Ukraine’s Strategic Push in Africa
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Mohanasakthivel J
Mohanasakthivel J is a Research Analyst with the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi. His area of research includes Foreign Policy Analysis, International law, Regional… Continue reading Ukraine’s Strategic Push in Africa read more
Keywords: Russia-Ukraine Relations, Africa
On 7 August 2024, the Spokeswoman of the Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that Ukraine had opened a second front in the Russia–Ukraine war in Africa1 . The statement highlights the growing attention Ukraine is paying to the African continent since the onset of the conflict. Ukraine’s recent initiatives, though ambitious, reflect a hopeful yet perhaps overly optimistic approach in seeking to counter Russian influence in Africa, a region where Moscow’s ties are deeply entrenched and longstanding.
Ukraine’s strategic shift towards Africa marks a significant change in its foreign policy. Between February 2022 and February 2024, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy participated in over 30 high-level meetings with African leaders and the African Union, reflecting a growing interest in strengthening both bilateral and multilateral relationships.2 These diplomatic initiatives were further solidified by the December 2022 announcement of plans to establish 10 new Ukrainian embassies across Africa.3 Prior to Russia’s invasion, Ukraine had a limited diplomatic infrastructure in Africa, with just 10 embassies.4
The momentum of Ukraine’s engagement was notably accelerated by the ‘New Horizons’ strategy, under which the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs embarked on four extensive diplomatic tours across Africa between 2022 and 2023. These tours, covering 12 nations including Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya and Morocco, highlighted Ukraine’s strategic interest in forging partnerships across diverse regions of the continent. On 30 December 2023, Ukraine unveiled its first communication strategy for Africa for 2024–2026, aimed at bolstering its image, advancing its interests and countering Russian influence5 . Recognising Africa’s pivotal role in the United Nations General Assembly as the continent with the largest voting bloc, Ukraine’s strategy reflects its awareness of Africa’s critical importance in shaping the dynamics of the Global South.
Challenges
Ukraine faces significant challenges in increasing its influence in Africa, primarily due to Russia’s well-established connections on the continent. Between 2018 and 2022, Russia was the leading arms supplier to Africa, accounting for 40 per cent of the continent’s weapon sales.6 Over the years, Russia has developed robust relationships with African nations through its embassies, media presence and cultural connections.
A major aspect of Russia’s influence stems from the Wagner mercenary group, now known as the Africa Corps, which operates under the Russian Ministry of Defence. Since 2017, this group has extended military support to nations such as Mali, the Central African Republic, Mozambique and Sudan in return for financial compensation or access to resources like gold. Since Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin has accumulated over US$ 2.5 billion from trading African gold.7
One of Ukraine’s key initiatives in Africa is the ‘Grain from Ukraine’ programme, launched by President Zelenskyy in partnership with the World Food Programme. Started on 26 November 2022, during the International Food Security Summit in Kyiv, this programme aims to address food shortages caused by the Russia–Ukraine war. With about US$ 220 million in support, the programme is expected to grow as more countries and organisations get involved. Working with the UN World Food Programme, Ukraine focuses on delivering grain to countries facing severe food shortages, including Ethiopia, Somalia, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. This initiative not only shows Ukraine’s commitment to humanitarian aid but also strengthens its ties with African nations.8
Ukraine’s strategy in Africa involves both economic and military initiatives. Economically, Ukraine aims to transition from merely exporting raw material like grains and oil to exporting processed goods and agricultural technologies. However, this economic engagement may be overshadowed by Ukraine’s military activities on the continent. Early in the Russia–Ukraine war, some African countries strongly condemned Ukraine’s call for African fighters to join the ‘international legion’ against Russia, with nations such as Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria expressing strong opposition.9
Recently, Ukrainian Special Forces have reportedly been active in Sudan, supporting General Abdel Fattah Burhan, the leader of the country’s regular armed forces, in their fight against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Mohammed Hamdan Daglo (Hemedti).10 The RSF has been supported by the Wagner group since 2017. Ukrainian forces have used advanced weapons like drones and guided missiles to try to reduce Wagner’s influence in Sudan. Despite these efforts, Ukraine’s support hasn’t been enough to change the situation in Sudan’s favour. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have even started cooperating with Russia, offering Port Sudan in exchange for Russian security support, which makes Ukraine’s efforts futile.11
The limited success of Ukraine’s strategy was further highlighted at the peace summit earlier on 16 June 2024. Out of the 82 states that signed a communique on a peace framework, only 11 were from Africa.12 Maksym Subkh, Ukraine’s Special Representative for the Middle East and Africa, urged African nations to participate in the second Peace Summit to help achieve a just resolution to the conflict.13
Additionally, Ukraine’s actions in Africa could cause concern among countries that don’t want to become involved in a proxy war between Russia and Ukraine. Mali and Niger have cut diplomatic ties with Ukraine. Other West African countries have criticised Ukraine after some Ukrainian officials claimed to support Tuareg separatist rebels in northern Mali. These rebels, connected to both separatist movements and al-Qaeda’s affiliate in the Sahel region, successfully pushed back a Malian-Russian offensive in northern Mali in late July, resulting in significant casualties for both Russian and Malian forces. Following this, Mali cut ties with Ukraine, accusing Ukraine of supporting the rebels and echoing Russian claims that portray Ukraine as a supporter of international terrorism. Ukraine later denied any involvement in the attacks, calling Mali’s decision short-sighted.14
In addition, Senegal reprimanded the Ukrainian ambassador for a video that contradicted its policy of neutrality in the Russia–Ukraine conflict. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)15 also condemned any foreign interference that threatens peace in the region, signalling that Ukraine’s actions could strain its relationships with these African nations. ECOWAS member countries, which have strong partnerships with Western nations and have imposed sanctions on the Russian-backed governments, might see Ukraine’s actions as a threat to their efforts. Senegal, which is leading efforts to bring these countries back into the ECOWAS fold, could find its efforts undermined by Ukraine’s military activities in Africa.
Conclusion
Ukraine’s renewed focus on Africa starkly contrasts with Russia’s entrenched relationships across the continent. While Russia has strengthened its ties with governments like those in Mali and Niger—countries that have recently cut diplomatic relations with Ukraine—Ukraine views its engagement in Africa as a vital part of its broader strategy to counter Russian aggression and secure global support.
However, empowering African nations should not come at the cost of exacerbating their existing vulnerabilities. Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, in an interview with The Washington Post,16 emphasised Ukraine’s intent to challenge Putin’s influence wherever possible, including in Africa. Although this approach aligns with Ukraine’s objectives of weakening Russia’s military capabilities, it risks alienating African nations by dragging the conflict into their region.
The US and Europe must caution Ukraine against expanding the battlefield into Africa, particularly the Sahel, where countries are already embroiled in conflict. West Africa and the Sahel region have faced persistent and escalating terrorist violence for over a decade, with the central Sahel states of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger being hardest hit. Groups like Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, affiliated with al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) frequently target security forces and civilians, seize territory and blockade towns. Supporting factions like the Tuareg rebels, who are linked to al-Qaeda, could further destabilise the region and cause ripple effects in neighbouring countries. As the Ukraine–Russia conflict persists, Ukraine’s engagement in Africa will require a delicate balance between its strategic goals and the need to maintain stable, constructive relationships with African nations.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.