Session – I: Non-State Armed Groups and Security: Some Theoretical Aspects

Opening Remarks by Mr. Varun Sahni:

We have a distinguished but large panel here so just that we don't sort of spend time introducing people between the various presentations let me go ahead and do that all right now.   Prof. Efraim Inbar is of course professor in political science at Bar-Illan University and Director for the Begin Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies; Dr. Rajesh Rajgopalan to my right is Associate Professor in International Politics at Jawaharlal University here in New Delhi; Wing Commander Krishnappa is a Research Fellow here at IDSA and Dr. Reshmi Kazi, to my extreme left is Associate Fellow here at IDSA. We also have two Discussants. Dr. Kalayana Raman for some reason is insisting on sitting in the second row, but he is also a Research Fellow here and finally we have Dr. Madan Mohan who is more sensibly sitting on the front row, who is Assistant Professor in Diplomacy and Disarmament at JNU another colleague of mine. My name is Varun Sahni, I am Professor in International Politics at JNU, so we have got a kind of a Bar-Illan-JNU-IDSA thing going on here.

This Session is on Non-State Armed Groups and Security: Some Theoretical Aspects. Just an initial thought, you know, may be after the presentations are done one of that ideas we could pick up. The interesting thing about India and Israel of course they are two states with nuclear weapons, obviously not nuclear weapon states but *de facto* states with nuclear weapons and both of them are on the receiving end of asymmetric warfare from their neighbours which has a considerable non-state armed group element to it. So, it's quite interesting actually to try to get these presentations together. I would request our four speakers to perhaps speak perhaps for twenty minutes each and after that we will give the discussants something between 10 to 15 minutes and that should then give us hopefully about an hour to discuss the things. So, Prof. Inbar floor is yours sir.

Presentation by Prof. Efraim Inbar on Small Wars: Theory & Practice

I will speak about small wars. First of all I just want to make sure that we are all talking about the same thing. When he mentions the word 'war' is basically the meaning of war has not changed. I am sure you are aware of the literature and all the new things but I think we should strike a balance between the old and the new and I will speak primarily about the constant rather than the new stuff. When I teach my students in war strategy basically I define war as some kind of competition in inflicting pain between social units. This is what we do in war, we inflict pain, we make enemy suffer until he says that I am willing to accept your terms just as more or less victory. It's a very crude definition but this is a true one so you have one clear competition in inflicting pain but there is also another equation at work and this is a capability to sustain pain. So, it's not clear always who is winning the party that is able to sustain more pain or the party that is able to inflict more pain. So, we have some kind of calibration between those two equations and which eventually leads us to what is victory which is not a simple term.

Small wars is not a new term also as we all know that guerrilla which is basically acknowledged as small war in Spanish has been in news for many years. Actually it came from the war that Pachedas groups of irregulars fought against Napoleon in his war in Spain in 1805 to 1814 probably just for curiosity as I first mentioned is [inaudible] documented by Anastas in 15th Century before B.C. Of course [inaudible] wrote about it and he quoted Tsun Tsu an old book of the 5th Century B.C. as the Jewish fought against the Greeks, until today we celebrate the victory of Macades against the Greeks basically it was a small war against larger power, the Greek Empire at that time and imperial Rome fought such wars, Lutvak wrote an excellent book, it was his PhD on the type of wars they fought at the edges of the empire. The term small war we owe it to the British Empire as many thinks in Israel as well as in India and it is probably first used as a literature by

officer Kale who published a book in 1896 *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practices* and Kale basically spoke about wars against imperial enemies, imperialist is a word basically meant purely in terms of numbers, the quality of fighting, but also culturally and I will quote, I am not sure it is politically correct to do so but I don't care as you know. He spoke about facing [inaudible] races savaged tribes and of course sometimes today particularly western powers have the same type of feeling when they face the irregulars. What actually remains is a differential of power, military power between the two sides and that is why sometimes these type of wars are called asymmetric wars today.

So, what's a small war, in my book at least. The first characteristic is reflected in its name at least for one of the sides the war is small, it doesn't require all the resources of the nation, it's not a large-scale conventional war, you don't have to spend all the manpower resources, you can allot just part of your military you don't have to call in the reserves if you have reserves or to call for national conscription, you can run this war without it. All the imperial wars by the British, by the French had this type of characteristic, sometimes they also used foreigners, the Gorkhas or the French you could buy services of mercenaries in order to do this type of wars, to some extent the Israelis have also used the army of Southern Lebanon for a while until it collapsed. So, this is one part. Also it's a small war because it is limited by the means you are using, you don't use necessarily air force, you don't use necessarily tanks or large bombs. Mostly it's an infantry war, it's mounted on mounted camel once, now it's mounted on helicopters that was the wars of Americans against the Indians, it doesn't need so much money, they are relatively cheap wars. For example, the war the French fought in Algeria it was about 10 to 15 per cent of Israel defence budget. The first Israeli Intefadah Israel devoted between 5 to 8 per cent of the national security budget to fight the Palestinians in their small war. The British in Ireland have the same type of numbers in terms of the amount from the national security budget. Basically the small wars do not involve the enlisting of or the mobilization of the national economy like a total war, like a big war, like the World War II or other this type of wars. So, they are smaller in several aspects.

The second clear quality of this war is in the type of military strategy at least one side uses. [inaudible] famous German historian distinguished in his famous book *History of the Art of War*, said it's art, it's not a science distinguished between two types of strategies. One is strategy to what we call to get decisive victory or alternatively an attrition strategy. The topology is based on the distinction in how to want to achieve victory. In the decisive type of strategy you want to achieve victory in a very quick way through a few grand battles in order to the rival force to submit to your will. In a strategy of attrition of course you just kick once in a while your enemy hoping that he will get tired, basically you prepare not to face to the whole power of your enemy and you are trying to defeat him through a series of actions of battles and of course it takes much more time. This is why attrition wars are longer. In the smaller war I would submit to you is characterised by the choice of a strategy of attrition, at least by one side and of course this happens when at least one side doesn't have conventional superiority, has no chance of facing successfully in one set battle the opponent. Also it happens when there is no clear centre of gravity, what Calusevitz called centre of gravity when there is no capital, when there is no large camps, large force that can be surrounded or attacked no political or economic or communication centre that can be attacked. Sometimes even great powers choose this type of strategy because as I mentioned before it requires less resources and also politically it is more amenable at home. This is why probably the United States escalated only gradually in Vietnam because it didn't want to ask Congress for too much money at once, it's always easier to do it in a more incremental way and this is what is Israel is basically doing vis-à-vis the Palestinians. It's a strategy of attrition because there is no real centre of gravity there. This strategy of attrition it main influence is the time factor and this is why small wars are protected wars basically, we are talking about protected wars.

A third characteristic is the area of political goals. There is no clear dichotomy between far-reaching goals and limited goals, but still intuitively we can speak about far-reaching goals, distortion of state for example is a far-reaching goal, limited goals is just want a piece of territory one city or something like this. I would submit to you that smaller wars the ones that we are talking about in this seminar have far-reaching goals and I will give you a few examples. Napoleon when he fought in Spain it was not only about concurring Spain, he wanted French hegemony in the European continent, this was part of the strategy. The U.S. went into Vietnam wrongly or rightly doesn't matter to defend the free world, this was the goal, this is how it was defined. At that time if you remember they have the Domino Doctrine they believe that if Vietnam falls the whole free world will be in danger. Great Britain fought in Malaya, in 1948 to 1957 or in Kenya 1952-56 basically to maintain the British Empire, it was not just about one small place at the end of the world, it was the stakes were much higher at least as viewed by those that were involved in the war. Israel in Lebanon when it fought against the PLO, or against the Hezbollah basically fought against groups, sub-states, sub-national groups which wanted to destroy the Jewish state. This was their goal, this was the partner to our violent dialogue. This destruction of the Jewish state is of course a far-reaching goal. Now for this type of struggle for far-reaching goals you have to invest lot of energies, it takes time, only for far-reaching goals are collectives ready to pay this heavy price over time. Only for far-reaching goals you can mobilize enough people to pay the heavy price of fighting, to pay the price of pain basically, the other side inflicting pain.

I would point out to several other characteristics in small wars. First of all I think armies are not yet ready to fight these type of wars. Armies in general prepare and officers are trained primarily to fight large-scale wars and this is one of the reasons we have problems with these type of encounters because there is little glory for the military profession in this type of encounter. And the question is do we need a special force for that? In Israel there is an ongoing discussion of should build what we you call a professional army or whether to go on with subscription. The young guys that joins the military are problematic in this type of wars, particularly reservists after a month of service in the territories, Israeli reservist can go and demonstrate [unclear] all military forces have less political freedom to do so. This is not only the Israeli experience. Algeria had the same problem, even the Soviet Union as a totalitarian state has a similar problem in Afghanistan. So it is a question how do you train your military for this type of encounters because militarization like all large organisation are quite conservative and they know how to do certain things. It is very difficult to move them away from what they know well. Another observation is that it takes time to identify that this type of encounter is really happening and to give you just one example, it is not clear to the military or to the political levels that they have a war in their hands. For example in Turkey in the 90s it took them time to realize that they have a war against [unclear]. At the beginning they called them bandits, it is the criminals, it is not a military problem, it is for the police to take care of it. Similarly the situation was in Algeria. Another example which I know is from Israel. The first intefada it took the political level quite a time to realise that what is happening at the time is something really different from what happened before and for example Rabin at that time was the defence minister, he was in the United States, he continued his visit as usual knowing that the standard operating procedures of the military will take care of the situation. Those standard operating procedures were totally inadequate to deal with the new situation. The Brits took about a year to realise that they have a problem in Cyprus in 1955. Of course in this type of encounters you don't have a clear front. You have a problem at the border but when there is no clear front it is much more difficult to realise that indeed you have a war on your hand. This type of wars also cause moral dilemmas more difficult for military establishments because these type of wars occur much more than the conventional type among civilians. You have your experience here in India but all over the world this type of wars involve operations among civilians which make it morally more problematic. Even if you try to minimize the level of unwanted casualties. This was true of the Dutch in Indonesia, the Brits in Kenya, in Malay and of course the

problems we have in Israel for example was targeted killing which we are very good at but still they are some times unfortunately civilians get hit. Democracies in particular have difficulties in fighting this type of wars because of those moral dilemmas.

Another observation that I think was considering and needs more elaboration than I have time is of course the type of the tensions between military level and the political level. In this type of operations we see more tensions between the military and the civilian superiors. It is not always clear what kind of autonomy the military should have in those operations, how much should the professionals take care of the situation, how much the political should be involved. Of course to some extent the new technology is allowing the politician micro management and this makes the situation more difficult whether the Prime Minister can pick up a telephone and talk to the person involved and telling I wanted you to do so, I wanted to do something different. We have seen generals rebelling after Algeria, we know from Israel that there are growing tensions between the professional levels and political level when it comes to this type of operations.

I would like to end my talk with asking the question, is the strong winning in this type of small wars. In Israel as well as in other parts there is a myth that ou can't win against a guerrilla, you can't win against the weak and this is not true, simply untrue. If I take a look at the statistics of this type of warfare in the past 200 years and I do it as a statistics, don't quote me too much about, basically you get a gist of what happened. So, the last 200 years between 1800 and 2000 almost 70% of the cases which involve all small wars, the State won, which is not bad. However, if we divide this 200 years by 50 year period and I take a look just at our more recent experience between 1950 and the year 2000 the results are less encouraging for the State. Only 45% of the strong power of state and obviously the state is stronger than a small group, is winning and I will mention, to remind you, a few instances where the strong side won because of this, because all of you, I am sure you know where we failed or the state has failed. The British won in Malaya in 47-48, they won in Kenya 52 and 56, the Philippines, Philippines together with Americans won in 1552 and afters in 72 to 80. The French won in Algeria militarily between 54 and 62 and it sometimes happens that the military is winning and the politicians are losing the war. The Iraqi state won against the Kurds in 60 to 65 and afterwards between 74 and 75. Morocco won against the Polesario 75 to 83, the Turks won against the Kurds in the 90s and now it's being renewed the struggle and I think they have the chance of winning again. I would add also that basically the Israelis have won against vis-à-vis the Palestinians twice, the first Intefada and the second Intefada. The statistics about terror clearly show that the state is winning, terrorism is not, in most cases not winning against the stronger power. So, basically about half of the cases the state is winning and the interesting question is why isn't the state [inaudible]. After all in real politic terms if you take a look at the differentials in power, you count how many divisions, and the side which is stronger has more divisions, if you remember the question of Stalin when he was told that the Pope doesn't like what he says he said 'how many divisions does the Pope have'? So, basically the groups or sub-states call it whatever you want are weaker. So, I think that first of all we should admit that over time the state have taken upon themselves because of various reasons. More limitations in achieving this are false. Those limitations are connected to international law or cultural and to some extent the western state is, and I put in an ambivalent way, is castrating itself and we fight with one hand behind our shoulder, behind our back, you know, that's not the way to fight. Also I must say that I don't buy Lutwak's theory about post-heroic warfare. To remind those who are not familiar with this theory basically says that the West is not willing to because the families have just one child and they are afraid, therefore it's basically a type of warfare which is very unwilling to take casualties and this is why we don't fight. [Inaudible] don't have any casualties also because of the cultural limitations we don't want also the enemy to have too many casualties and you see in Iraq in 1991 when one missile hit a hotel in Iraq and some of the Iraqi civilians, not necessarily people without blood on their hands, but still civilians were killed as Americans had to think twice

how they go on. I don't think this is true by the way, this paradigm, for example like Western countries like the United States or another Western country like Israel is ready to fight and those in the United States as well as Israel shows that there was nothing aversion to casualties, there is an aversion to losing a war, there is an aversion to continue without political results, but there is willingness to fight and to pay the price.

May be, we are now at a point where we changed direction, may it is because, I am talking about giving up part of the limitations which we imposed upon ourselves. May be it's because greater threat perceptions, radical Islam, may be terror, may be the nuclear threat, obviously higher threat perceptions will allow us to remove some of those limitations which we imposed upon ourselves. I know for example of an initiative the famous lawyer [inaudible] who basically tried to remove the limitation of international law on fight against terrorism and then basically the state will be able to hurt more, to inflict more pain. Basically we have neglected this part of the equation. It's not that the state or another state is not willing to pay in pain, it is less willing to inflict pain and what is important basically in these type of wars and I go back to Calovet, Calovet said in these type of wars, smaller wars, you will have to understand what the enemy appreciates or in my version what is painful to the enemy and I know that we live in a very technological age and people look for technological success to strategic problems. I think our main weakness is intellectual, we have to find out exactly what is the most effective way to inflict pain, this still is the most relevant question when we fight these type of enemies and it is those are not entities that you cannot inflict on them pain, you just need enough imagination to find what is painful there and if you get that you will get victory. Thank you.

Presentation by Dr. Rajesh Rajagopalan on Sub-national Insurgencies: Lessons from the Indian Experience

I love having little bit of space around me so I will use the podium. Basically I think one of the points that Prof. Inbar ended with is where I will begin because he correctly pointed out that conventional forces have tremendous difficulty in fighting insurgencies, in fighting these kinds of what is sometimes called fourth generation of warfare, a fourth generation warfare and addressing that question is what I start with as to why it is that states face this much difficulty in fighting against insurgents fighting these small wars. And as he correctly pointed out this is a challenge to bring in a larger issue of theory, this is a challenge for those who think that military power matters. Israelis for example would have seen that military power is most important, if military power is important then why is it that stronger powers do not win. The second question that I will deal with is what are the appropriate methods for dealing with these kinds of challenges, with these kinds of insurgencies. And finally, what are the consequences of these kinds of insurgencies in terms of national security and international security. Now, all of these broad questions that I am addressing I will look at primarily from the perspective of India and all of the answers or suggestions that I have comes from the Indian experience. We have of course had a long experience with fighting insurgencies, we have been fighting them for the last 50 plus years, 56 I think the Indian Army first went into the North East. So, we have a long experience and in terms of success we have also fairly enviable record because with the exception of the IPKF operation in Sri Lanka they have not lost a single insurgency. We haven't won very many of them, but we haven't lost them so I think that is with the exception of Mizoram and Punjab we haven't exactly won an insurgency but we haven't lost any of the other ones. So, that's a pretty good record. And so in a sense drawing lessons from the Indian experience might help us look at some of these questions that I address. But I also have to add a caveat before I start which is that by and large Indian experience has been the domestic insurgencies and therefore when you look as Prof. Inbar mentioned a lot of the cases, if you look at the universe of cases of small wars most of them have been international or foreign wars and I think most of the successes that he mentioned were essentially domestic insurgencies and I think there is a point to be

focused on that because I think states find it easier to deal with domestic insurgencies than with foreign insurgencies and I will suggest some reasons why that is so.

Let me start with the first question which is why it is that states have so much difficulties, why conventional armies have so much difficulties in facing insurgents. I think one of the reasons as he mentioned is the standard operating procedure that armies use i.e. conventional armies have a particular way of fighting and they find it difficult to adapt from that specific standard operating procedure to fighting insurgents. Andrew Karponovic who wrote one of the best books on the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army's Experience in Vietnam War argued that the U.S. Army fought in Vietnam with what he called the army concept which basically said that the primary fight that the United States will be engaged in will be in Central Europe and therefore that was the army concept, that is, to fight in Central Europe against a massive similarly structured Soviet Army, the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Army. So, in a sense that is what the U.S. Army wanted to do and they essentially took that template, that standard operating procedure and applied it to Vietnam which of course did not work. Now, that is not the only interpretation of the Vietnam War, I mean, that's an interpretation that I accept but within the U.S. Army there are other interpretations of why the U.S. did so badly in Vietnam. Harry Summers most famously which became known within the U.S. Army as the Powell Doctrine which is that, you know, we don't do jungles, we want to do deserts so in a sense the problem was that you couldn't fight in jungles or in those kinds of terrains but you could fight a conventional army, you could fight other conventional military forces as the first Iraq War showed. But it is not just the U.S. Army in Vietnam, it is also the Soviets in Afghanistan which Prof. Inbar also mentioned. The Soviets in Afghanistan had exactly the same problem that the United States had in Vietnam which was that they took a template which was designed for fighting in Central Europe, applied it to Afghanistan which did not work and they did the same thing in Chechnya which is again creating problems as the Americans are finding also in the second war in Iraq. Our case to some extent in Sri Lanka also reflects that, a conventional war bias, what I would call a conventional war bias.

Counter-insurgency military doctrines I would argue that needs to focus more on small unit operations on what Prof. Inbar mentioned as special forces. It is not that special forces are not used in counter-insurgency warfare, all armies do use special forces, but I there is a limitation in terms of the overall structure of militaries because militaries are structured for fighting in very large units, they are structured to fight conventional wars and therefore they tend to have a natural suspicion of small units or dispersal of mass; the mass is an important idea within military doctrines and for armies dispersal is something that they are wary of, they are very careful about and with good reason. I mean it's not just a bias that comes out of a some kind of standard operating procedure or an army culture. There are actually good reasons why you shouldn't disperse your forces and I gives you two instances of recent South Asian military history 1962 we distributed forces along the border in a very thin line and we were routed by the Chinese invasion. Similarly, the Pakistanis in East Pakistan and the Bangladesh war expecting that our objective was primarily to capture piece of territory similarly also dispersed their forces in a kind of a very thin line around the East Pakistan border and again we were easily penetrate that line and rout the Pakistani Army. So, in a sense dispersal becomes a serious military problem for good reason and therefore conventional armies tend to have a natural inhibition to disperse forces. They tend to prefer concentration of forces and this is particularly so when an army also has large conventional threats to face and the Indian Army for example always says that it's primary mission is to fight conventional threats like Pakistan and China, that is its primary mission; dealing with domestic insurgencies is only a secondary for the Indian Army and you would find that repeatedly cited in most army documents, in most army unit histories for example. So, in a sense it is understandable that when you face conventional adversaries your doctrinal culture tends to emphasise large unit operations and I would give you other examples. For example, even within a state the distinction between let's say the U.S. Army and the Marines is an important

distinction because the marines are not designed to fight large conventional wars, that's not the primary force, that's not the primary mission, they are essentially an expeditionary force and therefore as the marines themselves say we don't plan, we improvise. So, in a sense that is built into the sort of strategic culture or the organizational culture, the organizational ethos of that force whereas the U.S. Army is much more conventional and therefore much more inflexible when it comes to dealing with insurgencies and counter-insurgency operations. The marines when they were deployed in Vietnam did very well in the beginning as long as they were operating independently but as soon as they were taken over by the U.S. Army they were no longer as effective because the U.S. Army insisted on using the marines in the way that they used any regular U.S. Army unit. That distinction you would find also let's say between the colonial British Army and the colonial British Indian Army. The colonial British Army which was much more of an expeditionary force was much more flexible. The British Indian Army because of India's continental size and because of the fact that they were thinking primarily in terms of meeting some Russian invasion tended to be much more conventional, much more inflexible and you found that difference for example when the British Indian Army was deployed in the World War. They found it very difficult to fight especially in the beginning those kinds of conflicts. So, in a sense I think conventional armies do tend to have great difficulties especially when conventional armies face significant other conventional threats as India or as the United States does or other countries do. When they believe that the primary threat that they face is going to be a conventional enemy then they have great difficulty for good reasons in adapting to counter-insurgency warfare.

What has been Indian Army's approach to or doctrine in terms of dealing with counter-insurgency. There are four or five important elements in the Indian Army's doctrine which I think has made the Indian Army one of the more effective forces in terms of dealing with insurgencies. The first is a limitation on the amount of force that we use, the Indian Army right from the beginning even though there was some opposition in the beginning in the 50s, but right from the beginning did not use or gave up use of heavy artillery or air power in dealing with insurgencies and that was a very important political decision which the Army have virtually came to accept and that is important because that not only reduces the level of casualties but also because it is tiding to a larger understanding that insurgencies are political problems so that people that you are fighting are people that you eventually have to sit down and talk with and these are people that you are trying to sort of integrate within the national mainstream and therefore using indiscriminate force is going to be a problem for the larger objective which is to integrate that enemy that you are fighting into your national mainstream. One of the examples that I would cite is that in the U.S. Army in Iraq currently how many helicopters the gun ships have lost but in the last three or four years they have lost a fair number, and the Indian Army in the last fifty years hasn't lost a single helicopter gun ship in battle in the encounter insurgency for the single reason obviously that we don't use helicopter gun ships in any of these wars. So there is that limitation on the quantum of force is an important principle that the Indian Army stresses that which is tied to the understanding of these wars as political wars which we eventually have to reach compromises with the people that we are fighting and those compromises become easier if you were more discriminate in the use of force. That doesn't mean of course that Indian Army operations are general, far from it; there are human rights violations, war is never gentle; I am just talking about a kind of a sort of continuum, I mean, that if you consider U.S. Army in Vietnam or Iraq or the Soviet Army in Afghanistan and the Indian in the North East and Kashmir I think that you would see that distinction in terms of the quantum of force. The next couple of elements are fairly common to other armies that fight in these kinds of operations is you have to isolate the population from the insurgents and we have done that with variety of means, we learnt from the British, the protected villages and so on and so forth but nowadays we do that more with cordon and search operations and so on. The third element is dominating in insurgency affected areas, this is one of those things that the Indian Army is better at

doing probably than most of the armies because basically what we do is blanket an area with troops. For example, it's troop intensive, Indian Army operations. What that does is not just show the flag but it also prevents the insurgents from gaining complete control over specific areas, but the Indian Army has significant advantages which is that it beats a large army, there's an equally large paramilitary force, various paramilitary forces that India has and therefore we can and we also accept high levels casualties. So, it's easier for the Indian Army to do it, it's probably more difficult for some of the other armies that face this kind of challenges. The fourth element is that we always insist on maintaining larger forces, that's what I meant by large unit operations in the combat area. The Indian Army operations are almost never at the platoon level, it's always at the company levels and battalion levels which has its advantages but it's advantage is that it does allow as I said earlier to show the flag and to demonstrate the state's presence in these insurgency affected areas. One of the alternatives to this, reducing these kind of large units or may be even addition to that would be to be small forces. The British use very effectively what is called the Ferret Force in Malaya, the Germans when they were fighting the partisans and Russia and in occupied Yugoslavia also use commando force very effectively which we haven't as effectively I would argue, but we need to emphasize that more. And the final and the most important element of the army's doctrine is in acceptance. This is much more recent, seventies and eighties, this is an acceptance that ultimately there is no military solution to insurgencies. If you read anything that the Indian Army officers write post-1970s, 1980s, this is almost by rote, I mean, everybody would say the same thing. There are no military solutions to an insurgency. So, basically what the military force does in Indian counter-insurgency situations is to bring a situation about where political negotiations or political process can resume restoring normalcy as it is sometimes called. So, that is a very important idea that there are no military solutions is a very important element which I think is not something that, even though it is accepted in principle by many other militaries, I think, it's not as well operationalised in other doctrines as in the Indian case.

What are the international and the national security consequences especially in the South Asian case? One of the arguments that is usually made is that nuclearization of the region has made it more difficult for India to fight these kinds of wars. The often quoted theory is Glenn Schneider's *Stability-Instability Paradox* which suggests that you had a potential for nuclear escalation then that stability at the nuclear level encourages instability at the lower levels of conflict, that's a kind of paradox because basically what it does is that because you know that you can't fight at the nuclear level it allows you the freedom to fight at lower levels. Now, Glenn Schneider meant it primarily to talk about conventional wars, and he was talking about the European balance rather than really talking about a counter-insurgency. But it has been used in the South Asian context, I think, I would argue, mistakenly by to argue that because of nuclearization it has allowed Pakistan the freedom to support insurgencies and terrorism and so on India and Pakistan. I think that is partly wrong because if you simply look at history Pakistan has always done that, I mean, in 1948, the 1960s when they supported the rebels in the North East, 1980s when they supported the insurrection in Punjab and of course the Kashmir situation happened obviously after the nuclearization, but all of those other instances show that they have been involved in internal insurgencies in India and it had nothing to do really with nuclearization. Nuclearization may have given them greater confidence that Indian would not respond very vehemently but even without that they were very actively involved. So, I am not sure that nuclearization necessarily had anything to do with their involvement or increased in any way their involvement in sub-national conflicts or sub-national insurgencies within India. Nevertheless it does limit our options, I mean, Kargil is a good illustrate. Kargil is very similar to 1948 and 1965 because basically what they did in 1948 and 1965 in essence they repeated in Kargil. But what was our response in 1948 and 1965? Our response was a full-scale war. In the fifties itself Nehru had said that if you attack us in Kashmir we would across international border and that's precisely what we did in 1965, but in Kargil we couldn't do that, I mean, we kept our operations limited to

our side of the border. There was no limitation on the quantum of force used against those insurgents, for example, we used air power against the sort of intervention in Kargil, but that is very carefully kept within Indian territory. So, there are limitations that are imposed by nuclearization and the notion that came up after Kargil and after Operation Parakrama about cold start and limited war and so on suggest that we are still trying to grapple with the implications of how to deal with that situation, how to deal with extra or foreign support for domestic insurgence. But we haven't really reached a good solution to those problems. So, what we learn in a sense, in a couple of minutes, what do we learn from the Indian experience. The caveat that I said at the beginning needs to be re-emphasised which is that all of the instances that I talked about have been domestic insurgencies and the only that we lost was the foreign war which was in Sri Lanka and that tells us something important which is that in internal rebellions we are able to bear larger costs and we are willing to take our time. I mean, in a sense, Nagaland has been going on for the last – 1954-955 it began and it's still going on. But we are not going to get out of Nagaland, I mean, that's not even an option that we would consider. Our nationalism in a sense then conflicts Naga nationalism to the extent that we think of North East as an integral part of India or Kashmir as an integral part of India, we will bear any burden as it were and fight as long as it takes to prosecute those wars effectively, but that kind of staying power will not be available when you are fighting what you clearly consider to be foreign territory where you are essentially fighting for abstract principles whether it was the IPKF or the U.S. in Vietnam or the Soviets in Afghanistan, there if you don't have victory quickly then you are going to start wondering as to what is that you are fighting for, that doesn't arise when you are fighting in domestic cases. The second lesion I think that we have to learn from the Indian experience is that we have to drastically reduce the quantum of force that we use in these kinds of wars, we have to be very, very careful, very discriminate about the quantum of force that we use in these kinds of wars because you ultimately want to find a political solution, ultimately there is only a political way to resolve some of these conflicts and to reach that political solution you need to have space, that space is going to be taken if you are not careful about the quantum of force that you use. Another final implication is that counter-insurgency campaigns are very, very difficult to win completely militarily, I mean, it ultimately requires some kind of a political solution. And final implication in a sense is that states that face significant other conventional threats India or any other larger state will find it very difficult to deal or to modify their counter-insurgency doctrines effectively sufficiently to be able to deal with some of these threats because there are significant other conventional threats that you have to face and therefore that puts that ceiling in terms of the amount of modification that you can do in terms of your doctrine. Thank you.

Mr. Varun Sahni: Thank you very much Dr. Rajagopalan. I wonder if there is an interesting debate emerging here between Prof. Inbar's creative ways to inflict more pain and Dr. Rajagopalan's notion here about reducing the quantum of force, but this is just for any doubt in my role as chair, we could get to that little later. Wing Commander Krishnappa the floor is yours.

Wing Commander V. Krishnappa:
I think much of what I need to say, the theoretical, historical aspects of this debate has already been said. A mention has been made, before I get on to presenting my ideas about the 2nd Lebanon War, about the civil-military relations during this kind of conflicts especially in the democratic context. I think the 2nd Lebanon War is at one level is a story of political incompetence. This political incompetence in terms of keeping it specific to Israel is borne out of both a combination of personalities involved at the higher levels, the political structure which is essentially fractured and coalitional and also lack of institutional mechanisms which could have mitigated some of this otherwise structural problems, and most importantly level the military mind predominates the political mind in Israel for obvious reason, for historical experience and that led to adoption in a hurry, I might, a certain type of a doctrine and you know it's not that something I am saying, it's part of

the Winograd Committee's summaries which suggest that the Israeli leadership, combination of the prime minister and chief of staff failed to understand the nature of the war they were embarking upon and this is something not unique to Israel. I must say that this interaction between the political and military leaders, militaries tend to influence the political mind because mostly the political mind is not competent to grapple with the issues that are military. And this has also the other consequence of using military force which it is not prepared for, that is the story of the last 48 hours of Lebanon War where the politicians wanted to give a spin of victory and they sent forces without thoroughly identifying what their targets are and this is something that played out in the last phase of the war which appeared and incoherent and without a purpose and which is also well recognised by the Winograd Committee, if I might say. I must enter a caveat here, I am doing a long-term project on this war and I would consider that I am a student since we have very senior Israeli guests, I would be welcome to be contested if any of my observations are proved to be problematic. Then, the nature of war is well laid out by [inaudible] 200 years ago which is to say is complex, it is dynamic, once you set the force in motion one cannot be always on the top of it in terms of controlling it. So that principle of just war which suggests that you would embark on a war only when it becomes necessary is also partly borne out by the fact that you may not have the control, you may not always win, it's worth only if it is necessary to fight and that's something which Israel violated and it's also intriguing that very soon after the morning attack at around 9 o'clock, if am not wrong, 9.05 or something immediately within a hour of war a Olmert declared in a press conference and of course you had the meeting in the evening, this is strange because no consultation, no understanding of what to do. So, let me finish that point by saying that at some level the Israeli leadership misunderstood the nature of the war they were embarking upon and my second preliminary observation is that, you know, what is the meaning of Hezbollah and this particular war to the larger debate. Now, Hezbollah to my mind, is the most successful non-state armed group present in the world today by its own claim and much of the public opinion in Israel admits to this that it succeeded against the most sophisticated armed forces in the world twice over, 2000 and 2006. Now, one might dispute what this meaning of success means but to the support base of Hezbollah and the larger public opinion in the Arab world and much of the neutral public opinion of world Hezbollah seems to have emerged as a victor both in 2000 and more so in the 200y conflict. This is a huge issue for Israel to grapple with and in managing the perceptions of the world and also the perceptions of the principal target group of this war from the Israel perspective the Shias in Lebanon, again Israel's leadership failed to grapple with this issue and deal with in terms of information warfare, etc., this the second observation. Now, what to my mind, I had argued a year ago, more than a year ago I wrote this article *Who Won the Second Israel-Lebanon War* where I broadly concluded by saying that, well, in the immediate aftermath, the preliminary assessment would suggest that Israel achieved most important among its goals that it set out to achieve which is that for the first time you have the Lebanese army coming to the South and exercising its sovereignty now, and you have for the first time Hezbollah leadership in the middle of the war admitting its difficulties. This happened within a week's time, I think 20th of July Hezbollah leader admitted that if had anticipated this is the kind of response Israel would, the way it responded, he would not have embarked upon this particular abduction itself. You also have international force inserted in a much more greater strength, but these are material factors one could using them say Israel achieved success, but the most important goal which has been from 1982 to 2000 and even this time, I think, at the core of the Israeli strategy is to change the political dynamics within Lebanon. Now it appeared this 2006 war might have brought about some situation where that could be taken further if Israel were to work on it, but a year later it appears that doesn't seem to be the case, Hezbollah because it's an organization, not simply a military organization, it is both a religious organization with a very sophisticated technological base, a strong support base, it seems that Hezbollah has grown stronger in the last one and a half years in its political activism within Lebanon and it is the dominant player in the politics of Lebanon. In that fundamental sense this war, if at all it has made

a difference, it has made a difference in positive terms for Hezbollah. So, one could say that that is a biggest failure.

What did Israel tried to achieve by embarking upon this war. I will just take few of the points that I put out earlier. One was this issue of enhancing Israeli deterrence. Now, this became critical for Israel because ever since the withdrawal in 2000 and the Gaza withdrawal in 2005 and along with this, this strategy of Olmert for which he came to power, the unilateral strategy of building a wall and withdrawing from the West Bank and the war that started on 25ᵗʰ June 2006, the rocket war from Gaza Strip all this gave a sense that somehow Olmert is incompetent, he is unable to protect the Israeli citizens from the rocket fire that is coming from its territories that they voluntarily withdrew, in the conception of the Israeli public opinion. So it was necessary for Olmert's government to reinforce a sense of deterrence or whatever it is and increase the level of confidence in the public mind that we could go ahead and withdraw from West Bank. I think in that sense it didn't actually worked. I don't think the unilateral plan is going anywhere, I don't there is any possibility, I agree with the dark vision a frame has that I don't think a negotiated settlement is anywhere near us. So, in that sense enhancing the deterrence in order to facilitate the political agenda of the Kadima Party is I think is not in a very good shape. But if deterrence is seen in terms of deterring someone like Syria or some other state actor I don't anyone has doubts about Israeli's capability to inflict huge pains, as to borrow a Efraim's word, in terms of conventional wars. So, I don't think anyone had any doubts about Israeli's deterrence and I don't think this war as many believe that somehow Israel's invincibility has been lost after this war. I doubt any reasonable head of government in any of the Arab countries would take that seriously himself. In that sense that had no impact, this war had no impact either way that Israel can fight conventional wars and win with any Arabs or combination of all of them together, if necessary.

You see, one of the, I don't know there could dispute about this, in fact this borrowing from [unclear] strategic interaction theory in a way that theory suggests that the strong power wins if the strategies are matched in a way which is to say you also fight like a guerrilla if he is fighting like a guerrilla so the strong power will win if they are matched, if they are asymmetric then the weaker tends to win. Now, the Israeli aerial strategy was a guerrilla strategy, it targeted the civilian population whether you like it or not, you don't take, it was a brutal attack on the Southern Lebanon intended, deliberate in order to empty much of Southern Lebanon and that is what happened, by all open source, independent sources suggest out of 1.2 million Shia Lebanese in the Southern Lebanon one million almost had to reshuffle their homes and nearly 100,000 got displaced. But this was a strategy in order to remove the support base because one of the sources of legitimacy for Hezbollah is that they said 'we will protect you from Israeli attack, we are your defenders', the Lebanese army is incompetent and incapable and by doing this and not only doing this to the Shia population but even threatening the larger Lebanese infrastructure, etc., the message was sent that Hezbollah can't protect you, that was one of the aims and in that sense may be it appeared, in between, during the war and immediate aftermath there was some concern on part of Hezbollah that this has done more damage to them than good, but over time the solidarity of the Shia population hasn't shifted from Hezbollah and in fact it seems has gone further. That is the second point.

Now, much success was achieved, again yesterday's referenced made in another context by Efraim I would say, in these kind of situations even a containment strategy is a useful one perhaps that is what even the Winograd Committee at some point suggests that there could have been other ways of dealing with this that is that as the internal debates have been debated in the Israeli press that I think Leveni suggested that within a week's time they should stop this operation, 'we have done what could' and what that could have achieved is essentially this aim of Israel that destruction or reduction of long range rocket forces. This largely appears to be a success story; within the first 72 hours the reports

emanating from within Israel as well as many other who have written about it destroyed most of the long range forces and now, your now, the short range rocket forces are not easily targettable, it's difficult and they are also not very useful for the enemy in terms what damage you could inflict. In that sense there was a sense of achievement here and I think it's worthy because considering that you can't really transform, again Efraim yesterday mentioned societies which have very complex set of political dynamics at play which is what Lebanon is, so if you wish to embolden the Signora government, the Sunnis or the Moronites Israeli's have tried for many, many years various kinds, diplomatic, through intelligence sources, through the wars and occupation, etc., etc. I don't see a hope that that could happen and as you rightly mentioning the other day that the Shias are increasing in number, we may dispute at what rate, but they are certainly increasing in number and the more elite kinds obviously find it conflict zones not very palatable or migrating from Maronite and Sunni communities and they are spreading out to the North obviously for population growth, they will search for jobs and other opportunities and increasingly what we are seeing is a dream of a Shia country emerging in Lebanon and you cannot do much, neither Israeli's can do much, nor the March 14ᵗʰ coalition that came in together to the Syrian occupation after Harare's murder, they are in any position to shape this dynamic that will play out in years to come. So, in that sense I would say that the impact of this war, if anything, has solidified the Hezbollah support base and I think that seems to be the trend. Now, the longer term implications of this is simple. Israel will not obviously accept, now one would think that at the moment the Hezbollah is 'under' is not 'out'. In fact, it is showing signs of wanting to come above and play it out once in a while because it should be understood there is a tendency to believe because Hezbollah is a religious party, as the name indicates Party of God, it is not given to a reasonable understanding of the situation around and the context and operate according to the context. That is not an impression that I gathered by the statements of Nasrullah during this war. He appeared to be someone who is in control, in contrast to the leadership in Israel he appeared to be much more confident, sophisticated in his activities and in his ability to command his people and put out a story, a narrative of what he was trying to do much more competently than the Israeli political leadership could do and here's a person who seems to have the impulse of his people and ably leading them at this moment. So, the question of Hezbollah not seeking to acquire more capabilities, I mean, even if the UNIFIL, the blockading of borders and all of this, the impulse to acquire more arms is present and I think Hezbollah is doing it already surreptitiously and there is not much that international community can do about it, perhaps the lesson of this war is that as and when it becomes necessary, may be, Israel's only strategic option to my mind is to contain, that you contain at a level that it doesn't hit high-far at some other industrial towns and keep it only to the low rocket forces. To me the importance of Hezbollah of lies in the fact that it's both a combination of religious party, a sophisticated political actor both domestically and as well as internationally, it has all the characteristics of a non-state actor which has the diaspora support and it marries technology with its religious ideology very, very well and it is willing to bargain and negotiate and it plays very well this game of negotiations, time and again it has done and wait for its time. I think the essence of all kinds of leadership is timing and Nusrullah approved when he gave that speech while his one of the missiles went and hit the ship in the Mediterranean. I think various theoretical points have been brought about these asymmetric wars, but I think another variable that cannot be theorized actually and which is to my mind is very, very important and I mentioned in the beginning is the question of leadership. Non-state actors, to my mind, across this spectrum in the geographical from Lebanon to India, they seems to present a better picture of leadership than a state-actor. This is not something you could easily theorize but it's a very critical factor in understanding the shape of the world that is emerging and these are going to be, and Nusrullah is going to be the important influential actor in whole of Arab politics, he wins the maximum number of votes in any opinion polls, Al Qaeda leader Osama-bin-Laden comes second after him. So, of course, they are all important in their own ways, so do you deal with this phenomenon of people who are much more coherent and who appear more competent

and who are more willing to urge their supporters to sacrifice their lives more often than a democratic polity or even an authoritarian conventional politics, the state politics could do. This is the key challenge in the phenomena that needs to be observed and studied much more intellectually engaged as to why these people could bring with them those who are willing to die more of than the regular states could do. With that I will end.

Presentation by Dr. Reshmi Kazi on "The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism in Asia":
Thank you, sir. Before I begin I would like to say at the outset that this is part of my research project in IDSA and I would look forward to your comments, your suggestions so that I can further enrich my paper. Having said that nuclear terrorism is not a new phenomenon, the concept of nuclear terrorism is intricately associated with the inception of nuclear weapons. There is a long held consensus among scholars that the first usage of nuclear weapons by the Americans was not required to end the war against Japan, but to lay down the parameters of the global world order by implicitly terrorising enemies of the U.S. The United States primarily dropped the bomb to stop the Russians in Asia and to give them a sober pause in the Eastern Europe. Now, this was the instance of state sponsored nuclear terrorism. However, terrorism involving nuclear weapons have evolved significantly and emerged as one of the key concerns of the 21ˢᵗ Century. The attacks of 9/11 have left a resounding impact on the problem of nuclear terrorism not just in the United States but also all over the world. The diabolic attacks have led to the belief that in the present day era of nuclear terrorism there are no limits, no constraints, nothing that is off the table. The possibility of nuclear terrorism is becoming more and more salient in international affairs with the growing sophistication in lethality of conventional forms of terrorism, the vulnerability of nuclear power and research reactors to terrorist attacks and a weapon usable nuclear material to pilferage activities. Today's terrorists operate with apocalyptic motivations to unleash cataclysmic disaster on their targets and one instance, there is a 1996, Osama-bin-Laden asked Khaled Sheikh Muhammad, the principal planner behind the 9/11 why do you use an axe when you can use a bulldozer. Khaled Muhammad who is presently under U.S. custody told his interrogators that by axe Bin Laden referred to a proposal wherein he implied to charter a plane with explosives and to crash into the CIA in Langley, Virginia. We can imply from this that Bin Laden gave instructions to Muhammad to devise a more dramatic, devastating blow against the hated enemy, of course, that is the United States.

If you come to the traditional view of terrorism it implies by and large that terrorists do not want to go too far, their goal was primarily fulfilled by being able to have, in the words of Brian Jenkins a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. Real terrorists are more interested in publicity than in a greater number of victims. Perhaps this is one reason why John Paracheney argues that so far only three completed or attempted terrorist mass casualty attacks involving unconventional weapons material have occurred and these are first the Rajneeshi Religious Cult that attempted to influence a local election by poisoning the local people with salmonella, typhimorium; the second involved the usage of chlorine gas by the LTTE against the Sri Lankan military which led to the injury of approximately 60 army personnel and the third is with the usage of saran gas by the Shinrikiyo cult against commuters in a Tokyo subway in 1995. Now, these small number of tired and tested terrorist activity involving unconventional weapons probably implies that the terrorists are more interested in tried and tested methods rather than to go for unexplored or for that matter exotic alternatives which are technically more challenging and there are also series of difficulties involved in successfully carrying out an attack which involves chemical, biological, radiological as well as nuclear, in short CBRN weapons. However, there has been a change in perception. The conventional view suggesting a minimal likelihood of terrorist using WMD have significantly evolved particularly with the attacks on the twin towers. These attacks devise the conventional form of thinking and began to seriously contemplate the possibility of WMD being used outside the context of general inter-state warfare precisely by the terrorist groups. Richard Bets had argued that CBRN weapons which were considered as the technological

frontier of warfare and principal weapons of powerful states has now increasingly evolved to be the weapons of the weak, the states or groups. These weapons which were symbolic of strength are now believed to be the instruments of vulnerability and weakness letting them the only hope of so-called rock-states or terrorists against their targeted enemies.

Now, coming to the terrorists' access to the WMD materials and the barriers involved in it since the 1970s there has been considerable fear of these weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and non-state actors. According to Stanley Jacobs there are four pathways that terrorists could use to access, develop and deploy nuclear weapons or attack methodologies. First, the terrorist could steal an intact nuclear weapon and then perhaps illicitly transfer it into a target state. Second, the terrorist could attempt to construct an IND from the stolen or purchased fissile materials. Although this is a theoretical possibility the conversion of that information into a functioning device is a task of far different magnitude. Third, the terrorists could device a radiological – RDB – or a dirty bomb, and finally, the terrorists could attack and sabotage a nuclear reactor causing the release of large amount of radioactivity. Now, there are certain practical barriers involved in each of these pathways. As regards terrorists stealing or otherwise smuggling a nuclear weapon Thomas Baddy says it is unlikely that a non-state actor could successfully steal or acquire a finished nuclear device. According to him states invest billions of dollars to develop nuclear weapons as evident from the cases of Pakistan, North Korea and Iran. Hence, it is not rational to presume that these states will simply handover these lethal assets to any terrorist organization knowing fully well that the long term implications and military ramifications involved. The sources countries is also aware that these illicit transactions with terrorist organizations always pose the risk of detection, specially because such nuclear device will bear the imprint allowing it to be traced back to the donor country. However, this exposition does not take into account of those nuclear weapons which are lost or misplaced or unaccounted for. In 1997 former Russian Security Council Secretary Gen. Alexander Levitt claimed that the Russian government was unable to account for roughly 80 demolition ammunitions popularly known as nuclear suitcase bombs. These devices weight about 30 to 45 kg. and could be in a back-pack. However, this was retracted later on and so the matter was, you know, like left at that. The second aspect Jacob's first pathway that is to smuggle a nuclear device into a target state is a more realistic scenario. The clandestine shipment of nuclear material/device or technology is likely to be the primary way by which such a weapon could be used and detecting a clandestinely transported nuclear weapon is inherently difficult, the radiation signatures emitted by the fissile materials are weak and can be further attenuated by shielding. Moreover, illicit trafficking of nuclear devices and material become more likely in view of the structural trade environment inherent in the present state of globalisation. Again, the vast global trade routes, economic pressures to reduce inspection and open borders are also ways through which this illicit transaction can take place. On the second pathway of constructing a nuclear as suggested by Jacobs opinion is somewhat divided, in fact, widely divided on this likelihood. However, it is possible to construct an IND as oppose to a flawless state constructed weapon and this is primarily called a 'gun-type' weapon. There is broad consensus among experts that there are widely available plans and there are readily available machining tools for that and with simple improvements in the gun-type weapon it could be made versatile and mobile and could be easily carried or concealed in a car, boat, aeroplane, and it could occupy a very small area within a shipping container. The other type of weapon of course would be the implosion weapon, but it is considered to be complicated and will likely require state assistance in building it.

Well, considering the difficulties involved in acquiring, assembling, deploying and detonating a nuclear device in terrorist attack the third pathway of conducting an RDB is much more realistic. It is simpler to develop a dirty bomb and it is more likely that terrorists will gain access to the materials required to build an effective RDD. Many experts believe that unguarded nuclear waste facilities become a source of material to be

used in a radiological bomb. An RDD may not immediately result in mass casualties except for those individuals caught within the radius of the conventional blast, but could potentially kill thousands of people over a prolonged period of time due to exposure to radiation. Besides that the economic fall-out of an RDD attack can be more dramatic. The fourth pathway that is sabotaging a nuclear facility has emerged unfortunately as a more realistic probability in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The 9/11 Commission report noted that Khaled Sheikh Muhammad's original 9/11 plot was much more ambitious what actually transpired and involved among other things attacking a nuclear power plant with suicide aircraft. In area of aerial suicide attack sabotaging a nuclear facility is a strong possibility, I mean, it should not be beyond imagination. In August 2003 the Canadian authorities arrested 19 individuals on charges of conspiring to destroy a nuclear power plant on the shore of Lake Ontario. A recent incident, on 8th November, 2007 four armed men broke into the Palindaba nuclear facility in Pretoria a site where an estimated 25 bombs worth of weapons grade uranium are stored. These four technically sophisticated criminals de-activated several layers of security including a 10,000 volt electrical fence suggesting insider knowledge of the system. They spent about 45 minutes inside one of South Africa's most heavily guarded national key points, stole a computer which they eventually left behind and breached an electronically sealed control room. What is important to understand is that if armed attackers succeeded in penetrating the site's highly enriched uranium vault they could have carried away the materials for the world's first terrorist nuclear bomb. It also highlights the vulnerability of nuclear power plants.

Now, why would terrorists use nuclear device, a significant question. Apocalyptic groups who are unable to acquire a nuclear would attempt to develop an IND. Now, acquisition of an IND would serve dual purposes. First manipulation, and second mass destruction. It would also serve the purpose of conferring more prestige to a terrorist group than procreating an intact nuclear device since it would bring into their prominence their technical competence in building an IND. It would also serve to enhance the threat posed by the terrorist groups. Besides groups like Al Qaeda has self-imposed upon themselves that it is there to acquire a nuclear weapon in order to punish the infidels and make the world a better place. A politico-religious terrorist fashion is not content merely with death and destruction. They are keen on leaving an indelible mark on the psyche of the target leaving them to live in constant fear and panic. This purpose can be very well achieved with a radiological dispersal device. Now, this can be seen in terms of nuclear politics played by the terrorists acquisition of a nuclear weapon or for that matter an IND would confer international recognition and perhaps a create a sense equivalence with the state thereby promoting their national objectives to some extent. In addition the aura and the myth surrounding nuclear weapons could afford a terrorist organization significant political capital. Would terrorists use nuclear weapons if they could? After the 9/11 attacks the possibility of nuclear weapons falling in the hands of terrorist has emerged as a chilling prospect. With this one incident terrorists have indicated their inclination for mass killings, causing mammoth loss to property and wreck havoc on the psyche of the common people. Culminating with 9/11 attacks terrorism has become more violent and more deadly. The possibility that terrorists will resort to the WMD hence should not be beyond imagination. Besides the written materials about CBRN agents and the rudimentary sketches found in the Al-Qaeda caves in Afghanistan the nexus between the terrorists and the Pakistani nuclear scientists, the anthrax laced letters of 2001, the recent contaminated letters in the White House of February 2004 are strong pointers to the hypothesis that terrorists are willing to cross the threshold of weapons of mass destruction and today's terrorists are inspired by extremist religious ideologies, they justify destruction, vengeance and punishment as tools to achieve a better world. When such predilections are combined with a growing lethality of terrorist attacks the possibility of terrorists using nuclear, chemical and biological weapons becomes much more realistic. How can nuclear terrorism get enhanced. Now, this would primary depend on the capability of the terrorists to undertake nuclear terrorism by facilitating their access to

materials are facilities are by providing them with a safe and secure haven wherein they can conduct their planning and training without the fear of being detected. For this they have to develop nexus with the state establishment including state sponsorship, insider assistance and links to organized crimes. These wild cards will provide the terrorists with an element of surprise, it is not necessary that these terrorists and these wild cards need to have same motives, but should there be some kind of connection the wherewithal of carrying out an act of nuclear terrorism can be bolstered tremendously. Now, this is somewhat the situation is like in Pakistan. Credible sources have repeatedly confirmed about insiders within the Pakistani establishment who sympathise with the cause of the Al-Qaeda against U.S. and those collaborating with it. To this extent India has been the target of several terrorist attacks by radical Islamic groups like Jamaa-e-Islami, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hizbul Mujahiddin, Harkatul Mujahiddin and Jaish-e-Mohammad who have well established connection and share ideology with the Taliban headed Al-Qaeda. These extremists consider the West, particularly the United States their sworn enemy and needless to say they also consider allies or states which are collaborating with the United State as their enemy as well. The radical elements existing within the ranks of the Pakistani army are deeply motivated to join in the Jehad declared by the Al-Qaeda. The nexus tremendously heightens the danger of Pakistan's nukes falling in the hands of the Jehadi elements. The consequences of such a probability will spell doom not only for India but for the entire world. Insides can also be coerced into granting access to sensitive materials and explosives. In September 2004, 30 plus terrorists armed with automatic weapons and explosives that seized a thousand hostages at the school in Beslin. The conspiracy of several insiders working together of sort possibly coerced by the terrorists to do so is difficult to defend against. And this will provide access to that one missing link which is very important for the terrorists to carry out any act of nuclear terrorism that is the weapons grade material whether it's plutonium or highly enriched uranium.

The situation in Asia, there is no intense national and international attention to the risk of nuclear terrorism. The Palindaba incident shows that nuclear terrorism has emerged as a global issue. Former Soviet Union which developed one of the world's largest nuclear arsenals during the cold-war is constrained with severe economic challenges after its disintegration. In the post-Soviet era Russia inherited a vast nuclear complex with hundreds of tonnes of fissile material exist under inadequate and even non-existent security measures. Post-cold war Russia houses huge stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium approximately 1500 metric tonnes of H.E.U. were produced for the Soviet weapons programme and approximately 150 metric tonnes of plutonium. So, Russia remains to be a potential seepage point from where these fissile material may leak from the realm of the state into the hands of the non-state actors and terrorist groups, this possibility remains. Again, there have been numerous reports stating that Al-Qaeda is also attempting to cooperate with corrupt Russian officials and criminals with the objective of acquiring a nuclear device and from this we can possibly come to the conclusion that there is a possible collusion between Pakistan and the Al-Qaeda. Of course, again, the Iqu-Khan network also pointed out that there is a collusion existing between the Pakistan and the Al-Qaeda and to this extent Pakistan's top nuclear scientist Sultan Bashirat-in-Mahmood and Choudhary Abdul Masjid met Osama-bin-Laden and ……..Zawahari on two occasions 2000 and 2001 and shared sensitive nuclear secrets. These scientists were deeply motivated to help the Al-Qaeda the realize their stated ambitions. Is it possible to combat against nuclear terrorists. Undoubtedly, the threat of nuclear terrorism is real and it is growing, but we have to also take into consideration that terrorists are not psychotic or pathological, at least not all of them. On the contrary, they are reasonable, intelligent and they rationalize their acts which may be always acceptable to us. The terrorists can be stopped in their advances if there is a exercise of vigil and timely intervention to disrupt their plans, the terrorists have to follow a series of events before they finally resort to an act of nuclear terrorism. These starts from organizing and beginning operations, acquiring sufficient fissile material, fabricating a weapon, transporting the intact device to the target area, and finally detonating it simple as it may

sound but this is a very complex procedure where the terrorists have to pull out the entire operation with extreme dexterity and precaution. However, intervention at any stage in this chain can be sufficient to avoid a catastrophe. The terrorists have limited capabilities in terms of expert personnel and most importantly fissile material. So the assumption that terrorists will use their resources extensively to have access to expert and material is not always true. And this is evident from Om-Shinryuko's incident where they refrained from expanding their circle of experts for fear of being detected and this failed in their efforts to pull off a successful anthrax attack. So, terrorists also make mistakes, for them things do not always go as they plan. The point that I was basically trying to make here is not let's not go hysterical about the fact that they can pull off any act of nuclear terrorism and nothing can be done against it. I think timely intervention can make a lot of difference. Other than this there are several international tools like the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 implementation of this resolution is an effective way of combating nuclear terrorism and in addition we also have the physical protection of nuclear materials which was amended in July 2005 and that provides for expanded cooperation between States to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material. We also have the NPT and the IAEA safeguards as measures to control and prevent nuclear smuggling. As regards India's position it has already ratified the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material, the convention on early notification of a nuclear accident and the convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency. In addition India also has agreed to place 65% of its nuclear plants under IAEA safeguards and this step has enhanced the security of the nuclear reactors and plants in India from being targeted by any adversary or terrorist outfit. Moreover, India will be under less pressure and will be able to exercise stringent controls and constant vigilance over the remaining 35% of our nuclear plants constituting military reactors. India has also signed the international convention for suppression of acts on nuclear terrorism in the United Nations headquarters in September 2006. Well, just to conclude the nuclear terrorism remains a real and urgent danger. However, some real and important progress has been made in combating nuclear terrorism. These include securing nuclear stockpiles in recent years particularly in Russia, but there is more to be done. As Senator Richard Lugar has pointed out the war on terrorism cannot be considered one until every cache of nuclear weapons and their essential ingredients worldwide is reliably secured from terrorist access. What is needed is accountability, transparency, safety and security that has to be established and maintained in every state with nuclear weapons. Thank you.

Mr. Varun Sahni: Thank you Dr. Kazi. I will request our discussants to please now confine themselves to 10 minutes if you are going to get any discussion. Dr. Kalyana Raman, you first please.

Discussant's Comments by Dr. S. Kalayan Raman:
I will limit my comments to two issues; one of course, I will give a little historical legal basis on why India uses minimum force when it deals with domestic disorder, internal conflicts. The second point I thought I would focus upon is Efraim touched upon it when he spoke about how army is not really to fight small wars and a point that Rajesh took it even further when he talked about the conventional bias when armies wage counter-insurgency operations. There is a legal basis for India's use of minimum force and this is laid down in the Criminal Procedure which dates back to the British era 1860 the law that which laid Section 130, Sub-section(ii) emphasizes upon this and this was in a way violated in Jalianwallah Bagh in 1920 by Gen. Dyer when he commanded his troops to open fire on unarmed gathering of people assembled to celebrate Baisakhi. It was again reconfirmed, this particular law, it was reiterated that incidence of this sort should not happen. Now, interestingly on the eve of independence in May when communal conflagration was threatening to engulf the Indian sub-continent the interim Indian Cabinet which included leaders from both the Congress and the Muslim League under the Viceroyalty of Mountbatten, they actually granted permission for the military to use maximum force including air bombardment, if necessary, to contain any communal

conflict. But there was change of heart within a week or so when they saw that such establishment should not be tampered with, so it was withdrawn after about a couple of weeks and the letter that went from the Viceroy said that the long standing principle of using minimum force must be maintained. Now, post-independence given that we have inherited so much from the Brits including our legal system we have continued with the principle of dealing with internal conflicts. Of course, this principle was also in a way reinforced by the liberal traditions to which our leadership subscribed to. Here let me paraphrase some statements, there was a note that Pandit Nehru made in 1946 when the interim Cabinet took over power where he spoke about the role of the army in the Independent India. Now, in this there is a passage about armies having to deal with internal conflict. So, he points out that unfortunately the army has to be used on occasion to quell domestic disorder and all soldiers head this kind of work since it is against the self-respect and also because it is bad for army morale. Nevertheless, it becomes necessary where the police cannot handle the situation. Now, in a subsequent passage he criticises the British use of air power against the tribesmen in the Northwest Frontier. Now, he acknowledges that there is a very strong military case for using land power since it is very rapid, less expensive and does not involve many casualties. Nevertheless, he wrote, it is very difficult for public opinion in India or elsewhere to approve of it. While on the one hand you have the tribesmen indulging in murder, kidnapping, etc., which cannot be tolerated and has to be put down at the same time bombing of civilians is abhorrent to public and no government can indulge in it, except possibly in cases of extreme crisis and danger. Now, he had a recommendation on how to deal with domestic disorder; one was that of course the police force should be increased and the second was that a special peace preservation core could be formed to deal with situations so as to relieve the army as far as possible from the distasteful duty.

Now, against this backdrop I would like to take on this other issue of armies not being ready to wage small wars and Rajesh's wilful points/observations about the conventional bias of militaries. Now, what I am going to raise a series of questions on so as to take it forward it's more to set focused agenda for further discussion, not just in this audience but also on other forums later. Before that just let me briefly recapture Rajesh's arguments. Counter-insurgency operations necessitate the employment of defence skills weapons and attitude, it should therefore reflect the prominent though not exclusive use of small unit rather than large unit operations, units should therefore be diluted and dispersed, but this contradicts this principle of mass which you talked about and, of course, contend that even this principle can be applied in a counter-insurgency situation since maximum force should be applied at the point of decision. This effectively means you end up deploying larger forces and hence the conventional bias that is the essence of your argument. Now, I felt when I read this that it actually begins with an assumption which is that counter-insurgency operations necessitate the employment of defence skills and weapons, etc., which is best captured by this motto of the Indian Army's counter-insurgency jungle warfare school which is to fight a guerrilla like a guerrilla. But is this a real recipe for success, that's the first question that comes to my mind when you are fighting with a adversary that is arranged in this particular fashion adopting certain tactics, should we also adopt the same tactics? Is this a recipe for success? Now, the second question, would conventional militaries acting as guerrillas do defeat an insurgency whereby resolving the conflict. Now, there is an acknowledgement at least within India that conflicts are generally resolved on the basis of political compromise, there is a political solution and it should take place in the political domain whereas like you very nicely pointed out restoring normalcy is the maximum that armed forces do. Now, of course till date we have done quite well, except for Mizoram we haven't had many successes but we have successfully managed the situation, the Naga peace process is on, there are indications that things could be moving on in Kashmir, etc. Now, long-term commitment as you very correctly point out, long-term commitment and endurance are what strengthens our approach in counter-insurgency except in Sri Lanka which is a foreign intervention and now the question that arises is given this o.k. record is it really

bad that Indian military operates on the basis of a conventional bias. Now, the second set of questions that I thought about was how would military units and soldiers fighting like a guerrilla play out in an actual situation which Mao I think very nicely captured it when he said that people of the water and guerrillas are the fish who swim in it. Now, in the Indian case especially is it possible for large number of military units to move themselves among the people especially, say, if you North East for instance or even in Kashmir and this would be even more difficult in a foreign intervention where there is clear ability to identify and even in the Indian case there was one instance, I don't remember, in Mizoram I think Operation Zebra or something, I don't remember the name, that was a small unit that was sent, they just went all across Nagaland, they did have some success but it was never kind of repeated. But the essential point is that is it possible for a large number of units to adopt this kind of a tactic to deal with the rebels. One more question, if we are going to kind of make them into smaller units where there is not much central control, leadership control what would it mean for military discipline? If military discipline were to breakdown, we already have this phenomenon here and there, Ikhwans and guys going off, we see even in our cities police officers taking the law under their own hands and going beyond the law. If military discipline were to breakdown in a very volatile insurgency situation whether there is populous borders, one of the keys to winning the struggle, how it affect state's legitimacy in continuing this conflict. Now, one more, final set of questions, this relates to the way military train this and rigidity about military structures, how easy or difficult for them to adapt to counter-insurgency situations. Adaption does take place whey they are deployed for a long time, we all know that, but what organizational changes have to be put in place to make this possible, what role do personalities play in this rather than just simply organizational structures and how should training be structured so that they can seamlessly move between waging conventional campaigns and then going on to counter-insurgency campaigns and that leads to the paradox that you bring out in your paper about the need to safeguard against a conventional threat ultimately because that is something that we cannot wish away. Now, here one more thought, now we all read Mao and how he said that rebels must wage guerrilla warfare and guerrilla warfare only a strategic auxiliary to orthodox operations. Mao actually lays a lot of stress on orthodox operations, how these three phases where they move from guerrilla to eventually conventional operations, you know, what he calls mobile and positional warfare as conduct. Now, how does that time with this if we are going to structure our militaries to wage fight like a guerrilla, so what does that mean. So, I thought I will throw open these questions and see how we can these forward. Thank you.

Mr. Varun Sahni: Thanks a lot. Actually he has written on this in some of his publications, but thanks a lot for this discussion. Please Dr. Madan Mohan.

Discussant's comments by Dr. J. Madan Mohan:
Let me begin with the paper presented by Dr. Reshmi Kazi. She has presented a comprehensive sketch of nuclear terrorism, but I think the key question is what's the probability of nuclear terrorism? In other words, the level at which nuclear terrorism gets played out I think needs to be testified or gauged and in turn the probability of nuclear terrorism depends on two factors; one is the technology feasibility and that's questionable. Terrorists might acquire nuclear technology, they could use but they have not and so they will not that seems to be emerging. The other factor is the political question to what the resort to the nuclear route really serves the interests of terrorists in terms of their motives, in terms of their political motives and it seems that the resort to the nuclear route by the terrorists is theoretically one of the options but it is definitely the least likely option and not a tall rational option.

The other comment that I would like to make is one the paper presented by Dr. Rajesh Rajagopalan which is basically a question. The comment was that fighting insurgencies in the domestic or the foreign context the difference was made. My comment and a related

question is given that fighting insurgencies in the domestic context is laid in with constraints which are very obvious, to what extent the outcome of counter-insurgency operation in general can be really attributed to whether the setting is foreign or domestic, is that really the primary variable at work. The third and final comment that I would like to make is on Prof. Inbar's comment which is when he said that democracies do face moral dilemmas while fighting small wars. It seems to me that those moral dilemmas or constraints is also offset by intrinsic or inherent advantage the democracies possess in terms of normative advantage in the international system. On one hand it poses constraints for them because they are democracies, on the other hand I think it also expands the leeway for them considerably precisely because they are democracies. In other words democracies could get away with whatever they are doing by resorting to the use of normative language.

Dr. Mordechai Kedar: I personally want to thank all four presenters and they really touched very important aspects of this war against terrorism. However, I think that one point was missed by most of them, if not by all. When we talk about these non-state armed groups let's begin during the between India and Pakistan they fought on Kashmir, for example. India had nothing to do with the regime in Pakistan. Let them be whatever they are and they didn't try to change the political situation in India, Kashmir was the problem. When Briton was in fight with Argentina on the Islands of Falklands 1982 Britain had nothing to do with the regime in Argentina, they didn't like them but still or vice versa. The problem was that who will win these Islands. When we talk about non-state groups the fight is on the soul of the state, they are fighting for the state, on the state. Hezbollah is willing to take Lebanon over, they don't fight with Lebanon or with us in Mazar-e-Shabah on one area, they are fighting to take the state not to take an island or to take an area or district. So, this is actually a fight between two ideologies on one state leave Al Qaeda for example, because for them the state is the world, but JI in Indonesia are fighting for re-shaping Indonesia in their way or at least large parts of Indonesia in their eyes. So, the fight is actually not on a small space, it's an all-out war for the whole state. Is this goal makes another difference which, I don't think, I heard about this. The war is on the awareness, the war is on the psyche, the are is on the conviction of the people of their nation because one wants to drag it one side or the regime wants to take one side while the non-state group wants to take the nation to another place from the psyche, from its way of thinking, for its consciousness. This drags us to the third difference which again I don't recall hearing about is the use of mass media because in conventional wars mass media report on the war while here in this war mass media is part of the war because the one who occupies the mass media means who uses, the mass media better wages a better war because the fight is in the end of the day on the soul of the nation. This is why Hezbollah has its own TV Almana station, this is why Hamas has its own TV station. This is why Al-Qaeda also active in the media because the media is not a third party which reports on the war, the media is their battlefield where the war is in many cases. And this why the role of media in this non-state armed groups' war against states is a cautioned war unlike regular war. Just look at the Falklands War between Briton and Argentina, what happened with the journalists then, if remember, Margaret Thatcher put them all in one ship in order to provide them better vehicle to get to Falkland. However, by a miracle this ship lost the way and it came to Falklands only after the war was finished. She was a very wise woman Margaret Thatcher and she knew exactly what to do with the mass media in order to have the war afar is possible from the lenses, o.k., to look at to them what happens. Look, if I wanted to buy half a minute in a primetime in CNN, FoxNews, CBS and BBC International and all the local national networks how much would I pay to get advertisement for half a minute, o.k. These terrorists by exploiting some train station in New Delhi or in Madrid they get all the mass media for hours, for free, not for free 100 dollars which they paid to the one who exported himself and another 100 dollar which their bomb cost them, o.k. This is how they bought the whole media for who knows how long time in this. So, this is why I am saying that

the mass media is part of the war and this should be taken into consideration. Thank you very much.

Next Speaker: I was tempted because the discussion which just happened, because I was also not very sure whether the concept of a non-sate armed group explains much because I agree on some of the points just raised. But first if you look at the objectives of non-state actors one a large number of them have clearly state objectives in the sense that possibly they themselves want to reconstruct into a nation-state. This is clear about all those separatist secessionist kind of movements, not necessarily about groups which have millenarian objectives. Operationally if you look is there some space apart from states where non-state actors operate, they operate within the state structures. So, either it's a geographical space within the state structure where the NSGs operate or you create liberated areas which itself conceptually again is reminiscent to the character of a state itself. If you look at all the nature, NSG is again, all of them have actually evolved through the support of state structures or states. There would be very few instances either today we have groups which may have completely dissociated themselves from states but invariably a large number of them have emerged, operated, evolved through the support of states whether it's Hezbollah, the Al-Qaeda today itself still gets some kind of support from within a state, the LTTE had support, the LET-JEM in Pakistan they also have covert/overt weak support, but there is support. Having said that there is also now a fuzziness that comes in and that's the concept that Prof. Inbar brought in about this post-heroic war. I have a little problem with that but if you see the nature of warfare today it's actually post-national, but there is a certain fuzziness about it because on one side it is post-national and on the other side it is also national because state forces still subscribe to nationalism when they are fighting for the state. But all the other non-state groups obviously bring in the post-national element into the nature of warfare. Now, this also links to the fact that there are fundamental changes happening in our societies which someway didn't come in the presentation which I think Prof. Inbar could have looked into and which he kind of dismissed that it's difficult to recruit to armies, the fact is yes there are democratic transitions happening across the world and we need to be aware of that these are going to create problems in the nature of the state itself, in the nature of the recruitment process to the armies. Today we have a report in the Indian press about the problems in Indian army but we are aware of how difficult the United States finds to recruit to the army. Though a couple of more points, but since there isn't time I will leave those questions. I will just end here. Thank you.

Mr Shaul Shay: Just a few comments regarding the lessons of the Lebanese War. First of all, about the nature of the asymmetric warfare and its relevance to other lectures as well, we have to take in consideration that the environment is organized or at least built-up areas. It means that the battlefield is in a densely populated area. I disagree that the purpose in the Lebanon War was to force Shia population to leave. The problem was that Hezbollah rocket launchers were always in built-up areas. So, in advance we dropped leaflets to the population, we asked them to leave and then we gained the freedom to operate and this is the correct story. The result, I agree, that a big number of Shia population left the southern suburbs of Lebanon. This is one point. The second point is victory or not, it's first of all a psychological question. You know, the Yom Kippur War according to the Israel population it's a failure. If you analyse it from a pure professional perspective I think that it was the biggest victory of the IDF, but no matter till this day the Israelis believe we lose the Yom Kippur War although the long-term result was a peace agreement with Egypt. So, this question is not a simple question and the second point regarding the leaders of the non-state actors, almost all of them are a charismatic combination of spiritual and military leaders. They are very relevant to the period of the confrontation, but we can see from the experience including the Hamas and elsewhere they are totally not relevant to lead a state or something like state because they don't have any agenda, they don't have solutions. So, I agree that Nasrullah is very successful as long as the conflict with Israel will continue. This was the reason that although after

our withdrawal from South Lebanon Hezbollah tried to find justifications how to continue the conflict because otherwise he is not so relevant.

Next Speaker: We have been studying Israeli performance, Indian military, specifically their prescribed textbooks – promotion and examination – 47-48 war, 56 war, 67 war, 73 Yom Kippur War and we have always admired how the Israelis even on leave holidaying in Nepal went back to fight the Yom kippur War and how Arial Sharon snatched victory from the jaws of defeat because they were extremely good in force, and force attacks. Their Haganns, when they were raised in 47-48, their Udgas, their whole concept and how they have improvised in battle, but now there is a problem that the nature of war has changed. So my question is the Israeli military motivating its soldiers, its conscription probably, how is it motivating its troops, its soldiers to perform this war which leads to brutalization of the soldiers and the militarization of society because the threat is going to emerge, population of the Muslims is going to increase, the water resources are going to reduce and knowing your innovation and your adaptability I am sure you already worked out something, but the fear is that it may lead to no savage, a brutalization of the soldiery and a militarization of society. So, how are you going about it?

Next Speaker: I just wanted to address Prof. Inbar and Rajagopalan. On this whole issue of non-state armed groups if you look at the situation in Africa today that really confounds all conventional theories of warfare and specially if you look at the fact that here non-state armed groups are attacking each other, one supported by the government and one which is not supported by the government. Then, how do you find solutions to problems where their formal militaries don't exist, like in the case of India or Pakistan and how do you find the solutions which you suggested Prof. Inbar in terms of inflicting maximum damage. Here, most often the non-state armed groups have the similar kind of technical as the government. I think that solution is not possible in case of Africa and even if you look at the political resolution the problem which is going in Darfur is today that the non-state actor which is supported by the government, the Jangaveed is really going berserk, it's not in the control of the government. So how do you come to a negotiation table.

Mr. Varun Sahni: Let's do it in the reverse order now, so we will start with Dr. Kazi. If we could sort of, may be, keep it to about 3-4 minutes each because even with another ten minutes we will pretty much be eating severely into the lunch hour otherwise.

Dr. Reshmi Kazi: Thank you Dr. Mohan for your comments. In terms of technological feasibility I don't think that is so much of a barrier as acquisition of nuclear material, I mean, the fissile material is, there is weapons grade fissile material and in terms of technological feasibility I don't think there is much technical competence required to build a gun-type IND, lot of information is available. Of course, this is debatable whether you have detailed plans and comprehensive drawings which are required to build one. To say that they will not be able to, these are the words which you used 'they will not' I am not very sure about that because since they are in it, I mean, pretty insistent I cannot accept this 'they will not be able to'. And about the political motives, well, the acquisition of nuclear device would in terms of the nuclear politics as I mentioned in my paper and in my presentation, it would provide them a kind of international recognition and also a sense of being equivalent with that of a state and that serves a lot, probably can serve in some of their objectives. And this is a fact which is also corroborated by the Securing the Bond 2007 Report, it's the latest NTR report. Thank you.

Wing Commander V. Krishnappa: I agree with you that Hezbollah's ambitions are domestic and it wants to be the dominant actor, take over the state at some point of time, create a model Shia state, an exemplar for the rest of the world and this fits into the larger context of Shia revival, this resurgence and it serves those purposes well. But at the same time if one reads carefully the speeches and other documents, the Almanar TV

station reports, they also have a larger which is pan-Shia at some level, more secondary level, pan-Islamic and this combination of military success which always is followed by ideological and other political success historically seems to be very seductively attractive proposition and considering the larger developments in the region. So, I just thought I will share that point. But the second issue, the cognitive wars, the mind wars which played out during the 2nd Lebanon War and I agree the principle battlefield was there and that's where much of the Israeli incompetence was also present for variety of reasons, that's the point I made. But it's also important this relates to what kind of forces, in what proportion and how do you show respect to normative principles of international because Israel doesn't fight wars alone, it needs an ally and historically got American support and this time had its support and that support also faltered after Khana and there was pressures brought in because of that, so the use of indiscriminate force was counter productively when you are fighting the cognitive wars. This was played out during the Lebanon War, Israel was forced to think through whole range of things and so the kind of force you apply becomes very, very important and the morality issues get related to this and it's important Israel cannot fight war on its own and win them, if there is no public support outside Israel especially America. America cannot go alone because it has larger interest in the region which cannot be undermined by what Israel does in terms of how this uses its force. I think the virtual space is a very, very important thesis that is going around what we call fourth generation war, etc., and it's a very important battlefield to be fought and the stories their leaders tell and the stories that leaders embody and the congruence between what they say and actually is very, very important. That's the point I am making, I understand that when they transit from being rebels to that of governors we have seen many even made this comment about our Gandhi who was the biggest leader of this last century that would he have made a good prime minister if he were to be made one. So, this is a problem, but our concern is about the conflict not the post-conflict, so these people are making a huge difference and they have huge asymmetrical advantage over the democratic, more so the democratic leaders and the leadership in broader terms and even the otherwise state leadership anyway.

Dr: Rajesh Rajagopalan: A lot of questions, so I don't have time to go through in detail in each of them, but I can discuss this later. The first couple of questions that you had broadly suggested that since basically a fairly good doctrine and I think we have a very good doctrine why change it. In a sense that's the sense of the first three questions. And what I would say is that even though we have done fairly well I think we can do better. And even if you look at the Indian Army I mean they think there is need to be change – CIJWS, the I Battalions, RRR – all reflections of the army itself trying to grapple with finding a better way to deal with it. So, I think in a sense there are improvements that can be made, can that lead to victory? Victory would depend on lots of contextual factors, I am not going to say it will lead to victory, but it can definitely make the force much more effective. I mean that is important, that will be useful. I think that's one of the reasons why the army is constantly also trying to figure out these different types of formations and units to fights these kinds of insurgencies. The second broad issue that you talked about how does fighting like a guerrilla play itself out, I would think that you would need a combination of what we currently do which is lot of heavy deployment of troops but also much more intensive use of specialized forces. By specialised forces I am not meaning special force, I am not talking about para-cammandos, I am not talking about very highly trained, you know, guerrillas are not very highly trained, they are not highly educated Rambos. Think of them, they are especially naxalites or other forces, they are peasants, but nevertheless it's a different that you need. It is not so much that you need to be a Rambo to fight a guerrilla. All you need to do is a slightly specialized force. I will give you one example from the Indian case, the Andhra Police's Greyhounds, are tremendously effective in dealing with naxalites even though there have been questions about human rights and what not, but they are very, very effective. But that's partly because the police has a very different – it doesn't have all the organizational baggage the army has - that they were able to develop a force like the Greyhound Force.

So, you can develop them without really having to create Rambos in your army. The other issue that you raised is about military discipline in terms of having these kinds of forces. I think those that are to be worked out, but I think if you develop those kind of proper procedures I don't think there should be a problem in terms of military discipline. Yes, you will have some forces that have certain amount of autonomy, but in any case you do have even now forces operating with certain level of autonomy at the local level. It needs to be worked out, but you can deal with it. Transition between the three stages I think that issues is a problem for the guerrillas not for the state forces how they transit from a initial guerrilla stage to the conventional war stage is a problem for the guerrilla forces. So, in a sense one of the things that you could potentially do, I mean, even though it is not a feasible this thing but one thing that you could theoretically do is you could say we will pull off forces and wait for them to develop into a conventional force and then defeat them. I mean, that's a possibility but obviously in practical terms you can't do that but I think it's more of a problem for the guerrilla forces than for conventional forces. I think the cost strain in terms of fighting domestically and internationally is dying, domestically you can sort of wait for as long as you want. I think that is one reason I am suggesting that foreign and domestic insurgencies, dealing with them are very different because you have the luxury of time domestically that you don't have it internationally when you are fighting foreign wars. I will stop at that.

Mr. Efraim Inbar:
So much has been said, I will concentrate may be on the main theme. To a great extent the discussion here has been coloured by 'win hears and minds' paradigm. Basically you fight a war but you want the opponents to finally feel good about you. I must say that this does not always work and in many cases it doesn't work. For example, Israel will never be able to win the hearts and minds of Shiites in Southern Lebanon not because we don't have much to offer them, we do, but they will always fear more the Hezbollah activists, the Hezbollah terrorists than they like our carrots. Same story of the Palestinians, so basically since we face very ruthless opponent he is more able to make sure that civilian population cooperates with him. So, therefore, we have no choice but to go after the terrorists, to go after the insurgents and this is where most effort should go into, I think, probably a strategy of attrition is the best one in such situation when eliminating all of them is not a very easy option. And again, as I said yesterday for reasons, basically we cannot fix the whole world, we cannot fix Africa, we can contain the dangers; in certain parts we don't care if they kill each other. I am not sure if I care much if part of Africa are in total chaos. So, we say if them can't fix themselves well what can I do, if it doesn't damage my direct interests I must sit aside. So, we have to take care of the capabilities of the insurgents to hurt you and to hurt daily routine of your country. This is why I disagree with my colleague Mordechai Kedar you don't involve on TV. You have to kill the bad guys and afterwards doesn't matter the TV is at your disposal. All your bombs or TV stations or whatever, I say this is the conceptual problem of the Israeli army, the last war they were looking for a fate that wins a war forgetting that you have to go after the bad guys. I agree gaining the moral ground it's easier for democracies and they are not always good at that. We have problems, democracies, we are less good at lying, Palestinians are better at lying than the Israelis. So you always you find that you know non-democrats are better at lying. Now, I just want to end the question about Israel, about motivation. I think Israel doesn't have a motivation problem at all particularly since the last war. Actually at tactical levels was there was not even one battle in which the Israeli units didn't win. Sometimes at great loss, at great courage so we basically won every tactical battle, the problem was at strategic level, at the conceptual level and I think part of the problem was because we forgot basics and we started going for post-modernist notions, effect and forgot the very basics that you have an enemy, you have go after him and eliminate him, eliminate his capability to harm you. This is the main problem in Israel. I am not optimistic, I must say because part of the guard that went for those type of notions is still around and they make another mistake, you can fix training, you can fix equipment, you can fix the reservist, but if you have a, as

we say in Israel, a wrong diskette for your computer here it's not going to work. So, the issue is primarily intellectual clarity in Israel. This I would submit to you, this is the main problem and not motivation, we have no problem recruiting the best people for the best units and hire volunteers, all the combat units get more volunteers than they can digest. In other places it's true, in America they have a problem recruiting. I read the same article today, here you have a problem, I don't know how you will, if know subscription is an option, I will be interested to hear during lunch.

Mr. Varun Sahni: I think before we have lunch as I say a lot has been said, everybody has said and the chair hasn't said anything either. So, indulge me for thirty seconds or a minute. I am mentioning this point that Dr. Kedar made about the soul of the state. It's true, but it's true for insurgents who are basically ideological. If you are talking about ideological insurgents then yes, clearly they are talking about taking over this state and out there yes it is a battle for the soul of the state. I think it's different the case of ethno-cultural insurgents. And I think a lot of the sort of insurgence that have been this country for example are really ethno-cultural in nature, so they are not really seeking all of the state's authority which is what the ideological insurgents are doing. No, no, there is one important group which is creating a belt through this country they are called the naxalites, the other Maoists and this country keeps sleeping for another ten years as it seems it is, you could actually come to an ideological insurgency that actually wants the soul of the state and actually now has a near than a foot hold than to do so. So, it could happen, Mao, also managing a country the size of this country it does happen. The thing about ethno-cultural insurgence is that they want something which rather different, they want a bi of the territory of the state. They don't care about the authority of the state, they want a bit of the territory of the state and I think that is what creates a very different type of dynamic. And I think one of the issues in India, I started by commenting that there was something in common between Israel and India and that were states with nuclear weapons, both faced asymmetric warfare from their neighbours, but I think there is a fundamental difference here and that fundamental difference is about our people. The fact is the Indian Army ultimately feels it is fighting its fighting its own people and that leads to all of the things that Dr. Rajagopalan here and Dr. Kalana Raman there were sort of talking about. I think in a fundamental sense Israeli doesn't feel that, I think that makes for a world of a difference. I think one distinction between domestic and foreign is a very important particularly questions of battles of attrition and question of time and so on and so forth. But I think there is also this question of our people, I mean, there is another scholar here Wing Commander Lele who is a PhD from my Centre and his doctoral work is precisely on this point where he actually compares India and Israel on asymmetric warfare issues. Anyway this is just a thought from the chair to liven up the proceedings or to keep you from lunch for another couple of minutes. Lunch is served I suppose.

End of Session I