FOCAC 2012 – Sino-African Ties Surge Ahead

Characterising Sino-African relations as a robust partnership would be an understatement, if the recently concluded fifth ministerial conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is any indication. For not only has China surpassed all expectations by pledging a staggering US$ 20 billion credit line, which is double the amount promised in the last FOCAC conference in 2009, it has also opened up newer vistas of cooperation translating into a deeper and more constructive brand of engagement. Even though the fifth ministerial summit of the FOCAC did not receive the hyperactive media attention of the first, it is safe to consider the summit as being a high watermark in the trajectory of Sino-African relations in its own understated way. In fact, FOCAC 2012 went well beyond numbers and initiated the process of addressing serious concerns of a mature relationship by moving away from the narrow constraints of economic transactions.

FOCAC, the triennial summit initiated in October 2000, has evolved into the most important platform for African and Chinese policymakers to institutionalise and further Sino-African relations. Once airily dismissed as a land of abject poverty and vicious political paralysis, Africa today is considered as being the most exciting place to be – what with it harbouring seven out of the 10 fastest growing economies and IMF estimates pegging it to grow by 6 per cent in 2012. Through the last four summits down to the present one, held in Beijing from July 19 to July 20, 2012, the Chinese foray into Africa has only become deeper. Beyond the obvious motivation of securing energy supplies and mineral resources to feed its gargantuan economy, China’s imprint on Africa has come to shape the contours of its image as a global player, one that is growing increasingly conscious of how its power projection is perceived in the international political landscape.

It makes sense for China to tenaciously root for resource-rich Africa since other regions such as the Middle East, Central Asia and South East Asia appear relatively more hostile. The numbers speak for themselves. Other notable emerging markets like Brazil and Turkey have started to make substantial investments in Africa resulting in the proliferation of jobs in their own domestic constituencies. But China constitutes Africa’s biggest and strongest trade partner today, upstaging the United States in 2009. The trade between China and Africa peaked in 2011, amounting to US$ 166.3 billion, surpassing Africa’s trade with the US and other important European countries. The trade figures between the two have registered a 16 fold increase since 2000. China imported US$ 93.2 billion worth of oil and natural resources from Africa in 2011. Official figures available till the middle of 2012 reveal that China has pumped US$ 45 billion into Africa, which includes US$ 15 billion in direct investment. More than 2,000 Chinese enterprises are believed to be involved in business ventures in 50 African countries. Sectors which attract the bulk of Chinese investment include core infrastructure-related areas such as mining, construction, finance and manufacturing, unlike the West which is fixated on conditional aid for community and humanitarian development. China’s conservative restraint with regard to sermonising on Africa’s political setbacks and its business-as-usual approach has made China a less complicated ally for the Africans. President Hu Jintao’s statement at the opening of FOCAC 2012 – “We will give genuine support to African countries’ independent choice of development paths” – bears testimony to the continued Chinese adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal political landscape of Africa.

Even though the Africans have not instituted a formal monitoring mechanism to evaluate the status of the declarations made at previous FOCAC summits, there is a general consensus that promises have been fulfilled. The theme of the FOCAC 2012, “Build on past achievements and open up new prospects for the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership”, might sound hackneyed, but some of the contents of the Beijing Action Plan (2013-15) released at the end of the conference do show signs of going beyond rhetoric. In a definite departure from the commitments made in previous summits, the latest one makes a passing mention of efforts “to combat illegal trade and circulation of small arms and light weapons”. The Africa-China-EU Expert Working Group on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Chinese Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA) are manifestations of this assertion. Even this modest development is a significant step forward, since the subject of military aid is extremely controversial in the context of Sino-African relations with China causing a deluge of illegal arms in African conflict zones. According to various authoritative sources, over the last decade, arms exports from China have increased to the extent that today, it is the sixth largest arms exporter in the world. The sub-Saharan region in Africa is one of the main recipients of these. Cheap assault rifles and ammunitions of Chinese origin have been found in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Ivory Coast, Somalia, and Sudan, in repeated violation of UN sanctions. Domestic production of arms is booming in China. It has gone up by 95 per cent between 2007 and 2011. China, which is a major participant in arms trade shows in Africa, currently sells weapons to 16 African countries. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), it has a 25 per cent share of the African arms market, excluding South Africa. China repeatedly refuses to comply with UN injunctions regarding illegal arms transfers and has used its political clout in the UNSC to block the release of confidential reports citing China’s role in fuelling internal conflicts by illegal arms transfers. It is difficult to ascertain whether the Chinese state plays a covert role in abetting such transfers or is incapable of exercising control over a diffuse group of arms manufacturers.

There is a stronger focus on civil society/people-to-people exchange by harnessing human capital from universities and think tanks – initiatives meant for enhancing China’s soft power. One can sense a heightened urge for engaging with the African Union (AU) what with the pledging of “600 million RMB Yuan in free assistance to the African Union within three years starting from 2012”. However, this does not imply any shift in the general Chinese policy of engaging African countries bilaterally for major investment deals. Growing ties with AU will continue to play only a symbolic role in highlighting the growing friendship between China and the African continent as a whole, perhaps leading to military partnerships in the distant future. China knows it will lose leverage within the continent if all the African countries start speaking with one voice

The presence of United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon at the opening of the conference was telling as it raised the profile and credibility of FOCAC as a major international event. However, the most significant declaration to come out of the conference pertains to the launching of the “Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security”. This undertaking is fraught with implications for the other great powers in the continent, as China slowly but surely starts to sail in hitherto uncharted waters in the realm of military diplomacy. Although any overt military presence in the form of naval bases or deployment of trained Chinese soldiers is unlikely in the next decade, China has cautiously begun to adapt its security policy in Africa, at least in collaboration with regional organisations, if not unilaterally. Africa’s major energy deposits are located in the conflict-ridden areas of the Sudan and the Gulf of Guinea where the United States is also enhancing its stakes. At the same time, India is gradually expanding its influence in the Indian Ocean. As China ventures deeper into Africa, the practical considerations of protecting Chinese citizens and companies is a major concern for the Chinese diplomatic establishment. Nevertheless, China is set to remain a status-quo power in terms of its security objectives in Africa. It still does not possess the military might of the United States to project a unilateral military diplomacy in Africa and will have to remain dependent on the good will of others in order to protect its economic interest in Africa. It is to be borne in mind that Africa’s economic stability is largely dependent on the constant stream of natural resources from Africa, and China will therefore continue to follow the path of security cooperation for at least the next ten years.

The conference publicly revealed some lingering apprehensions of the African side. South African President Jacob Zuma’s unusual candour, in noting that the transactions between the two countries will become “unsustainable” in the long run if China continues to export manufactured goods for African raw materials, revealed that China needs to rectify increasing imbalances in the relationship. Chinese companies are accused of maltreating domestic labourers and defiling the environment. In addition, Chinese companies over the years have not shown any signs of transferring technology to foster African entrepreneurship. Interestingly, the World Wildlife Fund was commissioned in this year’s FOCAC to draft proposals for incorporating the concept of ‘green economy’ into the rubric of China-Africa ties. No other FOCAC conference had invited an international NGO before. China announced that it will implement the ”African Talents Program” to train 30,000 personnel across a wide range of sectors, offer 18,000 government scholarships, and build various cultural and vocational skills training facilities in a number of African countries. At the summit, China promised to import more African non-mining products and make investments for the development of the African industry. The number of duty-free goods coming in from Africa will soon increase. The number of agricultural centres and Chinese doctors in the continent are also set to increase. Such measures signify a more developmentoriented strategy and show that China is keen to brush aside notions of itself as a neo-colonial oppressor.

FOCAC 2012 was arguably bigger in scope and commitment. The fact that it turned out to be so in the backdrop of a crucial change of Chinese leadership in October 2012, the democratisation of Libya and Egypt, and a still fragile world economy, is evidence enough of the importance of Africa for China. It will definitely take more than high-profile PR-oriented diplomatic visits, like the 11-day Africa tour by the US Secretary of State immediately after the conference, to offset the Chinese influence in Africa.

References

• “Open Up New Prospects for A New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership”, Speech by H.E. Hu Jintao, President of the People’s Republic of China at the Opening Ceremony of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing, July 19, 2012 at http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dwjbzjjhys/zyjh/t953172.htm
• “The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) – Political rationale and functioning”, Centre for Chinese Studies Policy Briefing, Stellenbosch University, May 2012 at http:// www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/FOCAC_PolicyBriefing_political_final.pdf
• “Focac V Brings Billions More”, Africa-Asia Confidential (London), August 1, 2012 at http:/ /allafrica.com/stories/201208010877.html
• Outcome Document of FOCAC 2012, “Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015)
• Jonathan Holslag, “China’s New Security Strategy for Asia”, US Naval war college, Summer 2009 at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/09summer/ holslag.pdf
• Nabeel A. Mancheri, “China’s “Chequebook” Diplomacy in Africa”, Foreign Policy Journal, August 17, 2012 at http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/08/17/chinaschequebook-diplomacy-in-africa/
• Jonathan Holslag, “China and the coups: Coping with political instability in Africa”, African Affairs, May 10, 2011
• Yiagadeesen Samy, “China’s Aid Policies in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges”, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, March 12, 2010 at http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctrt20