

The Indian Army is primarily structured, equipped and trained to conduct high intensity conventional operations. Strategic policy formulation, planning, force structure, equipment acquisition and training are geared primarily for safeguarding the territorial integrity of the nation against external threats. However, owing to the rapidly changing security environment, the role assignment of Indian troops has undergone substantial changes.

The ever increasing requirement of troops in low intensity conflict operations has become a regular feature, resulting in constant and prolonged deployments.

Low intensity conflict operations and proxy wars have put tremendous professional and psychological pressures on military leaders and troops. Therefore, the importance of sustaining the motivation level and morale of troops in these circumstances, assumes added significance, which if not addressed in right earnest, can well manifest in the form of stress, tension, frustration, anger, and cumulatively result in below par performance as a combat outfit.



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SUSTAINING MOTIVATION

in

Sub-Conventional Warfare

K.C. Dixit



Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
New Delhi

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K. C. Dixit



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Introduction

Motivation is the most commonly used term to explain why a person responds under different sets of circumstances as he does. Although, the level of understanding of motivation in army has improved considerably in the past few decades, yet there are a significant number of leaders who still hold the conservative beliefs on how their subordinates want to contribute on a task / role.¹ They still tend to view motivation as a 'carrot-and-stick' process.² This does not stand to test with new generation.

Morale and motivation are closely linked. It is morale that leads to motivation. While morale is measure of happiness in the work environment, motivation is the measure of adequacy of incentive for performance on task(s). Typically, a salary is a good motivation but being paid well leads to higher morale. Morale is also defined as the enthusiasm and persistence with which a member of a group engages in the prescribed activities of that group.³ In the military milieu, morale and motivation are frequently used interchangeably. However, morale highlights the condition of the group (or the unit), while motivation describes principally the attitude of an individual.⁴

Soldier is a pious concept. A soldier accepts leadership, familiarisation and cohesiveness as his fundamental assets. It is motivation that drives a soldier to do what his leader wants him to do willingly. Operational fatigue, hardships and danger to own life and limb do not stop or slow down a motivated soldier. Motivation emanates from within the individual but its arousal depends on many factors which are not always within individual's control. How and when a soldier will behave, would depend on the stimulus provided to him by the environment as well as the inner state.

It is not just the numerical superiority of manpower, weapons or

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1. Jagdish Singh, 'An Empirical Study of Motivation in the Indian Air Force', *Journal of Defence Studies*, Vol 3. No. 4, October 2009, p.137.
 2. Ibid, p.137.
 3. Frederick J. Maning, 'Morale, Cohesion and Espirit de Corps', in Reuven Gal and David A. Mangelsdorff (ed.), *Handbook of Military Psychology*, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, England, 1991, p.445.
 4. Reuven Gal, 'Morale: From a Theoretical Puzzle to an Empirical Illustration An Israeli Example', *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, Vol. 6, No. 6, 1986, p.550.

equipments but the motivation of troops by highly motivated leadership that is bound to bring about the desired results. Sustenance of motivation of personnel is therefore, an important pre-requisite in sub-conventional operations.

Most complicated and most ancient machines which operate all the other machines in new wars are the men.⁵ Therefore, a study of factors affecting security forces personnel operating in sub-conventional warfare environment is a unique experience since it can lead to enhanced morale of troops at critical junctures, snatching victory from defeat in a difficult situation. As sub-conventional warfare requirements are different from conventional warfare, these have to be addressed appropriately with a view to derive optimum performance from security forces personnel in such an environment. Sub-conventional operations are often protracted and exert a lot of psychological pressure on men.⁶ Troops trained in conventional warfare experience significant stress in sub-conventional operations like low intensity conflict, counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist operations.⁷ Conventional military training makes a soldier think in clear cut extremes like black and white, friend and foe etc. This tendency often leads to situations where concept of enemy can not be applied to one's own people.⁸

Indian Army is primarily structured, equipped and trained to conduct high intensity conventional operations. Strategic policy formulation, planning, force structure, equipment acquisition and training are geared primarily for safe-guarding the territorial integrity of nation against external threat. However, owing to rapidly changing security environment, the role assignment of Indian troops has undergone substantial changes. The ever increasing requirement of troops in low intensity conflict operations has become a regular feature, resulting in constant and prolonged deployments. Low intensity conflict operations and proxy war have put tremendous professional and psychological pressures on military leaders and troops.⁹

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5. K. N. Jagdishchandran, 'Psychological Factors Affecting Soldiers in War', *Combat Journal*, August, 1989, p. 55.
 6. D.S. Goel, 'Psychological Aspects of Counter-insurgency Operations', *Combat Journal*, 1998, pp. 43-48.
 7. A. Ray, 'Psychology of Militancy', *Kashmir Diary*, Delhi, Manas Publications, 1997.
 8. D.S. Goel, no. 6, pp. 43-48.
 9. P. Badrinath, 'Psychological Impact of Protracted Service in Low Intensity Conflict Operations on Armed Forces Personnel', *USI Journal*, volume CXXXIII, no. 551, January - March 2003, pp. 37-38.

Therefore, the importance of sustaining the motivation level and morale of troops in these circumstances, assumes added significance, which if not addressed in right earnest, can well manifest in the form of stress, tension, frustration, anger and cumulatively result in below par performance as a combat outfit.

Indian Army has kept insurgencies under control. The ongoing proxy war in J&K, insurgencies in the northeast and the activities of Pakistan's ISI have kept India politically embroiled, economically burdened and militarily committed. The situation signifies operational and attitudinal challenges for an army organised and equipped to ward off external threats. Emergence of India as an economic power in the global arena has led to additional responsibility on the army. Army as an effective instrument of national power can live up to the aspirations of nation, if and only if, its soldiers continue to remain highly motivated to carry out assigned tasks.

In this backdrop, it is imperative that the peculiarities of the operating environment, its related effect on the behaviour and thinking of troops and measures required to be initiated by concerned agencies to sustain and enhance the motivational level of troops, are well understood and applied. Such an understanding will allow the military leaders to utilise most efficiently, the diverse talents among their subordinates. It is essential that military leaders become intelligent consumers of response/ need data, so that they function from a position of strength instead of a position of uncertainty / ignorance.

This paper is an attempt to understand the peculiarities of the operational environment in sub-conventional warfare scenario in Indian context, factors affecting the psychology and motivation of security forces personnel and finally recommend measures which need to be taken at various levels by concerned agencies to sustain and enhance the motivational level of troops.

Peculiarities of Operational Environment

The environmental factors which have a direct bearing on thinking and behaviour of troops deployed in sub-conventional warfare environment and ultimately affect their motivation, are product of a complex interplay of three elements viz the populace, the militant/ insurgent and the soldier.¹⁰

A general sense of insecurity among the public exists in the insurgency / militancy affected areas. The anti-social / anti-national elements resort to variety of ways and means to coerce, intimidate and scare the public, which in many cases leads to silent sufferings, unwilling obedience and migration. Unless the sense of security is ensured by the government, the populace is likely to fall prey to the designs of the insurgents / militants.¹¹ The local population tends to think that they have been wronged by the administration and tend to look at militant as their own boy fighting for a just cause, and security forces as the long and cruel hands of the administration, particularly when there are human rights violations. Propaganda by neighbouring countries and international agencies may further alienate the local population. In such circumstances, troops often from a different cultural milieu, who are looked upon as outsiders, are called upon to restore the deteriorating situations. Deliberate actions have to be taken by the military leadership to maintain their troops at desired levels of motivation in such an environment.

There is an overpowering cult of the gun and defiance of authority. The insurgents/ militants having acquired sophisticated and lethal weapons, by establishing nexus with powers inimical to the state, commit unimaginable inhuman crimes to intimidate the populace and undermine the authority of the government. In the absence of concrete intelligence about militants' modus operandi, knowledge of own concepts/ plans and necessary training to counter militants actions, the troops morale is bound to get adversely affected.

10. A. Ray, no. 7.

11. S. Chaudhury, 'Psychological Effects of Low Intensity Conflict Operations', Indian Journal of Psychiatry, 2006, pp. 223-231.

The security forces personnel end up fighting an elusive enemy, in the absence of any reliable intelligence and lack of cooperation of local population. Ambiguity of aim, lack of visible success and disproportionately high casualty rates tend to erode morale among security forces.¹² It is an important function of command to restore confidence of troops by keeping them well informed, and clearing all foreseeable doubts at the earliest available opportunity, in order to retain their fighting/sustaining capacity in the battlefield environment of the present and foreseeable future.

Insurgents /militants aim at inducing fear in the minds of police and paramilitary personnel through intimidation, lynching and other forms of retribution. This coupled with inadequate equipment and training of these forces, has adverse effect on their morale and efficiency. Traditional law and order police force lacks adequate combat potential to deal with such adversary.¹³ Besides training, other factors responsible for ineffective police response are lack of political will /policy, lack of effective leadership and inherent drawback /limitations of state police forces.¹⁴ As a result of these inadequacies, their credibility gets eroded, leading to loss of trust and confidence of the populace in their capabilities. Own forces need to understand these weaknesses and utilise their expertise and experience suitably.

Print and electronics media play a vital role in low intensity conflict and counter-insurgency operations. The media explosion of recent times is not just a theoretical factor any more. The very fact that a few million pairs of eyes all over the country and many more abroad are privy to each and every action of the security forces, whether under duress or otherwise, can be unsettling.¹⁵ This continuous glare of media puts caution to every action and decision by military leaders and troops. Though this is not an unusual phenomenon in an insurgency environment; the media seems to highlight such incidents with consequent adverse effect on the morale of the soldiers and the image of the army. More often than not, the army's point of view fails to attract same attention and publicity vis-à-vis a damaging report in the

12. D.S. Goel, no. 6, pp. 43-48

13. Om Shankar Jha, 'Combating Left Wing Extremism: Is Police Training Lacking', IDSA Occasional Paper No. 3, IDSA, New Delhi, June 2009, p. 7.

14. Ibid, p.7.

15. P. Badrinath, no. 9, pp. 41-42.

media even if it is yet to be proved. Truthful coverage of events is desirable to prevent panic or distortion of facts. Therefore, local media being a potent weapon in the hands of militants to discredit the army tends to impose undue caution on operations by the troops and thus affects the morale of troops adversely.

The politicians have a big role to play in militancy prone areas as they are capable of moulding the public opinion to a great extent. The growth of political systems has a direct bearing on the growth of insurgency. If the bulk of the people feel that they can live as decent human beings, can have land and homes, and will be protected by a strong and just government, they will have no reason to cooperate with insurgents.¹⁶ Political masters must understand that employment of army, at best, can only contain insurgency, but can never resolve it.

The growth of insurgency is directly attributable to the incapability of established political systems to meet the aspirations of the people which can be exploited by a few disgruntled as viewed from one side of the hill, or, patriotic leaders as viewed from other side of the hill. The general socio-economic conditions prevailing in such areas need greater attention of the civil administration of the state. At no stage, the authority of the government should be allowed to erode, to prevent the writ of the militants becoming supreme. However, the established governments fail to deliver due to lack or absence of cooperation amongst various agencies. Security forces employed in containing insurgency can not remain silent spectators to socio-economic developments, particularly in the under-developed areas. Regular efforts by the civil administration for development of the society are essential to ensure bolstering of their morale and maintenance of law and order by the security forces personnel.

Upholding and maintaining the laws of the land have to be the uppermost priority of security forces operating in sub-conventional warfare environment. The militants, who survive on the local population, have to be isolated or weaned away. The government enacts special laws, giving essential authority to the armed forces engaged in tackling the militancy situation. Even after deployment of the armed forces, the civil power

16. G.B. Reddi, 'Some Reflections on Approach to Counter-insurgency', *Combat Journal*, April 1989, p. 23.

continues to function, thereby implying that while upholding the above principle, all actions of the armed forces must contribute to strengthening of the hands of the state government.¹⁷ At the same time, government has to be strong enough to prevent falling prey to subversive designs of local press and other vested interests exerting constant pressures to dilute authorities given to security forces.

The concept of operations hinges on occupation of sensitive areas based on intelligence inputs. Retaining of adequate reserves at the sub-unit or unit levels for quick reaction is vital for success. In low intensity conflict scenario, there is a disproportionate requirement of resources in terms of troops, equipment and finance as compared to that of the insurgents. The areas where such operations are conducted usually lack the requisite infrastructure to absorb the increasing number of security forces personnel likely to be deployed.¹⁸

17. Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Army), 'Doctrine for Sub - Conventional Operations', HQ Army Training Command, Shimla, India, first edition, December 2006, p. 15.

18. Based on interaction with officers and men deployed in counter-insurgency environment in J & K.

Factors Affecting Motivation in Sub-Conventional Warfare

A soldier's motivation is a combination of desire and energy directed at achieving a goal. Influencing a soldier's motivation means getting him to do what must be done. Like any one else, a soldier's motivation also depends on the strength of certain needs and the perception that taking a certain action will help satisfy those needs. The soldiers also can be motivated by such forces as beliefs, values, interests, fear and worthy causes. Some of these forces are internal, such as needs, interests and beliefs. Others are external, such as danger, the environment or pressure. There is no simple formula for motivation you must keep an open viewpoint on human nature. There is a complex array of forces steering the direction of each soldier and these forces can not always be seen or studied. In addition, if same forces are steering two different people, each one may act differently.¹⁹ Knowing that each person may react to different needs will guide leader's decisions and actions in certain situations, since it is the leader who has the power to influence motivation.

The factors which tend to impact motivation of troops deployed in low intensity conflict and counter-insurgency operations have been derived from the analysis of response to questionnaire consisting of 38 questions. Response to questionnaire was obtained by the author through interaction during a field trip, with a sample size of 1085 consisting of 60 officers, 145 junior commissioned officers (JCOs) and 880 other uniformed soldiers deployed in counter-insurgency and high altitude areas in J&K. The questionnaire along with response is attached as ANNEXURE I to this paper. These factors are direct implications of peculiarities of such warfare and therefore, considered relevant and important. These factors have also been reconfirmed by sending the same questionnaire to 30 randomly picked up army officers separately. The confirmatory questionnaire along with responses is attached as ANNEXURE II to this paper. The responses of officers to confirmatory questionnaire have corroborated the findings. Let us analyse these factors in the light of responses to the questionnaire.

19. "Motivation & Leadership", <http://www.skagitwatershed.org/~donclark/leader/leadmot.html> (Accessed December 28, 2009).

Commitment

Indian soldier's commitment to nation is 100 per cent. This is clear from the negative response by all 1085 respondents to their willingness to compromise territory in bargain for peace with our hostile neighbours.²⁰ Response to 'who is your ideal motivator?' was a mixed one. While 42 per cent felt that their buddy was their ideal motivator, 38 per cent voted in favour of their family.²¹ Out of the remaining, 12 per cent felt their leader to be ideal motivator and eight per cent voted in favour of their own pride. When questioned about maximum strength provider in difficult situation, 84 per cent responded in favour of their God, 12 per cent for their leader, two per cent for their family and two per cent for their buddy.²² Response to 'who makes them risk their life in operations the most' was in favour of unit's pride by 78 per cent and four per cent voted in favour of their own pride. Nine per cent responded equally in favour of their leader and family.²³ This reconfirms that Indian Army is ethos-based and its soldiers take pride in the name and fame of their unit, dignity of their family, faith in God and respect for their leaders and fellow soldiers. However, materialistic needs due to comparison with civilian counterparts with similar or less stringent service conditions are affecting the behaviour of soldiers. This is evident from the response that 77 per cent of them joined army either to earn their livelihood or pay or pension and only 23 per cent responded to have joined the army either to live a life of honour or to serve motherland.²⁴

Cooperation from Civil Authority

Absence of clear-cut political directions in such type of warfare makes the task of army more difficult, leaving it to them to evolve their own aim, concept and plans to achieve the desired results. Most of the junior leaders expressed that commanders at each level must understand these critical issues and keep the troops fully informed. Response to adequacy of cooperation from civil administration, civil police, local politicians and local population was far from encouraging. 92 per cent troops felt that adequate cooperation from local public, bureaucracy, local politicians and even from

20. Refer response to question at serial number 33 of ANNEXURE I.

21. Refer response to serial number 1 of ANNEXURE I.

22. Refer serial number 28 of ANNEXURE I.

23. Refer serial number 33 of ANNEXURE I.

24. Refer response to question at serial number 5 of ANNEXURE I.

local police are not forthcoming in the initial stages of deployment.²⁵

Media Effect

Media is a potent weapon in the hands of militants to discredit the army, thereby imposing great caution on operations by the troops. Therefore, there is a need to train military leaders in handling media and adopting an aggressive and pro-active approach. All factual achievements must be reported truthfully.²⁶ 74 per cent respondents felt that local press is pro-militants while 11 per cent expressed that local press is justified. 15 per cent also mentioned that press or media is pro-government.²⁷ Only 16 per cent respondents expressed their satisfaction on handling of media by the army. 84 per cent felt a need for improving handling of media by army in counter-insurgency as well as low intensity conflict environment.²⁸

Difficulty in Identifying Militants/ Intelligence

Identification of militants is extremely difficult, which impacts the psychology of soldiers. This is evident from the fact that 100 per cent respondents felt so.²⁹ This is because militants enjoy either willing or forced public support. It is difficult to sift and isolate or segregate militant(s) from innocent people. The army's own intelligence network down to sub-unit level to obtain actionable information for successful conduct of operations requires a realistic boost.

Lack of timely actionable intelligence in initial stages of deployment of own troops, is an inherent drawback in low intensity conflict operations. At times double agents feed irrelevant or false information which causes confusion and delays in launching of operations. Lack of faith on the intelligence impacts on the performance of security forces personnel. Intelligence is no

25. Based on a survey by the author, in units deployed in counter-insurgency environment during November 2009.

26. More often than not, local press and electronic media tend to ignore the views and efforts of security forces while focusing / highlighting on thinking of extremists / hardliners. This issue emerged clearly during the interaction with officers and men deployed in counter-insurgency areas.

27. Refer response to question at serial number 3 of ANNEXURE I.

28. Refer serial number 11 of ANNEXURE I.

29. Refer response to question at serial number 4 of ANNEXURE I.

longer only a cloak-and-dagger game as is widely perceived.³⁰ Multiplicity of agencies calls for synthesising the desired intelligence inputs for specific operations.

Quick Reactions

Counter-insurgency operations can be very demanding on nerves. For success, an outfit has to be in a position to meet fleeting opportunities head on. The answer lies in maintaining constant state of alert and readiness and ensuring that the level of motivation is at a pitch, where fatigue and sleeplessness have to be subdued. This can have a telling effect on troops and officers alike. 92 per cent respondents were of the view that equal weightage be given in training at training centres and training academies to counter-insurgency (CI) and low intensity conflict (LIC) operations as well as conventional operations. These respondents stressed on the necessity of training for CI and LIC operations by units even in peace tenures, to be able to switch roles with minimum turbulence.³¹ If the junior officers, JCOs and soldiers are trained to become confident in playing their role effectively, their motivation level is bound to be at optimum levels.

Psychological Adaptability of Troops

The operating environment, various constraints and hostility of the populace bewilder a soldier in such an environment, where the soldier finds it difficult to adapt. The open aversion of the public to the security forces affect any one operating in this environment and soldiers are no exception. It is indeed humiliating and exasperating to see the very people whom one is out to protect, turn against the forces.³² 71 per cent respondents admitted that they feel stressed in this type of environment.³³ 64 per cent respondents expressed their ignorance about legal provisions in CI operations.³⁴ 93 per cent respondents admitted that briefing about terrain, militants, causes of insurgency and local population on induction needs improvement. 57 per

30. Balakrishnan Gurumurthy, 'The Challenges for Junior Leaders in the Next Decade', *Journal of the USI of India*, vol. CXXXI, No. 544, April-June 2001, p.248.

31. Refer to response to questions at serial numbers 12 and 13 of questionnaire at ANNEXURE I.

32. P. Badrinath, no. 9, p.43.

33. Refer to response at serial number 35 of questionnaire at ANNEXURE I.

34. Refer to response at serial number 26 of questionnaire at ANNEXURE I.

cent respondents were of the opinion that actions on their feedbacks is found wanting.³⁵

Command & Control, Initiative and Junior Leadership

The concept of operations hinges on occupation of sensitive areas based on intelligence inputs. Retaining of adequate reserves at the sub-unit / unit levels for quick reaction is vital for success. Mobility and good reliable communications are essential. Tactical fighting is mostly at platoon, section and sub-section levels. The junior leaders have to execute assignments independently. 88 per cent respondents felt that JCOs should take more initiative in units.³⁶ 84 per cent respondents were of the view that degree of delegation to junior leaders is unsatisfactory.³⁷ 77 per cent admitted that improvement is needed for creating conducive environment for creative thinking.³⁸ 67 per cent troops expressed that they get pushed beyond a point for glory seeking by superiors.³⁹ The importance of junior leadership, therefore assumes greater significance. This implies that effective command and control mechanisms and junior leadership requirements have to be addressed deliberately to ensure positive impact on the psychology of troops operating in sub-conventional environment. It is the leadership and decision-making at junior levels that would produce desired results.

Minimum Force

The army is organised, designed, equipped and trained to develop its full combat power in a conventional war to deal with external aggression and protect the sovereignty of the nation. Contrary to this, the use of 'minimum force' in such operations restricts the employment and exploitation of its full potential, despite casualties to own troops, at times.

Living Conditions

The living conditions and the transit facilities for troops operating in low intensity conflict and counter-insurgency environment are generally of temporary nature. Indian soldiers are simple rural folk and have negligible

35. Refer serial number 27 of questionnaire at ANNEXURE I.

36. Refer to response at serial number 31 of questionnaire at ANNEXURE I.

37. Refer serial number 14 of questionnaire at ANNEXURE I.

38. Refer serial number 15 of questionnaire at ANNEXURE I.

39. Refer to serial number 18 of questionnaire at ANNEXURE I.

comfort requirements when compared to many other armies of the world.⁴⁰ In many places where troops operate, there is an acute lack of basic amenities like accommodation, sanitation and the like, making living difficult. Regions like J&K as well as north east with their acute and peculiar weather patterns worsen the conditions further. 86 per cent respondents felt that living conditions needed improvement.⁴¹ A soldier operating in such conditions is bound to get psychologically demoralised, if not handled appropriately.

Pressures from Human Rights Organisations

74 per cent respondents admitted that fear of human rights violation while discharging their legitimate duty during operations induces stress and affects their performance.⁴² A soldier finds it quite intriguing when his colleague is shot by a militant, it does not amount to human rights violation, but if a militant is shot by a soldier in certain situation under justifiable circumstances, more often than not, it turns out to be a violation of human rights. The fear of perpetuating a human rights violation and judicial harassment puts restrictions on the actions of men apart from making them vulnerable to militants during operations. Fighting with one hand tied behind the back adds to the pressure on the soldier. A soldier feels handicapped and at times unable to rationalise. Additionally, public glare and media bring in more pressure in such areas.

Miscellaneous Factors

A large number of miscellaneous issues came out during the interaction with officers, JCOs and other ranks which affect the need satisfaction. These included extent of tenure in CI and LIC environment, standard of clothing and equipment, system of carrying mortal remains, system of processing honours and awards, disposal of disciplinary cases, adequacy of manpower in units, preparations and briefing before launching operations and granting of leave. In addition, issues pertaining to existing promotion system, rail

40. But, there may be a misinterpretation — the difference between basic comforts and desirable comforts. Life has changed over the years and so has the threshold of basic living conditions. A telephone, vehicle, refrigerator, TV and the power to run these gadgets are no more a measure of comfort. In fact, these can very well be clubbed under basic amenities, both at home as well as place of work.

41. Refer to response at serial number 32 of questionnaire at ANNEXURE I.

42. Refer to serial number 17 of questionnaire at ANNEXURE I.

travel difficulties, misuse of military uniform by civilian security agencies and financial worries which impact psychology of soldiers were also discussed.

82 per cent respondents were of the view that duration of tenure in CI or LIC environment should not exceed 18 months.⁴³ 74 per cent all ranks felt that Commanding Officer's tenure should be 36 months in such environment.⁴⁴ 87 per cent respondents expressed that standard of clothing or equipment ex-Ordinance channels is unsuitable and of poor quality. 62 per cent troops were in favour of furthering improvement in the existing system of carrying mortal remains of fatal casualties to their respective home towns. 76 per cent respondents felt that existing system of processing honours and awards to deserving personnel needs improvement, being cumbersome and time consuming.⁴⁵

94 per cent respondents admitted that cases of indiscipline take a long time for disposal due to excessive commitments and shortage of officers in the units.⁴⁶ 81 per cent troops felt that leave plan gets disturbed due to inadequate manpower in the units as a result of avoidable excessive holding of PBOR returning from temporary duty / leave by transit camps.⁴⁷

Only 24 per cent troops felt that operations were being launched after adequate briefing and preparations.⁴⁸ With regards to financial burden, 47 per cent respondents felt that cost of higher education of children is unbearable. 26 per cent were of the view that arranging medical treatment of dependants at home was unmanageable since military / government hospitals were far away from their home town / village. 23 per cent admitted that school education of children causes financial burden due to expensive education in good schools.⁴⁹ 95 per cent respondents felt that the promotion system in respect of PBOR be handled by record offices to avoid biases at unit level.

43. Refer to response at serial number 6 to questionnaire at ANNEXURE I.

44. Refer to response at serial number 7 to questionnaire at ANNEXURE I.

45. Refer to responses at serial numbers 8, 9 and 10 to questionnaire at ANNEXURE I.

46. Refer to responses to questions at serial numbers 19 and 20 of ANNEXURE I.

47. Refer to responses at serial numbers 21, 22, 23 and 24 to questionnaire at ANNEXURE I.

48. Refer serial number 16 of questionnaire at ANNEXURE I.

49. Refer serial number 36 of questionnaire at ANNEXURE I.

74 per cent troops expressed their dissatisfaction with regards to rail travel from one duty station to another on posting/ temporary duty or to their home town and back on leave. While 62 per cent respondents were dissatisfied with rail travel since return railway warrant prohibits travel in entitled class during return journey because onward journey was performed in lower class as a result of non availability of reservation in entitled class. 35 per cent troops expressed dissatisfaction with rail travel due to long queue for exchange of warrants.⁵⁰ 100 per cent troops felt that misuse of military uniform by civilian security agencies needs to be stopped by the government as it tends to tarnish soldier's pride.

50. Refer response to questions at serial numbers 37 and 38 of ANNEXURE I.

Recommended Measures to Sustain Motivation of Troops in Sub-conventional Operations

Army has been taking steps to maintain the motivation level of its human resource from time to time. However, it is intended to give impetus to motivation of our troops. The recommended measures are based on the field trip undertaken by the author in units and formations deployed in counter-insurgency and low intensity conflict operations in J&K. Psychological conditioning is a dynamic process and ways and means have to be found to enhance the motivational levels of troops engaged in these difficult operations. Hence, there is a need to improve the methodology of sustaining motivation over a longer period, so as to withstand the pressures prevailing in such an environment. The recommended measures for sustaining motivation of soldiers operating in sub-conventional warfare environment have also been reconfirmed by 30 officers picked up randomly. The feedback on recommended measures to sustain motivation in sub-conventional operations environment is attached as ANNEXURE III to this paper.

Training

Training is closely inter-linked with motivation. A high degree of motivation will demand correspondingly high level of training. This linkage must be clearly understood, in order to keep the motivational level high, at all times. Two major aspects related to training, for combating low intensity conflict, merit consideration. Firstly, even a highly trained soldier would require re-orientation training to take on the ever elusive insurgents, in this game of 'no rules and ethics'. Secondly, there is a requirement to have suitable training infrastructure and environment to hone the skills of a soldier to combat low intensity conflict. Army has been concentrating on training needs of our officers and men. However, there is scope for doing much more for minimising the casualties vis-à-vis militants.

Presently, Counter-Insurgency Jungle Warfare (CIJW) School is the only Category 'A' establishment which imparts training on counter-insurgency operations. This alone does not serve the purpose, as it is basically designed

to cater for operations, generally peculiar to the North East. As regards J&K, corps counter-insurgency schools, on adhoc basis have been established, where training facilities and infrastructure is inadequate. Hence, there is a need to shed the attitude of adhocism and evolve a comprehensive and long term approach to address our training requirements.⁵¹ There is a need to have more number of such schools with dedicated training faculty and infrastructure.

Our institutionlised system of training is a proven system which has been well designed and reasonably well implemented. The army has been able to convert a raw recruit into a fighter, who has performed well. There is, however, a need for certain amount of structured training at training centres and training academies for counter-insurgency and low intensity conflict operations apart from re-orientation training before deployment for such operations. Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) situations are going to remain a reality in the foreseeable future. Hence, the training for LIC environment must remain an ongoing process. Once the unit has been warned to mobilise for low intensity conflict environment, a well chalked out capsule should be conducted to hone up the skills and to relate the training to specifics of tasks at hand. Once the units are inducted in the sector of operations, situation specific and role related training should be organised. The new inductees to the units should be grouped with the veterans to acquire practical skills.

Allowing Needs of Personnel to Coincide with Needs of Organisation

Nearly all soldiers get influenced by the needs for job security, promotion, pay increments and appreciations by their peers as well as leaders. They are also influenced by internal forces such as morals and ethics. Leaders must ensure that their soldiers are trained and encouraged and provided opportunities to advance. At the same time leaders must ensure that their conduct has the same values, moral and ethic principles that they seek in their troops.

Involvement and Participation

Ideally, every man in the unit must know the situation and the task. He must

51. 92 per cent troops felt that, in view of changing nature of warfare, there is a need to have adequate training provisions for training in counter-insurgency operations at training centres during recruit training.

be given the opportunity, right climate and encouragement to come out with constructive suggestions. This generates interest, good ideas flow in, tired looks disappear and the men brace up for the big game. The entire plot must be projected in a manner that seeks their involvement. Once he feels deeply involved and associates himself with a plan, the level of motivation and self esteem goes up in larger proportions.⁵² All leaders must allow their subordinates to be part of the planning and problem solving process.

Success and Failure

Nothing breeds like success. Success tends to produce high morale and reinforces motivation. It gives a boost to a soldier's self esteem, faith in his leadership and self confidence. These very attributes breed further success which leads to yet higher levels of motivation and self esteem as well as pride in the unit. Failure often undermines a soldier's faith in his leaders. It also erodes his self respect and discipline and tactically it has a tendency to be self-reinforcing. However, failure is not always inimical to motivation. Professional pride, good training, discipline and high moral can insulate soldiers against the worst consequences of defeat. Therefore, operations should be launched only after detailed planning and preparations in order to maximise the chances of success.

Unit Cohesion

Regimental spirit generates primary group bonds and cohesion. Symbols and traditions lay stress on distinctiveness and pride in the outfit and promote unit cohesion and individual self esteem. The supportive nature of regimental/unit spirit becomes most evident in an intense counter-insurgency environment. Unit spirit is a true indicator of motivation. The unit commanders need to consciously take note of this aspect.⁵³

Making the Tasks Challenging, Exciting and Meaningful

Leaders have to make each soldier feel like an individual in a great team, rather than a cog in a lifeless machine. Soldiers also need meaningful work, even if it is tiring and unpleasant. The troops must be made to understand that the task assigned to them is important and necessary for the survival of the organisation. Stereo-type actions need to be discouraged.

52. 100 per cent troops re-confirmed their commitment to nation.

53. 78 per cent troops felt that they fight for unit's pride.

Media

Media and press play a very important role in forming opinions/impressions at national and international levels. It is essential to understand media and use it as a 'force multiplier'. A graduated and regulated system of interaction with the media needs to be developed. The army should be more transparent, ready and receptive to change. There is a need to ensure correct and factual reporting with regards to cases pertaining to either human rights violations or killing of innocent civilians. In effect, sacking of a colonel and a major for alleged charges of killing of innocent civilians in Jammu & Kashmir is a welcome step taken by the army. It is necessary to evolve an improved media strategy, not only to enhance the image of the army but also to beat the insurgents in their game of using the media. A carefully and aggressively organised media offensive could make the militants defensive in their approach. Rejoinders to false or incorrect/exaggerated reporting must be given out at the earliest. Army authorities must bring irresponsible /incorrect press items /releases to the notice of the Press Council of India for investigation and for suitable action against the concerned press reporter or the owner of the newspaper.⁵⁴

Junior Leadership

There is a requirement to make the junior commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers feel more accountable and responsible in handling the situations. A concerted effort is required in this direction as most actions in such a scenario take place at their levels. Particular attention needs to be paid in selecting and training of junior commissioned officers as they have not come up to the desired standards as yet. They need to be more competent, responsible and accountable. In counter-insurgency operations where the stakes are very high, well-trained and experienced officers and junior commissioned officers /non-commissioned officers confer a sense of protection on their subordinates by virtue of their military skills. Given the harsh, dangerous and stressful external environment, it is the effective

54. 84 per cent troops were of the opinion that army needs to improve the media management strategy for better results in counter-insurgency operations.

leadership, capable of maintaining high motivation level, which will keep the troops in high pitch and ensure success.⁵⁵

Leading by Example

The attitude and personality of the commanding officer plays a very significant role in such an environment. The commanding officer must be the role model for others to follow. He should be sensitive and alive to their welfare needs and problems, and the senior commanders must assist him in enhancing the capability and effectiveness of his unit.⁵⁶

Delegation⁵⁷

A great deal of 'lip service' has been going on about delegation. The system has chained itself in the rigidity of hierarchical structure, wherein freedom of action is a rare phenomenon. The 'Zero Error Syndrome' has become the biggest enemy. This attitudinal change is called for in the hierarchy. Only a few are directly involved in the creative and problem solving aspects of the organisation, while others merely carryout what they are told to do. Such a process not only impedes development and growth of subordinates but also acts as a serious deterrence to speed of operations. Lack of delegation has resulted in many a lost opportunity in the valley; and insurgents have repeatedly capitalised on the time spent by junior and middle level leaders in obtaining clearance from higher headquarters. Counter-insurgency operations are characterised by fluidity of situations, fleeting opportunities and chaotic conditions in most fire fights. The environmental peculiarities logically dictate rapid decision making and quick actions by leaders on the spot. Going back to military history, the German Army consciously adopted the concept of mission oriented tasks and development of

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55. It came out very clearly that junior commissioned officers tend to shy away from taking any initiative. There is a need to make promotion criteria from a non-commissioned officer to junior commissioned officer as also honorary commission more stringent so that quality does not get compromised.
 56. 81 per cent troops felt that over commitment of units, shortage of man power due to prolonged stay in transit camps in the garb of non-availability of transport which upsets leave planning, improper transport facility from transit camps to units, non provision of split warrants for railway travel which leads to travel in lower class due to non-availability of reservation in entitled class for onward journey and non provision of educational allowance for children for college education after class XII, being an unmanageable burden are some of the reasons which affect their performance and need to be addressed.
 57. 84 per cent officers and men felt that delegation exists only in books and conferences and not on ground.

initiative at all levels of leadership down to the Non Commissioned Officers as demonstrated in World War II. It was the product of an evolutionary process dating back to nineteenth century. There is a need to take a leaf from such historical examples.

Creative Thinking

In Counter-insurgency environment, each operation and every situation is different, and as such requires a situation specific solution. The sheer dynamics make set piece and copy book plans virtually non starters, particularly when pitched against crafty militants, who have to bank on guile for their very survival. The plans, therefore, need to be different, unorthodox and audacious to be successful. Junior leaders must be provided the right type of climate and encouragement to think independently. Creative thinking as an art must be mastered not only by senior officers but also by the leaders down the chain. Creativity does not occur because you want it to happen. It happens because the conditions are right to make it happen. The organisation that desires creativity must provide an environment that nurtures and encourages it. The right combination of elements and people must be in place. Vivid imagination, deep insight and creative approach result in unconventional solutions, which by virtue of being novel and opposed to conventional, result in resounding victories. This would correspondingly keep the motivational level high. Senior officers, therefore, must encourage such actions by units/sub-units.⁵⁸

Tackling Stress Related Issues

Efforts should be made to identify personnel who are under psychological stress and strain so that necessary remedial measures, including surveillance over such individuals, could be initiated. Junior commissioned officers and senior non-commissioned officers should truthfully report cases of abnormal behaviour /tendencies in individuals to superior authorities with out any delay to enable initiation of necessary actions on case to case basis.⁵⁹ Such prompt actions elevate the level of motivation of fellow soldiers.

58. 77 per cent officers and men felt that there is a need to improve the environment to develop attitude of creative thinking amongst all ranks.

59. 71 per cent troops felt that counter-insurgency environment induces stress because of uncertainty, lack of training and inability to sort out domestic bottlenecks at home due to indifferent attitude of civil administration, civil police and society towards their genuine rights.

Enforcing Discipline

There have been instances where officers did not have time to investigate culpable offences. This sends wrong signals and shows the authority in poor light. There should be no compromise made in dealing with disciplinary cases, particularly at the level of unit commanders. All cases of indiscipline need to be dealt with fairly and firmly. Exemplary punishments must be awarded to the culprits for offences that are serious, as any laxity is likely to lead to further indiscipline. A leader must let his subordinates know when they are not performing to an acceptable standard. Counsel those who behave in a manner that is counter to the unit's goals. By the same token, they must be protected when needed. Senior leaders need to constantly monitor the state of discipline, morale and motivation of the units.⁶⁰

Responsiveness of Civil Administration

Lack of quick response from the government and civil administration in the affected areas hampers own operations. These difficulties have been experienced by the troops in the past while operating in counter-insurgency areas. It is therefore, imperative to establish good rapport, understanding and working equation with the civil administration so that security forces efforts are not wasteful. These factors will culminate in bolstering the morale and motivation of the affected population as also own troops.

Improving Service Conditions

The army service has to be made more attractive. Shortage of officers needs to be made up, as the role of sub unit commanders is more pronounced in these operations. It is equally important to train them as motivated members of the organisation. A soldier must get back his status and pride in uniform. Approximately 50,000 personnel retiring from the army every year could become ambassadors in the country to help in drawing better talent, if and only if they take back happy memories of their experiences in the service. Special allowances to cater for the hardship and privations of soldiers must be reviewed afresh. Instead of harping on ranks, give them their status vis-à-vis civilian counterparts with similar service conditions and length of service.

60. 94 per cent officers and men felt that acute shortage of officers in the units and excessive administrative commitments leave no time for sorting out indiscipline cases since these tend to eat away a lot of time.

Improving Hygiene Factors

Hygiene factors may not be motivators in isolated areas of deployment in counter-insurgency operations but their absence could prove to be strong demotivators. Measures therefore, need to be taken to improve the state of accommodation, transportation facilities both by road and rail, provision of proper clothing and rations, leading to overall improvement in hygiene conditions. Clear note must also be taken of the deterioration in the maintenance of existing assets and special measures initiated to provide decent accommodation to all ranks, at least in peace stations. Similarly, provision of temporary shelters is essential for rest and refit of troops in these monotonous operations and must be given due importance. It will be worth considering either permitting issue of split railway warrants/ concession vouchers or reimbursement of actual rail fare for undertaking entitled travel whether on duty or as part of leave travel concession.

Tenure Duration

Maximum period of deployment in such areas should not exceed two years, including induction/de-induction periods. Units must be turned over smoothly so as to ensure a good combination of 'field - peace' profile and avoid over flogging of troops.⁶¹ Command tenures of commanding officers should continue to be of at least three years duration. Turbulence due to shorter or truncated command tenures needs to be avoided.⁶²

Disposal of Fatal Casualties

In short intense wars, disposal of bodies is carried out under unit arrangements. However, in the case of casualties in counter-insurgency operations, more deliberate measures need to be taken for funerals for all ranks. Service aircraft /transport or civil means are being used to transport mortal remains by fastest possible ways. The nation has accepted it as a moral obligation. However, funds earmarked for this purpose should be readily available at the disposal of the unit Commanding Officer.⁶³ Civil administration must display respect and realistic support to next of kin of

61. 82 per cent troops preferred to limiting tenure in counter-insurgency areas to 18 months.

62. 74 per cent troops expressed this concern.

63. 62 per cent troops felt that system of carrying mortal remains needs improvement.

battle casualties.

Recognition and Rewards

To imbibe a sense of achievement amongst troops, exemplary acts must get immediate recognition and rewards. There is a need to explore the possibility of announcing some awards at the level of Corps Commanders, without going through the existing time consuming processing channels. This would keep the men motivated and provide a sense of achievement.⁶⁴

Intelligence Gathering

Currently, faith in our intelligence is just not good enough. Since hard and concrete information is seldom available, a large number of 'duff' operations are attributed to lack of concrete information. Many a time, troops get the feeling that they are being flogged with no tangible results in sight. Intelligence that leads to successful operations is hence highly appreciated. Troops fed with hard actionable intelligence execute operations with hope, gusto and high motivation. The higher formations have an important role to play in this regard.⁶⁵

Elimination of Fear of Human Rights Organisations

Viewed against the fact that militants have considerable lethal power to strike soldiers at the time and place of their choosing and then merge with the local population, add to the overall stress factor on our troops. Under such difficult situations, there would be some instances where soldiers may react in good faith. The interests of troops must be looked after and various human rights organisations should be apprised of the facts and situations in which such cases have occurred. Minor issues should not be blown up out of proportion in the overall interest of the state.⁶⁶

Avoidance of Unhealthy Glory Seeking

In order to show achievements or out do other units of the formation, a

64. 76 per cent troops felt that system of processing cases for honours and awards is cumbersome and time-consuming.

65. 76 per cent troops felt that operations are launched in haste without proper briefing and information.

66. 74 per cent troops felt that fear of human rights violation in the line of carrying out operations puts a lot of strain and at times restricts their potential.

tendency to seek unwarranted or unhealthy glory tends to exist amongst the units. Appropriate measures must be initiated to curb such unhealthy tendency in the units, as this affects the troops adversely. There have been cases where individuals have pushed themselves and their men beyond a point, to get recognition and awards. These have a negative effect on motivation and must be curbed.⁶⁷

Excessive Commitments

Maintenance of minimum laid down strength at various locations at all times is essential. Special attention must be paid to see that the genuine requirements of casual/annual leave do not get hampered. Moderation in the tasks of units may be carried out for equitable distribution of commitments. Troops also realise the constraints, but at no stage unnecessary local restrictions on leave be imposed. Proper management will obviate any chances of excessive commitments.⁶⁸ Ensuring that PBOR returning from leave or temporary duty are not detained at transit camps, will improve availability of troops in units.

Awareness of Legal Dimensions

There is a requirement to educate the troops regarding legal implications of their actions while operating in such areas to prevent possibility of any default by them. While temporary anger on the loss of a colleague is understandable, this must not be permitted to lead to incidents like rape, burning of villages or harassment of innocent people. This would not only prevent interested parties from getting unnecessary mileage out of small incidents through the media but also ensure sustenance of soldierly ethos.⁶⁹

Feeling the Pulse

Man management assumes added significance in such environment, particularly at the level of commanding officer and company commanders.

67. 67 per cent officers and men felt that excessive flogging by higher commanders to show results to further higher reporting officers puts undesirable pressure on them.

68. 81 per cent troops felt that leave plans get hampered due to vested interests of transit camps. They felt that troops returning from leave are made to stay in transit camps basically to carry out cleaning and other administrative tasks and waste 4 to 7 days under the pretext of non-availability of transport.

69. 36 per cent troops expressed their ignorance about legal implications of their actions.

The officers and junior commissioned officers must have intimate knowledge of their men and at no stage the men should be allowed to feel neglected. There is a need to take innovative measures to improve and sustain the bondage between officers and men. Buddy system being practiced by the army is one such effective measure. Buddies not only watch out for each other's physical safety during operations, but also help each other to unburden worries, that weigh on the minds of their companion. Men can also provide timely (early) warning of what could be bothering their buddies to their superiors who could then take suitable steps to de-stress affected subordinates. Psychological indoctrination for low intensity conflict and counter-insurgency operations should form an essential and effective ingredient of pre-induction training.⁷⁰ Feeling the pulse of troops is an important command function. Contact with men is essential to obtain feedback or first hand information. Many events can be anticipated, if there is a well laid out system of feedback. The feedback must be addressed at appropriate level and actions must be initiated, where essential.⁷¹

Rest and Recreation

Routine in counter-insurgency operations is tough, exhausting and at times irritating. Searching for a militant, many a times results in seeing him in every bush and tree. There is therefore, a need for adequate and organised rest to avoid fatigue to the troops. This should not be an eye wash but ensured in right earnest.

Respect for Religion

This is a very sensitive issue and therefore, utmost care must be exercised to ensure that, at no stage, the religious sentiments of troops get hurt, either advertently or inadvertently. Due care must be taken to deal with any cases where religious feelings /beliefs of the troops are likely to be hurt. It is equally important to understand similar feelings among the population in the areas of operations. Special care has also to be exercised to demonstrate sympathetic understanding and respect for the religious sentiments of the local population. This should form part of regular briefing of troops before moving out for any operation. Unit commanders should utilise the services

70. It is a matter of concern that only 12 per cent troops accepted that they get motivated by their leaders / commanders.

71. 57 per cent troops felt that actions are not taken on their feedbacks.

of religious teachers in such circumstances. Religious teachers (RT) are an effective source of inspiration for motivating and instilling 'fear of God' in men, if employed gainfully. They should be frequently sent to all areas where the unit is deployed.⁷² Requisite quality of RT has to be ensured to derive real benefits, lest it may prove to be a wasteful effort.

Opportunities for Growth

Intensity and frequency of operations should not result in denial of opportunities for personal growth. Planning of promotion cadres and their conduct assumes special significance. Opportunities for personal enhancement, like appearing in civil examinations, attending a resettlement course and so on should continue to be provided.⁷³ Promotions of PBOR should preferably be handled/ processed at respective Records Offices instead of units to eliminate chances of possible personal biases.

72. 84 per cent troops felt that they derive strength and inspiration from God.

73. 95 per cent troops felt that promotions be processed and implemented as per directions of respective Record Offices, based on seniority and qualitative requirements as per rules, and not left to unit commanding officers as it leads to favoritism and de-motivation.

Conclusion

Indian Army has been engaged in low intensity conflict and counter-insurgency operations for more than last five decades. There has however been an increase in socio-political violence during the last two decades, leading to ever increasing commitments of the army. Introduction of technology and influx of foreign funds have encouraged and given a new dimension to insurgency/ militancy. In addition, the pace of life has become much faster and aspirations grown higher. Demands from family have also increased, contributing towards greater stress. Sustaining motivation of troops in such environment is a challenging task for military leaders at all levels. The motivation for army personnel has special significance and is different from those in other walks of life. Military leaders have to be sensitive to variations in their subordinates' needs, abilities and attributes.

Motivation of troops in sub-conventional environment involves interplay of numerous factors like group dynamics, leadership, management of conflict, team building, inter-personal relations, training and communication etc. Hygiene factors have become extremely important. A soldier should not be made to feel a sense of comparative deprivation vis-à-vis their counterparts in other spheres of national life. This could be possible by regular updating of conditions of service by the government. The service too could also help, by educating the troops regarding actual benefits. The civil government functionaries should behave with a soldier in a responsible manner and he must be made to feel that his work is important and appreciated. Soldiers should also endeavor to live up to the expectations of society.

Although importance of understanding the need for motivation has increased considerably in the past few decades, yet there are a significant number of military leaders who tend to view motivation as a “carrot and stick” process. The creation of a stimulating, productive and satisfying work environment is only possible by ensuring a healthy organisational climate in the army. Men will benefit from such an environment which will ensure better efficiency despite more commitments. Military leaders must realise that they on their own can not motivate troops. However, they can create the right kind of climate which will lead to significant enhancement in the motivational levels of subordinates.

The results of this study are worrisome and indicate fall in standards due to internal as well as external factors. External factors / issues include political system, government functionaries, media, adversaries and society and these can not be altered drastically. However, internal issues are more significant as compared to external issues since these can be addressed internally. The internal issues concern professionalism, superior training, combat morale and leadership responsibilities in such operations. There is a need to open more professional schools, preferably one in each division, with exclusive infrastructure and training staff for ensuring CI training of all ranks even during peace tenures. Modernisation of infantry is another important area which needs to be addressed.

In sub-conventional operations environment, a military leader has to get tasks executed through subordinates and junior leaders. This is easier said than done since contradictory requirements in such operations put a lot of pressure on leaders as well as soldiers. Respect for a soldier as a human being needs to be recognized and his good contributions need to be appreciated. Patience displayed by the leaders in distress will help in sustaining motivation. Disconnect between senior and junior leadership, if any, be addressed immediately.

Motivational practice and theory are difficult subjects, touching on several factors. Despite of enormous research, basic as well as applied, the subject of motivation is yet to be understood clearly and realistically applied. To understand motivation, one must understand human nature itself, where real problem lies. Human nature can be very simple, yet very complex. An understanding and appreciation of this is a pre-requisite to effective motivation of junior leaders and troops in the difficult operational areas. Motivated troops will have high morale and troops with high morale will perform better. Both these psychological conditions are dependent on tangible as well as intangible factors. But what needs to be understood is that creature comforts alone will neither motivate troops nor raise their morale. It has to be a correct and balanced mixture of training, creature comforts and leadership. Some of the important practices like trusting soldiers on ground, providing them with necessary wherewithal, recognising their contributions, showing genuine concern about them by taking care of their physical and emotional needs, treating troops as colleagues, ensuring presence of leader in difficult situations and making sure that the tasks assigned to them are accomplished with out recklessly endangering his men,

briefing the soldiers thoroughly about impending tasks and training hard with them apart from organizing their rest and breaks will help in keeping the troops at desired level of motivation.

Officers, by virtue of their higher educational and training standards, urban orientation and a number of army courses which they have to go through, understand the problem better. Their adaptation to this kind of warfare is also quicker. However, it needs to be borne in mind that Indian soldier coming from a rural background, is hardy, has few requirements and has implicit faith in the army, unit and officers in that order. The other fact in a stark contrast to Dantewada massacre is that Indian Army officers lead from the front. An unusually large number of officer casualties, both in conventional as well as sub-conventional warfare testify to this proud Indian Army Tradition. The weak area, is the attitude and capability of Junior Commissioned Officers to deliver goods in sub-conventional operations. JCOs develop a safety first mentality soon as they get promoted from NCOs. This is a paradox. JCOs, therefore, need to be made more accountable. Today in the army, JCOs duties and responsibilities are not so well defined. With the result they get away with non performance.

What also needs to be understood is the sad fact that our civil administrative authorities, whether at the centre or in the states have little understanding of this kind of warfare. Hence their attitude towards improving service conditions of soldiers is somewhat indifferent. Army has been taking measures to keep their human resource at desired level of motivation. However, there is a lot of scope for improving ground realities. A serious collective effort by the society, government, civil administration functionaries and army will only be able to yield desirable outcomes.

Based on the analysis carried out in this paper, the following points emerge:

- Commanding officer is the key. Hence his tenure needs to be viable.
- Due to operations in high stress environment, tenure of units in counter-insurgency operations must not exceed two years.
- Counter-insurgency operations training must be imparted as a special capsule in all training establishments.
- Divisional Battle Schools need to be properly equipped and staffed.
- Officers need to be trained in the art of media-interaction.
- Civil-military liaison needs to be of a high order.

- Actionable intelligence being crucial for success, there is an immediate necessity to devise a more synergized approach.
- Application of minimum force is almost a maxim in sub-conventional operations. Sub-conventional operations put severe restrictions on troops trained to cause maximum attrition. It is for this reason that mental re-orientation of troops and special training is so essential for sustaining motivation in such warfare. Therefore, army has to get used to the fact that it has to operate in a hostile environment with one hand tied behind its back.

This paper has brought out measures, which if taken in right earnest, will raise job satisfaction and confidence level of officers and men operating in sub-conventional warfare environment to optimum levels and thereby enable them to improve their performance, by appropriately addressing their needs and beliefs through application of suitable motivational tools and methodologies.

ANNEXURE I

Analysis of Feedback on Motivation of Troops Deployed in Sub-conventional Warfare Environment

Sample Size: 1085, Officers: 60, PBOR: 1025

1. Who is your ideal motivator?	Offr	Offr %	PBOR	PBOR %	TOTAL	TOTAL %
- Your leader	18	30%	113	11%	131	12%
- Your buddy	08	13%	447	44%	455	42%
- Your family	-	-	412	40%	412	38%
- Your own pride	34	57%	53	5%	87	08%
2. Do you get adequate cooperation from civil administration/ local population/civil police/ local politicians?						
- Yes	09	15%	78	8%	87	08%
- No	51	85%	947	93%	998	92%
3. How is local press?						
- Justified	10	17%	153	15%	163	15%
- Pro-militants	42	70%	760	74%	802	74%
- Pro-government / forces	08	13%	112	11%	120	11%
4. Is it possible to identify militants?						
- Easy	-	-	-	-	-	00%
- Difficult	19	32%	79	8%	98	09%
- Very difficult	41	68%	946	93%	987	91%
5. Why did you join army?						
- To serve mother land	12	20%	53	5%	65	6%
- To lead life of honour	12	20%	172	17%	184	17%
- For better pay & pension	09	15%	197	19%	206	19%
- To earn livelihood	27	45%	603	59%	630	58%
6. What is the ideal tenure in CI / LICO?						
- 24 months	12	20%	161	16%	173	16%
- 18 months	48	80%	842	82%	890	82%
- More than 24 months	-	-	22	2%	22	02%
- Less than 18 months	-	-	-	-	-	00%
7. What is the recommended command tenure for a Commanding Officer?						
- 36 months	45	75%	758	74%	803	74%
- 24 months	14	23%	235	23%	249	23%

	Offr	Offr %	PBOR	PBOR %	TOTAL	TOTAL %
- more than 36 months	-	-	22	2%	22	02%
- less than 24 months	01	2%	10	1%	11	01%
8. How is the standard of clothing / equipment ex Ordnance channels?						
- Good	02	3.5%	74	7%	76	07%
- Very Good / Exemplary	-	-	-	-	-	00%
- Bad	04	6.5%	61	6%	65	06%
- Very Bad / Not worth using	54	90%	890	87%	944	87%
09. How is the system of carrying mortal remains to home town?						
- Good	15	25%	180	17.5%	195	18%
- Satisfactory	16	27%	201	19.5%	217	20%
- Needs Improvement	29	48%	644	63%	673	62%
10. How is the system of processing honours and awards?						
- Satisfactory	08	13%	90	8.7%	98	09%
- cumbersome and time consuming	46	77%	778	76%	824	76%
- Motivating	06	10%	157	15.3%	163	15%
11. How is media management by army?						
- Satisfactory	12	20%	162	15.8%	174	16%
- Improvement needed	48	80%	863	84.2%	911	84%
12. Are you satisfied with CI training imparted at training centres / training academies in view of changing nature of warfare?						
- No change required	06	10%	81	7.9%	87	08%
- Equal weightage required for CI / LICO type of warfare at par with conventional operations for satisfactory performance	54	90%	944	92.1%	998	92%
13. Do you recommend training for CI / LICO even in peace tenures to be always ready?						
- Yes	55	92%	943	92%	998	92%
- No	05	8%	82	8%	87	08%
14. Are you satisfied with the degree of delegation to junior leaders?						
- Delegation is adequately given/satisfied	12	20%	162	15.8%	174	16%
- Only in papers/for talking/unsatisfactory	48	80%	863	84.2%	911	84%

	Offr	Offr %	PBOR	PBOR %	TOTAL	TOTAL %
15. Do you get encouragement for giving bright ideas for better results in CI operations?						
- Yes	08	13%	79	7.7%	87	08%
- No, improvement is needed for creating conducive environment for creative thinking	45	75%	790	77%	835	77%
- Stereo-type drills are good enough	07	12%	156	15.3%	163	15%
16. Are the operations launched with adequate briefing and rehearsals?						
- Operations launched with adequate briefing and preparations	24	40%	236	23%	260	24%
- Operations launched in haste with inadequate briefing and preparations	36	60%	789	77%	825	76%
17. Is fear of human rights violation during operations affecting your performance?						
- No fear of human rights violation	18	30%	264	25.7%	282	26%
- Yes, induces stress & affects performance	42	70%	761	74.3%	803	74%
18. Do you get pushed beyond a point for glory seeking by superiors?						
- Yes	42	70%	685	66.8%	727	67%
- No	18	30%	340	33.2%	358	33%
19. Are disciplinary cases being disposed of promptly?						
- Yes	03	5%	62	6%	65	06%
- No	57	95%	963	94%	1020	94%
20 Why cases of indiscipline take long time for disposal or get neglected?						
- Due to partialism	01	1.6%	10	1%	11	01%
- Due to fear of earning bad chit	03	5%	51	5%	54	05%
- Due to excessive commitments and shortage of officers	56	93.4%	964	94%	1020	94%
21. Do you get leave as per plans?						
- Yes	05	8%	202	19.7%	207	81%
- No	55	92%	823	80.3%	878	19%

	Offr	Offr %	PBOR	PBOR %	TOTAL	TOTAL %
22. Why leave plan gets disturbed?						
- Due to casual attitude of superiors in unit.	02	3%	31	3%	33	03%
- Due to inadequate manpower in units	48	80%	830	81%	878	81%
- Due to any other reasons like operations	10	17%	164	16%	174	16%
23. Why units have inadequate manpower?						
- Excessive holding of PBOR returning from leave/ TD by Transit Camps on flimsy grounds	48	80%	830	809%	878	81%
- Deficiency in unit	01	1.6%	10	1%	11	01%
- Excessive commitments	11	18.4%	185	18%	196	08%
24. How many days are spent in transit camps while returning from leave / TD?						
- Up to 03 days	20	33%	142	13.9%	162	15%
- 04 to 07 days	34	57%	845	82.4%	879	81%
- 08 to 12 days	06	10%	38	3.7%	44	04%
25. Do you get adequate briefing about terrain, militants, causes of insurgency and local population on induction?						
- Yes	25	42%	51	05%	76	07%
- No	35	58%	974	95%	1009	93%
26. Do you know about legal provisions in CI operations?						
- No	32	53.3%	662	64.6%	694	64%
- Yes	28	46.7%	363	35.4%	391	36%
27. Is action taken in units on your feedbacks?						
- Yes	30	50%	437	43%	467	43%
- No	30	50%	588	57%	618	57%
28. Who gives you maximum strength in difficult situations?						
- Your leader	24	40%	106	10%	130	12%
- Your GOD	30	50%	881	86%	911	84%
- Your family	03	5%	19	2%	22	02%
- Your buddy	03	5%	19	2%	22	02%

	Offr	Offr %	PBOR	PBOR %	TOTAL	TOTAL %
29. Which type of promotion system do you recommend?						
- Unit based system	18	30%	39	3.5%	54	05%
- Respective Records Office based system	42	70%	989	96.5%	1031	95%
30. Why do you feel that promotion system based on Records Office is better?						
- Since it is based on merit	-				-	-
- It tends to avoid favouritism	-				-	-
- It will serve the system better	-				-	-
- All of the above	42	70%	989	96.5%	1031	95%
- None of the above	18	30%	36	3.5%	51	05%
31. Who should take more initiative in units?						
- Officers	-	-	11	1%	11	01%
- Junior Commissioned Officers	49	82%	927	90.6%	976	88%
- Senior non- commissioned officers	11	18%	65	6%	76	07%
- All of the above	-	-	22	2.5%	22	04%
- None of the above	-	-	-	-	-	00%
32. How are the living conditions in your lines?						
- Satisfactory	24	40%	128	12.5%	152	14%
- Need improvement	36	60%	897	87.5%	933	86%
33. What makes you to risk your life in operations the most?						
- Unit' pride	39	65%	807	78.7%	846	78%
- Family's pride	02	3%	95	9.3%	97	09%
- Your own pride	07	12%	37	3.6%	44	04%
- Your leader	12	20%	86	8.4%	98	09%
34. Will you agree to compromise own territory in bargain for peace with your hostile neighbours?						
- Yes	-	-	-	-	-	00%
- No	60	100%	1025	100%	1085	100%

	Offr	Offr %	PBOR	PBOR %	TOTAL	TOTAL %
35. Do you feel stressed in this environment?						
- Yes	36	60%	734	72%	770	71%
- No	24	40%	291	28%	315	29%
36. What causes financial burden on you?						
- School education of children	18	30%	231	22.5%	249	23%
- Higher education of children	22	37%	488	47.5%	510	47%
- Medical treatment of dependants at home, Military Hospital being away	12	20%	270	26.5%	282	26%
- Talking to family members	08	13%	36	3.5%	44	04%
37. Are you happy with rail travel arrangements?						
- Yes	24	40%	258	25%	282	26%
- No	36	60%	767	75%	803	74%
38. Why you are not satisfied with rail travel?						
- Return railway warrant prohibits travel in entitled class during return journey since onward reservation was in lower class due to non-availability of reservation in entitled class	36	60%	637	62%	673	62%
- There is long queue for exchange of warrants	203	33%	360	35%	380	35%
- Any other reasons like delays, transit facilities etc	04	7%	28	3%	32	03%

ANNEXURE II

Confirmatory feedback from Officers on motivation in Sub-conventional Warfare Environment

Sample Size: 30

	Officers	%
1. Who is your ideal motivator?		
- Your leader	05	17%
- Your buddy	05	17%
- Your family	02	06%
- Your own pride	18	60%
2. Do you get adequate cooperation from civil administration/ local population/civil police/ local politicians?		
- Yes	05	17%
- No	25	83%
3. How is local press?		
- Justified	04	13%
- Pro-militants	22	74%
- Pro-government / forces	04	13%
4. Is it possible to identify militants?		
- Easy	-	
- Difficult	10	33%
- Very difficult	20	67%
5. Why did you join army?		
- To serve mother land	03	10%
- To lead life of honour	06	20%
- For better pay & pension	03	10%
- To earn livelihood	18	60%
6. What is the ideal tenure in CI / LICO?		
- 24 months	24	80%
- 18 months	06	20%
- More than 24 months	-	-
- Less than 18 months	-	-
7. What is the recommended command tenure for a Commanding Officer?		
- 36 months	20	67%
- 24 months	10	33%
- more than 36 months	-	-
- less than 24 months	-	-

	Officers	%
8. How is the standard of clothing / equipment ex Ordnance channels?		
- Good	02	07%
- Very Good / Exemplary	01	03%
- Bad	18	60%
- Very Bad / Not worth using	09	30%
09. How is the system of carrying mortal remains to home town?		
- Good	06	20%
- Satisfactory	07	23%
- Needs Improvement	17	57%
10. How is the system of processing honours and awards?		
- Satisfactory	04	14%
- cumbersome and time consuming	23	75%
- Motivating	03	11%
11. How is media management by army?		
- Satisfactory	06	20%
- Improvement needed	24	80%
12. Are you satisfied with CI training imparted at training centres / training academies in view of changing nature of warfare?		
- No change required	04	13%
- Equal weightage required for CI / LICO type of warfare at par with conventional operations for satisfactory performance	26	87%
13. Do you recommend training for CI / LICO even in peace tenures to be always ready?		
- Yes	27	90%
- No	03	10%
14. Are you satisfied with the degree of delegation to junior leaders?		
- Delegation is adequately given/satisfied	06	20%
- Only in papers/for talking/unsatisfactory	24	80%
15. Do you get encouragement for giving bright ideas for better results in CI operations?		
- Yes	03	10%
- No, improvement is needed for creating conducive environment for creative thinking	24	80%
- Stereo-type drills are good enough	03	10%

	Officers	%
16. Are the operations launched with adequate briefing and rehearsals?		
- Operations launched with adequate briefing and preparations	09	30%
- Operations launched in haste with inadequate briefing and preparations	21	70%
17. Is fear of human rights violation during operations affecting your performance?		
- No fear of human rights violation	08	27%
- Yes, induces stress & affects performance	22	73%
18. Do you get pushed beyond a point for glory seeking by superiors?		
- Yes	22	73%
- No	08	27%
19. Are disciplinary cases being disposed of promptly?		
- Yes	03	10%
- No	27	90%
20 Why cases of indiscipline take long time for disposal or get neglected?		
- Due to partialism	01	03%
- Due to fear of earning bad chit	02	07%
- Due to excessive commitments and shortage of officers	27	90%
21. Do you get leave as per plans?		
- Yes	04	13%
- No	26	87%
22. Why leave plan gets disturbed?		
- Due to casual attitude of superiors in unit.	01	03%
- Due to inadequate manpower in units	24	80%
- Due to any other reasons like operations	05	17%
23. Why units have inadequate manpower?		
- Excessive holding of PBOR returning from leave/ TD by Transit Camps on filmsy grounds	23	77%
- Deficiency in unit	01	03%
- Excessive commitments	06	20%

	Officers	%
24. How many days are spent in transit camps while returning from leave / TD?		
- Up to 03 days	06	20%
- 04 to 07 days	19	63%
- 08 to 12 days	05	17%
25. Do you get adequate briefing about terrain, militants, causes of insurgency and local population on induction?		
- Yes	12	40%
- No	18	60%
26. Do you know about legal provisions in CI operations?		
- No	17	55%
- Yes	13	45%
27. Is action taken in units on your feedbacks?		
- Yes	13	43%
- No	17	57%
28. Who gives you maximum strength in difficult situations?		
- Your leader	06	20%
- Your GOD	18	60%
- Your family	05	17%
- Your buddy	01	03%
29. Which type of promotion system do you recommend?		
- Unit based system	08	27%
- Respective Records Office based system	22	73%
30. Why do you feel that promotion system based on Records Office is better?		
- Since it is based on merit	-	-
- It tends to avoid favouritism	-	-
- It will serve the system better	-	-
- All of the above	22	73%
- None of the above	08	27%

	Officers	%
31. Who should take more initiative in units?		
- Officers		
- Junior Commissioned Officers	23	78%
- Senior non- commissioned officers	04	12%
- All of the above	03	10%
- None of the above	-	-
32. How are the living conditions in your lines?		
- Satisfactory	09	30%
- Need improvement	21	70%
33. What makes you to risk your life in operations the most?		
- Unit' pride	21	70%
- Family's pride	03	10%
- Your own pride	03	10%
- Your leader	03	10%
34. Will you agree to compromise own territory in bargain for peace with your hostile neighbours?		
- Yes	-	-
- No	30	100%
35. Do you feel stressed in this environment?		
- Yes	19	64
- No	11	36%
36. What causes financial burden on you?		
- School education of children	08	27%
- Higher education of children	12	40%
- Medical treatment of dependants at home, Military Hospital being away	06	20%
- Talking to family members	04	13%
37. Are you happy with rail travel arrangements?		
- Yes	09	30%
- No	21	70%

	Officers	%
38. Why you are not satisfied with rail travel?		
- Return railway warrant prohibits travel in entitled class during return journey since onward reservation was in lower class due to non-availability of reservation in entitled class	19	63%
- There is long queue for exchange of warrants	09	30%
- Any other reasons like delays, transit facilities etc	02	07%

ANNEXURE III

Summary of feedback from Officers on recommendations to sustain motivation in Sub-conventional Warfare

Sample Size: 30

Mark the recommendations for sustaining motivation in CI / LICO Environment by awarding marks as under:

Strongly recommended = SR Recommended = R

Not Recommended = NR

Do you recommend for improving training of officers and men in conduct of CI / LICO in order to minimize casualties to own troops?

SR= 21 R= 09 NR= 00

Do you recommend structured training at training centres /training academies for CI /LICO?

SR= 18 R= 12 NR= 00

Do you recommend equal weightage for conventional as well as CI / LICO training at training centres / training academies since most operations in today's scenario include CI operations, low intensity conflict operations anti-terrorist actions?

SR= 24 R= 06 NR= 00

Do you recommend more counter-insurgency training schools with requisite infra-structure?

SR= 12 R= 16 NR= 02

Do you recommend that leaders should have same values, moral and ethic principle that they seek in their troops?

SR= 24 R= 06 NR= 00

Do you recommend that leaders must allow their subordinates to be part of planning and problem solving process?

SR= 04 R= 24 NR= 02

Do you recommend launching of operations only after detailed planning and preparations?

SR= 12 R= 18 NR= 00

Do you recommend regimentation for ensuring primary group bonds and cohesion?

SR= 12 R= 17 NR= 01

Do you recommend making tasks challenging, exciting and meaningful to sustain motivation?

SR= 10 R= 18 NR= 02

Do you recommend need for better handling of media to ensure truthful reporting?

SR= 06 R= 22 NR= 02

Do you recommend making junior officers, JCOs and NCOs more accountable?

SR= 08 R= 21 NR= 01

Is leading by example recommended by commanders?

SR= 14 R= 16 NR= 00

Do you recommend delegation to junior officers, JCOs and NCOs?

SR= 16 R= 14 NR= 00

Do you recommend shift in attitude towards accepting mistakes (zero error syndrome)?

SR= 18 R= 12 NR= 00

Do you recommend creative thinking amongst junior leaders?

SR= 20 R= 10 NR= 00

Stress related issues be addressed on priority?

SR= 22 R= 08 NR= 00

Do you recommend quick disposal of disciplinary cases and counselling of those who behave in a manner that is counter to unit's goals?

SR= 18 R= 12 NR= 00

Do you recommend better understanding and good rapport with civil administration to ensure quick response during operations?

SR= 12 R= 18 NR= 00

Do you recommend improvement in service conditions?

SR=20 R= 10 NR=00

Do you recommend that service personnel (officers as well as PBOR) must get back their status and pride in uniform?

SR= 16 R=14 NR= 00

Do you recommend improvement in hygiene factors like separate warrants for return and onward journey, improvement in living conditions, improvement in clothing and equipments?

SR= 20 R= 10 NR= 00

Do you recommend tenure duration of 02 years in CI /LIC areas?

SR= 24 R= 06 NR= 00

Do you recommend improvement in handling of mortal remains of fatal casualties?

SR= 10 R= 18 NR= 02

Do you recommend improvement in processing honours and awards?

SR= 11 R= 17 NR= 02

Do you recommend improvement in intelligence set up?

SR= 07 R= 20 NR= 03

Do you recommend improvement in interaction level with NGOs and Human Rights Organisations for making them understand ground realities?

SR= 07 R= 20 NR= 03

Do you recommend avoidance of attitude of unhealthy glory seeking by leaders at the cost of over-flogging of subordinates?

SR= 06 R= 22 NR= 02

Do you recommend accountability on the part of transit camps for withholding PBOR on unjustifiable grounds?

SR= 17 R= 13 NR=00

Do you recommend education of troops on legal implications in CI environment?

SR=08 R=22 NR=02

Do you recommend regular contact with subordinates and actions on feedback?

SR= 13 R= 17 NR= 00

Do you recommend organised rest to avoid fatigue to troops in CI environment?

SR= 09 R=18 NR= 03

Do you recommend preservation of religious beliefs of soldiers?

SR= 10 R= 18 NR= 03

Do you recommend promotion of PBOR based on records held with respective record offices to avoid individual biases?

SR= 07 R= 18 NR= 05

Do you recommend equal opportunities for growth/ personal advancement?

SR= 10 R= 20 NR= 00