Egypt’s Stakes in Qatar’s Predicament

Egypt, like many other Arab African countries, has been a member of the Arab Cooperation Council and has therefore been engaged with the geopolitics of the region. So when a fault line developed in the GCC on June 5, 2017, with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE and Bahrain cut ties with Qatar accusing it of sponsoring terrorism, Egypt was among the first countries from outside the region to respond. All other North African Arab countries took a neutral stand on the issue. Egypt’s response on this issue is based on high stakes, both domestic and external.

Africa and the Crisis relating to Qatar

On June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE and Bahrain cut ties with Qatar accusing it of sponsoring terrorism, Egypt announced the withdrawal of its envoy from Doha and gave a margin of 48 hours to Qatari ambassador in Cairo to leave the country. Egypt’s foreign ministry announced suspension of air and sea links to Qatar citing threat to national security. Egypt’s ministry of civil aviation notified that Egypt’s airspace will be inaccessible for Qatari flights from next day. As part of the quartet, Egypt has supported Saudi Arabia’s stance on Qatar and the President of Egypt Abdel Fattah el Sisi appreciated US President Donald Trump who echoed the quartet’s stand on Qatar.

Apart from Egypt, all other North African Arab countries including Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya maintained a neutral stand on the issue. Qatar has considerable influence in Arab Africa. Algeria advocated that the crisis regarding Qatar must be resolved through dialogue, though its Islamist Members of Parliament formed a parliamentary committee in solidarity with Qatar. Morocco, though an ally of Saudi Arabia, has more recently received investments from Qatar. So while remaining neutral, it sent planes loaded with food for Qataris despite accusations of ignoring demands of its own people protesting at Al Hoceina. Tunisia too maintained a neutral stand on the issue even though Qatar is its biggest Arab investor. Qatar is a major player in western Libya; whereas eastern Libyan leaders and Tobruk based House of Representatives supported the blockade by the quartet isolating Qatar.

Among other countries of Africa, Eritrea, Mauritania, Senegal, Chad and Gabon sided with Saudi Arabia; Ethiopia and Somalia advocated for dialogue between the concerned parties. Ghana on the other hand announced to open its embassy in Doha, throwing its weight behind Qatar. Head of African Union, President of Republic of Guinea, Alpha Conde, emphasised on constructive dialogue and diplomatic efforts as effective tool in resolving the crisis. African Union applauded the mediatory role played by Kuwait through Emir of Kuwait Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah. Chief of African Union, Mr Mahamat Moussa Faki stated that if the rift is not addressed speedily, it could have adverse political, security and humanitarian implications for the Gulf States, the African continent and for international peace and stability.1

Africa and the GCC

Africa’s relations with GCC go back to antiquity and the two regions are tied with shared bonds of Islam and Arab culture. African languages like Swahili and Hausa share words and phrases with Arabic language. The east African island of Zanzibar was the Headquarter of the Sultanate of Oman. African human resource was used in date plantations and pearl diving industry of GCC countries. The leaders from both the regions shared common experience in their struggle against colonialism.

The economy of a number of African countries benefits from the remittances sent by their citizens residing in GCC countries. African people are 28 per cent of the population of UAE, 25 per cent of the population of Muscat and 22 per cent of Qatari population.2 Currently, GCC nations are investing in African tourism sector for instance Dubai World has invested in Victoria and Albert complex in Cape Town. Similarly, GCC countries have invested in African land for food production since 2007-2008 food price crisis.3 Availability of unused cultivable land in Africa is an attraction for the oil rich but arable land-deficient GCC countries.

Egypt and the GCC

As an Arab country situated in North Africa, Egypt has significant linkages with the GCC. Before Arab Spring, Egypt and Gulf countries shared warm relations reflected in its support to Kuwait when Saddam Hussain invaded it in 1991. Egypt provided third largest contingent after US and UK comprising of 35,000 troops during the gulf war. In return Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE and Qatar waived the debt of $6 billion on Egypt. As per ministry of foreign affairs of Egypt, seventy per cent of Egypt’s 6 million total emigrants live in the Gulf. In 2009-2010, Egypt received $1.5 billion from Kuwait and $ 1 billion from Saudi Arabia.4 Gulf business men have invested in Egypt in tourism, industry, and agriculture and service sector.

During the Arab spring, among the GCC countries, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE and Kuwait backed the incumbent Hosni Mubarak; while Qatar supported the extremist elements of Muslim Brotherhood with material and non-material sources. It provided financial support to the rebels while propagating their cause through Al Jazeera channel. As Muslim Brotherhood led by Mohamed Morsi came to power, Qatar maintained good relations with Egypt. However as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE and Kuwait supported the coup against Muslim Brotherhood and Abdel Fattah el Sisi came to power, Qatar virtually came in Egypt’s line of fire.

After the Arab Spring, Egypt aimed to portray an image of a globally relevant, moderate state interested in rebuilding the Egypt-GCC coalition. When internally Egypt was witnessing the rise of Muslim Brotherhood and revival of its extremist tendencies, it gave priority to fighting terrorism outside its own borders and at international forums. As it supported cohesion of state in the face of extremist groups, bandwagoning with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and UAE against Qatar came naturally to it.

Egypt’s Stakes

Egypt understood that to be relevant globally and to re-emerge as a regional leader, it has to re- build its relations with the GCC countries that supported it during the Arab Spring. Egypt achieved more than one goal by supporting Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain in isolating Qatar. It gained global relevance, clarified its position in opposition to terrorism, gained regional eminence by taking a stand against terrorism and is able to bonhomie with other GCC states. Apart from that, by taking a firm stand against Qatar, it sent a strong message to Muslim brotherhood leaders at home.

Egypt is aware that if it has to maintain good relations with GCC, it cannot incline towards Iran. Going against Qatar which is also accused of being soft on Iran, is an opportunity to prove Egypt’s repulsion from Iran. Secondly, since Iran and Egypt both intend to lead the region in terms of resources and capabilities, standing against Qatar gives Iran a strong message. Thirdly, by opposing Qatar, Egypt has tried to fit in the image created by other Arab countries who see it as the only country able to match Israel’s capabilities. Iran’s support to Hezbollah and Hamas worries Egypt and gives it another reason to go against Iran.

Egypt believes in diplomatic methods to resolve the Arab-Israel issue, whereas Iran believes in direct and violent methods. Egypt is the first Arab country to publically sign a peace treaty with Israel while Iran finances Hezbollah and Hamas and promotes violence. It is an irritant for Egypt as Hamas gets soft support from Muslim Brotherhood.5 As Egypt engages in the ongoing crisis, Qatar has sidelined it in a subtle but firm manner. Qatar and Al-Jazeera have been addressing to this crisis as the gulf crisis, signifying its lack of concern towards Egyptian demands and fostering GCC unity while excluding Egypt.

A final Egyptian tussle with Qatar is due to its closeness with Sheikh Yousef al Qardawi, an influential Egyptian theologian based in Doha, Qatar. Sheikh Yousef al Qardawi who was born and brought up in Egypt, was banished due to his radical views and sought refuge in Qatar from where he engaged in preaching his ideology. He has used social media to propagate his views and is the president of World Union of Muslim scholars. Qardawi also has a following among Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which is an irritant for Egypt. During the Egyptian crisis, he preached and gave moral support to the Muslim Brotherhood through al Jazeera channel. When Morsi was in power, he visited the Tahrir square and gave motivational speeches. He even issued a fatwa against those who rebelled against Morsi. He has financial backing from Qatar and is close to Emir of Qatar.6

Conclusion

Egypt’s stake in the current predicament of Qatar within the GCC, thus, is very high. The ongoing crisis gives an opportunity to Egypt to not only slight the Muslim Brotherhood in its own backyard, but also to reposition itself as a religious leader in the region that can stand up to Iran. Improved relations with other countries of the GCC will also enable Egypt to regain its place in the regional comity of nations.

Dr. Lakshmi Priya is Research Assistant, West Asia Centre, IDSA.

• 1. Abdur Rahman Alfa Shaban, “Qatar-Gulf Crisis: AU urges speedy resolution through dialogue”, Africa News, June 17, 2017, at http://www.africanews.com/2017/06/17/qatar-gulf-crisis-au-urges-speedy-resolution-through-dialogue// (Accessed August 16, 2017).
• 2. Yaw Nyarko and Silvana Melitsko, “Africa and the Arab gulf: A new economic and political alliance?”, Journal of African Development, Spring 2010, 12 (1), pp. 10-18 at http://yawnyarko.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Africa-and-the-Gulf-JAD_vol12_ch11.pdf (Accessed on July 2, 2017).
• 3. The Report: Qatar 2015, “Qatar among GCC countries investing in Africa”, Oxford Business Group, at https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/qatar-among-gcc-countries-investing-africa (Accessed July 3, 2017).
• 4. Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi, “Gulf states must repay Egypt favour”, Al Jazeera, February 17, 2011, at https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/02/2011214151229281695.html (Accessed April 27, 2017).
• 5. Gawdat Bahgat, “Egypt and Iran: The 30-year Estrangement”, Middle East Policy Council, Winter, XVI (4), at http://www.mepc.org/journal/egypt-and-iran-30-year-estrangement (Accessed April 27, 2017).
• 6. Staff Writer, “Qardawi: The top advocate of suicide bombings”, Al Jazeera, June 09, 2017, at https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2017/06/09/The-reasons-Qaradawi-on-the-top-of-Egypt-s-most-wanted-list.html (Accessed April 27, 2017).