INDIA, AFRICA and UN Security Council Reform

Arpita Anant

She worked at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses from 2007 to 2022 . read more

View Point

Introduction

The United Nations (UN) has been an important venue for the coming together of India and Africa. It is here that independent and non-aligned India, with other colonies of the world, including those in Africa, waged a battle for decolonisation, end of apartheid, and a new international economic order. The UN, thus, was the instrument for the destruction of the global colonial order. Several decades on, India and Africa with its 54 countries are still engaged with the UN is several ways, including to reform the very instrument of their deliverance. One of its prime organs, the Security Council (SC), they argue, represents the archaic world order of 1945. Together with several other countries, they seek to make the institution more representative, democratic and effective.

On September 14, 2015, after several rounds of discussion, the process of Security Council reform received a crucial thrust when the 69th General Assembly (GA) adopted, without a vote, a text that would be the basis for future negotiations on reform of the Security Council.1 Currently, the main coalitions on the issue of reform in the UN are the L.69 (42 members), the G4 (4 members), the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group (12 core members, 20-30 informal supporters) and the African group (54 African countries represented in the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) by the Committee of Ten (C10) from the five regions of Africa). 2 India which is the leading country in the L.69, is also a part of the G4, together with Brazil, Germany and Japan.

Africa’s countries are all together in the African Group; and 11 of them are also in the L.69. 3 In addition, there are several countries that have submitted their individual proposals. 4 Other groupings that have a somewhat different position on the issue of SC reform, but have not contributed to the current framework document and have countries from Africa as their members are:

The Arab Group of the League of Arab States with Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia in it.
The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) with Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Sudan and Suriname. It also has as observers the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), League of Arab States (LAS) and the African Union (AU).
The Accountability, Coherence, Transparency (ACT) group (25 members), with Gabon, Ghana and Rwanda.

Africa, India and the current stage of SC Reform

A reading of the text adopted for further negotiation on September 14, 2015 reveals where the countries of Africa and India (African group, L.69, and G4) stand on the five issues identified as integral to Security Council reform.

Categories of Membership:
- Permanent Members: Both G4/L.69 and African Group are in favour of an additional 6 permanent seats. However, African Group was firm on 2 seats for Africa, while G4 and L69 countries have not said so. While G4 and L.69 countries have said that the election of new members will be done by the General Assembly as is the current practice, African Group has not said anything on this in general. The African group has however said that the 2 African members must be selected by AU, which the G4 and L69 have not endorsed.
- Non-permanent members with a two-year term: G4 would like 4-5 more, L.69 wants 6 more, and the African Group wants 5 members from Africa alone. On election procedure for these seats, L.69 and G4 would like to continue with the current process, while African Group would like the AU to select African members
- New categories of seats: Neither G4/L.69 nor the African group have a position on this matter.
Regional Representation
- The African group was particular about having a place for Africa in the larger schema of equitable representation. The G4 however was in favour of cross regional arrangements to better represent the diversity of the General Assembly. It also favoured representation of small and medium sized states as well as the small island developing states (SIDS) in nonpermanent category. The L.69 group proposed that smaller countries in the region must have representation in the non-permanent category and that this should be ensured by regional groups.
- Distribution of seats in permanent and non-permanent categories in case of expansion
Size of an Enlarged Security Council and Working Methods of the SC
- Size of an enlarged the Security Council: In a range of 21-27, the African Group would like the total membership to be no less than 26, the L.69 prefers 27 and the G4, 25 or 26.
- Working methods of the SC
The Question of the Veto
- The G4 countries would like the question of veto for new members be decided in a framework of a review. They also favour involvement of other member states in the process of review on the use of veto in certain circumstances.
- The L.69 group advocates that the right to veto be abolished, but as long as it exists it should be extended to all permanent members.
- The African group also advocates that the right to veto be abolished, but as long as it exists it should be extended to all permanent members in the interest of common justice.
- Voluntary limitation/restraint of use of veto: Neither of the three groups have a position on this matter.
- Mandatory restriction of the use of the veto: Neither of the three groups have a position on this matter.
- Explaining the use of veto: Neither of the three groups have a position on this matter.
- Veto trigger mechanism: Neither of the three groups have a position on this matter.
Relationship between the Security Council and the Assembly
- Mandates of the General Assembly and the Security Council: The African group and the L.69 group have both called for the Security Council to not encroach upon the charter mandated functions of the General Assembly and to limit itself to matters of international peace and security. The G4 has no position on this matter.
- Role of the General Assembly: The African group would like to see application of Charter provision that give powers and lay down rules of procedure for the General Assembly to act in urgent matters of peace and security. Neither the L.69 nor the G4 has a position on this matter.
- Coordination between the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council: The African group, L.69 and the G4 would all like it if there is timely flow of information between the two.
- Cooperation and communication between General Assembly and Security Council: None of the three groups have a position on this matter.
- Annual Report and Special Reports of the Security Council to the General Assembly: The L.69 and G4 would like the SC to submit detailed annual and special reports to the Assembly. The African groups adds to this reports on current situations of international concern.
- Participation and access for members of the General Assembly to the work of the SC: The African group would like all member states to know about positions taken by states and rationale for decisions of the SC. The subsidiary organs of the SC must provide all information to members of the Assembly. The L.69 group recommends that closed door meetings be stopped and non-members be given access to documents and records of the SC. In accordance with the Charter, non-members whose issues are under consideration must be invited to the SC for consultation. Non-member states must also have access to subsidiary bodies of the SC and be allowed to participate in discussions. The G4 would like to see more informal discussions between members and the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission as well as Chairs of country-specific committees of the Commission.
- Public meetings, public briefings and open debates: The African group would like more open meetings on the subject under consideration of the SC. It would also like open presentations of reports of Special envoys or Special Rapporteurs. The G4 would like the Security Council to meet in open format, hold open debates especially on working methods and make more use of informal interactive dialogues. The L.69 has no position on this matter.
- Consultation with troop and police contributing countries: The African group would like to see more interaction of the SC with the UN Secretariat and consultations with troop contributing countries (TCCs) not only in drawing up of mandate but also during the operations and in changing of mandates. The Working Group of the SC on Peacekeeping Operation must consult TCCs in early stages of mission planning. The L.69 has a similar position on this matter. The G4 would, in addition, like finance-contributing countries to be consulted.
- Selection and Appointment of the Secretary General: Neither of the three groups have a position on this matter.
Any other related matter
- Review: The L.69 would like a review of the situation created by amendments of the Charter. The G4 would like a review to take place every 15 years. The African group has no position on this matter.
- The process of Charter amendments: The L.69 and G4 would like to present the amendments to the Charter required as a result of a framework resolution for approval by the General
  Assembly. The African group has no position on this matter.

Africa, India and the long quest for SC reform

In historical perspective, India and the countries of Africa have been together on this matter since 1979, when the first request for expansion of the Security Council since 1963 was made. The quest then was only for expansion of the non-permanent category. Algeria, India and Nigeria were among the 10 countries who submitted a proposal for expansion arguing that the membership of the UN had increased substantially but non-aligned and developing countries were underrepresented in the non-permanent category.5 The next initiative came on November 23, 1992, when India along with 23 countries of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) sponsored a draft resolution on equitable representation in the Security Council. 6 The African countries as a part of this initiative were Algeria, Egypt, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia and Zimbabwe. This was revised a bit in December 1992 and supported by 35 countries, including India. The new African entrants were Togo, Uganda and Gabon. 7 The General Assembly adopted the resolution on December 11, 1992, which, as per the draft resolution, requested member states to submit their comments on the matter, the Secretary General to present a report on the submissions of member states and the General Assembly to continue this discussion in the next (48th) session in 1993.

By July 1993, 50 countries submitted their views on the subject. 8 India was indeed there, and had highlighted the falling ratio between the Security Council and the General Assembly from 1:10 to 1:36 in case of permanent members; and from 1:4 to 1:12 in case of non-permanent members. India also proposed certain criteria for membership, opposed rotational permanent membership, and favoured the election of new members by the General Assembly. From among the African nations, there were Gabon, Mauritius, Madagascar and Nigeria. Gabon suggested a relook at Article 27 (3) of the Charter which stipulates the affirmative vote of the P5 for making any change in the membership of the SC. Madagascar made only a general argument in favour of expansion. Mauritius had a very clear proposal of having 12 permanent members and 9 non-permanent members. 99 In an addendum, three more African countries gave their suggestions. Algeria, proposed increase in non-permanent and permanent membership, inclusion of Africa in both categories, with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) playing a role in electing rotating nonpermanent members and changes in the functioning of the Security Council. Libyan Arab Jamhariya made a strong case for expansion of unrepresented continents and regional groups and abolition of veto as it contradicts the principle of collective security. Finally, Sudan expressed the need to do away with the veto, give a rotational permanent seat to the Non-Aligned group and increasing powers of the Assembly to stand up to the SC. 10 In a second addendum, Egypt suggested the addition of non-permanent and permanent seats, articulated the need for transparency and other changes in the working of the SC, a new category of membership to reflect regional realities (or the pre-eminence of regional powers), with two or more rotational seats, and more number of seats for Africa since the OAU had the most members as compared to other regional organisations.11 Ghana made its submission in September 1993 and said that geographical representation in the expanded Security Council is a must and the permanent category must be expanded accordingly; also that there needs to be transparency in the decision making of the SC. .12 The Islamic Republic of Mauritania submitted its support for expansion in November 1993, with no specific suggestion. .13 The final submission came from the African group of states, as per the decision of the OAU, and was submitted on their behalf by Tanzania. This proposal was for permanent and non-permanent seats, with two permanent seats and more nonpermanent seats for Africa, and the veto, if retained, to be also given to the new permanent members. .14 In addition, on behalf of the League of Arab states, Egypt submitted a memorandum for their adequate representation in proportion to their numbers, given their historical and cultural links. .15

As a result of this momentum, an Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) was set up by A/RES/ 48/26 on December 3, 1993. 16 Given the increase in the issues on the agenda, the Report of the Open-ended Working Group submitted in 199517 classified issues under Cluster I (to look at various aspects of expansion of SC) 18 and Cluster II (to look at reforming the ways of working of the SC) 19. Simultaneously, the NAM, which included India and all of Africa’s countries at that time, submitted a 10 page proposal for consideration of issues in Clusters I and II. 20

In a first in 1996, the position of the African group was rearticulated as the “African common position”, though the substance of the position remained the same – demanding two permanent seats for Africa, nomination by regions and election by general assembly, no third category/rotational seats from a pool of 20. 21 Developing on its position paper of 1995 on Cluster II issues relating to working and decision making of the Security Council, the NAM recommended that the measures taken thus far were ad hoc and needed to be institutionalised and formally conveyed by the General Assembly to the Security Council. 22 In addition, Egypt circulated the text of the Twelfth Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned countries held in New Delhi in April 1997. The NAM insisted on not taking a decision on this issue without arriving at a consensus, and cautioned against unnecessary haste on the matter. The OAUs Harare Declaration submitted by Zimbabwe reiterated the points made earlier, but raised the total seats from 25 to 26, with Africa getting 5 non-permanent seats as compared to 4 suggested in 1993.

In 1998, Egypt requested the OEWG to undertake a thorough study of the legal basis and scope of the veto, since the constitutional basis and clarification of scope of its use had not been adequately done in the Report of the Working Group. 23 Alongside, a submission by Egypt on behalf of the NAM clarified this issue further, saying NAM had wanted limitation on the use of veto institutionalised rather than going by the 35 item list decided on by the General Assembly in 1949. 24 On the basis of an OAU decision of June 1998, Senegal presented the formula for selection of the rotational 2 permanent African nations in the Security Council. 25 Meanwhile, all the countries came together to stall attempts that were perceived as taking away from the role of the General Assembly,, which in their view had greater sanctity due to its universal membership. The reference here is to the Razali proposal for reform that was tabled in 1998. 26 In 2000, NAM requested the working Group to ignore proposals to leave the veto power untouched and argued for a curtailment of the veto power. 27

Following the Millennium Summit, Secretary General Kofi Annan constituted a High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The report of the panel released in December 2004 and titled “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility” proposed two models of a reformed SC. 28 Meanwhile, following the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration, the African Common Position was tabled as a draft resolution with a proposal to:

Enlarge the Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories and improve on its working methods;
Accord the new permanent members the same prerogatives and privileges as those of the current permanent members, including the right to veto;
Grant Africa two permanent and five non-permanent seats in the Security Council and increase its membership from fifteen to twenty-six with the eleven additional seats to be distributed as follows:

Two permanent seats and two (additional) non-permanent seats for African States;
Two permanent seats and one non-permanent seat for Asian States;
One non-permanent seat for Eastern European States;
One permanent seat and one non-permanent seat for Latin American and Caribbean States;
One permanent seat for Western European and other States;

Amend the Charter of the United Nations accordingly.

In September 2007, the OEWG recommended, among other things, the initiation of intergovernmental negotiations (IGN). A four member task force had studied the proposals submitted thus far and recommended that new ways and compromises may be considered since no one proposal had sufficient support from all quarters including through IGN. 30 India and the African countries were now parts of newer coalitions such as the L.6931 , G432 and the African Group33, and pushed for the formalisation of the process by initiating the IGN. In September 2008, vide decision 62/557, the General Assembly adopted a resolution by consensus on the need for IGN on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters. The main areas of focus were also outlined:

categories of membership;
the question of the veto;
egional representation;
size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the SC; and the relationship
between the Security Council and the General Assembly.

After the launch of the Intergovernmental Negotiations in February 2009, member countries overwhelmingly supported the idea of text-based negotiations. Several existing and new groups submitted their proposals for Intergovernmental Negotiations. In May, Ambassador Zahir Tannin presented a 31-page text based on all inputs received and lists all options given in it. 34 In the first revision of this text, suggestions of the African group were incorporated. These were for 2 permanent and 5 non-permanent seats for African countries to be selected by the African Union, veto to all permanent members as long as it exists as a matter of common justice, geographical representation as regional representation to be decided by the AU, 26 member SC, several changes in working methods of the SC. 35 The L.69 group wanted the inclusion of provision for review of permanent and non-permanent seats, addressing the issue of non-representation of some regions and less representation of developing countries to be addressed and a closer look at the working methods of the SC. The Non Aligned group wanted to work towards elimination of the veto, support for enhanced and increased African representation in the SC, and changes in the working methods of the SC. G4 felt new permanent members should not exercise veto until the issue of veto is decided in the new framework document; regional representation means equitable geographical representation, 25 member SC, and changes in the working methods of the SC.

By August 2010, the second revision of the text was readied, and these were circulated in a text of February 2011 as third revision. This time, the African group affirmed that African members should be selected by AU and then elected by the General Assembly, the veto as in the first revision, need for African representation, 5 non-permanent seats for Africa, 2 permanent seats for Africa, allowing for special envoy briefings in public except in exceptional circumstances, consulting with Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) for all aspects in peace keeping, wider participation in formal and informal meetings with non-members, formalising the rules of procedures of the SC, preventing extension of sanctions unless it is in interest of international community, avoiding using Chapter VII except as last resort, SC should not take up for discussion an issue that does not constitute threat to international peace, refrian from pursuing political agendas, preventing erosion of powers of General Assembly, presentation of SC special and annual reports to GA, giving information on reasons behind a decision and reasons to act/not act on a particular issue. The L.69 group insisted on a provision for review for the expanded membership, places for underrepresented regions and developing countries, enahanced access and transparency with nonmembers in work of SC, full implementation of Article 31 and 32 of the Charter, involving TCCs in all aspects of Peacekeeping operations. The G4 still said there should be no veto for new members regardless of category, regional representation should mean equitable geographical representation, there should be 1 additonal non-permanent and 2 permanent seats for Africa, 2 for developing countries from Asia and 2 from Latin America and Caribbean; SC should meet in public fora and only in exceptional cases in private, hold timely and qualitative briefings for nonmembers to inform them of references and findings of subisidiary bodies of SC, infomral cunsultations, consult with interested parties, consult with TCCs, finance contributing and mission receiving countries; susidiary bodies must give information to non-memers, implement Articles 31 and 32, forecast of meetings to be shared with members earlier than later, non members should be given draft resolutions for information, presidential statements and other draft documents tabled in the Security Council; Charter separation of powers between SC and GA should be maintained and stay complementary, SC to submit annual and special reports to GA, President of SC to have regular consultation with PGA and President of ECOSOC.

The NAM pushed for curtailing use of veto and moving towards its eventual elimination, support for Africa, tranparency, openness and consistency in work of SC, reducing the number of closed meetings and informal consultations; called on the SC to allow for briefings by Special Representatives in public forums (as by Africa group), consult with affected parties, take on board suggestions of the affected parties (as by Africa group), susidiary bodies to inform general membership of matters (as by African group), formalise the rules of procedures of the Security Council (as by African group), sanctions to be clearly defined, imposed for a short period and not preventively applied, use of Chapter VII as last resort (as by Africa Group); SC should not take up for discussion an issue that does not constitue threat to international peace (as by Africa Group); improve relationship between GA and SC and stick to their respective mandates; SC to present special and annual reports to GA (as by Africa group), reports should be more analytical and comprehensive.

The multiplicity of proposals led to an impasse, which the L.69 group tried to break by a proposal of September 6, 2011 attempting to arrive on a common ground by agreeing to the African group’s demand for veto power. In March 2012, a discussion was arranged to discuss the L.69 proposal. The L.69 representative explained that they supported Africa’s claim for permanent seat with veto and suggested consultations with the S5, a group of five small countries, considering similarity of positions.36 The convergence with the L.69 group and a possible common platform was mentioned by the President of the C.10, which represents the AU. The tension between L.69 and G4 position on veto, especially since the L.69 has some G4 members, was pointed out by Egypt. In April, 2013 an updated third revision was submitted to the PGA.

Further, groups like the LAS and the OIC, which had member states from Africa also, came up with position papers from time to time. The LAS submitted a working paper in May 1997 (based on a resolution of the League taken in September 1993), in which they supported the position of NAM on working methods and most other issues. They asked for 2 non-permanent seats and 1 permanent seat for Arab countries which would be rotational, to be implemented in consultation with the Asian and African regional groupings.37 The League of Arab States as well as those states who are members of the NAM said that, if expanded, the group of Asian states should get 2 permanent seats on a rotational basis. 38 In the first revision of the text, the OIC asked for adequate representation for the Islamic Ummah, developing countries and regional organisations, while the Arab group reiterated the need for Arab representation. In the second revision, they repeated these proposals, while the OIC also called for transparency in the working of the SC and the SC not encroaching upon GA prerogatives.

Recounting the Perplexities

While the attempt to have text-based negotiations to get clarity on the positions of countries has certainly been achieved with countries contributing to the framework document, these positions reveal the difficulty of arriving at a common ground. Analysing the Africa-India dyad on this issue, and its relation with other groups of which the African countries are members, is replete with instances of complexities involved in the process. Some among the many perplexities are highlighted below, first at dyadic level and then on how they relate to other coalitions or individual countries outside the dyad, both category-wise.

First, on the issue of categories of membership, at the dyadic level, how would the G4 and L.69 reconcile to the African group’s insistence that the AU be the arbiter in choosing the African permanent and non-permanent members for the SC, rather than their preferred mode of election by the General Assembly? Assuming that they do, how will they deal with those opposed to having any additional permanent seats (Ireland, Lichtenstein and Panama)?

Second, on the question of regional representation, the African group has spelt out that it would like Africa to have two seats each in the two categories. The G.4 and L.69 however seem to have a preference for cross-regional and small country representation, especially in the non-permanent category. Will the African group agree to this? Will the African group as a whole support the G4/ L.69 proposals for regional representation? Assuming they do, would the three groups come together for instance to reject questions related to distribution of seats in case of longer term nonpermanent seats (proposed by Ireland and Lichtenstein), distribution of additional two-year nonpermanent seats under any expansion model (proposed by Montenegro, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland Serbia and Ukraine) and distribution of seats during the gradual removal of categories (proposed by Panama)?

Third, on the question of the size of the expanded Security Council, within the dyad, whose number preference will eventually prevail, though the difference in sizes proposed falls in a narrow range of 25-27? Outside of the dyad, how will they convince Montenegro that a 21-member SC is too small? On the more serious question of the working methods of the SC, two of the groups have made some proposals that do not overlap with the other. For instance, the African group has proposed that the SC should play a non-political and Charter-mandated role. On the other hand the L.69 group proposed that non-members should be allowed to vote in all penholding decisions and the SC should deal with every issue in a time-bound manner. Will they come together on this? There are instances where the proposals of the G4 and L69 overlap such as the issue of presidency rights of non-permanent members. What position will the other countries in the African group take on this issue? There are instances where L.69 proposals overlap with African group proposals such as the use of appropriate charter provisions (Chapter VI, VII or VIII) in particular crises. Would the G4 concur with this? Assuming convergence between them, outside of the dyad, the challenges may not be many as most opinions are for more transparency of the SC and for its better relations with other organs of the UN system.

Fourth, on the question of the veto, within the dyad, the G4 group is for a review of the veto before the new members are given veto powers. The L.69 and African group favour veto powers for all or none. Where does India really stand on this issue? Assuming they resolve this matter, how will they deal with the proposal of not granting veto powers to new permanent members (Australia, Chile, Ireland, Singapore, and UK)? Again, how will countries of the dyad that are not in the G4 respond to proposals for restraint on uses of veto in instances of mass atrocities? (Australia, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ukraine, and several others).

Fifth, on the subject of the relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council, there is a great deal of convergence within the dyad as the emphasis is on more communication between the two bodies, their respective presidents, open debates and substantive consultations with troop contributing countries regarding peacekeeping operation starting with the setting of their mandates. Similarly, proposals of countries outside the dyad too are convergent.

Sixth, on other related matters, within the dyad, the G4 and L.69 groups would like the General Assembly to approve the required amendments to the Charter. Would other countries in the African group agree to this? They would also like a review of the amendments, though the duration for such a review is not agreed upon. Again, will the African group agree to this? Outside of the dyad, there are no substantially different suggestions on this matter.

Finally, common to all these dilemmas is the added nuance that India has taken some positions as part of the G4 and some others as part of the L.69. On the question of regional representation, for instance, while India as part of G4 favours cross-regional representation, as part of L.69 it favours regional groups to ensure representation of smaller states. Will India be able to convince the others in the G4 to endorse the L.69 proposal or indeed the others in L.69 to favour the G4 position? Similarly, how will countries that are part of the African group as well as the L.69 vote? Will they favour the African group proposal for AU arbitration of the election of African members or the L.69 proposal of following the present practice of election by the General Assembly?

Assuming all of this is resolved, they would have to start contending with those who have not participated in the IGN process, and that is a significant number. Importantly, three of the five permanent members whose yes-vote will be an essential for the reform of the Security Council39 have not accepted the process of text-based negotiations. 40

Persistent Differences and the Continuing Conundrum of SC Reform

What emerges quite clearly from the discussion above is that, starting from 1992, as countries who wanted expansion and reform of the SC also became part of emerging groupings other than the Non-Aligned Movement, though not necessarily breaking away from it, the number of issues on the reform agenda increased. Also, some differences have remained on the board for a long time. First is the difference in understanding the object of equitable representation. While India has remained steadfast on equitable representation for developing countries, Africa’s countries have come to justify regional representation. As part of OIC and LAS, they also seem open to consideration of a religious or cultural criteria within developing countries. Second is the issue of veto. Formally, India is committed to not having veto powers for new permanent members to begin with, however, Africa’s countries are firm on having veto powers. Third is the process of election of new members. While India continues to favour election by the GA, Africa favours a two-step process with a selection by the AU coming before an election by the GA. On the methods of working of the SC, there are not many serious differences.

At the very least, the decision on text-based negotiations has brought some more legitimacy to the process of reform. However, there is no guarantee yet that Security Council reform is any closer or any less complicated. For Africa and India, the present predicament calls for greater flexibility on both sides to arrive at a common position, but also the maturity to contend with those who have not agreed with the substance and method of reform. As countries become members of coalitions that cater to their multiple identities and interests, this may even require a rethink on the best way forward on the issue of reform. The two sides can use the consensus achieved thus far and the goodwill enjoyed by them in other coalitions and/or individual countries in them to do so.

1. “General Assembly Adopts, without Vote, ‘Landmark’ Decision on Advancing Efforts to Reform, Increase
Membership of Security Council”, September 14, 2015 at http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ga11679.doc.htm,
(Accessed on December 1, 2015).
2. For summaries of their positions see Lydia Swart, “Timeline UN Security Council Reform 1992- November 2015”,
Centre for UN Reform Education, pp. 1-9, at http://centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/Timeline%20November%202…, (Accessed on December 1, 2015). The C10 consists of Algeria, Congo
Brazzaville/Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda and
Zambia
3. In 2007, when the grouping came together, nine African countries in L.69 were Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Liberia,
Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles and South Africa.
4. For their inputs to the framework document see Annex, “Submissions of the member states to the Framework
Document”, General Assembly of the United Nations, President of the 69th Assembly (PGA), Letters,
“Intergovernmental Negotiation on Security Council Reform”, July 31, 2015, at http://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/
uploads/sites/3/2013/11/Security-Council-reform-IGN-31-July-2015.pdf (Accessed on October 4, 2015).
5. A/34/246, November 14, 1979. The other countries were Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Guyana, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka. They argued that “the global average of the number of countries represented by one non-permanent seat in the Security Council is 14.7. The number of Asian countries represented by one non-permanent member is 18.5. The corresponding figure for African States is 16.3, for Latin American States, 14, for the West European and other States 9.11 and for Eastern European States 10. This state of affairs constitutes an under-representation of nonaligned and developing countries on one of the principal organs of the United Nations. So request to amend the Charter must be taken up by the 34th General Assembly.”
6. A/471L.26, November 23, 1992. The other countries associated with the initiative were Bhutan, Brazil, Guyana,
Honduras, Indonesia, Japan, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Paraguay, Venezuela and Vietnam.
7. A/47/L.26/Rev.1, December 9, 1992. Other new countries associated with the initiative were Barbados, Chile,
Columbia, Cuba, Jamaica, Jordan, Nicaragua, Pakistan and Peru
8. A/48/264, July 20, 1993.
9. Permanent: Americas – 2, West Europe and Other States Group – 4, East Europe – 1, Africa – 2, Asia – 3. Nonpermanent:
Africa and Asia – 4, East Europe – 2, Latin America and Caribbean – 2 and West Europe and Other States
Group – 1.
10. A/48/264/Add.1, July 26, 1993.
11. A/48/264/Add.2, August 27, 1993
12. A/48/264/Add.3, October 4, 1993.
13. A/48/264/Add.4, November 12, 1993.
14. A/48/264/Add.5, November 30, 1993. The proposition was that: (a) The membership of the Council should be
increased from 15 to 25. Five of these will be the present permanent members while the remaining 20 will be
composed as follows: Africa (6), Asia (5), Latin America and the Caribbean (4),Western Europe (3) and Eastern
Europe (2); (b) The application of Article 27, paragraph 3, should be limited to action under Chapter VII of the
Charter; (c) By virtue of their economic might and their ability to assume increased obligation, Germany and Japan
should become permanent members against seats allocated to their geographical groups;(d) Africa should be granted
two permanent seats against the six seats;(e) Latin America and the Caribbean should be allocated one permanent
seat against the four seats; (f) Asia, which already will have had China and Japan as permanent members, should
be allocated an additional permanent seat against the five allocated to them; g) The details of the agenda items for
discussion in the Security Council should be published in the Journal of the United Nations as is done with the
General Assembly;
(h) The reports of the Security Council to the General Assembly, in compliance with Article 24, paragraph 3, should
be more comprehensive and analytical to enable the General Assembly to discharge its duties under Article 11 of the
Charter.
15. A/43/264/Add.8, March 3, 1994.
16. Lydia Swart, n.2.
17. Report of the Open-ended Working Group, A/49/47, September 15, 1995.
18. This cluster would deliberate on the principles for the expansion of Security Council membership; size and
composition of the permanent membership; size and composition of the non-permanent membership; new categories
or new types of membership, and the qualifications of and modalities for the selection of members of each of these
categories or types; the overall size of the expanded Security Council; voting procedure in the Security Council,
including the question of the veto; and the question of periodic review.
19. This cluster would deliberate on measures taken and practices adopted by the SC to enhance its transparency and
working methods and their streamlining, expansion or possible institutionalisation; the retention, modification or
finalisation of the SC’s provisional rules of procedure; the briefings by the SC Presidency; the enhancement of
mechanisms for information-gathering and analysis; wider consultations with concerned or interested parties;
increased consultations between the SC and troop-contributing States; the relationship of the Security Council to
other United Nations organs, including the reports of the Security Council to the General Assembly.
20. A/49/965, September 18, 1995.
21. A/50/Add. 1, September 9, 1996.
22. A/51/47, 1997, Annex.
23. A/52/47 (Supplement No 47), Annex XIII, 1998
24. The Question of Veto, Egypt Working Paper, Annex VII, NAM paper of March 27, 1996, A/50/47/Rev.1, 1998.
25. A/52/47 (Supplement No 47), Annex XXIV, 1998.
26. Lydia Swart, n.2.
27. A/55/47, Annex XIX, 2001.
28. Ibid. “Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year term nonpermanent
seats, divided among the major regional areas…” and “Model B provides for no new permanent seats
but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year nonpermanent (and nonrenewable)
seat, divided among the major regional areas….”, p. 2
29. A/59/L.67, July 18, 2005.
30. A/62, 47, 2008.
31. “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related
matters”, September 14, 2007, at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/61/L.69/
REV.1&Lang=E (accessed on December 28, 2015). The countries included Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Burundi,
Cape Verde, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Liberia, Mauritius, Nauru, Nigeria, Palau, Papua New
Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
32. Global Policy Forum, “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security
Council and related matters”, July 6, 2005, https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/0706g4resolution.pdf,
(accessed on December 28, 2015). The G4 resolution was also supported by Afghanistan, Belgium, Bhutan, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Fiji, France, Georgia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Kiribati, Latvia, Maldives, Nauru, Palau,
Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Ukraine.
33. Global Policy Forum, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security
Council and related matters, July 14, 2005, https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/0718auresolution.pdf,
(accessed on December 28, 2015). The resolution was sponsored by 43 African countries. Algeria, Angola, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia
and Zimbabwe.
34. Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Letter dated May, 10, 2010, at https://
www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Afghanistan_Letter_from_Amb_Tanin_May_1…, (Accessed on December 20, 2015).
35. Letter dated May 26, 2010. https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/
Afghanistan_Letter_from_Amb_Tanin_May_26_2010.pdf, (Accessed on December 20, 2015).
36. L.69 Statement in the 8th Round of IGN, March 13, 2012, http://www.centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/
L69%20Statement%20delivered%2013%20March.pdf, (Accessed on December 20, 2015).
37. A/51/47, Annex.
38. A/52/47 (Supplement No 47), 1998.
39. Article 108 reads thus: Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United
Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified
in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations,
including all the permanent members of the Security Council. See Charter of the United Nations, Chapter XVIII,
Amendments, at http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-xviii/index.html, (Accessed on December
12, 2015).
40. See the letters of representatives of US, Russia and China in Annexes to the letter of PGA, n.4.

July-September 2015
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