Regional Powers in Libya

Just like the conflict in Syria, Libya has ripened into a proxy war between the regional powers. While Qatar, Turkey and Sudan have been supporting the Libya Dawn and General National Congress (GNC) based in Tripoli, Egypt and United Arab Emirates (UAE) are backing the internationally recognised government based in Tobruk and its allied General Khalifa Haftar’s Operation Dignity. However, such a proxy war will only destabilise Libya. Rather than taking sides, countries in the region would be better advised to support the United Nations backed peace process and aid peace building measures in Libya. There is a glimmer of hope as recent developments in the region augur well for peace and reconciliation in Libya.

Libya: A status quo of chaos

Libya became the first case of foreign intervention in the indigenous social uprising that was called the ‘Arab Spring’. Starting from the month of February 2011, Libya grabbed global headlines, from the time Colonel Qaddafi issued his heart wrenching warning of a massacre to the rebels of Benghazi up till the point when the Colonel himself was brutally mobbed, beaten and killed. Slowly and steadily, however the focus shifted, from Libya to Syria, then the Islamic State (IS) and the Ukraine crisis. The headlines moved on, yet Libya remained caught up in the chaos that it was left in by its triumphant liberators. Plagued by a precarious security situation and caught in a political conundrum that involves two governments located in two different cities, Libya is slowly deteriorating into a ‘failed state’. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined by 20 to 30 per cent in 2014, and fiscal deficit was 50 per cent of GDP. 1 Libya is exhausting its foreign reserves at a massive rate of $2.5 billon per month to pay wage bills including wages to various militias, subsidies and other government expenses. 2 Amid armed conflicts among militias, oil production to 200,000 to 300,000 barrels per day from 1.6 million barrels per day and the time when oil prices have also declined. 3 With a population that mostly depends on state dole outs and food imports, the economic situation looks alarming.

The state of affairs in the security realm is distressing. Libya’s transition highlights the complexity of post-conflict state building. On one hand, the state has not been able to exercise monopoly over force and hence it cannot exercise sovereign control over its resources and territory. According to estimates, Libya has some 1700 militia groups with 231,000 registered fighters. 4 The numbers vary according to estimates; some reports claim that there are few hundred militias in single city alone. 5 In the current conflict in Libya, the powerful Misrata militias supported by Islamists militias control the capital Tripoli and most of Tripolitania region as well as Benghazi. They have reinstated the General National Congress (GNC) said to be dominated by Islamists members. 6 Collectively known as the Libya Dawn, they rose up in response to Operation Dignity launched by General Khalifa Haftar with a mission to defeat Islamists forces that he claimed dominated the Ahmed Maiteg government of March 2014. 7 General Haftar’s Operation Dignity is said to be supported by the Qaqa and Swaiq militias of Tripoli. 8 Zintan militias are also said to be allied to Haftar and control the mountainous region of north-western Libya. The Tuaregs control eastern regions near Mali and most of the smuggling routes to Algeria are said to be aligned to Libya Dawn. 9 Their rivals, the Toubou, control routes towards Niger and Chad and are said to be allies of Operation Dignity due to their rivalry with Tuaregs.10 To add to the complexity, there are various jihadists’ elements like Ansar-al Sharia that partly control some towns both in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. Shura Council of Islamic Youth control Darna, a port city in the east and have declared allegiance to Islamic State. On the other hand, the political transition in Libya is on an uncertain path. There are two governments, the reinstated GNC supported by Libya Dawn and Tobruk based internationally recognised government led by Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni which is backing Operation Dignity. However, the lines between Islamists and non-Islamists, Libya Dawn and Operation Dignity militias are very ambiguous. Divisions are undercut by many factors like, changing tribal loyalties, economic incentives and political opportunism.

Libya Dawn backers and Supporters of Operation Dignity

Libya Dawn and the GNC in Tripoli are backed by Qatar, Turkey and Sudan. These countries have traditionally backed Muslim Brotherhood affiliated movements during the Arab Spring. Qatar has used the Arab Spring to expand its influence in the region. It has provided political dissidents from the Muslim Brotherhood the means of venting their views through Qatari media channel Al-Jazeera. The Muslim Brotherhood within Qatar has been externally focussed since in a rich and lightly populated country like Qatar, the state has ensured its population gets quality health and education services, thereby limiting Brotherhood’s scope to influence population by offering such social services. 11 Therefore, Brotherhood has tried to expand its influence in countries like Libya backed by the Qatari monarchy. Qatar may be working in tandem with Turkey to supply arms to militias, with Turkey acting as middlemen. In September 2014, Libya had accused Qatar of providing arms to militias that occupied Tripoli.

Turkey’s support for Libya Dawn spawns from its rivalry with Egypt. President Morsi was actively backed by Turkey and it has criticised the regime of President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. In August 2013, Turkey had requested the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Egypt as response to the military coup led by Al-Sisi to overthrow Morsi’s government. When Egypt launched air strikes in Libya as response to the presence of Islamic State in Darna, Turkey condemned the air strike. 12 Turkey continues to not recognise Prime Minister Al-Thini’s government. Egypt on its part has accused Turkey of supporting terrorism in Sinai. The Egyptian Foreign Minister had objected to the African Union’s invitation to Qatar and Turkey to attend the International Contact Group for Libya meeting held in January 28, 2015 in Addis Ababa. In protest, Egypt had not attended the opening session of the meeting accusing the African Union of not coordinating the participation of outside countries properly. 13 Sudan’s backing of Libya Dawn stems from its rivalry with Egypt over the Renaissance Dam.

General Haftar’s Operation Dignity has received support from Egypt. United Arab Emirates has also given support at the behest of Saudi Arabia. Egypt does not want an Islamic government in its eastern neighbourhood. There are many Egyptian migrants that work in Libya and their security raises the stakes for its involvement in Libya. UAE and Saudi Arabia, being gulf monarchies are worried about Muslim Brotherhood dominated forces coming to power in Libya, especially after having successfully deposing their prime foe Qaddafi. It was these concerns that led Egypt and the UAE to launch air strikes in Libya in August 2014.

A glimmer of hope for peace

However as the recent developments in the external environment suggests, the chances of peace and reconciliation appear brighter in Libya. Firstly, there has been a rapprochement between the GCC and Qatar in November 2014 after Saudi Arabia and UAE had recalled their ambassadors from Qatar in March 2014 due to its alleged Qatar’s alleged interference in internal matters of other countries in the region. 14 Qatar is also distancing itself from Muslim Brotherhood especially after the growing threat from Islamic State. Rapprochement among GCC members augurs well for peace in Libya as intra-Gulf rivalries will not play out in the country. Secondly, there has been rapprochement between Sudan and Egypt as well over the Renaissance Dam issue, with both of them along with Ethiopia signing a framework agreement.15 Thirdly, the countries south of Libya, particularly Mali, Mauritania and Senegal are increasingly weary of jihadist threat emanating from Libya and hence are pushing the UN to act on the Sub-Saharan jihadists network that has caused disturbances in their territories. 16 Algeria is also sensitive towards the trans-Saharan smuggling networks that operate in Libya. Hence Algeria is actively engaged in supporting the peace process in Libya. Lastly, the presence of French troops in Mali and Niger is partly due to growing threat of jihadists in Libya. Even though French will not directly intervene in Libya, the presence of French troops will help in building western pressure on Libya and other regional powers to work towards peace and stability.

Regional powers in Libya need to work for peace and stability in Libya rather than choosing proxies for furthering their narrow interests. Instead, their interests shall be better served if they aid Libya in post-conflict peace building. These countries would not have to incur the expenses of peace building in Libya as the country is rich enough to foot the bill. Rather an effort towards peace will not only be good for overall regional stability but will also present opportunities for these countries to economically engage with Libya.

• 1. Missy Ryan, “Oil-rich Libya, torn by conflict, may be going broke”, Washington Post, February 18, 2015, at http:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/torn-apart-by-conflict-oi… 2015/02/18/b2a1912a-b78e-11e4-aa05-1ce812b3fdd2_story.html, (Accessed on March 13, 2015).
• 2. Ibid.
• 3. Ibid.
• 4. Candice Moore, “Four Years After the Fall of Gaddafi: The Role of the International Community in Stabilising a Fractured Libya”, Conflict Trends, Issue 1, 2015, p. 52
• 5. Christopher S. Chivvis and Jeffrey Martini, “Security After War”, in Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the Future, National Security Research Division, RAND Corporation, 2014, p. 13.
• 6. It cannot be said for sure whether GNC was dominated by Islamists. The Muslim Brotherhood affiliated Justice and Construction Party had 21 per cent of seats in the GNC, while the moderate National Forces Alliance won 49 per cent of seats. It was the presence of large number of independents whose ideological loyalties were not clear that probably gave an impression that GNC was dominated by Islamists.
• 7. Candice Moore, “Four Years After the Fall of Gaddafi: The Role of the International Community in Stabilising a Fractured Libya”, Conflict Trends, Issue 1, 2015, p. 54.
• 8. Ishaan Tharoor and Adam Taylor, “Here are the key players fighting the war for Libya, all over again”, The Washington Post, August 27, 2014, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/08/27/here-are-th…, (Accessed on March 25, 2015)
• 9. Richard Reeve, “Libya’s Proxy Battlefield”, Oxford Research Group Briefing, January 13, 2015, at http:// www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers_and_reports/…, (Accessed on March 23, 2015).
• 10. Ibid.
• 11. David Roberts, “Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?”, Middle East Policy, Vol XXI, No.3, 2014.
• 12. Soner Cagaptay and Marc Sievers, “Turkey and Egypt’s Great Game in the Middle East: The Regional Powerhouses Square Off”, Foreign Affairs, March 8, 2015, at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2015-03-08/turkeyand-egyp… (Accessed on March 21, 2015).
• 13. “Egypt takes issue with AU inclusion of Turkey, Qatar in Libya meeting”, Daily News Egypt, January 28, 2015 at http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/01/28/egypt-takes-issue-au-inclusion-…, (Accessed on March 26, 2015).
• 14. Justin Vela, “UAE, Saudi and Bahrain ambassadors to return to Qatar”, The National, November 17, 2014, at http:/ /www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/uae-saudi-and-bahrain-ambassadors-t…, (Accessed on March 22, 2015).
• 15. “Nile water countries sign framework deal on Renaissance Dam”, Sudan Tribune, March 24, 2015, at http:// www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article54369, (Accessed on March 21, 2015).
• 16. Richard Reeve, “Libya’s Proxy Battlefield”, Oxford Research Group Briefing, January 13, 2015, at http:// www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers_and_reports/…, (Accessed on March 23, 2015).