Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
मनोहर पर्रिकर रक्षा अध्ययन एवं विश्लेषण संस्थान

Peace in South Sudan in the aftermath of the July 2016 Crisis

Adarsha Verma
He worked at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses from 2016 to 2018 read more
View Point

The crisis that took place in Juba, South Sudan, from 8-11 July 2016, saw intense fighting resulting in the death of many civilians, two peacekeepers of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and collapse of the fragile peace agreement between the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, and his former First-Vice President, Dr Riek Machar. The crisis brought unrestrained violence to the capital of the world’s youngest nation and the warring factions left a trail of destruction and suffering in their wake. Delving into the details of the crisis necessitates a look into the incidents that led to the July 2016 crisis and its likely effects. It also presents an occasion to analyse the reasons for reduced effectiveness of UNMISS, actions that are needed to enhance efficacy of the Regional Protection Force for Juba and measures that will assist in return of peace to this conflict-ridden state.

The Run-Up to the Crisis

South Sudan’s struggle for independence spanned nearly two hundred years right from 1821, when Muhammad Ali, the Ottoman Sultan’s Viceroy in Egypt, sent an expedition to invade Sudan in search of slaves and ivory. From then on, whether it was the Turkiyas (1820-1881), the Mahdiya (1881-1898), the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1898-1956) or the State of independent Sudan (1965-2011), all were perceived by the people of Southern part of Sudan as following similar policies of oppression; as if it were a continuum of colonization.1 The long struggle for independence culminated in a referendum for self-determination in 2011 which, according to the referendum commission, weighed heavily (99.57 per cent)2 in favour of a separate nation (South Sudan).

Celebrations of independence soon gave way to tribal conflict when in 2013, President Salva Kiir accused his deputy, Dr Reik Machhar of staging a coup against the Government.3 Both leaders represent different majority ethnic groups of South Sudan namely the Dinkas and the Nuers respectively (South Sudan has more than 60 ethnic groups4 The Army got divided on tribal lines and started fighting each other as tribal affiliations proved stronger than the fledgling camaraderie in the Army comprising of ‘men from the bushes’. The fighting between tribes which ensued, was fierce, with both sides waging a war based on a ‘scorched earth policy’ – burning, pillaging and committing atrocities of a kind unheard before.

South Sudan is land-locked. Disagreement with their northern neighbor, Sudan, over tariffs for transporting oil and the destruction of basic infrastructure during internal conflict led to an almost complete halt in oil production. A country which relies on oil to finance 98 per cent of its budget5 suddenly had no source of finance. Whatever money available, was siphoned off by corrupt leaders or used for enhancing military strength. The deteriorating security situation resulted in approximately 20 per cent of population of certain states of South Sudan (like Unity and Upper Nile), staying in the UN Protection of Civilian (POC) Camps and another 10-15 per cent in swamps and other inaccessible areas, so that their rivals could not reach them easily.

The Peace Agreement

Severity of the crisis caught international attention and after prolonged negotiations, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-mediated peace was brokered by leaders of the African Union (AU). The Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan6 (hereafter referred to as ‘Peace Agreement’) was signed by President Salva Kiir and Dr Reik Machhar in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 17 August 2015. Key points of the Agreement were the immediate cessation of hostilities, confinement of soldiers to barracks located out of Juba, appointing Dr Reik Machar as the “first vice-president”, formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) in 90 days and investigation of human rights (HR) violations during the conflict by setting up ‘hybrid courts’.7 Progress on the implementation of Peace Agreement was painstakingly slow. In October 2015, within two months of the signing of the Peace Agreement, President Salva Kiir disrupted the peace process by issuing a presidential decree increasing the number of States in the country from 10 to 288, with inter-state divisions based on ensuring that his community (Dinkas) retain control of most of the natural and energy resources. As expected, this was vehemently opposed by all parties less the ruling party. The international community which should have interjected and halted any disruption to an agreed peace agreement chose to remain a mere spectator. This issue (of division of 28 states) and regular clashes between the two warring parties resulted in a tense political and military environment in the country and exhibited a lack of seriousness by the Government of South Sudan in implementing the peace agreement.

The Crisis and its Impact

On 07 July 2016 at about 1730 hours, heavy gunfire erupted outside the residential compound of President Salva Kiir as he along with the rebel leader and first Vice President Dr Reik Machar prepared to address the Nation. The security guards of the two leaders clashed and fighting spread into the streets of Juba, risking a return to civil war. Throughout the fighting from 08-12 July 2016, the belligerents blatantly ignored international human rights law and humanitarian law and appeared to deliberately target civilians on the basis of ethnicity. Information documented and verified by UN Human Rights Department suggests that approximately 500 people were killed and thousands injured during the fighting in various areas of Juba. On 12 July, the President of South Sudan announced that more than 300 soldiers had been killed as a result of the fighting, but information received by UNMISS suggests that the number of fatalities, including civilians, is much higher. Renewed international pressure brought the fighting to an end on 12 July 2016.

The planned address to the Nation on the fateful day was to be portrayed as a show of solidarity between the two leaders on the eve of the fifth anniversary of the Independence Day (09 July) of South Sudan. The date and time of initiation of this crisis thus, leads to a speculation that the military is not fully under the control of the President himself. Indeed when asked about the firing, President Salva Kiir, in a joint statement with his Vice-President, given to the media said, “(W) hat is happening outside is something that we cannot explain to you”.9 It can be speculated that the governmental forces (SPLA) wanted to disrupt the proceedings and stop the show of solidarity.

During and in the aftermath of the clashes, homes, shops and markets were ransacked and looted, property destroyed, tens of millions dollars’ worth of humanitarian assistance pillaged from warehouses of humanitarian agencies and food supplies for approximately 220,000 people stolen.10 Thousands of civilians were forcibly displaced as a consequence of the fighting. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), nearly 103,500 people fled to Uganda in July, followed by 49,427 in August following the fighting in Juba in July. The number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Juba alone rose by 12000 in August 2016.11

Consequent to the July crisis, Dr Reik Machar, the Opposition leader, fled the country. Seeing the opportunity, the President nominated Taban Deng Gai, also from the Opposition, as the First Vice President in place of Dr Reik Machar. This divided the ‘opposition’ into two groups, one continuing their support for Dr Machar whereas the second group supporting the new man, Taban Deng Gai, as their leader. Clashes between these two groups were reported at various parts of the country. Reports of the Taban Deng group collaborating with the Government forces against Reik Machar forces also surfaced at various places. The weakening of the Opposition due to this political turmoil was a major consequence of the crisis, which has the potential of derailing peace efforts in South Sudan.

With a weakening opposition and absence of Dr Reik Machar, President Salva Kiir has been working towards enhancing his political control. Both at the national and the state levels, the Government forces are tightening their grip over administrative matters, free movement of civilians and UNMISS peacekeepers. Post July, the Government has further restricted the right to freedom of expression, clamping down on journalists and media outlets.

This effort towards consolidating the political control of the Government has also had an adverse impact in terms of enhancing the scope of the internal conflict in South Sudan. The Government forces have amplified their efforts to ensure that opponents do not consolidate and mount a threat to Juba. Operations have been launched against the Southern regions of South Sudan (Equatorias) in a bid to flush out opposition. The intensity of fighting has increased in the Equatorian states which were comparatively peaceful prior to the July 2016 crisis.

Overall, the July 2016 events in Juba demonstrated the extremely fragile political and security situation in South Sudan and the complete disregard for civilians by the parties to the conflict.

Role of UNMISS

The July crisis has also brought to the fore, the question of the effectiveness of UNMISS. Despite five years of UNMISS deployment, peace is yet to return to South Sudan. The sufferings of the people can be gauged from the fact that out of an estimated population of 12.7 million, an estimated 1.83 million people are internally displaced and another 1.75 million have fled to neighboring countries.

The failure of UNMISS to attain its mandated objectives can be attributed to a number of reasons. First, though the number of military personnel in UNMISS have increased over time (an increase from 7000 to 12500 personnel in 2013, alongwith a change in mandate from ‘Capacity Building’ to ‘Protection of Civilians’12), UNMISS military is overstretched, considering the vast expanse of the country and spread of tribal conflict. Presently, this shortage is being managed by periodic movement of troops from locations of lower threat to those of higher threats. Second, the type of weapons that can be brought inside South Sudan is strictly controlled by Government authorities. Citing sovereignity concerns, attack helicopters and unmanned areial vehicles, necessary as deterrence against atrocities by warring factions, are not permitted to be brought into South Sudan. Patrolling in armoured vehicles, use of air support for operations and night patrolling outside UN bases by peacekeepers are not allowed. Third, the UNMISS personnel are not allowed freedom of movement in certain areas by Government troops. No serious actions seem to be taken by the UNSC when such Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) violations are reported by the UNMISS. Over the years, the areas in which UNMISS can patrol and make their presence felt, have gradually decreased. Fourth, the poor road communications and low lying ground which results in almost 60 per cent of the country getting flooded in rains, further restricts movement of UNMISS forces. Air assets are always at a premium, hence scarcely available for routine military patrols. Fifth, the lack of will of the international community to institute punitive measures against erring civilian and military leadership has further abetted continuation of war crimes. Sixth, the primacy being given to safety of PoC Camps by the Mission Leadership has resulted in a defensive mindset amongst UNMISS forces. Resultantly, little heed is paid to violence outside the camps, citing reasons of lack of resources. This lack of initiative to move out of bases has been exacerbated by the lack of basic medical facilities for peacekeepers that deters risk taking. Overall, UNMISS has presented itself as a force which is reactive and is inadequately equipped to steer the country towards peace. UNMISS peacekeepers have generally displayed a ‘wait and watch’ attitude due to lack of effective surveillance means and weapons as well as due to the general inhibition to use available weapons to enforce peace.

RPF and Peace Enforcement

In order to overcome some of the inadequacies of UNMISS, an additional 4000 strong Regional Protection Force (RPF) was approved by the UNSCR 2304 (2016) after the July crisis, to supplement the peacekeepers already deployed to the country.13 The RPF is mandated to operate within Juba and is vested with specific tasks related to protection of civilians and strategic installations in the capital, such as the airport as also engaging any actor credibly found to be preparing or carrying out attacks on United Nations personnel, humanitarian actors, or civilians. The Security Council has authorised UNMISS and the RPF to use all necessary force to carry out their mandate.

Despite the mandate, the efficacy of the RPF in ensuring peace and security in Juba remains suspect. Unlike the UN Mission in Congo (MONUSCO), where a similar RPF (the ‘Intervention Brigade’) successfully operated alongside government forces against the M23 rebels, UNMISS and RPF will face resistance to its activities from the government forces (SPLA) itself. Should there be a requirement of employing coercive military force by the RPF against SPLA, there is likelihood of fresh conflict dynamics and further endangering lives of civilians in Juba. It is therefore imperative that the UNSC engages the Government of South Sudan on the role, type of weapons and equipment that this force can get into the country. The visit of the Security Council members to South Sudan on September 04, 2016 was a step in this direction14.

Additionally, it must be established that the four of the five Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) of the RPF (Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda) being neighbours, would implement the UNMISS mandate without prejudice to vested interests and national caveats. Majority of the troops comprising the RPF are from countries which already have troops as part of the UNMISS.

Induction of the RPF will however, provide UNMISS with additional resources for enhanced force presence thereby encouraging the return of humanitarian aid workers and development agencies to the capital. It also has the potential to improve the established norms of freedom of movement for UNMISS personnel and their interactions with government forces.

The levels of training, motivation and the will to implement the mandate will be key deciding factors. Though the RPF will be under the overall command of the Force Commander UNMISS, this arrangement has the potential to create command and control problems, unless it is clearly delineated.

The fact is that despite its shortcomings, UNMISS remains the only hope of peace and security to the multitude of South Sudanese. Therefore, employment of the RPF must ensure a positive turnaround in the security environment in Juba. This deployment must be done rapidly and any delay or obstructionist tactics of the South Sudan government must trigger punitive actions.

Quest for Peace

The pattern of the conflict underscores that political wrangling and opportunism is behind most of the violence in Southern Sudan, and that local defense forces and militias are responsible for conducting campaigns to benefit national level elites, who have cast politics in a distinctly ethnic mould.15

Following the crisis in Juba in July 2016 and the subsequent flight of Riek Machar from the country, many stakeholders have posed questions surrounding the continued viability of the Peace Agreement. With the overhaul of opposition leadership in the TGoNU by President Salva Kiir, including the appointment of Taban Deng Gai in place of Dr Reik Machar as First Vice-President, the opposition is now divided and its leadership and representation in the institutions of transition disputed, thus blurring the legitimacy of the current governmental formation. The principal challenge is the lack of inclusivity in the political process, in particular with respect to Dr Reik Machar, who retains significant political and military support, and the increasing feelings of political marginalisation among other ethnic groups, many of which believe that the Government is pursuing a policy of Dinka domination throughout the country.16 Thus, inclusion of Dr Reik Machar and other leaders of ethnic groups in the peace negotiations is imperative.

Notwithstanding the above, the events in South Sudan since independence in 2011 and especially after July 2016 have clearly indicated that the present leaders lack the will to bring in peace and stability to the country, have vested interests of personal power and financial gains and are oblivious to the sufferings of the common people. Should the leaders continue to obstruct peaceful negotiations, international community should put pressure on them to agree to laid-down peace agreement terms or relinquish political power. Measures such as freezing of accounts and targeted sanctions should be enforced. Additionally, swift trials of human rights offenders by Hybrid Courts as envisaged in the Peace Agreement, be implemented to deter future violations.

As regards food availability, the July crisis has further exacerbated an already tenuous food security situation. As a consequence of the fighting, immediately after the ceasefire was declared, prices of basic commodities in Juba rose by as high as 45-80 per cent for legumes, 12-58 per cent for cereals and 70-80 per cent for fuel. The local currency lost further ground to the US dollar (depreciated by 43 per cent) in the aftermath of the conflict, exchanging at SSP 60/1 US dollar down from SSP 48/1 US dollar a week earlier. South Sudan currently has an inflation rate of over 300 per cent – the highest in the world.17 Overall, in South Sudan, up to 4.8 million people – well over one-third of the population – will be facing severe food shortages over the coming months. 18 Efforts by the UNMISS and Non-Governmental Organisations to provide the people of South Sudan with the means of livelihood and capacity building need to be improved.
Overall, the economy needs to get back on track and for that to happen, oil needs to flow. Government forces must provide security to workers in oilfields so that production can re-commence. A positive indication in this direction are the efforts of the South Sudan Government which is currently in talks with India to revive closed oil blocks and has even offered compensation to ONGC Videsh for the period that the blocks were closed. ONGC Videsh holds a 25 per cent equity interest in the Greater Pioneer Operating Company, which produced 37 000 bbl/d (oil barrels per day), and 25 per cent in another Oil Block, which produced 4,600 bbl/d (both blocks located in the northern and most restive part of South Sudan).

Conclusion

Events of July 2016 have shattered the progress towards peace in South Sudan. The international community needs to put in more efforts to ensure that leaders of warring factions fulfill their commitments for a peaceful future for the people of South Sudan. Though the RPF addresses certain symptoms of the problem, the real solution lies in intense political engagements and firm resolve of the international community to ensure peace and security to this region.

Colonel Adarsha Verma is Research Fellow, Military Affairs Centre, IDSA.

Keywords: Sudan
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