The Israel–Hamas War has posed significant political and security challenges for Saudi Arabia. Following the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, Saudi Arabia urged restraint from both sides, while also holding Israel responsible for the occupation of Palestinian territories.1 It expressed its concern for the protection of civilians and the deprivation of rights of the Palestinian people. Reaffirming its longstanding stance on the Palestinian issue, Saudi Arabia called for renewed international efforts towards achieving a two-state solution. This position echoes the Arab Peace Initiative proposed by Saudi Arabia in 2002, which advocates for a two-state solution and the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.2 Throughout the war, Saudi Arabia has condemned Israel’s attacks on schools and hospitals, as well as the killing and forcible displacement of civilians in Gaza. The Kingdom has also called for the safe delivery of aid to the people of Gaza, the return of all hostages and a lasting peace between Israel and Palestine.
Saudi political and diplomatic efforts
As the war intensified, Riyadh launched several political and diplomatic initiatives at the regional and global levels. Saudi Arabia called on all the Arab and Islamic countries to come together to support Palestine and condemn Israel for its war against Gaza. Riyadh played a pivotal role in mobilising the member countries of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Arab League and hosted meetings to address the situation in Gaza.3 The Arab and Islamic countries’ delegations have visited a number of countries around the world rallying for support for the Palestinian cause. Leveraging its Islamic soft power, Saudi Arabia played a leadership role in bringing the Arab and Islamic countries together in the midst of the war.
At the United Nations, Saudi Arabia has made consistent calls for a ceasefire and achievement of Palestinian statehood.4 Besides, Saudi Arabia has played a very active role in mobilising political support for Palestine in different regional organisations and forums. Apart from the Arab Islamic group, it has also played a leading role in rallying support through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Arab–American Ministerial Meeting and the six-member Arab grouping on the situation in Gaza. Riyadh has worked closely with the US to push for a ceasefire in the war. The US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has visited Saudi Arabia and engaged in discussions with the Saudi leadership. By reaching out to individual countries and regional organisations, the Saudi strategy is to put concerted pressure on Israel to end its military actions in Gaza.
Saudi–Israel normalisation talks
The Hamas attack on Israel happened at a time when Israel and Saudi Arabia were engaged in secret talks to normalise their relationship. Multiple rounds of discussions had reportedly shown positive responses from both sides. After the success of Israel’s normalisation agreements with Bahrain and the UAE, the Saudi–Israel normalisation would have significantly transformed the regional dynamics in the West Asian region. This would have changed the entire perception of the Arab–Israeli relationship and the regional balance of power in West Asia. Further, Israel–Saudi Arabia normalisation would also have a significant impact on the Palestinian struggle for statehood.
US President Joe Biden stated that one of the objectives of the 7 October Hamas attack on Israel was to derail the Israel–Saudi normalisation talks “because the Saudis wanted to recognise Israel”.5 The October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Israeli war on Gaza has led to a pause in the Israeli–Saudi talks with an uncertain future. Saudi Arabia has now stated that normalisation with Israel is not possible without recognition of the Palestinian state on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.6 Thus, the war has placed the Israel–Saudi Arabia normalisation talk in a state of indefinite uncertainty.
Saudi concerns over the Red Sea crisis
The recent involvement of the Houthis in the war against Israel has further escalated tensions in the Red Sea, creating significant maritime security challenges for Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom has fought a long war against the Houthis beginning in 2015. In the past, the Houthis have also attacked ships in the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab el Mandeb. However, the situation in Yemen witnessed a substantial improvement following the Saudi–Iran rapprochement in March 2023. But the threat from the Houthis in the Red Sea has resurfaced since they have joined the war against Israel.
In response to the deteriorating security situation in the Red Sea, a US-led military coalition has launched Operation Prosperity Guardian to ensure maritime security in the region. However, Saudi Arabia has opted not to join the Operation. This decision reflects a complex dilemma: while the Kingdom condemns the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea, it is also wary of being perceived as directly participating in the war, choosing to maintain a more cautious stance.
Saudi humanitarian support for Gaza
Saudi Arabia has provided huge humanitarian aid to Gaza through the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSRelief). In November 2023, in the immediate aftermath of the beginning of the war, in response to the flash appeal by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), KSRelief provided US$ 15 million to support UNRWA in the Gaza Strip.7 Again in March 2024, Saudi Arabia provided another US$ 40 million to the UNRWA towards the agency’s humanitarian efforts.8 By providing humanitarian aid in a war situation, Saudi Arabia has reiterated its support for the Palestinian people.
Conclusion
The beginning of the Israel–Hamas War has brought new challenges for Saudi Arabia. Without expressing its support for Hamas, Saudi Arabia has expressed its solidarity with the people of Gaza in particular and Palestine in general. The real diplomatic and political challenge for Saudi Arabia would come after the end of the war as resumption of the normalisation talks with Israel will not only take time to restart but would also be more politically sensitive than before. Saudi Arabia’s policy is to tread cautiously in the middle of the war so that it can resume its talks with Israel once the war ends and at the same time continue to support the people of Palestine and their struggle for statehood.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Israel–Hamas War has posed significant political and security challenges for Saudi Arabia. Following the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, Saudi Arabia urged restraint from both sides, while also holding Israel responsible for the occupation of Palestinian territories.1 It expressed its concern for the protection of civilians and the deprivation of rights of the Palestinian people. Reaffirming its longstanding stance on the Palestinian issue, Saudi Arabia called for renewed international efforts towards achieving a two-state solution. This position echoes the Arab Peace Initiative proposed by Saudi Arabia in 2002, which advocates for a two-state solution and the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.2 Throughout the war, Saudi Arabia has condemned Israel’s attacks on schools and hospitals, as well as the killing and forcible displacement of civilians in Gaza. The Kingdom has also called for the safe delivery of aid to the people of Gaza, the return of all hostages and a lasting peace between Israel and Palestine.
Saudi political and diplomatic efforts
As the war intensified, Riyadh launched several political and diplomatic initiatives at the regional and global levels. Saudi Arabia called on all the Arab and Islamic countries to come together to support Palestine and condemn Israel for its war against Gaza. Riyadh played a pivotal role in mobilising the member countries of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Arab League and hosted meetings to address the situation in Gaza.3 The Arab and Islamic countries’ delegations have visited a number of countries around the world rallying for support for the Palestinian cause. Leveraging its Islamic soft power, Saudi Arabia played a leadership role in bringing the Arab and Islamic countries together in the midst of the war.
At the United Nations, Saudi Arabia has made consistent calls for a ceasefire and achievement of Palestinian statehood.4 Besides, Saudi Arabia has played a very active role in mobilising political support for Palestine in different regional organisations and forums. Apart from the Arab Islamic group, it has also played a leading role in rallying support through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Arab–American Ministerial Meeting and the six-member Arab grouping on the situation in Gaza. Riyadh has worked closely with the US to push for a ceasefire in the war. The US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has visited Saudi Arabia and engaged in discussions with the Saudi leadership. By reaching out to individual countries and regional organisations, the Saudi strategy is to put concerted pressure on Israel to end its military actions in Gaza.
Saudi–Israel normalisation talks
The Hamas attack on Israel happened at a time when Israel and Saudi Arabia were engaged in secret talks to normalise their relationship. Multiple rounds of discussions had reportedly shown positive responses from both sides. After the success of Israel’s normalisation agreements with Bahrain and the UAE, the Saudi–Israel normalisation would have significantly transformed the regional dynamics in the West Asian region. This would have changed the entire perception of the Arab–Israeli relationship and the regional balance of power in West Asia. Further, Israel–Saudi Arabia normalisation would also have a significant impact on the Palestinian struggle for statehood.
US President Joe Biden stated that one of the objectives of the 7 October Hamas attack on Israel was to derail the Israel–Saudi normalisation talks “because the Saudis wanted to recognise Israel”.5 The October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Israeli war on Gaza has led to a pause in the Israeli–Saudi talks with an uncertain future. Saudi Arabia has now stated that normalisation with Israel is not possible without recognition of the Palestinian state on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.6 Thus, the war has placed the Israel–Saudi Arabia normalisation talk in a state of indefinite uncertainty.
Saudi concerns over the Red Sea crisis
The recent involvement of the Houthis in the war against Israel has further escalated tensions in the Red Sea, creating significant maritime security challenges for Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom has fought a long war against the Houthis beginning in 2015. In the past, the Houthis have also attacked ships in the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab el Mandeb. However, the situation in Yemen witnessed a substantial improvement following the Saudi–Iran rapprochement in March 2023. But the threat from the Houthis in the Red Sea has resurfaced since they have joined the war against Israel.
In response to the deteriorating security situation in the Red Sea, a US-led military coalition has launched Operation Prosperity Guardian to ensure maritime security in the region. However, Saudi Arabia has opted not to join the Operation. This decision reflects a complex dilemma: while the Kingdom condemns the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea, it is also wary of being perceived as directly participating in the war, choosing to maintain a more cautious stance.
Saudi humanitarian support for Gaza
Saudi Arabia has provided huge humanitarian aid to Gaza through the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSRelief). In November 2023, in the immediate aftermath of the beginning of the war, in response to the flash appeal by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), KSRelief provided US$ 15 million to support UNRWA in the Gaza Strip.7 Again in March 2024, Saudi Arabia provided another US$ 40 million to the UNRWA towards the agency’s humanitarian efforts.8 By providing humanitarian aid in a war situation, Saudi Arabia has reiterated its support for the Palestinian people.
Conclusion
The beginning of the Israel–Hamas War has brought new challenges for Saudi Arabia. Without expressing its support for Hamas, Saudi Arabia has expressed its solidarity with the people of Gaza in particular and Palestine in general. The real diplomatic and political challenge for Saudi Arabia would come after the end of the war as resumption of the normalisation talks with Israel will not only take time to restart but would also be more politically sensitive than before. Saudi Arabia’s policy is to tread cautiously in the middle of the war so that it can resume its talks with Israel once the war ends and at the same time continue to support the people of Palestine and their struggle for statehood.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.