelligence analysis, assessment and estimates go hand in hand with strategic planning and open up the access route that leads to conceptionalizing a grand strategy which defines *the ways and means by which interests can be enforced and goals can be achieved.*

Kautilya may not be the first author to write about intelligence matters in a scholarly fashion, but he is certainly the first to do so in a systematic, comprehensive and in-depth manner. Kautilya views intelligence as an integral part of statecraft—and not merely as the trade of spying. The *Kautilya-Arthashastra* is unquestionably *a foundational text of the political science sub-discipline of intelligence studies*—but as such, it has been largely ignored. Kautilya has left a large reservoir of ideas and concepts with respect to intelligence affairs which has so far remained untapped for tackling problems and puzzles of contemporary intelligence studies. I hope that this observation will soon become obsolete.

NOTES

1. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, X, 6, 51. The Latin number designates the book within the *Arthashastra* (15 in total) and the Arabic number the chapter thereof; when there is an additional Arabic number, it refers to the *sutra* number within the respective chapter in Kangle's English translation; see Kangle, R.P. (Ed.), *The Kautilya Arthashastra, Part II* (English translation), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2010a/1972.

2. John Le Carré, *Absolute Friends*, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2004, p. 327.

3. Cf. Weber, Max, *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, Tubingen: Mohr/UTB, 1988a; Weber, *Religion und Gesellschaft—Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie*, Frankfurt am Main: Zweitausendeins, 2008; Alfred Hillebrandt, *Altindische Politik*, Jena: Fischer, 1923; Heinrich Zimmer, *Philosophie und Religion Indiens*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973; R.P. Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra, Part III* (Commentary), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2010b/1965; N.P. Sil, *Kautilya's Arthashastra—A Comparative Study*, New York: Lang, 1989; Roger Boesche, *The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and his Arthashastra*, Lanham, US: Lexington Books, 2002; Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, London: Routledge, 2009.

4. Bozeman, Adda B., *Strategic Intelligence & Statecraft*, Washington: Brassey's, 1992, pp. 1f.

5. Cf. Richelson, Jeffrey T., *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, Cambridge,

MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1985; Loch K. Johnson, 'Preface to a Theory of Strategic Intelligence', *International Journal of Intelligence and counterIntelligence*, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2003, pp. 638–63; Stephen Marrin, 'Intelligence Analysis Theory: Explaining and Predicting Analytic Responsibilities', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 22, No. 6, 2007, pp. 821–46; William E. Odom, 'Intelligence Analysis', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2008, pp. 316–22; Bowman H. Miller, 'Improving All-source Intelligence Analysis: Elevate Knowledge in the Equation', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2008, pp. 337–54; Mark M. Lowenthal, 'A Disputation on Intelligence Reform and Analysis: My 18 Theses', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 31–37; and expert interviews with Dr Hans-Georg Wieck, former Head of the German Foreign Intelligence Service (BND), Ajit Doval, former Director Intelligence Bureau (India), and R. Banerji, Special Secretary (retd) in the Cabinet Secretariat (India).

6. In 2012, P.K. Gautam, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) Research Fellow, raised the question of intelligence analysis in the *Kautilya-Arthashastra* in the context of the IDSA Project, *Indigenous Historical Knowledge*. Cf. P.K. Gautam, *One Hundred Years of Kautilya's Arthashastra*, Delhi: IDSA Monograph Series, available at http://idsa.in/monograph/One HundredYearsofKautilyasArthasastra, accessed on 4 September 2013.

7. Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra, Part II*.

8. Meyer, Johann J. (ed.), *Das altindische Buch vom Welt—und Staatsleben: Das Arthacastra des Kautilya*, Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1977/1926.

9. Cf. Weber, Max, *Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, Tubingen: Mohr/UTB, 1988b.

10. Plessner, Helmuth, *Macht und menschliche Natur*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003, p. 217. Helmuth Plessner (1892–1985) was a German–Jewish sociologist and social philosopher. His 1931 study, *Macht und menschliche Natur* (Power and Human Nature), has not yet been translated into English.

11. Kent, Sherman, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951.

12. Cf. Davis, Jack, 'Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis', Occasional Papers 1/5, The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, 2002, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol1no5.htmKent, accessed on 2 March 2014.

13. Cf. Scharfe, Hartmut, *Untersuchungen zur Staatsrechtslehre des Kautalya*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1968, pp. 233–76; Charles Drekmeier, *Kingship*

and Community in Early India, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962, pp. 208ff.

14. Cf. Deacon, Richard, *A History of the British Secret Service*, London: Grafton, 1982; Stevan Dedijer, 'Ragusa Intelligence and Security (1301–1806)—A Model for the Twenty-first Century?', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2002, pp. 101–14; Sean P. Winchell, 'The CDX: The Council of Ten and Intelligence in the Lion Republic', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2006, pp. 335–55.

15. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, I, 10; V, 1.

16. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, I, 10 and 17; IX, 4 and 5.

17. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, V, I.

18. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, I, 12, 18; I, 13, 2.

19. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, I, 12, 19; IX, 6; XIII, 3.

20. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, I, 12, 20; I, 16; XI, 1.

21. Ibid.

22. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, XI, 1; XII, 1–4.

23. Ibid.; XIV.

24. Cf. Fritze, Ludwig (ed.), *Mudrarakschasa oder des Kanzlers Siegelring. Ein indisches Drama von Visakhadatta*, Leipzig: Reclam, 1886.

25. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, I, 11 and 12.

26. Ibid.

27. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, I, 14.

28. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, I, 12 and 13.

29. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, I, 12.

30. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, I, 16; XI, 1; XII, 1–4; XIII, 1–2.

31. Cf. Roy, Gandhi Jee, *Diplomacy in Ancient India*, Patna: Janaki Prakashan, 1981; Schwalm, Hansjörg, *Die Rolle des indischen Kriegswesen vor und während der Herrschaft Chandraguptas und seines Ministers Kautalya*, Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag,1986; S.D. Trivedi, *Secret Services in Ancient India: Techniques and Operation*, Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1987; Gayatri Chakraborty, *Espionage in Ancient India (From the Earliest Time to the 12th Century A.D.)*, Calcutta: Minerva, 1990; Boesche, *The First Great Political Realist*; Rohatgi, Manila, *Spy System in Ancient India,* Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2007; Friedrich Wilhelm, 'Königsindisch—eine Variante im großen Spiel der Geheimdienste', in Wolfgang Krieger (Hg.), *Geheimdienste in der Weltgeschichte* [*Intelligence in World History*], München: Beck, 2009.

32. Bozeman, *Strategic Intelligence & Statecraft*, p. 1.

33. Ibid., p. vii.

34. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, VI, 2, 33.

35. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, IX, 1, 15.

36. Cf. Miller, 'Improving All-source Intelligence Analysis', p. 338.

37. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, I, 5.

38. Ibid., 19, 7–17.

39. Kangle uses alternatively the terms 'knowledge', 'intellect', 'science' and 'political science'.

40. Ibid., 5, 5.

41. Ibid., 5, 15–16; restated almost verbatim in VI, 1, 4.

42. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, I, 6, 2–3.

43. Ibid., 1, 5.

44. Ibid., 5, 11.

45. Ibid., 7, 1.

46. Ibid., 19, 7–14.

47. Ibid., 5, 17.

48. Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, p. vii ff.

49. Marrin, 'Intelligence Analysis Theory', p. 827.

50. Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, p. 76.

51. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, I, 4, 13–14; I, 13, 2–14.

52. Bozeman, *Strategic Intelligence & Statecraft*, p. 2.

53. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, I, 16.

54. Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, p. 4.

55. Ibid., p. 70, e.a.

56. Ibid., p. 161.

57. Ibid., p. 38.

58. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, VI, 2, 4.

59. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, VII, 18, 43.

60. However, magic can be used as a means of psychological warfare by the ruler possessing knowledge-cum-intelligence.

61. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, IX, 4, 26.

62. Miller, 'Improving All-source Intelligence Analysis', p. 344.

63. Ibid., p. 345.

64. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, I, 9, 4–8.

65. Ibid., 9, 7.

66. Ibid., 7, 9.

67. Ibid., 15, 55–57.

68. Ibid., 12, 26.

69. Ibid., 15, 35.

70. Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, p. 156.

71. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, I, 2, 12.

72. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, VII, 11, 45.

73. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, VIII, 2, 12.

74. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, I, 1, 19.

75. I follow J.J. Meyer's German translation which here, I think, is less opaque than Kangle's; *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, XV, 1, 3.

76. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, I, 15, 61.

77. The *Kautilya-Arthashastra*'s holistic approach to statecraft and intelligence marks a major difference to the other great ancient work on this subject area; Sun-Tzu's *The Art of War*, cf. K.N. Ramachandran, 'Sun Zi and Kautilya: Towards a Comparative Analysis', in K.N. Ramachandran et al. (eds), *Sun Zi and China's Strategic Culture*, IDSA Occasional Paper Series, New Delhi: IDSA, 1999, pp. S46–78.

78. Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, p. 64.

79. Ibid., p. 48.

80. Ibid., p. 74.

81. Ibid., p. 54.

82. Ibid., pp. 151–56.

83. Ibid, p. 60.

84. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, II, 10, 63; e.a.

85. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, VIII, 2, 1.

86. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, VI, 1, 1.

87. Cf. Liebig, Michael, 'Kautilya's Relevance for India Today', *India Quarterly*, Vol. 69, No. 2, 2013, pp. 99–116.

88. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, VII, 18, 43.

89. Cf. Morgenthau, Hans J., *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, pp. 107–70.

90. Cf. Liebig, 'Kautilya's Relevance for India Today'.

91. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, I, 16.

92. Liddell Hart, B.H., *Strategy*, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1967, p. 322.

93. Cf. Kovac, Mitar and Jan Marcek, 'Konzepte und Methodische Aspekte der Formulierung und Umsetzung der Staatlichen Strategie', in *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2013, p. 34–47.

94. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, IX, 1, 1.

95. *Kautilya-Arthashastra*, VII, 1, 1.

96. Ibid., 1, 5.

97. Ibid., 1, 38.

98. Ibid., 18, 44.