The Korean Peninsula is in the news again. This month North Korea has sent out two strong signals. The first was a conducted tour, on 12 November 2010, of the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex for a US nuclear scientist, Siegfried S. Hecker and his two colleagues from the Centre for International and Security Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University. The second was the shelling of the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong on 23 November 2010. North Korea asserts that it retaliated after being first shelled by South Korea. Denying this, South Korea states that it had been conducting military drills in the area earlier on and its forces had fired West, and not North.
It appears that a premeditated plan is falling into place and a ‘testing of waters’ has begun. Two main issues are examined here – the rationale for the nuclear revelation and the military build up.
In the first place permitting Hecker to visit and see the facilities of the nuclear complex appears to be a brilliant move. Prior to joining CISAC Hecker was head of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, one of the principal entities involved in the creation and stewardship of the US nuclear stockpile. This was Hecker’s fourth trip to the complex, and thus a report by him would gain tremendous attention.
In his November 20 report,1 Hecker brings out some interesting points:
Hecker leaves some questions unanswered with the caveat that “these and other questions would take time and more people to answer.”2 The questions he leaves are: Is Pyongyang really pursuing a modern nuclear electricity programme? If so, what are its chances of success without outside help? Has Pyongyang decided to abandon its plutonium production complex (or at least keep it dormant)? Does it have additional uranium centrifuge facilities that could easily be dedicated to producing HEU bomb fuel? How did North Korea acquire centrifuge technology at such a level of sophistication and when? Why did Pyongyang decide to show us the facilities now and how does this fit into their broader strategy of how to deal with its domestic and international challenges?3
The second issue is the shelling of the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong. In this context, it would be useful to consider a few important aspects. South Korea’s Defence Minister, according to a 22 November report, had stated that his country was considering the re-deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons, which the United States had removed in December 1991.4 This issue was discussed by a parliamentary committee and it was planned to be taken up during a joint US-South Korean military committee meeting scheduled in December 2010. However, on 23 November, the South Korean Deputy Defence Minister ruled out the redeployment of US nuclear weapons on its soil as a deterrent against North Korea, further stating that “Redeploying US tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea would cross the line set by the policy of denuclearising the Korean peninsula.5 The retraction, apparently, came too late.
There is a strong possibility that North Korea has crafted a well laid out plan to bring the United States back to the negotiating table. The statement of the South Korean Defence Minister and the military exercise conducted by South Korea could possibly have given the North Koreans the chance to employ strong arm tactics for recommencement of negotiations. This appears to be the main agenda. In response the international reaction has been the usual.
Deploying a carrier force in a region of tension has been the standard US procedure. But this step has attendant ramifications and affords both strategic and tactical advantages. As of now the situational balance is tilting in favour of North Korea and China. Given the geographical, strategic and tactical setting of the area, India needs to observe and closely follow the situation. There are lessons in the offing to be learnt.