

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

No.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg
Delhi Cantonment, New Delhi-110010



Journal of Defence Studies

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.idsa.in/journalofdefencestudies>

Kautilya's Arthashastra: Indian Strategic Culture and Grand Strategic Preferences

Kajari Kamal

To cite this article: Kajari Kamal (2018): Kautilya's Arthashastra: Indian Strategic Culture and Grand Strategic Preferences, *Journal of Defence Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 3, July-September 2018, pp. 27-54

URL <https://idsa.in/jds/jds-12-3-2018-kautilya-arthashastra-kajari-kamal>

Please Scroll down for Article

Full terms and conditions of use: <https://www.idsa.in/termsfuse>

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

Views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Kautilya's Arthashastra

Indian Strategic Culture and Grand Strategic Preferences

*Kajari Kamal**

The utility of the theory of strategic culture to explain the choices nation-states make is still to be convincingly proven. Alastair Iain Johnston has provided a viable notion of strategic culture that is falsifiable, its formation traced empirically, and its effect on state behaviour differentiated from other non-ideational variables. Following his methodological framework, Kautilya's Arthashastra is identified as the 'formative' ideational strategic text which is assessed to illuminate Indian strategic culture. Through Johnston's lens, answers to three inter-related questions about orderliness of the external environment are extrapolated from the text. These basic assumptions are substantively reflected in the grand strategic preferences latent in the treatise, suggesting coherence in strategic thought. Paradoxically, the complex, yet logical, procedure of arriving at the preference ranking incorporates quintessential 'structural-realist' ideas. However, it is the robust strategic culture which lends meaning to these objective variables and potentially determines state behaviour in a culturally unique way.

INTRODUCTION

Jawaharlal Nehru was independent India's first Prime Minister, and undoubtedly the architect of its strategic outlook and its subsequent operationalisation. It was Nehru's contention that there has been 'a cluster of ideas that assume inner cohesion and continuity, and the core gestalt of this idea cluster were generated already in the very early phase of India's cultural history.'² The pursuit to discern these fundamental elements,

* The author is pursuing PhD at the Department of Political Science, Hyderabad Central University, Telangana, India.



which potentially shape Indian strategic culture and its concomitant international behaviour, has perhaps reached a level of criticality. India today, more than ever before, is poised to become the elephant with a large 'footprint'.³ The choices that India makes will have a considerable impact on areas well beyond South Asia. How is India likely to behave? What are its grand strategic preferences? It is to address these vital questions that we turn to cultural studies and attempt to delineate Indian strategic culture.

The proliferation of studies in the field of strategic culture in the past several decades has been primarily due to the inability of the mainstream international relations (IR) theories to satisfactorily explain international developments. Academic theorisation in the field with disparate research agendas geared to tackle the inherent elasticity of the concept of 'strategic culture', and to draw out useful explanations, has led to the generation of an immense body of literature. Scholars belonging to the Global North have offered insights and theories to explain the nature of strategic culture. It could be rather imprudent to infer that such insights, formulations, and theories would have transnational application. Yet, they do offer a guide to formulate our understanding of strategic culture, with specific reference to India.

This article employs the theoretical framework of Alastair Iain Johnston⁴ to investigate Indian strategic culture, and argues that there exists a set of coherent, identifiable assumptions about the nature of international relations which are cogently reflected in a set of ranked, grand strategic preferences. These are discerned from a careful study of India's classical text on statecraft, Kautilya's *Arthashastra* (KA).⁵ The inquiry has been informed by Johnston's conception of strategic culture,⁶ and answers to all methodological questions drawn from his framework of analysis.

The article is divided into two broad parts. The first discusses the concept of strategic culture, and highlights some of the important conceptual and methodological issues that have directed the research. The second part identifies KA as the 'object of analysis' for investigation, and delineates the 'central strategic paradigms' and 'grand strategic preferences' with reference to the text.

STRATEGIC CULTURE: THE CONCEPT

What do we understand by the term 'strategic culture'? And, what are the methodological tools of arriving at one? Can we conclusively prove the

effects of strategic culture? The research so far on strategic culture—or more broadly cultural and ideational influences on strategic choice—has debated on these questions, and can be divided into three generations.⁷ Johnston's elaboration of the three generations has been accepted by most strategic culture scholars. Colin S. Gray succinctly summed up Johnston's detailed division by pointing out that all the generations add up to a small group of people, with the first-generation scholars studying a more Russian/Soviet approach to fighting a limited nuclear war; the second generation scholars aimed to decipher the cunning coded messages behind the language of strategic studies; the third generation's objective seems to be mainly researchability.⁸

Johnston's *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (1995) is often cited as the classic third generation work on strategic culture. The study investigates the existence and character of Chinese strategic culture by identifying the *Seven Military Classics* as the 'object of analysis'. The empirical focus is on the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), and the causal linkages to the manner in which external threats were dealt with in this period are studied. Johnston takes the concept of strategic culture as providing the ideational milieu which conditions strategic behaviour, and from which strategic choices could be derived. Let us understand the contours of Johnston's framework of analysis through the broad themes that have engaged the strategic culture scholars.

Defining Characteristics of Strategic Culture

Johnston suggests strategic culture as a 'system of symbols' comprised of two parts: the first consists of basic assumptions about the orderliness of the strategic environment—that is, about the role of war in human affairs (whether it is aberrant or inevitable), about the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses (zero-sum or positive-sum), and about the efficacy of the use of force (about the ability to control outcomes and eliminate threats, and about the conditions under which the use of force is useful).⁹ The second part of strategic culture consists of assumptions at a more operational level about what strategic options are the most efficacious for dealing with the threat environment as defined by answers to these three sets of questions.¹⁰ Most ambitiously, he separated culture from behaviour to test how the former might causally affect the latter in some falsifiable way.

This definition of strategic culture made a substantial departure

from definitions provided by the first generation, both in terms of what constitutes strategic culture and their sources. Colin Gray, who borrowed directly from Snyder's conceptual work, defined American strategic culture as:

modes of thought and action with respect to force, derived from the perception of national historical experience, aspirations for self-characterisation (for example, as an American, what am I? How should I feel, think, and behave?), and from all the many distinctively American experiences (of geography, political philosophy, civic culture, and 'way of life') that characterize an American citizen.¹¹

Scholars like Gray, David Jones, Carnes Lord, and William Kincade located the sources of strategic culture expansively in macro-environmental factors. Influences like geography, political variables such as history, and nature of the state and its relation with society were considered important. Cultural resources such as belief systems, myths, and symbols, as well as textual and non-textual sources of tradition and institutional elements were also seen as reservoirs of strategic culture.¹²

The lack of specification on what exactly is to be analysed and the vastness of the sources of strategic culture offered, rendered the prospect of comprehensive and conclusive research untenable. Johnston, on the other hand, pointedly suggests strategic-cultural objects at the earliest possible point in history as the chief sources. These 'objects' are representative of the foundational period in the development of strategic thought and practice. His definition, therefore, is in line with the 'positivist' agenda that he set out to seek.

Culture and Behaviour

Perhaps the relationship between culture and behaviour represents one of the deepest of the divides existing in security studies literature today.¹³ It is popularly called the 'Johnston-Gray debate' or 'positivism versus interpretivism'. The main arguments of the debate between Johnston and Gray stem directly from their respective definitions and understanding of what constitutes 'strategic'. Johnston had taken the first generation, especially Gray, to task for invoking an 'everything but the kitchen sink' treatment of strategic culture, thereby making it difficult to establish anything as non-cultural.¹⁴

Given the all-encompassing nature of strategic culture as an independent variable, there is no possibility in most of the first generation

literature for there to be a break or disjuncture between strategic culture and behaviour.¹⁵ Johnston also pointed to the 'little or no appreciation of the potential instrumentality of strategic culture.'¹⁶ Gray answered by providing a 'belated development of first generation enquiry.'¹⁷ He conceived strategic culture 'as a context out there that surrounds, and gives meaning to strategic behaviour, as the total warp and woof of matters strategic that are thoroughly woven together, or as both.'¹⁸ In other words, strategic culture should be approached both as a shaping context for behaviour, and itself as a constituent of that behaviour.¹⁹ However, Gray has also upheld Johnston's criticism of the first generation for raising some important concerns. He acknowledges the problems presented by a concept of strategic culture that 'comprises so extensive a portfolio of ingredients, and is so influential upon behaviour, that it can explain nothing because it claims to explain everything.'²⁰

Who are the Keepers of Strategic Culture?

There is a general consensus in the literature that elites are instrumental in defining foreign policy goals, and fashioning responses to new security challenges. By keeping the focus on key elites and security managers who oversee national security policy, Johnston's approach in the third generation exhibits continuity with the first and second waves. They both view the highest institutions of decision-making within the state as the fundamental locus of the manifestation of a nation's strategic culture.

Amenability to Change

An important aspect of understanding strategic culture is to comprehend its response to environmental factors. The focus of most studies of strategic culture is on the continuity of state behaviour. In a 'belated development of first generation enquiry',²¹ Gray asserts that strategic culture(s) can change over time, as new experience is absorbed, coded, and culturally translated. Culture, however, changes slowly.

Under what conditions can strategic culture change? According to Johnston, a-historical or 'objective' variables such as technology, capabilities, levels of threat, and organisational structures are all of secondary importance. The interpretive lens of strategic culture lends meaning to them. If strategic culture does change, it does so slowly, lagging behind changes in 'objective' conditions.²² This distinguishes the strategic culturalists from the mainstream realists' view.

Structural Realism versus Strategic Culture

Undoubtedly, the thrust of the post-Cold War wave of culturalism in security studies was the fundamental reassessment of the utility of neo-realism as the dominant paradigm in IR. Johnston, who made a noteworthy study of strategic culture in China, states at the very outset of his project that, ‘the notion of strategic culture, in principle at least, poses a significant challenge to structural realist claims about the sources and characteristics of state behavior by rooting strategic choice in deeply historical, formative, ideational legacies.’²³ According to him, ‘the third generation, which emerged in the 1990s, attempted a rigorous conceptualization of ideational independent variables in the forms of military culture, political military culture, and other organizational cultures, and took the “realist edifice as the target”.’²⁴

According to Ashley Tellis, the quest for a parsimonious explanation—a distinguishing characteristic of contemporary social science—threatens the viability of strategic culture as a self-sufficient explanation of competitive political behaviour.²⁵ Gray answers such critics by pointing out that there are, and can be, no un-encultured realists.²⁶

It must be admitted here that one of the chief goals of this article is to demystify Indian strategic thinking, and evaluate its explanatory capability. The sheer charter of the agenda of this article suggests an alignment with Johnston rather than Gray (to clarify the stand on the Johnston-Gray debate). The hypothesis, therefore, is that historically rooted ideational variables influences the strategic choices of the decisionmaking elites.

The contemporary literature on Indian strategic thought was found to be wanting in understanding the uniqueness of the ancient Indian traditions of philosophy and statecraft, contained in the classic texts. In this context, Johnston’s analysis of the strategic culture of another Asian civilisation threw substantive light on the scope and methodology of such a study. In his book, Johnston suggests that the findings that he has presented should be viewed as the first step in what ought to be a cross-cultural, longitudinal study of strategic culture. Thus, this article seeks to understand the nature of Indian strategic culture through Johnston’s lens.

APPLYING JOHNSTON’S LENS TO KAUTILYA’S *ARTHASHASTRA*

Most scholarly works on Indian strategic culture have referred to KA either as the foundational basis, or as an important component, or at least

as a great treatise on statecraft which has failed to influence the subsequent generations because of India's chequered history. Unfortunately, very few scholars have attempted to read the original text and grasp its nuances. In 2006, the US Department of Defense commissioned a study on the subject, titled 'India's Strategic Culture' under Rodney W. Jones. According to the study, India does have a distinct strategic culture and Kautilya's work is one of the essential components of it. The profile of India's strategic culture has distinctive traits and is rooted in its ancient culture and heritage. According to Jones, these traits draw from, among other sources, Kautilya's *Arthashastra* which parallels Niccolo Machiavelli's *The Prince*, as an 'exposition of monarchical statecraft, realpolitik in inter-state balances of power, and the practices of war and peace.'²⁷

Kanti Bajpai's work on Indian strategic culture, while based on Johnston's framework, turns to post-Cold War writings of some of the most important voices in the Indian strategic community as the written 'text' from which cultural traits are inferred. He notes: 'In India, there are no canonical texts across which one would test for consistency of preference ranking.'²⁸

Shrikant Paranjpe's study²⁹ is of consequence to this article in two important ways. One, it also sees strategic culture as consisting of two main parts: one relates to the worldview of the nation; the other with the operational aspect of dealing with the world at large in terms of national self-interest. And second, in spite of following the Gray approach in establishing that Indian strategic thinking is a product of historical, cultural, geo-political, socio-economic compulsions, it recognises Kautilya's *Arthashastra* as an important legacy to Indian strategic culture.

Marcus Kim, submitting that Indian understanding of strategic affairs is primarily based on endogenous politico-cultural resources, identifies Kautilyan and Gandhian thought as the most important. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu also identifies two basic trends of strategic thought in India, both of which originate in antiquity: the idealist tradition which goes back to Ashoka and leads to Gandhi on the one hand, and a realist tradition that dates back to Kautilya on the other hand.³⁰ Manjeet Singh Pardesi, acknowledging the importance of KA on modern India's strategic and military thought, deduces India's grand strategy and applies it to five pan-Indian powers: the Mauryas, the Guptas, the Mughals, British India, and the Republic of India.³¹ Rashed Uz Zaman's work also explores Kautilya's *Arthashastra* as a significant influence on India's strategic culture among a variety of other ideational

factors.³² Bharat Karnad is clear about his core argument: there is a deep-rooted tradition of politico-strategic realism in India that goes back to the Vedic period. Kautilya has refined this traditional thinking in a scholarly fashion and has codified the idea-contents of our realpolitik legacy.³³

Some of the practitioners of Indian foreign policy recognise the existence of a vibrant and rich ancient heritage of strategic thought, and recommend reading Kautilya to ‘help broaden our vision on issues of strategy.’³⁴ In a similar vein, Shyam Saran, former Indian Foreign Secretary, argues the importance of the ancient text, and convincingly establishes the Kautilyan paradigm in the conduct of India’s foreign policy in his book.³⁵

Perhaps, the most comprehensive and the most recent study that has delved in analysing the *Arthashastra* as an unequivocal ‘endogenous politico-strategic thought’, and its impact on modern politics in India, has been undertaken by Michael Liebig and Subrata K. Mitra in their book, *Kautilya’s Arthashastra: An Intellectual Portrait—Classical Roots of Modern Politics in India*.³⁶ Interestingly, making a departure from some of the other acclaimed readings on the *Arthashastra* mentioned earlier, they contend that the *Arthashastra*, a crucial part of India’s classical political heritage, constitutes the normative reservoir that underpins modern India’s political identity.

Indeed, ancient Indians seem to have thought systematically and thoroughly about most issues, and strategic thinking would be no exception. The following sub-section will defend the *Arthashastra* as the ‘object of analysis’, in line with Johnston’s framework of analysis.

Object of Analysis

It is important for Johnston that

the content analysis of strategic cultural objects begins at the earliest point in history that is accessible to the researcher, where initial strategic culture-derived preference rankings may reasonably be expected to have emerged, or where those who use these strategic traditions imply the roots of their thought lie.³⁷

Fortunately, in the case of India, the *Arthashastra* becomes the unambiguous choice.

In the case of China, besides the proportion of all military texts comprised by the *Seven Military Classics*, Johnston alludes to other reasons for analysing these texts. They mix elements from Confucian-Mencian, Legalist, and Daoist traditions in Chinese statecraft.³⁸ He arrived at this

conclusion after reading some non-military texts dealing with issues of statecraft and strategy. In the Indian context, Bharat Karnad contends, in a similar vein, that Kautilya

conveyed by then a four thousand-year old 'vocal tradition' of the *Vedas* and the *Puranas* into written form—distilling, compiling, collating, interpreting, and commenting on the innumerable issues pertaining to statecraft and society, and culling laws, social norms, policy strictures and organizing principles contained therein and in a host *shastras* (disciplines) and *sutras* (axioms).³⁹

Therefore, it does not lie outside the broader Indian strategic and philosophical framework.

Another important criterion for the selection of the *Seven Military Classics* in the case of China—which has an equal resonance with the *Arthashastra* in India—is that the work provided the textual and intellectual basis for much of the writings on military affairs to follow. Although the *Arthashastra* has been treated by many historians as a description of the Mauryan Empire and administration, Upinder Singh opines that 'it is a theoretical treatise, not a descriptive work, and although its core probably dates to the Maurya period, it has interpolations belonging to later centuries.'⁴⁰ The *Arthashastra's* embeddedness in India's cultural continuity reveals itself not only through its oral and written transmission but, equally so, in the work's reception by outstanding figures of India's cultural spheres across the centuries.⁴¹

The final charge which Johnston thinks could be levelled against these texts is that the content may not address grand strategic questions. Do these works explicitly or implicitly discuss the pros and cons of different types of grand strategies? Or are they primarily concerned with military strategy, tactics, and training? Bharat Karnad's assessment provides an answer to this in definite terms. He says:

The ancient Indian politico-military thoughts [were] exceptional in [their] plumbing the big picture as well as the minutiae of almost every aspect of statecraft in exhaustive detail. The use of force in diplomacy, for instance, was scrutinized, and war in all its variety and its conduct studied; the nature and the causes of conflict examined; the various factors, including morality, that impact on inter-State relations assessed; the requisite weights assigned military capabilities and paradigms of international relations were conceptualized.⁴²

It is clear from the above discussion that the *Arthashastra* measures

up to all the criteria which Johnston invokes in the case of the *Seven Military Classics* in China.

Central Strategic Paradigms

In Johnston's methodological framework, the answers to three interrelated questions constitute a model of strategic culture from which logically derived grand strategic preferences flow out. The three questions pertain to the role of war in human affairs, the nature of the adversary, and the role and efficacy of violence or military force. Together these constitute the 'central strategic paradigm'.

Role of War

Is war an inevitable phenomenon? Or is it a deviant? In the first verse of (6.2) of Kautilya's *Arthashastra*—*Sama vyayamau yogakshem ayoryonih*—the welfare of a state [ensuring the security of the state within its existing boundaries and acquiring new territories to enlarge it] depends on adopting a policy of 'non-intervention or overt action'; this establishes the basis for all foreign policy.⁴³ Non-intervention is not a policy of doing nothing, but the deliberate choice of a policy of keeping away from foreign entanglements in order to enjoy the fruits of past acquisitions by consolidating them. *Vyayama*, as interpreted by Rangarajan, implies an active foreign policy; *Yoga*, the objective of enlargement of one's power and influence, and through these, one's own territory.⁴⁴

P.K. Gautam convincingly links *yogakshema* (*yoga* means acquisition and *kshema* means protection and sustenance) to the law of *matsyanyaya* (the big fish swallowing the small one).⁴⁵ Since there is no chastiser under the condition of anarchy, and *matsyanyaya* consequently prevails, *yogakshema* enjoins the ruler to secure the survival of the state including through resort to war (*danda*).

Another explication of *yogakshema* is through the concept of *raison d'état*.⁴⁶ According to Mitra and Liebig, the Kautilyan *raison d'état* integrates two fundamental value ideas:

1. Maintaining and expanding the power of the state.
2. Ensuring the welfare and security of the people.

The first value idea means political rationality that commits the ruler to the optimisation of the seven state factors: *swami*, the sovereign king; *mantrin*, the ministers; *janapada*, the people and the territory; *durga*, the fortification; *kosha*, the treasury; *sena* or *danda*, the

army; and *mitra*, the ally. The second value idea is the solemn commitment of the ruler to strive for the happiness of the people as laid down in Book I of the *Arthashastra*: 'In the happiness of the subjects, lies the happiness of the king and in what is beneficial to the subjects is his own benefits' (1.19.34).⁴⁷ The *Arthashastra* also emphasises maintaining a balance between the ancient Indian notion of the *trivarga*: ethical goodness (*dharma*); wealth and power (*artha*); and pleasure (*kama*). In 9.7.60, Kautilya writes, 'Material gain, spiritual good and pleasure: this is the triad of gain.'⁴⁸ Although *artha* is ranked higher, its interconnectedness with *dharma* and *kama* is vital.

The pronounced conjunction of *dharma*⁴⁹ and *artha* throughout the text dispels some of the myths harboured by Western military historians and cultural relativist theorists. Christopher Coker asserts that the West is unique in secularising warfare, and for the non-Western societies, violence remains the moral essence of the warrior. Taking the example of the *Bhagavad Gita*, Coker asserts that, for non-Western warriors, violence is existential.⁵⁰ However, it is clear that Kautilyan military ethos is firmly rested on political rationality in union with political normativity, discerned through scientific enquiry, in a highly secular manner.

In Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, while war is an inevitable phenomenon, the decision to wage war is a well-considered one, based on many inputs. Prime among the considerations is that the action should be legitimate and 'righteous'. It is important here to highlight the distinction that Kautilya makes between political normativity and 'general ethics'. If fundamental state interest is at stake, unethical state actions gain a different normative quality. If state actions violate general ethical standards but are congruent with *raison d'état*, they are legitimate for Kautilya.⁵¹ In external relations, the ultimate expression of *danda* is war. This too is not without normative constraints. Wars fought for political unification, which is identified as the political goal to further state interest, are considered 'righteous'; and those which cause destruction are labelled 'demoniacal'.

Kautilya's categorisation of wars is also based on political rationality. *Prakashayuddha* or 'open fight' is in the place and time indicated; *kutayuddha* or 'concealed fighting' involves the use of tactics in the battlefield; and *tusnimyuddha* or 'silent fight' implies the use of secret agents. It is stated that when the *vijigishu* is superior in strength, and the season and terrain are favourable to him, he should resort to open warfare (10.3.1). In fact, a fight about the place and time of which notice has been given, is considered righteous—*dharmishtha* (10.3.26).⁵²

Nature of Adversary

The above discussion on righteous war illuminates the content of the other two central strategic paradigms. The righteous-war doctrine embodies a zero-sum view of the adversary, since it places unrighteous violators of the moral-political order beyond the pale.⁵³ According to Kautilya, the most important of a king's neighbours is the 'enemy'. Among the states surrounding a kingdom, there is always one who is the natural enemy.⁵⁴ Rangarajan contends that this is the state that is looking to out-manoeuvre the king and spring an attack if not pre-empted. The other neighbours may be hostile (*aribhavi*), friendly (*mitrabhavi*) or vassal (*bhrityabhavi*). However, the main target of the conqueror is always the designated natural enemy—'one cannot make peace with the enemy' (7.13.17).⁵⁵

It is also important here to understand the much-touted concept of the *mandala*, and its dynamics with the three 'text-immanent concept clusters'⁵⁶—the *saptanga* (the seven state factors), the *sadgunya* (six methods of foreign policy), and the *upayas* (the four basic tools of politics). The would-be conqueror shall apply the six methods of foreign policy [as appropriate] to the various constituent elements of his Circle of States with the aim of progressing from a state of decline to one of neither decline nor progress, and from this state to one of progress (7.1.38).⁵⁷

The constituents of the *rajmandala* are *vijigishu* (conqueror), *ari* (adversary), *mitra* (ally), *arimitra* (adversary's ally), *mitra-mitra* (ally's ally), *parshnigraha* (adversary in the rear), *aakranda* (ally in the rear), *madhyama* (middle king), *udasina* (neutral king) and *antardhi* (weak intervening king, 7.13.25).⁵⁸ This representation is symbolic, signifying that all states in the mandala system face a familiar predicament, and defines relationship in a dynamic manner, which may create opportunities for some and expose others to danger.⁵⁹ Therefore, there are no permanent friends and adversaries.

Relative power is a recurrent theme in the *Arthashastra*. That the power equation shall make policy is an important Kautilyan contribution.⁶⁰ A state's position is determined by its relative progress and the relative decline vis-à-vis other states in the neighbourhood. It is decline for the conqueror if the enemy's undertakings flourish; conversely, the decline of the enemy's undertakings is progress for the conqueror. Parity between the two is maintained when both make equal progress (7.12.29).⁶¹

Kautilya also categorises the 'antagonist' on the basis of several factors. He defines an antagonist as one whose kingdom shares a common border

with that of the conqueror. Neighbouring kings who are deemed to be antagonists are of different kinds:⁶²

1. Enemy: a powerful antagonist neighbour [having excellent personal qualities, resources and constituents] is an enemy.
2. Vulnerable adversary: one who is afflicted by a calamity [to one or more of his constituents].
3. Destroyable antagonist: one who is weak or without support.
4. Weakened or harassed: one who has support but can be weakened (6.2.14-19).

To sum up, while war is a relatively frequent phenomenon in the conduct of human affairs, whether one goes to war or not depends on the adversary, and the threat it poses. It is the enemy's disposition that determines the level of threat.

This brings us to the following questions: When, according to Kautilya, is the right use of a state's coercive power? What is its relative utility with regard to an array of other non-violent measures enlisted in the *sadgunya*?

Utility of the Use of Force

With war being seen as a recurrent phenomenon, and some incidences of relationship with the adversary tending towards zero-sum, the resultant strategic culture model seems to be veering towards one of the extreme ideal forms. It assumes 'war is inevitable or extremely frequent; that war is rooted in an enemy predisposed to challenge one's own interests; and that this threat can be handled through the application of superior force.'⁶³ It is essentially in this last link of the trilogy of the central strategic paradigms that Kautilya makes a substantial departure from the extreme ideal form.

In his famous lecture 'Politics as a Vocation' Weber said that, 'truly radical "Machiavellianism", in the popular sense of that word, is classically expressed in Indian literature in the *Arthashastra* of Kautilya; compared to it, Machiavelli's *The Prince* is harmless.'⁶⁴ A political realist typically argues that there will always be conflict in international relations and, therefore, rule by the strongest. Kautilya surely knew the 'utility of the use of force', among several other measures to pursue political goal. But his genius lay in his idea of *raison d'état*: the synthesis of purposive political rationality and political normativity.

To bring out the importance of this duality in the *Arthashastra*, a comparison with the Chinese *Seven Military Classics* would be useful. Johnston contends that it is natural for these military texts to assign greater importance to the use of the military instrument. This emphasis on violence as vital for survival stands in contrast to the Confucian-Mencian notion of internal rectification as the means to deal with external security. In a similar vein, in the Indian context, Roger Boesche argues that the tenets of statecraft used by Kautilya do not necessarily corroborate with those espoused by the Epics. He contends that by using secret agents, assassins, disinformation, and propaganda, Kautilya was ready to use almost any means of violence in fighting a war, and much of this advice violated the tacit code of war found in the great Indian epics.⁶⁵ Appadorai quotes the *Dharamshastra* to prove this point—‘Manu’s *Dharamshastra* categorically stated: “One should not do a good thing by following a bad path.”⁶⁶ The implication here is that the *Arthashastra*, to some extent, lies outside the larger cultural and intellectual tradition of antecedent Hindu texts. According to Giri Deshingkar, ‘ancient Indian thinkers produced two schools of war, diplomacy, and interstate relations: the *dharmayuddha* (*ethical warfare*) school; and the *kutayuddha* (*devious warfare*) school.’⁶⁷ He adds: ‘At the level of rhetoric, the concept of *dharmayuddha* always reigned supreme. But in practice *kutayuddha* was often the norm.’⁶⁸ He also points to a strong ‘religious’ base of Indian strategic thought as against the ‘secular’ base of the Chinese.

In response to some of these charges, P.K. Gautam rightly points out that any judgment on Kautilya’s morals should be done in the context of *yogakshema*. Kautilya enjoins the king to adopt policies that would lead the nation-state to *vriddhi* and avoid those that result in *kshya*.⁶⁹ This is his *Rajdharma*. To elucidate, he quotes Gupta: ‘It is important to remember that *dharma* in the literature of *Arthashastra* usually refers to *rajdharma*—that is, the dharma of the king, and not to dharma as a whole. *Rajdharma* is essentially confined to the political domain in which the prescription of righteousness applicable to the individual does not apply in the same manner.’⁷⁰ On the break with the *dharamshastras*, Charles Drekmeier contends: ‘Whereas the *dharamshastras* considered government and political process with reference to the ideals expressed in the Vedic canon, the largely secular analysis of *Arthashastra* treats this subject more objectively.’⁷¹

The *Arthashastra* is evidently against the reckless use of force. It

advocates desisting from war if disputes can be settled through alternate means; military force is clearly the *ultima ratio*. The preference for minimally violent stratagems as against military force is most succinctly depicted in the following sutra:

An archer letting off an arrow may or may not kill a single man, but a wise man using his intellect can kill even reaching into the very womb (10.6.51).⁷²

One should neither submit spinelessly nor sacrifice oneself in foolhardy valour. It is better to adopt such policies as would enable one to survive and live to fight another day (7.15.13–20, 12.1.1–9)⁷³.

Kautilya's *Arthashastra* therefore advocates that war (in terms of use of forceful military power) is to be undertaken as the last resort, after having done the calculations, tried covert and clandestine methods to weaken the enemy, and having satisfied himself that he is superior to the enemy in all essential respects. This essentially translates into a minimal use of violence as the enemy has already been drawn towards the verge of defeat through other means. This resonates with a comment in one of the Seven Military Classics: 'First achieve victory and only then go to war.'⁷⁴

This throws light on an important question: Does the use of non-violent stratagems which bring about confusion, weakening, and the diminution of the enemy be considered under the rubric of 'force' or not? Does the preference for these strategies really mean the preference for non-violent strategies? Or, are they just different means of pursuing violence?

The answers to these questions are found in the text itself. 'Use of force is capturing the enemy by means of open, deceptive or secret war, or by using the methods suggested for capturing a fort' (7.6.3–8).⁷⁵ Rangarajan contends that war against an enemy is defined broadly by Kautilya and is not limited to only physical warfare. He draws our attention to *mantrayuddha* or 'war by counsel'—meaning the exercise of diplomacy. Kautilya's *Arthashastra* also makes a reference to, *upajapa* or 'psychological warfare', and *gudayuddha* or 'clandestine war', which is using covert methods to achieve the objective without actually waging a battle—usually by assassinating the enemy.⁷⁶

To conclude, one may argue that in a constantly changing conflict situation, with identities of states in the *mandala* swiftly transforming, a strategist must be prepared to adapt to dangers and opportunities that suddenly appear. For such a situation, Kautilya has laid down a number of military and non-military strategies to respond flexibly to the enemy,

and thus create conditions for victory. The preference for non-military strategies is sufficiently validated in the text. Also, it is the welfare of his subjects too, and not the augmentation of the state's power alone that drives the king's decision to go to war, harbour hostility or make peace with his adversary, or use military and non-military measures in carrying out his duty.

Grand Strategy

The central heuristics outlined above in isolation have no meaning. They are to be seen conjointly with the grand strategic preferences gleaned from the 'object of analysis.' For a single strategic culture to exist in any society, the two ought to be congruent. Identifying a grand strategic preference ranking which flows logically from the central assumptions is an important step in the research process. This step is crucial also because it helps operationalise the central paradigm thereby making it empirically testable.

Concept and Typology

It is important to first explicate the term 'grand strategy', and thereafter devise a working typology which encapsulates the many dimensions of the term in a workable, effective manner. The term 'grand strategy' here is inclusively understood to mean 'the combination of national resources and capabilities—military, diplomatic, political, economic, cultural and moral—that are deployed in the service of national security.'⁷⁷ A study of the evolution of the concept suggests that a grand strategy, operating at a higher level, is an expansion of the traditional connotation of the word 'strategy' in four important ways.

1. It expands strategy beyond military means to include economic, diplomatic, social, cultural, informational, etc.
2. It includes considerations of the period of peacetime along with wartime.
3. It takes into account both the internal and external components of national security.
4. It incorporates relative gains and the effect the grand strategy would have on other states into its calculations.

Interestingly, Kautilya deals with the concept of grand strategy (without using the term) as a central theme of his treatise, incorporating each of the above-mentioned factors in a manner that lays bare the

combinatorial possibilities of grand strategic profiles. The Kautilyan theory of state clearly envisions its end goal, and optimally employs all resources available to achieve it.

An important concept which has been used extensively by Kautilya to facilitate this endgoal was the concept of *yogakshema*—which, as an umbrella concept, ensured the stability of the state. *Yogakshema* is not to be understood only as conquest of territory or expansion of the state. It has other aspects of the acquisition (not only by force, but other entrepreneurial means as well) of both material and non-material (spiritual as well as other intangibles) goods for the people; and their protection (*rakshana*).⁷⁸ This integration of two fundamental goals of maintaining and expanding the power of the state and ensuring the welfare and security of the people, sets this work apart from the essentialism of a realist framework of grand strategy. For the realists, the most important elements of a state's foreign policy are comprehensible in terms of only one goal—security.

The conceptual foundation of Kautilya's theory of state and statecraft (with respect to domestic as well as foreign policy) is the *saptanga* theory. In Books VI and VIII of the *Arthashastra*, Kautilya expounds the *saptanga* theory which refers to the seven 'constituents' or 'state factors'. The seven *prakritis* (constituents) are:

1. *swami*: the ruler
2. *amatya*: the Minister [government and administration]
3. *janapada*: territory and the people
4. *durga*: the fortress⁷⁹
5. *kosa*: the treasury [economy]
6. *danda*: armed might
7. *mitra*: the ally [in foreign policy]

The *saptanga* theory means that state power is an aggregate of the material and non-material variables which can be adequately assessed and evaluated. It, therefore, represents a holistic and comprehensive concept of national power. This concept is intrinsically linked to the *sadgunya* cluster which outlines the six methods of foreign policy to be adopted. The seven parameters of the *saptanga* theory provide objective and substantive criteria for making a sound assessment of the correlation of forces between competing or adversary states, and deciding on the course of action in foreign policy:

1. Peace: the rival state is stronger, and will remain so in the foreseeable future.
2. War: the rival is vastly inferior in power.
3. Neutrality: the correlation of forces is balanced.
4. Coercive diplomacy: one's own power is rising vis-à-vis the rival state.
5. Alliance building: the rival state's power is rising faster than one's own.
6. Diplomatic double game: the constellation among rivals and allies is highly fluid.⁸⁰

The *sadgunya* cluster can be understood as a continuum of which peace and war are the poles. According to Kautilya, the conduct of foreign policy is restricted to a fixed array of policy options. Further, the concept cluster *upayas* (not original to Kautilya) were the four basic principles of political action which guided the selection of the foreign policy. The four *upayas* (*saman* or conciliation, *dana* or gifts, *bheda* or dissension, *danda* or the use of force) were ranked; its criterion being the 'amount of effort necessary'⁸¹ to enforce one's will on the other.

Kautilya's *Arthashastra* clearly states the fundamental objective of the *vijigisu* (ruler); it identifies crucial constituent elements (both internal and external) which together symbolise comprehensive national power and provide the necessary resources to attain the objective; it outlines the various methods by which foreign policy can be conducted (after due consideration of the strength of the constituent elements, and the amount of risk involved); and it lays down various factors to be considered at the operational and tactical level.

A working typology to order the grand strategic predilections becomes imperative to arrive at a preference ranking. The range of options available to the decision maker is categorised and ranked in a manner that is reflective of the strategic culture.

Johnston attempts to categorise grand strategy in such a way that (a) the distinction between types, while perhaps blurred at the margins, is generally clear and exclusive, and (b) all or most plausible politico-military behaviours are included such that the typology is generally exhaustive.⁸² He proposes three types of grand strategy.⁸³

1. *Accommodationist*: This strategy relies primarily on diplomacy, political trading, economic incentives, and other strategies that

aim at influencing the adversary's behaviour through compromise and concession.

2. *Defensive*: This grand strategy is more coercive in nature than an accommodationist strategy. It relies on static defence along an external boundary. It captures the notion of deterrence through denial or limited punishment. Security is strengthened through internal mobilisation and the augmentation of resources.
3. *Offensive/Expansionist*: This strategy is highly coercive, relying primarily on the offensive, preventive, pre-emptive, or predominantly punitive uses of military force beyond immediate borders. The strategic goal behind the use of military force is total military victory and the political destruction of the adversary, including the annexation of at least some territory.⁸⁴

While this categorisation proposed by Johnston seems to fit the criteria for both an exhaustive and clear cut ranked preference ranking, the omission of political goals or explicit ends within its ambit does put it at variance with grand strategy dealt with in the *Arthashastra*. In the text, grand strategy, involving the coordinated application of military, economic and diplomatic means subsumes assumptions about political ends, which provides the justification for the coordinated action in the first place. Therefore, Kautilya's *Arthashastra* is a quintessential work of grand strategy, and the 'ends-means relationship seems to be the most appropriate framework'⁸⁵ for its assessment.

Grand Strategic Preferences

The grand strategic categorisation proposed by Johnston seems to fit the Indian context well. The range of strategies mentioned in the text (*sadgunya*) collapse into these three categories of grand strategic choice. The next question to deal with is how these grand strategic choices are ranked in KA and whether the ranking convincingly represents the central assumptions or not. While the text clearly states that going to war as the least preferable option, there are a number of strategies suggested which fall under the 'accommodationist' and 'defensive' categories. Their use in very specific circumstances is prescribed keeping all the logistical and operational factors in mind. Kautilya sets forth the *sadgunya* theory: a state has six policy options for the conduct of its foreign policy—no more, no less. 'These are really six measures, because of differences in the situations', says Kautilya.⁸⁶

Out of the six foreign policy methods suggested, *samdhi* (peace) and *samsraya* (seeking protection when threatened by a stronger king or taking refuge in a fort) clearly belong to the 'accommodationist' category. *Vigraha* (war) is outrightly 'offensive'. *Yana* (augmentation of power) and *dvaiddhibhava* (dual policy) belong to the 'defensive' category. The latter is the policy of making peace with a neighbouring king in order to pursue, with his help, the policy of hostility towards another.⁸⁷ Both these policies relate to the enhancement of state factors (*prakritis*), including through the help of an ally. However, when *yana* and *dvaiddhibhava* are combined with *vigraha*, these policies acquire an offensive orientation. *Asana* (neutrality), which is a method used in connection with both war and peace, does not neatly belong to any one category. Johnston does express the plausibility of a mix of accommodationist and defensive strategies, and defensive and offensive strategies.

The defensive dimension of Kautilyan grand strategy is evident in the inclusion of the *durga* (fort) and *danda* (army) in the seven constituents of the state. Of these, *durga* is more important, and is placed earlier than *danda* in the list of *prakritis* (6.1.1). The importance given to a good defence strategy is laid out in the following sutras:

Therefore, he should raise troops keeping in mind 'The enemy has these troops; for them these would be counter-troops.' ... That with elephants, machines and carts at the centre, equipped with lances, javelins, spears, reeds and arrows, is a counter-force against elephant divisions.⁸⁸

... Thus he should carry out the raising of troops so as to withstand enemy troops, in conformity with the strength of his own troops, (and) in accordance with the various types of divisions (that may be necessary).⁸⁹

According to Kautilya, making peace includes a variety of objectives: (i) it enables a king to enjoy the fruits of his own acquisition, and promote the welfare and development of his state without intervening in any conflict in his neighbourhood; (ii) a king may use a peace treaty to strengthen alliances; (iii) he may purchase peace by giving a hostage, and await a favourable opportunity for pursuing his own interests; (iv) he may use it as one arm of a dual policy.⁹⁰

Among the three *shaktis—utsaha*, the energy, bravery, personal drive of the king, *prabhava*, material resources consisting of the treasury and army, and *mantra*, good counsel and diplomacy—Kautilya regards *mantrashakti* as the most important. Also, of the four *upayas* which are

mentioned alongside the six policies, Kangle finds something in common between *saman* and *samdhi*, and between *danda* and *vigraha* combined with *yana*.⁹¹ If there is indeed an overlapping between the *sadgunya* and the *upayas*, and the latter are known to be clearly ranked, *samdhi* emerges as a preferred strategy.

The preference given to accommodationist and defensive strategies over the offensive is in line with the central paradigm which considers the use of force as the last resort. Therefore, the grand strategic preference ranking seems to emanate logically from the central strategic paradigm outlined in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*. It can be presented as the following.

1. Preference to defusing security threats through moral rectification and externally through diplomatic strategy, pacification, trade and tributary relations, etc.
2. Next best is to rely on slightly more coercive but defensive grand strategy. This could involve static defence measures like fort-building, enhanced armed preparedness, etc.
3. The least-preferred way of dealing with a security threat is to use coercive offensive measures which would bring about the political and military destruction of the enemy.

CONCLUSION

It can be argued that the two components of strategic culture—that is, the central strategic paradigm and the grand strategic preference ranking—as discerned from KA exist as clear sets, and are congruent with each other. Interestingly, we observe that the process of arriving at a grand strategy as explicated in the *Arthashastra* is akin to a structural-realist model. It is a defining feature of the structural model to make calculations of the expected utility of different strategies in the light of the available resources and capabilities. The question then arises how are the predictions made by strategic-cultural model different from the ones derived from a structural-realist one? This is precisely the concern which theorisation in the field of strategic culture aims to address.

It is important to mention here that, in Kautilya's scheme of things, the objective indicators (military capabilities, relative strength, economic resources, internal cohesion, etc.) are viewed in conjunction with a highly normative dimension—the welfare of the people. This normative element is not rhetorical, as is observed by Johnston in the case of the Confucian-Mencian strategic discourse in Ming China. The normative

and ethical logic of the text is enshrined in the concept of *rajdharma*, which is essentially *dharma* in the context of the political sphere. It is this moralism that acts as a fine filter to realist calculations, thereby highlighting the potentially independent, explanatory capability of a cultural variable.

Therefore, strategic culture as deduced from the *Arthashastra* is not unaffected by objective factors. In fact, a scientific method of enquiry of the objective conditions is itself an inalienable part of the strategic culture. This implies an element of dynamism inherent in the concept. However, there is a set of core philosophical and ethical principles that are deeply embedded in the political culture and are less resistant to change. These constrain the effect that the environmental factors have on a nation's security policy. Put differently, the locus of strategic decisions is rooted in the strategic culture which subsumes the structure and lends meaning to it.

This article has attempted to establish that the central heuristics and the accompanying ranked preferences deduced from KA, a text representative of a formative period of the development of Indian strategic thought, are compatible through the object of analysis. However, the utility of strategic culture can be proven only when it is shown to have a substantial effect on strategic behaviour. The grand strategic choices of a nation's decision elite should be consistent with the behaviour predicted by the strategic-culturally derived preference ranking. The proposed last step of the research process is to assess India's foreign/security policy in the light of the Kautilyan underpinnings of Indian strategic culture.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Colonel (Retd.) Pradeep Gautam and Dr Saurabh Mishra for their invaluable guidance on understanding the purport of Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, as well as the organisers of the seminar, 'Exploring the Roots of India's Strategic Culture', 5 October 2017, held at the IDSA.

NOTES

1. Nehru's ideas presented here are summed up in Subrata K. Mitra and Michael Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra, An Intellectual Portrait: Classical Roots of Modern Politics in India*, Germany: Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2016, p. 173.

2. Analogy borrowed from Bharat Karnad's, 'An Elephant with a Small Footprint': The Realist Roots of India's Strategic Thoughts and Policies', in *India's Grand Strategy, History, Theory, Cases*; see also, Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit, V. Krishnappa (eds), *War and International Politics in South Asia*, Routledge, 2014, p. 200.
3. Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. The central idea of the book was first published in the form of an article, 'Thinking about Strategic Culture', *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring 1995, pp. 32–64.
4. Translations of the Text by R.P. Kangle and L.N. Rangarajan have been used for the study. Their elucidation of key concepts from their respective foci has helped in understanding the text more comprehensively.
5. Strategic culture for Johnston is ranked grand strategic preferences derived from central paradigmatic assumptions about the nature of conflict and the enemy, and collectively shared by decision makers.
6. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, n. 3, p. 5. According to Johnston, these generations are roughly temporal in sequence, though there is some overlap. Some of the literature that belongs conceptually to the first generation appeared after the emergence of the second generation.
7. Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, footnote 1, p. 129.
8. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, n. 3, p. 37.
9. Ibid.
10. Colin S. Gray, 'National Style in Strategy: The American Example', *International Security*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Fall 1981, p. 22.
11. See Colin S. Gray, 'National Style in Strategy: The American Example', n. 10, pp. 21–47; Colin S. Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, Lanham, Maryland: Hamilton, 1986; David R. Jones, 'Soviet Strategic Culture', in Carl G. Jacobsen, (ed.), *Strategic Power USA/USSR*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, pp. 35–49; Carnes Lord, 'American Strategic Culture', *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1985, pp. 269–93; and William Kincaid, 'American National Style and Strategic Culture,' in Jacobsen, *Strategic Power USA/USSR*, pp. 10–34.
12. The debate is specifically addressed in Stuart Poore, 'What is the Context? A Reply to the Gray– Johnston Debate on Strategic Culture', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29, 2003, pp. 279– 84; David Haglund, 'What Good is Strategic Culture?: A Modest Defence of an Immodest Concept', *International Journal*, Vol. 59, No. 3, Summer 2004, pp. 479–501.

13. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, n. 3, p. 13.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 14.
16. Colin S. Gray, 'Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation Strikes Back', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1, January 1999, p. 49.
17. Ibid., pp. 49–69.
18. Ibid., p. 50.
19. Johnston, cited in Colin S. Gray, 'Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation Strikes Back', n. 16, p. 54.
20. Gray, 'Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation Strikes Back', n. 16, p. 49.
21. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, n. 3, p. 1.
22. Ibid., p. ix.
23. Ibid., p. 18.
24. Ashley J. Tellis, 'Overview', in Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills (eds), *Strategic Asia 2016-17: Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific*, Seattle and Washington DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, p. 7.
25. Colin S. Gray, 'In Praise of Strategy', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2, April 2003, p. 292.
26. Rodney W. Jones, 'India's Strategic Culture', Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 31 October 2006, available at <https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/india.pdf>, accessed on 25 June 2018.
27. Kanti Bajpai, 'Indian Strategic Culture', in Kanti P. Bajpai and Harsh V. Pant (ed.), *India's Foreign Policy: A Reader*, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 85.
28. See Shrikant Paranjpe, *India's Strategic Culture: The Making of National Security Policy*, New Delhi: Routledge, 2013.
29. See Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, 'Of Oral Traditions and Ethnocentric Judgements', in Kanti P. Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo (eds), *Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice, Essays by George K. Tanham with Commentaries*, New Delhi: Manohar, 1996, pp. 174–90.
30. Manjeet Singh Pardesi, 'Deducing India's Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives', Working Paper 076, Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, April 2005.
31. See Rashed Uz Zaman, 'Kautilya: The Indian Strategic Thinker and Indian Strategic Culture', *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 25, pp. 231–47, 2006.

32. See Bharat Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy*, New Delhi: Macmillan, 2005.
33. Shivshankar Menon, 'Keynote Address', in P.K. Gautam, Saurabh Mishra and Arvind Gupta (eds), *Indian Historical Knowledge: Kautilya and His Vocabulary*, Vol. 1, New Delhi: IDSA and Pentagon Press, 2015. Also see, Shivshankar Menon, *Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy*, New Delhi: Penguin, 2016.
34. Shyam Saran, *How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century*, New Delhi: Juggernaut, 2017.
35. Liebig and Mitra, *Kautilya's Arthashastra, An Intellectual Portrait*, n. 1.
36. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, n. 3, p. 40.
37. Ibid., p. 45.
38. Karnad, n. 32, p. 10.
39. Upinder Singh, 'Politics, Violence and War in Kamandaka's *Nitisara*', *The Indian Economic and Social History Review*, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2010, pp. 29–62.
40. Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra, An Intellectual Portrait*, n. 2, p. 37.
41. Karnad, n. 32, p. 3.
42. L.N. Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1987, p. 546.
43. Ibid.
44. P.K. Gautam, 'Overcoming the Ways of Matsya-Nyaya', *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 37, No.5, pp. 521–25.
45. Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra, An Intellectual Portrait*, n. 2, p. 132.
46. Ibid.
47. P.K. Gautam, *Understanding Dharma and Artha in Statecraft through Kautilya's 'Arthashastra'*, IDSA Monograph Series, No. 53, July 2016, p. 9.
48. S. Radhakrishnan defines *dharma* as 'a code of conduct' supported by the general conscience of the people. It is not subjective in the sense that the conscience of the individual imposes it, nor external in the sense that the law enforces it. Dharma does not force men into virtue but trains them for it. It is not a fixed code of mechanical rules, but a living spirit which grows and moves in response to the development of society, see, *The Heart of Hinduism*, Madras, 1936, pp. 17–18, as quoted by P.K. Gautam, *Understanding Dharma and Artha in Statecraft through Kautilya's 'Arthashastra'*, n. 47, p. 14.
49. Kaushik Roy, *Hinduism and the Ethics of Warfare in South Asia: From*

- Antiquity to the Present*, New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 4.
50. Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra, An Intellectual Portrait*, n. 1, p. 134.
51. R. P. Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra Part III: A Study*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2014, p. 258.
52. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, n. 3, p. 72
53. Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, n. 42, p. 547.
54. Ibid.
55. Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra, An Intellectual Portrait*, n. 2, p. 61.
56. Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, n. 42, p. 563.
57. Ibid., p. 557.
58. Ibid., p. 552.
59. Ibid., p. 543
60. Ibid., p. 554
61. Ibid., p. 555
62. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, n. 3, p. 106
63. Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation', in W.G. Runciman (ed.), *Weber: Selections in Translation*, Eric Matthews (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 212–25; also see p. 220.
64. Roger Boesche, 'Kautilya's "Arthashastra" on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India', *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 67, No. 1, January 2003, p. 33.
65. A. Appadorai, *National Interest and India's Foreign Policy*, Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1992, as quoted in P. K. Gautam, n. 47, p. 26.
66. Giri Deshingkar, 'Strategic Thinking in Ancient India and China: Kautilya and Sunzi', *China Report*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1996.
67. Ibid.
68. P.K. Gautam, n. 47, p. 26.
69. V.K. Gupta, *Kautilyan Jurisprudence*, New Delhi, p. 1, as quoted in P.K. Gautam, n. 47, pp. 41–42.
70. Charles Drekmeier, *Kingship and Community in Early India*, Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 189, as quoted in Gautam, *Understanding Dharma and Artha in Statecraft through Kautilya's 'Arthashastra'*, n. 47, p. 42.
71. Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, n. 42, p. 675.

72. Ibid., p. 544.
73. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, n. 3, p. 103.
74. Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, n. 42, p. 611.
75. Ibid., p. 676.
76. Bajpai, Basit, and Krishnappa, *War and International Politics in South Asia*, n. 2, p. 1.
77. Excerpt from an email conversation with Dr Saurabh Mishra.
78. The state should have a sufficient number of forts across its territory at strategic locations for ensuring defence against foreign invasions.
79. Michael Liebig and Saurabh Mishra, 'Introduction', in Michael Liebig, Saurabh Mishra (eds), *Arthashastra in a Transcultural Perspective: Comparing Kautilya with Sun Zi, Nizam al-Mulk, Barani and Machiavelli*, New Delhi: IDSA and Pentagon Press, 2017, p. 8.
80. Mitra and Liebig, *Kautilya's Arthashastra, An Intellectual Portrait*, n. 1, p. 136.
81. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, n. 3, p. 112.
82. Johnston discusses typologies offered by Edward Luttwak (*Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, 1987, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press) and Charles A. Kupchan (*The Vulnerability of Empire*, 1994, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). Luttwak suggests two kinds of grand strategy, both of which subsume political goals and grand strategic means under one concept. Johnston points to a problem in Luttwak's typology: it excludes a range of grand strategic means that could, in principle, be used to pursue either grand strategic end (status quo and revisionist). Kupchan identifies three basic strategies: compellence, deterrence, and accommodation. While Kupchan's categorisation seems more satisfying because it includes a wider range of grand strategic choices, and because it does not limit specific choices to specific state goals, Johnston does not find the distinction between compellence and deterrence useful.
83. This useful categorisation has been made by Johnston for his study of Chinese strategic culture.
84. Medha Bisht, 'Arthashastra: Reflections on Thought and Theory', in Michael Liebig and Saurabh Mishra (eds), *Arthashastra in a Transcultural Perspective: Comparing Kautilya with Sun Zi, Nizam al-Mulk, Barani and Machiavelli*, New Delhi: IDSA and Pentagon Press, 2017, p. 197.
85. R.P. Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra Part II*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2010, p. 321.
86. Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, n. 42, p. 549.

87. Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra Part II*, n. 85, pp. 412-13.
88. Ibid.
89. Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, n. 42, p. 548.
90. Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra Part III: A Study*, n. 51, p. 255.