Mali in Crisis

It has been a difficult six months for the Malian people. Following a coup in March this year, Tuareg opposition rebels, buoyed by an inflow of unsecured weapons and ammunition from Libya, maneuvered a takeover of parts of northern Mali after large numbers of the Malian army abandoned northern towns to support the coup leaders in Bamako. In April, alongside two previously unknown armed groups linked with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Ansar Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), the Tuareg group, the Movement for the Liberation of Azwad (MNLA) declared an independent state of Azawad in northern Mali – an area approximately the size of France. In Bamako, following regional and international pressure on the military junta to hand over power to a civilian government, West African leaders negotiated the formation of a transitional government tasked with restoring order and the sovereignty of Mali, and conducting elections. The government has failed in its mandate so far. The coup leaders are still seen as influential; as part of the handover deal, Captain Amadou Sanogo who led the junta in Bamako in March was recognised as a former head of state. Relations between the interim government and members of the junta are reported to be fractious. In July, interim president Dioncounda Traore sustained injuries from being beaten by supporters of the coup who protested against Traore possibly remaining in office for a year.7

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has played a lead role in negotiations through the crisis, had ordered Bamako to form a transitional unity government by August, or face expulsion from the group. After consultations with a wide range of civil society actors, political parties and the junta, Traore on August 20, announced the formation of a new administration, headed by Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra, which also includes a new ministry of religious affairs. Three members of the military who are seen as close to the coup leaders have also been appointed to the new cabinet.8 The focus has now shifted to the possibility of military intervention to restore constitutional rule in northern Mali.

Over the past four months, Ansar Dine and MUJAO, both hardline Islamist groups aiming to rule by Sharia law, have chased out the secular MNLA, and consolidated their control over key northern towns. The two groups, now joined by foreign fighters (including from Somalia, Pakistan, and Nigeria), have also been carrying out corporal punishments, including amputations for minor crimes, public floggings and stoning.9 There is also evidence that the northern towns of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu are being used as a base for training and recruitment by AQIM. Groups in northern Mali would also have the opportunity to profit from the trans-Saharan drug smuggling route that crosses this region. Most worrying to international observers would be that AQIM now control civilian airports in all three towns, in addition to a military base in Tessalit near the Algerian border.

After months of hesitation to request for military help, France confirmed in the first week of September that the Malian government had made a formal appeal to the ECOWAS. ECOWAS is also considering the possibility of reimposing sanctions on members of the Malian military who are seen as obstructing political transition in the country and inciting violence within certain sections of Malian society.10

Mali did not make the request earlier apparently because the former coup leaders opposed the idea for intervention by a foreign force that could diminish their influence. Sanogo has announced that he supports Traore’s efforts to reclaim the north, and that the request to ECOWAS had not “stepped on the Malian army’s toes” since the appeal was only for logistical and technical support for the Malian army, rather than intervention by foreign troops.11 African Union leaders had reiterated their preference for a peaceful solution, with the use of military force as a last resort, during a heads of state meeting in Addis Ababa in July. The UNSC is expected to discuss the intervention force for Mali on the sidelines of the upcoming session of the UN General Assembly.

While diplomacy takes its course, thousands in the region face distressing humanitarian conditions. Acute food shortage, drought, and lack of access to aid have placed more than 1.6 million northern Malians at risk of starvation. Close to 400,000 people have fled northern towns to central Mali or neighbouring Mauritania, Niger and Burkina Faso since armed groups took over. A military offensive in the northern region is bound to exacerbate the situation, forcing more people out of their homes.12 The crisis in the north has wreaked hitherto unforeseen consequences not only on security conditions in Mali and the surrounding region, but also on the economies of these states. Mali for instance has scarce natural resources but a rich cultural history that has brought in much needed revenue from tourism. The historic northern town of Timbuktu, a spiritual and intellectual capital and a centre for Islam in Africa around the 15th century, has been one of Mali’s biggest tourist destinations. Since the takeover of the town, the armed groups have destroyed centuries-old mausoleums of Muslim saints, deeming the sites to be un-Islamic.

Without regional and international assistance, even a functioning government in Bamako would not be able to regain control over the northern regions, given that the Malian army lacks the military capacity for such an operation. The regional context does not ease the situation for Mali or its neighbours; drought, famine, rising food prices and the large number of refugees and IDPs are already a pressing concern for states including Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, and Burkina Faso. In the meantime, while AQIM and allied groups seem focused on consolidating control over the north, the threat of targeted attacks on foreign soil by groups trained here remains high. Restoration of political stability and security in Mali is crucial in a region where other countries such as Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Cote d’Ivoire are still emerging from recent political crises. In a region already plagued by activities of transnational criminal networks, the establishment of a base for groups such as AQIM has the potential of creating swathes of insecure, unstable territories across the Western Sahel, posing a threat to both regional and global security.