# Nation-building
## A Case for Armed Forces in Post-conflict Peacebuilding

*Amitabh Hoskote*[*]

*Indian peacekeeping forces have served the cause of international peacekeeping for over 70 years and have logged not just an enviable record doing so, but have garnered a huge bank of institutional knowledge on post-conflict transitions. With the country on the cusp of becoming a power centre in the international comity of nations, it is imperative to recognise and utilise this knowledge for the armed forces to contribute to nation-building. The author argues for an enhanced role for the armed forces in post-intervention and fragile transition governance operations.*

**Keywords:** *Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, Nation-building, Post-conflict, Fragile Transitions*

*Power is one thing; the problem of how to administer it is another.*
— General Douglas MacArthur, after World War II

### INTRODUCTION

Post-conflict transition is justifiably a complex process including peacekeeping, reconstruction and transition, which together comprise peacebuilding in conflict zones. The Indian armed forces have a rich and unblemished record at peacekeeping in various conflict zones over the years since the end of World War II.[1] The enormous experience garnered in these conflicts, as well as the deployments in insurgency-prone areas in Kashmir and the Northeast, however, do not find the requisite translation

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[*] Colonel (Dr) Amitabh Hoskote is a Visiting Fellow at Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.

to policymaking and implementation. The armed forces remain an essential arm of the state, but strategic thought does not extend beyond the kinetic phase comprising operations, although the reconstruction phase, which includes governance operations, humanitarian aid, and handholding during transition, also form important parts of military operations. Hence it becomes imperative that the institutional experience garnered in such conflicts is gainfully utilised to produce a contributing arm of government and society. On the cusp of becoming a power centre in the international comity of nations, India now needs to revisit the functions of peacebuilding externally, and nation-building internally. This article puts forth the argument/case for the armed forces of the union as contributing members towards nation-building based on their experience in conflicts. Using theoretical constructs as well as examples from military operations in conflict areas, the article argues the case for the armed forces to be a productive arm of government, contributing towards nation-building.

It is justified to say that the process of post-intervention peace, reconstruction and transition is highly complex with multifarious and far-ranging issues demanding a very high degree of introspection, policy decisions, and implementation, which address a majority of the multitude of demands. It would necessitate having on board all political entities, former non-state combatants, and elements of civil society to provide lasting solutions.[2] In case of intrastate conflicts with international ramifications, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, or even peace enforcement in certain cases, form essential facets of the process apart from peacekeeping.[3] The UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UNDPPA) also undertakes issues such as prevention and mediation, elections, gender and WPS matters, and climate change in addition to or as an adjunct to peacebuilding.[4] Rational choice demands that peace remains the core of the discussions with maximum benefits for all sections of society affected by the conflict itself. In its 2012 Policy Report, the Berghof Foundation of Germany defines the process of security transition, emphasising the role of the armed forces as part of the state in managing the issues of security transition such as interactions with non-state actors, former combatants, inclusivity, reintegration and challenges of accountable transitions.[5] The armed forces play an absolutely vital role in maintaining cohesion and security amidst the fragility associated with transitions, simultaneously providing the base for restoration of the state's right over the use of force. Paradoxically, many of the skills and capabilities that go into creating

a winning military force, possessing the capacity to wage brutal battle, serve equally well in relieving large-scale suffering in the post-intervention transition phase. Their training and operational acumen make militaries ideally suited to provide a sound foundation for the ensuing peace over the time period required to attain stability. In 'Conflict and Conflict Management: Reflections and Update', Kenneth W. Thomas views two independent dimensions that would become postulates for the resolution of conflict, namely, the choice of beneficiaries and the choice of time frame.[6] Further analysis of the two reveals that the choice of time frame is vested within the choice of beneficiaries; as such, the earlier the choice becomes systemic, or extending to all involved parties, the earlier a first step towards reconciliation. When the requisite skills, the experience (from the time of conflict), and the organisational structures are all already available, logic demands that these be utilised rather than creating or formulating these from the ground upwards—this argument is the basis of the case for the use of armed forces in transition scenarios.

The question of military interventions has been interrogated by the author during the course of research and forms part of both the theoretical construct as well as arguments for the suitability of the armed forces in fragile transitions. Analysis of extant literature on intervention forces in conflict reflects that the study of armed forces in governance is limited and nascent in nature, therefore, it demands urgent attention from a political point of view. Some studies do elucidate the requirements for governance operations and are relevant to the case for armed forces in nation-building. For instance, Gregory L. Rhoden argues for the community of professional soldiers to identify and remedy the lack of proficiency in governance operations, analysing requirements during stability and reconstruction operations in transitions after actual combat has ceased. He identifies doctrinal shortcomings using a survey of past and present instances of post-conflict transitions.[7] Nadia Schadlow uses 15 cases of historical interventions over a hundred years to evaluate military roles in transitions. The author raises pertinent questions on why success in combat does not necessarily yield successful political outcomes; answering this by highlighting the challenges that continue to exist even after combat operations have ended. The breadth of landscape in her analysis provides substantiation of the premise of consolidation during transition being an integral part of the intervention itself, and not separate from it.[8]

### Strategising Role of Armed Forces in Strengthening Democracy

Successful employment of military options must be measured by the government's ability to consolidate political order and ensure governance; 'keeping' of peace must be in tandem with reconstruction of society's torn fabric caused by violence and conflict. It has been pointed out that lasting peace is based on political solutions or the 'primacy of politics', and not simply military engagements.[9] Lasting political solutions also require a suitable environment to be nurtured in, given the fragility of transition. While challenges of governance and stability are often considered apart from utilisation of armed forces in kinetic phases, the organisation best suited to implement measures to counter fragility and ensure non-partisan policies suited to governance in conflict-ridden areas is the apolitical institution of armed forces, especially to nullify centres of power other than the legitimate state. The basic reasoning stems from some important facets of a post-conflict scenario. First, political fragility demands that the armed forces be positioned to play a proactive role during the phase of consultations and negotiations. Second, contingencies from flux in a conflict state need a professional force equally ready to use force if required, especially since certain protagonists may challenge governance, as it questions their raison d'etre. Third, with experience and an ear constantly to the ground during conflict, armed forces are best poised to provide meaningful insights about the protagonists in the conflict. Fourth, the armed forces can provide secure environment for re-establishment of governance structures, allocation of resources in a non-partisan manner, and ensure standards for reinstating faith in justice systems, thus integrating institutions with the envisaged political solution. Fifth, violence and illegal activities espoused by non-state actors can only be tackled by the armed forces, especially to substantiate the legitimate rule of law in such fragility and/or lawlessness. Sixth and lastly, the presence of armed forces strengthens the legitimacy of a negotiated resolution, structures and institutions of governance, and act as a buffer between strata of political actors and interest groups, all vying for power in the flux.

Military intervention has seen a paradigm shift, so has the traditional concept of security. It now encompasses activities related to resolution of conflict through an imposition of collective will from within the state or having international dimensions. It has evolved into maintaining peace in conflict zones, aiding development, and measures to remodel

failed states. Elements of environment consciousness, conservation, and planned development also form its part. Evidently, armed forces have moved away from their traditional roles to include non-traditional roles. The following section examines the changes in traditional concepts and how these impact armed forces in conflict resolution, and how their strategic employment can create sustainable peace.

### Changes in Conventional Military Intervention and Operations

The traditional role of waging war to enforce political will has been enunciated by military strategists such as Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz.[10] After the Cold War, the belief that wars would come to an end, was rudely shaken by violence perpetrated by various state and non-state actors across the globe in the late 20th century. The emphasis shifted to peaceful resolution and use of military intervention as a last resort, bringing the focus on non-traditional roles of the armed forces. The role of the United Nations has become more challenging to provide a collective system of international peace.[11] Enforcement of peace by military intervention requires armed forces of member states to be kept in readiness, even if no direct military threat exists. In some instances, interventions have found an enlarged scope of fighting groups due to direct attacks or to provide security to affected populations.[12] In this changed paradigm of conventional operations as well as operations to support transitions, the validity of understanding underlying political contexts cannot be emphasised more, if the kinetic successes are not to be undermined. General David Petraeus terms this facet as 'armed politics' or 'comprehensive civil-military counter insurgency campaign'.[13] Armed forces become a vehicle for imposition of peace and to ensure the terms of agreement between warring factions, thus bringing monitoring and maintaining of peace in the ambit of military operations including prevention of any violence.[14]

### Diversified Paradigms of Security

Apart from the security for establishing borders, the concept now includes development, peacebuilding and environment protection, as part of human security. Studies on new paradigms of security establish that countries with focus on the earlier concept of security, channelise economic strengths accordingly, with commensurate voids and imbalances in development, indirectly affecting peace; poor indicators

of education, health, and employment invariably lead to internal strife, violence, and conflict. Similar disruptions occur with inadequate emphasis to environments, causing large-scale displacement of aboriginal populations and attendant costs of conditions creating or likely to create conflict in future.

## Peacekeeping and the New Environment

Historically, the term 'peacekeeping' was used during the Suez crisis in 1956. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was deployed in the crisis; prior to that, 'observer' missions were used to report on the situation, not actively participating.[15] Similar observer mission was deployed in Kashmir, initially United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) after the 1948 resolution, and later United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), after the 1951 resolution. Operations of such groups were restricted to their parent organisation's mandate (e.g., Aaland Islands' settlement by League of Nations and History of Peace Observation).[16] The larger work of the organisations behind the operations was recorded by these works, and even case studies or personal memoirs; restricted however to tactical level operations or adaptation of policy to suit tactical situations rather than long-term solutions or applicability across the board. Each conflict had its own set of peculiarities, so the same rules did not apply. Works on the UN Emergency Force and Congo were such examples.[17]

In post-Cold War context, peacekeeping has changed to include interstate and intrastate conflicts, and instead of just keeping warring combatants away from each other, now extends to reconstruction, reconciliation, and justice provisioning during transition phases.[18] Success of peacekeeping is not just absence of violence; Boutros-Ghali has brought in the use of two more terms—'preventive diplomacy' and 'peacemaking'—the former preventing disputes from arising and the latter bringing hostile protagonists to agreement. A maximalist strategy has taken shape encompassing conflict resolution rather than the narrower conflict management. The difference lies in addressing the root causes of the conflict.[19]

## Value of Peacekeepers in Peacebuilding

Influence of armed forces' presence as peacekeepers on peacebuilding has been analysed in a series of studies, construing that peacekeepers' presence deters re-emergence of violence in conflict, making peace more

durable.[20] Their presence makes attacks more difficult, raises the cost of aggression, and mitigates the security dilemma for those desirous of peace and resolution. A second set of studies indicates positive correlation between presence of peacekeepers and the move towards democracy and avoiding further conflict.[21] Conflict also finds external instigation of violence to jeopardise the peace process.[22] Peacekeepers armed to diffuse such external instigation are crucial. The withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan has been viewed as a strategic failure, or at the very least, premature.[23] This is due to its inability to have developed capacity in Afghan security forces to be able to counter the onslaught of Taliban post US withdrawal, and therefore unable to meet its own stated objective of nation-building. Comprehensively thus, empirical research points to positive value of peacekeepers in peacebuilding, contributing to deterrence of violence and providing stability amidst the fragility of transition.

### Can the Armed Forces be Taught Peace?

Seemingly, an overarching dichotomy exists in the proposition itself—how can a body of personnel drilled and ingrained with the wilful destruction of the enemy be taught peace? Academics have critiqued the armed forces about their apolitical stance, and their rigid norms and values; e.g., they have been likened to organised crime, citing military threats as akin to protection rackets, except for being under the umbrella of government sanction.[24] Conversely, norms and values espoused by militaries are considered indicators of professionalism drawing a distinction between them and their civilian control in democracies, hence their apolitical nature.[25] Another study suggests that the key to teaching peace to the military is in their professionalism, and recommends certain principles which are valid for peace studies as also addressing the confusion and agnosticism surrounding the studies in general.[26] First, respect military experience, do not privilege it. Combat experience considered as the highest test of leadership and character implies, however, that those who have not experienced combat are not credible sources of commentary, and therefore personnel from the services harbour distrust towards such (civilian) sources. The answer lies in not getting overtaken by the myths which seem to make combat experience larger than life. This works beneficially both ways, the civilian bringing certain insights which may miss the soldier, and the soldier bringing insights into conflict and its resolution from personal experience. Second, the reiteration of the just

war theory, which is a double-edged weapon at best; while existence of armed forces is justified by the just war theory, with the sheer destructive power of weaponry, violence creating more violence, and alternatives such as diplomacy, just war theory implies refusal by a soldier to be part of an unjust war, making it a controversial moral obligation on soldiers. Third, awareness and therefore consideration of a non-violent alternative, since it goes against the grain of military training, does not form part of its curriculum. However, its inclusion is a growing necessity due to the increasing use of armed forces as peacekeepers or even peacebuilders, as also an extension of the just war argument. Linking nationalism to the defence of the country is essential to build a high sense of achievement and aid morale in the field; however, it also tends to blur lines of control over violence. Militaries especially in liberal societies find their apolitical nature a matter of pride.[27] Civilian oversight of the armed forces is usually cited as the reason that militaries are apolitical in nature. To deconstruct the inevitability of violence by the armed forces, an encouragement of critical consciousness is required. This precept also serves as the fourth principle.

Attributes inherent to a soldier's being such as loyalty, integrity, commitment, self-discipline, respect for authority, physical and mental tenacity, determination, bravery and an underlying sense of empathy and kindness, must be recognised as inspiration to fellow citizens. The commitment of a soldier needs channelising for him to recognise and fully understand his own capability to contribute to peace.

## Metamorphosis from Belligerents to Peace-builders

Armed non-state actors can act as 'spoilers' of peace initiatives, who should be dealt with disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). Research by scholars of peace-building with former combatants suggests that DDR and security sector reform (SSR) are mutually dependent and conditioned by the political environment.[28] Demobilisation followed by integration of such combatant groups into political or security entities, has to be planned and implemented simultaneously with changes required in security, political, socio-economic, and justice systems of governance. Thus, peace-building is interplay between human security, justice, and development paradigms. Such transitions fall in the domain of the armed forces by virtue of the nature of work involved in situations of volatility and reconstructing legitimacy of democratic institutions. Primary tasks during the transition which militaries are best equipped to handle are elaborated below.

- **Disbanding Ex-combatants' Networks:** A third of conflicts see return to violence in five years.[29] To obviate recurrence of violence, existing networks have to be disbanded, and then assimilated into society. These processes have inherent problems of disbanding structures and provision of security. Chain of commands and commitment to their perceived fight have to be broken to avoid resurgence of violence.[30] A rush to disband cadres also has risks, as impatience permeating the cadres may set off fresh violence, especially if divisions exist in the ranks, or by the failure of troop reduction by the government (e.g., Maoists in Nepal felt DDR framework advocated by the US and Indian governments aimed at disbandment without agreement on integration modalities or constitution writing).[31] Half-hearted efforts at rehabilitation result in fresh violence, or inadequate safeguards for the protection of former combatants.[32]

- **Supervision of Ex-combatants' Weapons:** Reclamation of the government's ownership of use of force is an indicator of the success of its peace process. For the ex-combatants, weapons afford protection and are useful bargaining tools, so handing over weapons is directly dependent on ironclad guarantees.[33] The appearance of relative power parity is relevant for the peace settlement based on dialogue and negotiation.[34] As such, regulation of surrender of weapons has to be in tandem with visible reciprocity on reduction of troops, protection of ex-combatants, no semblance of power imbalances, and measures to restore confidence in the government's ability to keep its word.

- **Ex-combatants' Transition from Destructive to Constructive Contributors:** Former combatants have to be helped in transiting to normal civilian life and employment, which is viewed rather sceptically by them. Reintegration and employment must focus on dignity of life and earning. The Indian initiative for youth to join the army in Kashmir can be quoted as a good example; the drive has seen a huge turnout at each recruitment drive, sometimes even despite warnings from militant groups. However, such initiatives have inherent challenges—first, identification of eligible candidates for reintegration; second, the process has to be suitable for the benefit of the larger societal need, rather than former combatants since the same problems affect others also; third, reintegration of militant cadres must be part of broader structural reforms. Armed forces deliver an important intangible, i.e., the need to have community based and holistic approach during the transition. By virtue of

having lived in the area for sustained periods of time, over which they have developed a social networking with the population, intelligence networks, and have contributed to the development of the area, armed forces have more insights on ground realities. Again using Kashmir as an example, the army has built schools, medical facilities, and contributed to local requirements for engineering resources including sanitation. Commanders interact regularly with local population, even more so after Project Sadbhavna became a reality. Their ability to take real ownership at the conceptual and implementation level remains far higher than any other body of personnel, making it easier for assimilation and therefore expedite reintegration efforts.

At the end of a violent conflict, a vicissitude is required to remodel certain existing security, justice, and defence institutions, the transformation exhibiting the government's earnestness to meet terms of the peace process, while re-establishing state's control and legitimacy over use of force. It is critical that an impartial, apolitical, but law-abiding institution of the state be tasked to assist in this crucial phase.

**Arguing the Claim for Suitability of Armed Forces**

Modern armed conflict involves several participants, amplifying the conflict's complexity. Traditional use of armed forces in conflict resolution seems to be undergoing a rapid evolution, which calls for a revision of its role in this context. Such complexity has brought about a change in strategic thought to consider peace operations as part of broader military operations. These peace operations will continue to be guided by principles that in the past were limited to the execution of combat operations. The same peace operations may comprise a range of activities, such as conflict prevention, medium to high intensity counter-insurgency operations, and bolstered by humanitarian support activities. Due to the scope of work that the armed forces are capable of handling, as well as their intrinsic attributes as discussed earlier, it builds a strong case for armed forces spearheading the transition to peace. It has ample precedent, with some of the most complex post-conflict transitions being facilitated by the armed forces. These precedents also provide us with a set of lessons based on the experiences garnered during the transitions. It does necessitate certain prerequisites, primarily for the armed force to be given the resources and be prepared and organised for multiple roles. The main role of armed forces remains to create and maintain a safe and stable

atmosphere enabling other institutions to function fully. Yet, due to the changing nature of conflict and its resolution, an integrated approach system is required for armed forces to attain and ensure stability. This in turn provides the space for resumption of democratic institutions. This section brings out points in favour of the armed forces to trail-blaze the intricacies of transition to peace.

## Is Conflict Really Over?

Peace agreements are expected to usher in peace. But they are also based on the terms of the agreements being implemented in letter and spirit. Strategic success is achieved only by the consolidation of political order, but it is often misunderstood that military intervention in conflict is only required for the kinetic phase of combat operations. In many conflicts, various issues relating to internal struggles create conditions for the conflict to continue, even after the violent phase has been deemed over.[35] This highlights the difference between simply peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Peacekeeping seeks to keep a ceasefire and prevent hostilities from reoccurring, monitoring and facilitating execution of a peace agreement. Armed forces are employed to facilitate diplomatic action, conflict mediation, and ensuring basic security conditions to reach a political solution. In peace-building scenarios, armed forces operate after political solutions to conflicts have been arrived at, creating a secure and stable environment allowing other institutions to focus on reconciliation and peace-building. Conflict resolution scholars contend the employment of armed forces after the signing of a peace agreement is central and indispensable to the process, failing which the agreement loses its effectiveness.[36] The issue was highlighted in the Brahimi report to the UN Secretary General vide which peace support operations distance themselves from the 'military matrix operations of surveillance, cease-fire, and separation of rival forces that follow an intra-state conflict, to incorporate a complex model with many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace, in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars'.[37] The requirement to conduct simultaneous operations countering designs of violence, and consolidating political gains accrued by the peace agreement, is usually not understood. Resultantly, the need for extending peace support operations undertaken by the military beyond combat operations, to winning the population, creating capacity in legitimate institutions including police forces, justice, and administration, and political consensus building is not grasped. These are viewed as different

phases, while they are actually required in simultaneity, being an amalgamation of principles of operations undertaken by the military otherwise restricted to combat, with those principles supportive to peacebuilding such as impartiality, apolitical credentials, and high moral authority.

## Is Unity of Effort Being Negated?

Samuel P. Huntington's argument on the apolitical nature of the armed forces has been highlighted earlier; norms and values espoused by militaries are indicators of professionalism drawing a distinction between them and civilian control exerted over them in democracies, hence their apolitical credentials.[38] However, he also held that the distinction of military professionals lay in managing violence, contributing to the notion that governance operations in fragile transitions (as being discussed here) are not tasks for armed forces. The idea of the armed forces taking the lead in political activity also causes disquiet in the minds of bureaucrats and politicians. The argument here is that the unity of effort required in fragile transitions can be best lead by the armed forces. The precept about war and politics holds true here; armed forces cannot absolve themselves of politics of conflict. Once military intervention has been initiated, the armed forces have to constantly innovate and restore the lost political order.[39] The same combat troops participate in reconstruction; lack of acknowledgement stems from a combination of the military mindset and the civilian apprehensions about their role in democracy. While Clausewitz left political consolidation unconnected to the violence of conflict, the same finds admission in Fred Ilke's work, as the 'intellectual difficulty of connecting military plans with their ultimate purpose'.[40]

If responsibility for reconstruction is spread among a number of arms of the government, it is unrealistic to expect the civilian arms to exert the control required in the midst of violent conflict. Therefore, this premise negates the unity of effort that is a realistic means to long-term peace. Examples of such disorganisation form part of studies for conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.[41]

The fact that large-scale reconstruction, medical assistance, protection and/or rebuilding of religious landmarks, and provision of safety and public order would all constitute tasks given to the armed forces, will not absolve them from primary responsibilities of defence. Simultaneity demands that they support the restoring/setting-up of civilian institutions, law and order, guarantee the functioning of the

judicial system, ensure safe conduct of the electoral process, and other aspects of the political, economic, and social life of the region. Armed forces are equipped with multiple capabilities to deal with such tasks, and can be provided resources where not. Functional partnerships with civilian organisations must be in a unity of effort model.

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**Does Building on Existing Foundations Make Sense?**

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The argument for suitability of armed forces in transitions rests on duties that they can be entrusted with. Transition operations see armed forces being primarily involved in security, control, and de-escalation of violence including maintaining ceasefires, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants, negotiations between interest groups and restoring trust. Deployment of troops enhances effectiveness of communications, which in turn affects the peace process. Skills required include both combat and contact skills. The former includes navigation using maps, knowing first aid, usage of weapons, patrolling, reporting, and using communication radios. The latter includes liaison, negotiation, and investigative skills. Other ancillary functions include support to police forces in maintaining law and order, training, monitoring of elections, and human rights by government organisations, NGOs, and civil society groups. Thus, in the expanded concept of security and the expanded role of the armed forces, they take on additional and non-traditional duties. Employing the armed forces would mean building on existing foundations, and in fact, a continuation of ongoing projects in the conflict zone. As the example below highlights, the resources available with the armed forces may be normally adequate to deal with the additional tasks entrusted to them; however, if need be, extra allocations of finances/resources can be made to them to optimise utilisation.

One of the most apt examples in this context is Operation Sadbhavna started by the Indian Army in 1998. By then, with almost a decade of violence, large tracts of Kashmir suffered from destruction of government property, schools, bridges, electric supply systems, and basic health care, remoteness of many of these areas adding to the complexity of rebuilding. The need of the hour was not only to wrest the initiative back from the militant groups, but also to reintegrate affected population with the national mainstream. Subsequently, Op Sadbhavna gained traction and became a model of 'Winning Hearts and Minds' campaign in J&K.[42] The realisation that the army is the only organisation capable of stepping in, has come with long years of effort in Kashmir.

Op Sadbhavna's broad objectives included development, mitigating alienation among the people, and encouraging integration. It focused on core social indices of education, women and youth empowerment, development of infrastructure, and health and veterinary care. Over the intervening years, the scope of work has only increased, as has the faith in the army's ability to deliver. The army has constructed Army Goodwill Schools (AGS) in 53 locations of Kashmir, educating more than 1,00,000 students up to higher secondary levels.[43] Apart from school education, the army also started a programme called Kashmir's Super-30 to provide students the training required for engineering entrance exams. This programme is being run in conjunction with the Centre for Social Responsibility and Leadership. The army has also taken on infrastructure development projects such as bridges, power plants, and roads using its integral resources from Engineer regiments and the Border Roads Organisation.[44] A number of small and large infrastructure projects such as construction of foot bridges, tracks to improve connectivity in rural areas, schools, orphanages, primary health centres, community development centres, and vocational training centres, rural mini hydel electrification projects, installation of transformers, erection of solar lights and distribution of solar lights, provisioning of generators, construction of check dams, water supply schemes, and digging of hand pumps and borewells for water, were also undertaken. Additionally, development projects like construction of bus-stop shelters, utility toilets, renovation of rural government schools, development of play fields and stadia and construction of model villages destroyed in 2005 earthquake were undertaken. Large-scale relief operations were also carried out by the army during the earthquake.[45]

The army has been running hospitals providing healthcare in remote areas, organises a number of medical camps and has established a number of health centres. These centres have been equipped with ultrasound, ECG machines, oxygen cylinders, nebulisers, etc., and villagers are regularly educated on family planning, child care, basic hygiene and sanitation. Free medicines are provided. Medical exhibitions displaying posters on various fatal/dangerous diseases like AIDS, Cancer, TB, etc., and screening of life-style diseases are regularly organised. The Army also provides artificial limbs to civilians injured in mine blast and terrorism related incidents. Motivated youth are identified in medical camps in rural areas for further training in para-medical care and first aid by the Army Field Hospitals. These men are provided civil recognised

certificates for spreading awareness of hygiene and sanitation amongst their people, to become self-employed and to be readily available for immediate medical aid in case of emergencies. In addition, veterinary camps are regularly organised by the Army's Remount and Veterinary Corps to provide veterinary care and advice to people rearing cattle in remote rural areas. One fallout of violence has been the growing incidence of psychiatric issues among the youth, where the army has its own specialists to deal with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). All these have been recognised as measures to build trust and aid reconstruction in strife-torn areas.[46]

In addition to these activities, the army also conducts work in other areas as well including vocational training, sports, and recruitment drives, yielding improvement in quality of life, providing benefits to the locals, contributing to the economy, and generating employment opportunities. This enumeration is evidence of the foundations built by the armed forces, which will facilitate transition. The army is also the only organisation that has its integral resources to deal with virtually all the possible breakdowns in administrative machinery in the state. It has a comprehensive medical system providing doctors, psychiatrists and veterinarians. Its military police can not only handle law and order situations, but also provide training to police forces. Its legal branch can aid the justice system. Military diplomacy can be one of the most sensitive facets of transition and therefore be utilised to effect.[47] These and a host of other issues of fragile transitions can be handled well. Most importantly, the army does not function on the concept of limited liability as seen in other government or private sector organisations. The concept of unlimited liability may sound strange to the untrained ear, the community of soldiers has its own system of 'uncompromising quirks of culture and ethos, nail-biting training and the seclusion of its barracks, operational theatres and deployment – creating a distinct and unique set of battle-hardened separateness from the mainstream civilian society. Military service is not a job but a calling in life; it subconsciously drives a moral burden on the soldier, who is expected to answer the call to arms at the state's directive, even at the sure cost of losing a life or limb'.[48] In consonance with its apolitical stance, high degree of impartiality, and a high moral authority, which are important prerequisites for transitions, the armed forces remain strong contenders for peacebuilding.

<div align="center">CONCLUSION</div>

Indian armed forces have served with distinction in conflict-afflicted areas for over 70 years, building a remarkable repertoire of institutional knowledge on the various facets of conflict, including their in-country deployments. This must now be utilised by giving the armed forces an enhanced role in post-conflict transition governance, and must be considered part of the process, rather than restricting the armed forces to the kinetic phase of operations. It is evident that in the new and expanded concept of security, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, armed forces will invariably play the lead role in fragile transitions. Essential prerequisites for transitions are an apolitical character, high degree of impartiality, and a moral authority, all organisational assets of armed forces; additionally, the concept of unlimited liability will make the armed forces strive for the success of peace processes. The case for armed forces in peacebuilding roles and therefore contributing to nation-building, is strengthened by the following conclusions emerging from the above research.

First, political fragility demands that armed forces be positioned proactively during post-intervention consultations and negotiations. Second, contingencies stemming from flux in conflict be tackled by professionals ready to use force if required. Third, armed forces are best poised to provide meaningful insights on ground situations with their experience, and social and intelligence networks. Fourth, armed forces secure the re-establishment of governance structures, unprejudiced and impartial allocation and optimisation of resources, ensuring high standards and reinstating faith in justice systems, thus trail-blazing the integration of institutions with political solutions. Fifth, violence and illegal activities espoused by non-state actors be tackled by the armed forces, especially given the fragility of transitions. Lastly, armed forces strengthen legitimacy of negotiated resolutions, structures and institutions of governance, acting as a buffer between strata of political actors, interest groups, and others vying for power in the flux of post-conflict transitions.

Suitability of the armed forces for fragile transitions is also based on essential prerequisites, which are embedded in the training, character, ethos, and functioning of the armed forces. First, their impartiality, mandatory for equity in transition. Second, their apolitical stance owing to organisational ethos, giving greater traction in rebuilding trust and providing functional institutions for more political accommodation. Third, their high moral authority due to their intrinsic loyalty, integrity,

and selfless service to the nation, which is the primary reason for armed forces enjoying high degree of respect in society. Fourth, unlike any other arm of government, their functioning on a premise of unlimited liability is the reason why resorting to the use of armed forces happens in the face of complete and abject failure of other organs during crises.

As a country on the cusp of becoming a power centre in its own right in the comity of nations, armed forces of the union now need to be given an enhanced role in post-conflict transitions. It is a natural progression during the metamorphosis to great power status, and will increase the contribution of the armed forces to peacekeeping externally, and nation-building internally.

## Notes

1. According to the official website of the Indian Army, India has provided peacekeepers to 43 UN missions since the inception of the UN. These include force commanders, contingents, staff officers and observers. Major General (later General) KS Thimayya headed the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea in 1950, when the country was still a nascent republic. See 'Indian Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations', Indian Army, available at https://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/FormTemplete/frmTempSimple.aspx?MnId=lQWbsnNIC9XwKdFbktstUw==&ParentID=TEDs6u5ddEwvubHZuM1wIA==&flag=+fGvWE0Ci71I5iTbhimANg== , accessed on 9 March 2022. The UN Peacekeeping website also devotes a page to the Indian efforts, wherein it highlights the more than 2,00,000 peacekeepers provided by India over 70 years, including protecting civilians in conflict zones, disarming ex-combatants, and aiding the transition to peace. See https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/india, accessed on 9 March 2022.

2. Socio-ethnic conflict may find its resolution in the engagement of relevant sections of civil society. See Ashutosh Varshney, 'Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond', *World Politics*, Vol. 53, April 2001, pp. 3–4, 364–65 (presented at the American Political Science Association, Boston).

3. For instance, as authorised to the UNMISS in South Sudan from 2014 onwards. Details are available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmiss, accessed on 1 June 2022.

4. Role of the UN DPPA extends to managing violent conflict and political crises, sustaining peace and enhancing partnerships. Same can be accessed at https://dppa.un.org/en/what-we-do, accessed on 1 June 2022.

5. The Berghof Foundation comprises a merger of the erstwhile Berghof Conflict Research, Berghof Peace Support, and the Institute for Peace

Studies. The policy report titled 'From Combatants to Peacebuilders: A case for inclusive, participatory and holistic security transitions' is available at https://berghof-foundation.org/library/from-combatants-to-peacebuilders-a-case-for-inclusive-participatory-and-holistic-security-transitions, accessed on 26 February 2022.

6. Kenneth W. Thomas, 'Conflict and Conflict Management: Reflections and Update', *Journal of Organisational Behaviour*, Vol. 13, 1992, pp. 265–74.

7. Gregory L. Rhoden, *Occupation and Governance: The New Face of Operational Art*, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2006.

8. Nadia Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory*, Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2017.

9. The High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations was appointed by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in 2014, to review the current state of UN peace operations. The panel was chaired by Nobel laureate and former President of Timor-Leste Jose Ramos-Horta, and vice-chaired by Ms Ameera Haq. The report submitted by the panel in 2015 became known as the Horta Panel Report, and recommended certain essential shifts, first of which was 'primacy of politics' or the requirement of political solutions to conflict, rather than just military engagements. Gist of the panel's work is available at https://www.peacewomen.org/resource/report-high-level-independent-panel-united-nations-peace-operations, accessed on 1 June 2022.

10. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War,* Delhi, Jaico Publishers (translated), 2010; Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Herefordshire, Wordsworth Classics of World Literature (Reprint), 1997.

11. The Agenda for Peace was announced by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali laying the commitment of the United Nations to resolution of conflicts which would be termed Peace Operations. This was a result of the UN Security Council adopting a statement for the same. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping', New York, Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations on adoption of statement by Summit Meeting of UN Security Council, January 1992.

12. Use of military intervention is required to buttress the efforts of the peacekeeping force in identifying and addressing the underlying causes of the conflict. Chapter VI of the UN Charter deals with military activities in such areas. If the scope of intervention is enlarged to persuade groups to desist from fighting and violence, and/or to suppress them by use of force,

Chapter VII mandates are applied, which give due legal endorsement for such use of force.

13. David Petraeus in an interview with Jonathan Marcus of the BBC in 2015. The full text of the interview can be found at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32950900, accessed on 20 May 2022. General Petraeus gives insight into the importance of a combined civil-military campaign when heading the effort in Iraq. During Secretary Rumsfeld's tour, the same was highlighted by Petraeus, in the context of enhancing troop strength in Iraq. Attention is also drawn to Matthew G. Mattingly, *Purely Military Advice: Military Translation of Strategic Policy in Wars of Limited Aims*, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2019, pp. 18–20, 40.

14. William J. Durch and Madeline England, 'The Purposes of Peace Operations', in *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations – 2009*, London, Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2009.

15. Paul F. Diehl, 'Peacekeeping and Beyond', in Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I William Zartman (eds), *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, London, SAGE Publications, 2009.

16. James Barros, *The Aaland Islands' Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968; David Wainhouse, *International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast*, Baltimore, Maryland, John Hopkins University Press, 1966.

17. Gabriella Rosner, *The United Nations Emergency Force*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1963. Also see Ernest Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the United Nations Congo Operation*, Baltimore, Maryland, John Hopkins University Press, 1967.

18. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, New York, 1995.

19. John Cockell, 'Conceptualising Peacebuilding: Human Security and Sustainable Peace', in Michael Pugh (ed), *Regeneration of War Torn Societies*, London, Macmillan, 2000, pp. 15–37.

20. Virginia Fortna, 'Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 97–114, 2003, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1079-1760.2003.00504010.x, accessed on 1 March 2022. Also see Virginia Fortna, 'Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanism and Empirical Effects', *World Politics*, Vol. 56, No. 4, pp. 481–519, 2004.

21. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, 'International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 779–802, 2000.

22. Brian Urquhart, 'Peacekeeping: A View from the Operational Centre', in Henry Wiseman (ed), *Peacekeeping; Appraisals and Proposals*, New York, Pergamon, 1983, pp. 161–74.

23. Isaac Chotiner, 'David Petraeus on American Mistakes in Afghanistan', *The New Yorker*, 20 August 2021, available at https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/david-petraeus-on-american-mistakes-in-afghanistan, accessed on 23 May 2022.

24. Charles Tilly, *Bringing the State Back In: War Making and State Making as Organised Crime*, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 169–91.

25. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1957.

26. James S. Page, 'Teaching Peace to the Military', *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 571–77.

27. Indian armed forces are an example of how apolitical nature is considered a matter of pride. From the time cadets join their training academies, it is drilled into them. In social gatherings of officers' messes, one way to discourage political talk is to levy a fine on the officer doing so; it is usually to host a round of drinks for all present there. At senior levels, some amount of political science is included in career courses of instruction.

28. Veronique Dudouet, Hans J. Giessmann and Katrin Planta, 'From Combatants to Peacebuilders: A Case for Inclusive, Participatory and Holistic Security Transitions', Germany, Berghof Foundation Policy Report, 2012.

29. Human Security Centre, Human Security Brief 2007, Burnaby, Simon Fraser University, 2007.

30. Kalle Liesinen and Sami Lahdensuo, 'Negotiating Decommissioning and Reintegration in Aceh, Indonesia', in C. Buchanan (ed.), *Reactions on Guns, Fighters and Armed Violence in Peace Processes*, *Negotiating Disarmament*, Vol. I, Geneva, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2008.

31. Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta, n. 28.

32. Sudha Ramachandran, 'The Downside to India's Kashmir "Friendlies"', *Asia Times*, 26 September 2003. Also see Vasundhara Sirnate, 'Kashmir's Crossroads: Self Rule, Indian Integration and Party Politics', *Foreign Affairs*, 15 April 2015, available at  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2015-04-15/kashmirs-crossroads, accessed on 25 February 2022.

33. Chandra Lekha Sriram, *Peace as Governance. Power Sharing, Armed Groups, and Contemporary Peace Negotiations*, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

34. I. William Zartman, *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*, Washington D.C., Brookings Press, 1996.

35. Nadia Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory*, Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2017.

36. William J. Durch and Madeline England, 'The Purposes of Peace Operations', in *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations – 2009*, London, Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2009.

37. Lakhdar Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc, A/55/305-s//2000/809, New York UN Headquarters, 2000 (Report submitted to the Secretary General of the UN).

38. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1957.

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40. Fred Charles Ilke, *Every War Must End*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2005 (Second revised edition).

41. Schadlow, n. 35.

42. Interview with Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain by the author, 2014.

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46. Matthew Green, *Aftershock*, Portobello Books, 2016.

47. Arjun Katoch, 'Military Diplomacy - An Underutilised National Resource', *Indian Defence Review*, 20 July 2015, available at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/military-diplomacy-an-underutilised-national-resource/, accessed on 3 March 2022.

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