G.G. Dwivedi

Maj. Gen. (Dr.) G.G. Dwivedi, SM, VSM & BAR (retd.) was Defence Attaché in China, Mongolia and North Korea; has commanded a Division in the North East. read more

Background

On assuming mantle of Fifth Generation leadership of People’s Republic of China (PRC), President Xi Jinping unfolded his China Dream (Zhong Meng); ‘prosperous and powerful’ China. It envisioned restoration of China’s past grandeur and rejuvenation (fuxing), given China was a global economic power for better part of the last two millenniums. To extend its strategic outreach, Xi pronounced China’s ‘international economic cooperation vision’ in 2013 which later got incarnated as ‘Belt Road Initiative’ (BRI). The BRI covers Eurasia, South-South East Asia and Africa. The underlying rationale is to use abundant wealth as soft power to extend its influence through ‘cheque book diplomacy’. Alongside, ‘Maritime Silk Route’ initiative was also launched to effectively control the maritime space.

Till 1990s, China’s influence in Africa was rather limited and its economic engagement insignificant. Main thrust of Beijing’s diplomatic activities then was to defend its core interests like ‘One China’ principle and winning over friends across Africa. Over last two decades, Beijing has adopted a proactive approach to engage with Africa.  To position itself as a leader of the developing world, China has expanded its scope of bilateral and multilateral engagements. Africa is integral to Beijing’s grand design to shape a new global order.

China’s changing approach to Africa is driven by its national interests; namely continent’s strategic location, oil and rare earth metals besides fish. While China’s engagement with Africa is multi-dimensional, its geo political intent often overrides economic considerations. China has evolved a clear ‘Africa Policy’ enunciated in its updated 2015 White Paper. Africa on the other hand does not have an overt China policy.2 Nonetheless, African leaders are increasingly treating China as a great power. Broad objectives of Africa China policy include mobilising Chinese financial resources, winning Beijing’s support in the international arena and seeking alternate development partners.

China’s Africa strategy has yielded considerable success in building close ties with nations of the continent and Beijing an ideal test case in projecting its influence beyond its borders. This paper delves into the salient facets of China’s Africa Strategy and its implications.

Salient Facets

Changed Approach

Chinese approach with regards to engagement with Africa has undergone significant change over the years. While infrastructure remains predominant, China’s engagement with the region has evolved significantly driven by new narrative. It is no more about resources or offering blank cheques and guaranteed results. Instead, the focus is on creating opportunities to fast track economic development through major infrastructure projects. These are in sync with Beijing’s global ambitions. Most of the investments are being undertaken by Chinese state owned companies to facilitate nation’s exports.

China’s Africa strategy 2.0 has four overarching components. These are: access to natural resources particularly oil and gas, tap huge market for Chinese exports, strengthen Sino-African relations to enhance international influence and play more constructive role in regional stability. Even the African governments look up to China to contribute to their economic development through aid, investment, infrastructure development and trade. Some even aspire to replicate China’s rapid economic development model. Essential facets of China’s Africa strategy are enumerated in the succeeding paras.

Economic Engagement

Chinese economic engagement with Africa has grown over the years. In terms of investment, as per Global Tracker, between 2005-18, it stands at $299 billion.3 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) especially in technology and ‘Small and Medium Enterprises’ are critical component of China’s current investment policy in Africa. In terms of FDI growth rate, Chinese investment increased by 24 per cent during 2010-14 while American FDI grew only by 10 per cent. Chinese financing helps closing massive infrastructure gap estimated at $170 billion per year by the African Development.4

As per McKinsey, there are over 10,000 Chinese owned companies operating in Africa; Huawei and Transsion have become as well-known as General Electric and Coca-Cola. Low-cost smart phones as ZTE and Tecno are gaining increasing market share, with latter claiming 25 per cent of continent’s smart phone market.5 Jack Ma owner of Alibaba launched $10 million initiative for the African entrepreneurs. There is significant competition amongst the Chinese companies vying for the same contracts. More than 25 per cent of Chinese investment is concentrated in Nigeria and Angola.

Third summit meeting of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was held in Beijing in 2018 where vast majority of Africa’s 55 countries top leaders participated. Xi Jinping committed $60 billion in new financing for Africa. It marked a shift in focus revealing China’s attempt to shed the tag of ‘neo-colonialism.6 From traditional model of ‘resource for infrastructure’, China apparently is recasting towards next stage of equity investment.7 One of the reason for the shift is the effort to rebrand China in Africa in the wake of global accusations of Beijing engineering debt traps. Case in point is China’s occupation of Kenya’s profitable Mombasa port where China had lent 550 billion Kenya Shilling for Kenya’s Railway project which, Nairobi is unable to pay.8 Djibouti is another a country in severe debt distress as a result of excessive Chinese borrowing, with public external debt as percent of GDP increasing from 50% to 85% in two years.9

Military Dimensions and UN Peace Keeping

For many years, Chinese leaders dismissed external military deployments as characteristic of Western imperialism. Hence, until recently, experts considered China’s relations with the African states to be focussed mostly on economic matters. In fact Africa’s relations with the major powers appeared to follow a pattern; collaboration with US in defence and counter terrorism and with China in trade-economic arena. Over the past decade, China’s role in peace and security has grown rapidly through arms sale, military cooperation and peace keeping deployments in Africa. It is has made efforts to adopt a systematic pan-African approach to security. China’s policy with regards to defence in Africa is significantly different from US strategy. It is a comprehensive blend of trade cum investment alongside cultural exchanges, medical assistance and anti-piracy operations.

It was in 2008, the Chinese Navy undertook its first operational deployment beyond Asia-Pacific in the Gulf of Aden to support UN sanctioned anti-piracy task force. In March 2011, Beijing deployed a warship to evacuate Chinese nationals in the wake of mounting violence in Libya. Since 2012, People Liberation Army (PLA) has been sending combat troops to high risk theatres like Northern Mali and Southern Sudan. Currently around 2500 Chinese troops and police personnel are deployed across the continent. In September 2015, China joined UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) and built 8000 strong peace keeping standby force.10 Beijing also allocated $1 billion over 10 years to UN peacekeeping and development fund besides $100 million in new funding to the African Union’s rapid deployment capability.

In 2016, PLA located troops in Djibouti, with ten years lease at $20 million annually; its first permanent overseas deployment.11 All these moves are in sync with the ‘New Historic Missions’ Doctrine, which calls for an expeditionary capability which can safeguard growing Chinese interests on the African Continent, maintain naval presence in the Western Indian Ocean, protect merchant ships from piracy and support its UN missions in the region.12 In 2015, China passed a counter- terrorism law authorizing PLA’s deployment on overseas counter terrorism missions. PLA has also established as active partner in the defence diplomacy encompassing training, arms sale and establishment of military facilities.

At the China-Africa ‘Defence and Security Forum’ 2018, organised by China’s Ministry of National Defence, Beijing showcased an increasingly strategic approach to its defence relations with the African countries. According to recent data provided by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2009-13 and 2014-18, States in Sub-Saharan Africa received 25 per cent of total arms shipment with top five importers being Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Cameroon and Senegal.13 China was the second largest supplier of weapons to Sub- Sahara Africa after Russia, accounting for 22 per cent.

Soft Power Projection

In its pursuit to acquire great power status, soft power with Chinese characteristics has been the core of Beijing’s grand policy. It is primarily driven through non-coercive approach combining politico-diplomatic measures along with economic initiatives and education cum cultural exchanges. China’s persistent claims about its peaceful rise enables it to soft sell various projects through attractive loan options or gifts-case in point funding of $200 million African Union Headquarters. Today total Chinese diaspora in Africa is estimated at one million.

Since the 1960s, in the garb of anti- colonial initiatives, political party training has been an important element of China’s engagement with Africa, steered by its ‘Central Party School’ to export ideology and culture. Over a period of time, these programs have been restructured and expanded in scope, becoming highly technical, hands on to share China’s experience; its model of economic development and governance. Wang Huning is the architect of Chinese concept of soft power to achieve nation’s strategic objectives.14 The Chinese model is based on the subordination of military and government to the party and state sponsored capitalism.

Implications

China’s engagement with Africa is a critical element of Beijing’s strategy to regain its rightful place in the global polity. Africa provides China an excellent platform to test its ability to exert influence in the extended neighbourhood. China’s role in Africa defies conventional approach as it has astutely combined its role as a long established diplomatic partner and of late as an investor. Chinese interests in Africa are multi-prong; include trade, security, diplomacy and soft power. Beijing is a major aid donor but its intent and aid practices are often misunderstood. It has adopted benign approach vis-à-vis other nations like the US, wherein it portrays as the flag bearer of the developing world. China also refrains from paying heed to American values of democratizations and mode of governance.

As per Rand Corporation report, China has sought a constructive role as a contributor to the stability of the region, partly to mitigate security related threats to its economic interests. African governments look up China to lend political recognition and legitimacy as also contribute to their economic development. They also expect China to deal with them in ways that US and Western governments do not. China is the largest trading partner of Africa and has economic ties with the continent have expanded over the years. Overall, African officials view China’s role positively.15

However, China’s presence in Africa is not without controversy. Some nations are critical of Chinese engagement with respect to poor labour condition, unsustainable developmental practices and unfair negotiation deals by taking advantage of African government relative weakness. In few cases resentment at Chinese business practices has let to popular protest and violence. Many countries have been pushed into debt trap due to Beijing’s BRI; Kenya being the latest victim. Even the Chinese policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Africa has come under scrutiny. 

While USA and China may not be strategic rivals in Africa, the two are in competition due to conflicting business interest. Chinese engagement in Africa has been primarily focussed on the extraction of natural resources, infrastructure development and manufacturing, with ‘no string attached’ approach. US on the other hand has concentrated on high-tech trade and services as also on aid through policies aimed at promoting democracy, good governance and human development. Mr John Bolton former ‘National Security Adviser’ to President Trump while outlining US Administration new Africa strategy had stated: “greatest threat to America in Africa comes not from migration or extremism but from China due to Beijing’s corrupt and predatory business practices.16

India’s engagement with Africa was summed up in two words; “Continuity and Change”, by Shri H V Shringla, Foreign Secretary recently in a speech at a conference on Africa in New Delhi.17 He further elaborated that India’s relationship with Africa has been advanced using consultative and responsive mechanism under the rubric of India-Africa Forum Summit. India’s association with Africa is more about facilitating the capacity building of African people. There are thousands of African students studying in India at any given point. Thirteen of the current or former Presidents, Vice Presidents and PMs have studied at institutions in India. PM Modi in his speech to the Ugandan Parliament in 2019 had said that India’s priority is Africans: every man, woman and child in Africa.18

The 2015 Summit in New Delhi saw participation from 54 countries of African Continent. India’s trade with Africa in 2019 was valued at $69 billion.19  Delhi’s bilateral partnership with Africa is defined by the spirit of ‘developing together as equals’ with emphasis on capacity building, skill development and investment in ‘Small and Medium Enterprises’. While Indian projects have had positive impact on lives of Africans, there is a definite realisation that the partnership is yet to attain its full potential. Poor track record of project delivery and implementation in comparison to China is one area of principle concerns. Indian Government has enunciated “Ten Guiding Principles for India-Africa Engagement” in July 2018 to have coherent Africa policy in place. Whereas India cannot compete with China’s economic prowess, Delhi can definitely take advantage of growing realisation in Africa about Beijing’s terms of engagements which are being resisted.

China’s engagement with Africa is an important component of its grand strategy. Chinese investment in Africa has expanded both in scope and size, marking a definite shift from the traditional model of ‘resources for infrastructure’. Today, even the African governments are well aware of Chinese interests and have refined their negotiating skills to pursue their objectives. Still, Chinese presence in Africa has not been without controversy. India needs a coherent Africa policy and leverage its inherent advantage of goodwill, marked by human touch. Given its strategic location and vast growth opportunities, Africa will be an arena of inter power rivalry, with China being a major player.

*Maj. Gen. (Dr.) G. G. Dwivedi, SM, VSM & Bar retired as Assistant Chief Integrated Defence Staff (Strategic). Veteran of Bangladesh War, later commanded Battalion in Siachen, Brigade and Division in intense CI environment. A PhD from JNU, he is alumnus of National Defence College and Harvard Kennedy School. He served as Defence Attaché in China, Mongolia and North Korea. As Professor and founder Chair at Aligarh Muslim University he was instrumental in establishing new faculty of International Studies. Well published, he is a visiting faculty to reputed institutions, speaks at international forums; frequently appears as a panellist on national TV.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. White Paper, ‘China Africa Policy’, 2015, at 2. Chris Alden and Lu Jiang, “Does Africa have a China Strategy”, International Affairs Blog, June 13, 2019, at

  https://medium.com/international-affairs-blog/does-africa-have-a-china-strategy-a6950559c53a  (Accessed on January 30, 2020).

• 3. Lonny J Ani Brooks, “21st Century Belongs to China- 22nd will be Africa’s”, Quartz, February 21, 2019, at

  http://qz.com (Accessed on January 28, 2020).

• 4. Aubrey Hurby, “Dispelling the Dominant Myths of China in Africa”, The Atlantic Council, September 03, 2018, at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/dispelling-the-dom… (Accessed on January 30, 2020).
• 5. Ibid.
• 6. Shannon Tiezzi, “FOCAC 2018: Rebranding China in Africa”, The Diplomat, September 05, 2018, at https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/focac-2018-rebranding-china-in-africa/  (Accessed on January 31, 2020).
• 7. Yun Sun, “China’s Changing Approach to Africa Brookings”, February 04, 2019, at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/02/04/chinas-changing-approach-to-africa/  (Accessed on February 02, 2020).
• 8. Ashwani Mahajan, “China Debt-Trap Diplomacy”, Indian Express, New Delhi, December 19, 2019, at https://www.newindianexpress.com/opinions/2019/dec/19/chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy-2078207.html  (Accessed on February 02, 2020).
• 9. Aubrey Hurby, no. 4.
• 10. “China National Defence in the New Era”, Foreign Languages Press.Co.Ltd., Beijing, China, July 2019.
• 11. SIPRI, “Foreign Military presence in Africa”, SIPRI Backgrounder, April 2019, at https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/sipribp1904.pdf
• 12. Paul Nantulya, “Pursuing the China Dream through Africa: Five Elements of China’s Africa Strategy”, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, April 06, 2017, at https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-dream-five-elements-china-africa-strategy/  (Accessed on February 05, 2020).
• 13. Wilder Alejandro Sanchez and Scott Morgan, “Africa Arms Sales, Global Geopolitics and Security Threats International Policy Digest”, June 28, 2019, at https://intpolicydigest.org/2019/06/28/africa-arms-sales-global-geopolitics-and-security-threats/  (Accessed on February 05, 2020).
• 14. Paul Nantulya, no. 12.
• 15. Larry Hanauer and Lyle Morris, “China in Africa, Implications of deepening Relationship”, Document NumberRB-9760-OSI, Rand Corporation, 2014, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9760.html  (Accessed on February 10, 2020).
• 16. Cornelia Tremann, “The New US Africa is not About Africa. It’s about China”, The Interpreter, 20 December, 2018.
• 17. Harsh Vardhan Shringla, “Why India Africa Bond Matters”, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, February 14, 2020.
• 18. Ibid.
• 19. Ibid.