Japan’s Imperial Family, with the Emperor and Empress at its centre, has been a significant moderating influence on Japanese politics in the post-war era. Though debarred from any significant political role by the new Constitution adopted under the United States-led Allied Occupation in 1947, the Imperial Family remains the constitutional ‘symbol of the nation’. One of the striking ramifications of this is that the Imperial couple, or even members of their extended family, can be said to have emerged as remarkably effective tools of diplomatic soft power. The current Emperor’s two recent foreign trips to Indonesia and the United Kingdom denotes how the Emperor forms a complex nexus between Japan’s 20th century history and its modern status as a member of good standing with the Global North.
The Japanese Emperor in Modern Diplomacy
Japan’s monarch regained diplomatic significance only when the reign of the samurai was overthrown in 1868. As the Japanese polity underwent modernisation and a new German-inspired Constitution was promulgated in 1889, Emperor Meiji and his descendants became not only the final arbiters of domestic policy, but also the key decision-makers in foreign policy. It was on Meiji’s authority that the Japanese army invaded and annexed Okinawa, Manchuria and Korea in 1879, 1905 and 1910 respectively. His son Taisho was the authority behind Japan’s occupation of German colonial territories in Liaodong and Shantung in China after the First World War, while his grandson Showa presided over the great conflagration that was the Second World War.
With the announcement of Japan’s surrender on 15 August 1945, the Emperor’s war-making prerogatives were finally taken from him. The Allied Occupation, led by the United States, instead drafted a new Constitution in 1947 that returned him to the status of a disenfranchised figurehead.1 Some diplomatic powers remained with the Imperial Household, namely the receiving of credentials from foreign envoys and making formal visits to key countries. Even this, however, was strictly circumscribed by the powerful Imperial Household Agency, which remains the office ‘in charge of’ the Imperial Household’s affairs.
Nevertheless, the post-war Emperor became a powerful sign of Japan’s goodwill. Emperor Showa’s visit to Britain in 1971 and the US in 1975 marked Japan’s rehabilitation as a key Asian ally in the Cold War. The visit of the then Crown Prince Akihito and his new bride Crown Princess Michiko to India in 1960 was an early premonition of the importance Japan would come to attach to ties with India, reconfirmed by their return in 2019 as Emperor and Empress.
Upon assuming the throne in 1990, Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko (who are still alive and therefore not customarily referred to by their regnal name, Heisei) proved to be indefatigable practitioners of koushitsu gaikou (Imperial diplomacy)2, visiting over 36 countries in their 30-year-long reign. In 1992, the Imperial couple visited China, where they delighted their hosts—and dismayed Japanese conservatives—by issuing a statement of regret for Japan’s actions during the Second World War.3
Conservatives were further disappointed by his public statement of apology to Koreans for his country’s actions there between 1910 and 1945, a statement that was promptly accepted by then-President Roh Moo Hyun.4 Akihito even broke a deeply-controversial ‘taboo’ when he acknowledged that his ancestors, who he technically claims descent from in an unbroken lineage stretching back to the mythological Sun Goddess, may have been from the Korean peninsula.5
Significance of the Emperor’s Indonesia Visit
After Emperor Akihito announced his abdication in 2019, his son, Emperor Naruhito, took the throne with the regnal name Reiwa. As his accession occurred in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, Naruhito and Empress Masako, a former career diplomat, spent the two initial years of their reign holding socially distanced events with select individuals. As the threat of the disease receded in 2023, the Imperial couple took to touring again.
Their tour of Indonesia in June 2023 was their first foreign foray, which demonstrated Naruhito’s inheritance of his father’s style of diplomacy. The six-day trip conducted between 17 and 23 June saw the royal couple engaging deeply with Indonesian culture and people in a variety of settings. Characteristically, it also featured the Emperor’s open acknowledgement of the ‘difficult time in our relations with Indonesia’, which referred to Japan’s brutal occupation of what was then called the Dutch East Indies during the Second World War.6
However, the visit also had a pronounced political and strategic objective. This can be best understood by the Emperor’s remarks prior to his departure, when he clearly stated that “[w]orking with new and developing countries is becoming increasingly important to resolve global issues such as climate change, energy, and food”.7
Indonesia is not only the largest economy among the ASEAN countries, but also a traditional investment and aid destination for the Japanese. By 2022, the country had received over 380.5 billion yen in Official Development Assistance for technical cooperation, while Japan–Indonesia trade reached over US$ 32 billion in 2023.8 A survey conducted by the Japanese Foreign Ministry in 2022 found that over 59 per cent of Indonesians feel that Japan is an important partner, as against 54 per cent who felt that China played that role best.9 As such, the visit was an opportunity not only to reaffirm post-Cold War Japan’s ‘Asia-centric’ diplomacy, but also the sincerity of its outreach towards the countries of the Global South.10
Significance of the Emperor’s UK Visit
In June 2024, Japan’s Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako departed for the United Kingdom for an eight-day state visit.11 Their visit, their second foreign trip, was touted by the Japanese media as a sort of homecoming, as both the Emperor and Empress are alumni of Oxford University, and the Emperor has been on record as stating he feels a sense of kinship to the UK.12
During the trip, the Imperial couple attended several functions hosted by the British royal family mixed in with personal visits to sites of interest such as the Thames Barrier (on which the Emperor wrote a dissertation) and Oxford University itself. However, it is the speech he delivered at Buckingham Palace on 26 June during the official banquet hosted by King Charles III and Queen Camilla that is most worthy of attention here, as it illustrates perfectly how the Imperial institution serves as a diplomatic vehicle for Japan’s key foreign policy interests.13
In the early years of the 20th century, as Japan rapidly modernised its economic and military structures, the UK, then at the head of the British Empire, had signed a landmark treaty of alliance with the Empire of Japan in 1902. This treaty, which formed the basis of what is called the Anglo-Japanese alliance (nichiei domei), was intended as a counter to perceived Russian expansion and accepted the principle of an exclusive sphere of interest for Japan in Korea as well as a share of the spoils in China.14 Renegotiated and extended up to 1922 as the ‘marrow’ of Japanese foreign policy,15 the Alliance in effect gave space to Japan to expand its empire deeper into Northeast Asia while it protected British imperial interests in Southeast Asia from challenge.
In contemporary times, the United Kingdom and Japan are once again on the road to convergence. The former is currently one of the few European powers that actually has a robust Indo-Pacific strategy and is a member of several Indo-Pacific minilateral groupings such as AUKUS as well as the Five Eyes, both of which Japan is keen to join.16 It is also a collaborator with Japan and Italy on the advanced fighter design programme called the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP),17 making it a pivotal power bridging Europe and East Asia. Finally, Japan and the UK share common outlooks regarding issues such as support for Ukraine against Russia and pursuing active diplomacy with the Global South.
The Emperor’s speech at Buckingham Palace, with its references to a ‘friend[ship] like no other’ and a ‘close friendship based on mutual understanding of the importance of international rules and global institutions forged from the lessons of history, including its darkest years’, conveyed the same message tailored to audiences in the Global North. The speech solidified not only the Imperial couple’s deep personal connections to the UK, but also signified a deeper strategic synergy that harkened back to the past as much as to the future.
Conclusion
The Imperial institution since 1945 has been a story of rediscovery, as the occupants of the Chrysanthemum Throne have attempted to mould it to serve a Japan which no longer pursues territorial expansion and eschews aggressive war. At the same time, Emperor Naruhito rules over a Japan that is dealing with pressing issues that require innovative solutions devised in tandem with the world to solve. As such, the nation’s First Ambassador now has his task cut out for him.
In future, it is suggested that the Government of Japan could give more thought to having the Imperial couple visit India again, an event the Government of India would—and should—surely approve of. Additionally, visits to African countries, especially Kenya or South Africa, could further cement Japan’s outreach to the Global South even as it relieves them from the burden of apologising for their history.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. Barak Kushner, The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 2005, pp. 157, 177.
2. Kenneth J. Ruoff, Japan’s Imperial House in the Postwar Era 1945-2019, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2020, p. 135.
3. Ibid., pp. 164, 294. Opposition by conservatives is covered on p. 168.
14. Shigeru Murashima, “The Opening of the Twentieth Century and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1895-1923”, in Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibata (eds), The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, Volume 1: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1600-1930, Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London, 2000, pp. 162, 168.
17.“「グローバル戦闘航空プログラム(GCAP)政府間機関の設立に関する条約」の署名” (Signing of Convention on the Establishment of the “Global Combat Air Programme – GCAP International Government Organisation”), 外務省 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan), 14 December 2023.
Introduction
Japan’s Imperial Family, with the Emperor and Empress at its centre, has been a significant moderating influence on Japanese politics in the post-war era. Though debarred from any significant political role by the new Constitution adopted under the United States-led Allied Occupation in 1947, the Imperial Family remains the constitutional ‘symbol of the nation’. One of the striking ramifications of this is that the Imperial couple, or even members of their extended family, can be said to have emerged as remarkably effective tools of diplomatic soft power. The current Emperor’s two recent foreign trips to Indonesia and the United Kingdom denotes how the Emperor forms a complex nexus between Japan’s 20th century history and its modern status as a member of good standing with the Global North.
The Japanese Emperor in Modern Diplomacy
Japan’s monarch regained diplomatic significance only when the reign of the samurai was overthrown in 1868. As the Japanese polity underwent modernisation and a new German-inspired Constitution was promulgated in 1889, Emperor Meiji and his descendants became not only the final arbiters of domestic policy, but also the key decision-makers in foreign policy. It was on Meiji’s authority that the Japanese army invaded and annexed Okinawa, Manchuria and Korea in 1879, 1905 and 1910 respectively. His son Taisho was the authority behind Japan’s occupation of German colonial territories in Liaodong and Shantung in China after the First World War, while his grandson Showa presided over the great conflagration that was the Second World War.
With the announcement of Japan’s surrender on 15 August 1945, the Emperor’s war-making prerogatives were finally taken from him. The Allied Occupation, led by the United States, instead drafted a new Constitution in 1947 that returned him to the status of a disenfranchised figurehead.1 Some diplomatic powers remained with the Imperial Household, namely the receiving of credentials from foreign envoys and making formal visits to key countries. Even this, however, was strictly circumscribed by the powerful Imperial Household Agency, which remains the office ‘in charge of’ the Imperial Household’s affairs.
Nevertheless, the post-war Emperor became a powerful sign of Japan’s goodwill. Emperor Showa’s visit to Britain in 1971 and the US in 1975 marked Japan’s rehabilitation as a key Asian ally in the Cold War. The visit of the then Crown Prince Akihito and his new bride Crown Princess Michiko to India in 1960 was an early premonition of the importance Japan would come to attach to ties with India, reconfirmed by their return in 2019 as Emperor and Empress.
Upon assuming the throne in 1990, Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko (who are still alive and therefore not customarily referred to by their regnal name, Heisei) proved to be indefatigable practitioners of koushitsu gaikou (Imperial diplomacy)2 , visiting over 36 countries in their 30-year-long reign. In 1992, the Imperial couple visited China, where they delighted their hosts—and dismayed Japanese conservatives—by issuing a statement of regret for Japan’s actions during the Second World War.3
Conservatives were further disappointed by his public statement of apology to Koreans for his country’s actions there between 1910 and 1945, a statement that was promptly accepted by then-President Roh Moo Hyun.4 Akihito even broke a deeply-controversial ‘taboo’ when he acknowledged that his ancestors, who he technically claims descent from in an unbroken lineage stretching back to the mythological Sun Goddess, may have been from the Korean peninsula.5
Significance of the Emperor’s Indonesia Visit
After Emperor Akihito announced his abdication in 2019, his son, Emperor Naruhito, took the throne with the regnal name Reiwa. As his accession occurred in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, Naruhito and Empress Masako, a former career diplomat, spent the two initial years of their reign holding socially distanced events with select individuals. As the threat of the disease receded in 2023, the Imperial couple took to touring again.
Their tour of Indonesia in June 2023 was their first foreign foray, which demonstrated Naruhito’s inheritance of his father’s style of diplomacy. The six-day trip conducted between 17 and 23 June saw the royal couple engaging deeply with Indonesian culture and people in a variety of settings. Characteristically, it also featured the Emperor’s open acknowledgement of the ‘difficult time in our relations with Indonesia’, which referred to Japan’s brutal occupation of what was then called the Dutch East Indies during the Second World War.6
However, the visit also had a pronounced political and strategic objective. This can be best understood by the Emperor’s remarks prior to his departure, when he clearly stated that “[w]orking with new and developing countries is becoming increasingly important to resolve global issues such as climate change, energy, and food”.7
Indonesia is not only the largest economy among the ASEAN countries, but also a traditional investment and aid destination for the Japanese. By 2022, the country had received over 380.5 billion yen in Official Development Assistance for technical cooperation, while Japan–Indonesia trade reached over US$ 32 billion in 2023.8 A survey conducted by the Japanese Foreign Ministry in 2022 found that over 59 per cent of Indonesians feel that Japan is an important partner, as against 54 per cent who felt that China played that role best.9 As such, the visit was an opportunity not only to reaffirm post-Cold War Japan’s ‘Asia-centric’ diplomacy, but also the sincerity of its outreach towards the countries of the Global South.10
Significance of the Emperor’s UK Visit
In June 2024, Japan’s Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako departed for the United Kingdom for an eight-day state visit.11 Their visit, their second foreign trip, was touted by the Japanese media as a sort of homecoming, as both the Emperor and Empress are alumni of Oxford University, and the Emperor has been on record as stating he feels a sense of kinship to the UK.12
During the trip, the Imperial couple attended several functions hosted by the British royal family mixed in with personal visits to sites of interest such as the Thames Barrier (on which the Emperor wrote a dissertation) and Oxford University itself. However, it is the speech he delivered at Buckingham Palace on 26 June during the official banquet hosted by King Charles III and Queen Camilla that is most worthy of attention here, as it illustrates perfectly how the Imperial institution serves as a diplomatic vehicle for Japan’s key foreign policy interests.13
In the early years of the 20th century, as Japan rapidly modernised its economic and military structures, the UK, then at the head of the British Empire, had signed a landmark treaty of alliance with the Empire of Japan in 1902. This treaty, which formed the basis of what is called the Anglo-Japanese alliance (nichiei domei), was intended as a counter to perceived Russian expansion and accepted the principle of an exclusive sphere of interest for Japan in Korea as well as a share of the spoils in China.14 Renegotiated and extended up to 1922 as the ‘marrow’ of Japanese foreign policy,15 the Alliance in effect gave space to Japan to expand its empire deeper into Northeast Asia while it protected British imperial interests in Southeast Asia from challenge.
In contemporary times, the United Kingdom and Japan are once again on the road to convergence. The former is currently one of the few European powers that actually has a robust Indo-Pacific strategy and is a member of several Indo-Pacific minilateral groupings such as AUKUS as well as the Five Eyes, both of which Japan is keen to join.16 It is also a collaborator with Japan and Italy on the advanced fighter design programme called the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP),17 making it a pivotal power bridging Europe and East Asia. Finally, Japan and the UK share common outlooks regarding issues such as support for Ukraine against Russia and pursuing active diplomacy with the Global South.
The Emperor’s speech at Buckingham Palace, with its references to a ‘friend[ship] like no other’ and a ‘close friendship based on mutual understanding of the importance of international rules and global institutions forged from the lessons of history, including its darkest years’, conveyed the same message tailored to audiences in the Global North. The speech solidified not only the Imperial couple’s deep personal connections to the UK, but also signified a deeper strategic synergy that harkened back to the past as much as to the future.
Conclusion
The Imperial institution since 1945 has been a story of rediscovery, as the occupants of the Chrysanthemum Throne have attempted to mould it to serve a Japan which no longer pursues territorial expansion and eschews aggressive war. At the same time, Emperor Naruhito rules over a Japan that is dealing with pressing issues that require innovative solutions devised in tandem with the world to solve. As such, the nation’s First Ambassador now has his task cut out for him.
In future, it is suggested that the Government of Japan could give more thought to having the Imperial couple visit India again, an event the Government of India would—and should—surely approve of. Additionally, visits to African countries, especially Kenya or South Africa, could further cement Japan’s outreach to the Global South even as it relieves them from the burden of apologising for their history.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.