Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
मनोहर पर्रिकर रक्षा अध्ययन एवं विश्लेषण संस्थान

Rising Tensions in the Horn: Ethiopia, Egypt and Somalia on a Collision Course

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On 8 September 2024, during National Sovereignty Day, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed asserted that Ethiopia’s name is synonymous with freedom and dignity. He reaffirmed that the country has never initiated aggression against others throughout its history but has bravely defended its sovereignty against numerous threats.1 This assertion comes at a time of growing tensions in the Horn of Africa, particularly as Ethiopia seeks avenues for maritime access and Egypt opposes the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Egypt is also forging new regional alliances. Cairo signed a defence pact with Somalia in August 2024.2 It has also deployed soldiers to Somalia as part of the new African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia,3 further underscoring shifting regional dynamics and rising tensions.

Strategic Realignments and Rising Animosity

The Ethiopia–Somaliland agreement on 1 January 2024, has reshaped strategic interests across the Horn of Africa, prompting Somalia to reassess its diplomatic and defence strategies. Ethiopia’s actions have spurred Somalia to actively pursue new alliances to counterbalance Addis Ababa’s expanding regional footprint. Central to this effort is Somalia’s deepening defence cooperation with regional countries starting with Turkey, marked by the signing of new agreements aimed at strengthening its military capacity amid growing regional uncertainty.4 Turkey also has a good relationship with Ethiopia and is mediating between the two countries.5 The possibility of Turkey taking antagonistic positions against either Ethiopia or Somalia is, therefore, unlikely.

The more significant development is Somalia’s evolving relationship with Egypt, which carries broader geopolitical ramifications. Egypt has expressed its intention to deploy troops in Somalia, officially under the pretext of combating the Al-Qaeda-linked group Al-Shabaab. Yet, the strategic impact of an Egyptian military presence in the Horn extends far beyond counterterrorism. For Cairo, this move serves two purposes: solidifying its influence in Somalia, signalling its resolve to challenge Ethiopia’s growing dominance in the region and forcing it to return to negotiations.

Somalia’s growing ties with Egypt, coupled with its expanding relations with Eritrea, another historical adversary of Ethiopia, suggests a broader realignment. The foreign ministers of Egypt, Eritrea and Somalia met on the sidelines of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York to discuss their common strategic goals, underscoring this trilateral alignment.6

The growing cooperation was further reinforced on 10 October 2024, when the leaders of Somalia, Egypt and Eritrea convened in Asmara, Eritrea, and issued a joint communiqué.7 While the official discourse centered on the protection of Somalia’s sovereignty and stability, the subtext indicated a concerted effort to challenge Ethiopia’s regional influence.

Ethiopia’s concerns have deepened with Eritrea’s involvement in the evolving alliance. The suspension of Ethiopian Airlines flights to Eritrea8 on 3 September, attributed to ‘difficult operating conditions’, reflects the worsening diplomatic ties between the two neighbours. Although Addis Ababa and Asmara cooperated temporarily during the Tigray War (2020–2022), their post-war relationship has reverted to historic rivalries.9 The Eritrean leadership also fears that Ethiopia harbours ambitions to reclaim access to Eritrean ports, which it lost when Eritrea gained independence in 1993.

Ethiopia’s foreign policy in the Horn of Africa is shaped by two primary objectives: securing maritime access and safeguarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). These priorities have fuelled tensions with both Somalia and Egypt, as the latter intensifies efforts to obstruct the dam’s progress. Egypt views Somalia as a strategic ally to counter Ethiopia’s ambitions on both fronts. Cairo’s increasingly assertive rhetoric and military activities have elevated the risk of conflict, compounded by its recent military cooperation agreement with Somalia. Within a month, Egypt supplied Mogadishu with two shipments of military equipment, with Somali Defense Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur publicly expressing gratitude for the support10 . In the coming months, the strategic competition between Cairo and Addis Ababa is expected to escalate, potentially drawing both regional and external actors into the conflict.

Assessment

Ethiopia plays an indispensable role in stabilising Somalia, driven by the need to secure its borders and combat the Al-Shabaab insurgency. Given Somalia’s persistent fragility, Ethiopia has supported regional governance structures in Somaliland and Puntland, creating buffer zones11 to shield itself from terrorist threats while consolidating its influence. Over the years, Ethiopia’s continued involvement in Somalia’s peacekeeping efforts has made it an important actor.

Ethiopia was the driving force behind the ‘building blocks’ approach, which facilitated the introduction of federalism in Somalia. In 1998, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs articulated this strategy in a position paper, asserting that ‘local administrative structures could constitute building blocks’ for the restoration of the Somali state. However, Egypt’s recent proposal to deploy 5,000 troops to the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) and an additional 5,000 troops on a bilateral basis has raised concerns in Ethiopia, which views Cairo’s growing presence as a potential challenge to its influence and strategic interests.12

Moreover, General Michael Langley of AFRICOM referred to Ethiopia as an “anchor state”, emphasising its vital contributions to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Ethiopian forces, particularly in Southwest State, have been instrumental in driving Al-Shabaab out of key areas and fostering stability.13 Beyond security engagement, Ethiopia’s involvement in strengthening local governance structures has helped prevent the spread of extremism. Without Ethiopia’s sustained engagement, Somalia would likely face a dangerous security vacuum, jeopardising not only Somalia’s stability but also the security of the wider Horn of Africa.

Second, the federal system in Somalia, long beset by challenges in maintaining unity, is now facing heightened pressure. Several semi-autonomous regions, including Puntland, Jubaland14 and Southwest State, oppose Egypt’s deployment of troops and instead align with Ethiopia.15 Tensions within the federal system have deepened, as evidenced by Puntland’s recent declaration that it will operate as an independent government until Somalia’s federal constitution is finalised.

It is important to note that the constitutional disagreements are also influenced by clan dynamics. The Hawiye clans, dominant in central and southern Somalia, especially in the greater Mogadishu area, tend to favour a unitary state. In contrast, the Darod clans, influential in Puntland and Jubaland, strongly support federalism. These two clans have shaped Somalia’s political landscape since the post-conflict period, with their divergent visions often driving political competition. To resolve these persistent disputes, Somalia requires a comprehensive constitutional revision followed by a nationwide referendum.16 Without such measures, tensions between the federal government and its member states are likely to persist. If unresolved, these political divisions spanning both the federal and clan levels could become a major source of instability, especially in the post-ATMIS era.

Third, Uganda, another key player in the region, has also voiced scepticism. Uganda’s State Minister for International Affairs, Henry Okello Oryem, questioned why Egypt is only now seeking to join the mission. “The TCCs are asking, why does Egypt want to join now? Where have they been all this time?”, he remarked, highlighting the concerns of other troop-contributing countries (TCCs). Meanwhile, the European Union (EU), the primary donor to African Union (AU) missions in Somalia, has expressed a neutral stance but emphasised the need for participating countries to focus entirely on combating al-Shabaab.17

Fourth, Somalia has emerged as Egypt’s key ally in countering Ethiopia since the start of the Sudanese civil war, which has weakened Egypt’s influence in Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have supported Egypt’s position on the GERD since Sudan is also a downstream country on the Nile. The historical rivalries and current political situations between Ethiopia and Egypt contribute to ongoing tensions, with the Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) acting as a trigger for recent escalations. However, it is not the main cause of the conflict. If Somalia becomes a battleground in the dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt, this could have serious negative effects on the entire region.

Finally, in order to prevent the situation from escalating into a broader regional conflict, it is important to restart peace negotiations. Somalia could consider reopening discussions through established mediators like Turkey, which has previously facilitated talks between the two countries. Alternatively, the African Union could play a mediating role to help prevent further escalation. Experience from Sudan shows that outside interference can worsen conflicts, as external powers often prioritise their own interests over long-term stability.18 It is crucial for African nations to address these tensions internally rather than letting external parties influence the situation.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

Keywords: Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia
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