Assessing Azm-i-Istehkam
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Saman Ayesha Kidwai
Saman Ayesha Kidwai is a Research Analyst (Counter Terrorism Centre) at MP-IDSA. She joined the institute in August 2021. She holds a Master’s degree in Conflict Analysis and Peacebuilding from… Continue reading Assessing Azm-i-Istehkam read more
Keywords: Counter-Terrorism, Pakistan
Pakistan announced the launch of the Azm-i-Istehkam (Resolve for Stability) operation in June 2024 to eradicate terrorism, the 12th such military operation since 2007. The federal government has advanced this to address the backlash of nurturing and facilitating violent extremism and terrorism across its borders for decades.
The Broader Context
Pakistan’s confrontation with terrorist threats has surged over the years, with 2023 proving to be the deadliest year, mainly for military and police personnel. The suicide bombing attack at a mosque inside the Peshawar Cantonment area in January 2023 killed approximately 100 and injured no less than 150 devotees. Within six months, it experienced another fatal attack when Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl’s (JUI-F) political rally was targeted in July, killing over 50 attendees and wounding more than 200.
As per the Global Terrorism Index Report 2024, Pakistan ranks as the fourth country most affected by terrorism-related activities, moving up from its previously held seventh rank. A report by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies in January 2024 noted that 17,785 terror-related events have resulted in 72,203 casualties since 2006.11
Pakistan has charged the Afghan Taliban for allegedly harbouring TTP fighters and allowing Afghanistan to be used as a launch-pad to undermine its national security. Against this backdrop, Baloch insurgents have also scaled up their attacks, with TTP inflicting maximum damage and casualties mainly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.
What seems to have inevitably pushed Pakistan’s federal government to re-evaluate its counter-terror strategy was the intensifying pressure imposed after Shahbaz Sharif and Army Chief General Asif Munir visited China in June 2024. While Chinese personnel have been targeted by Baloch insurgents and TTP operatives for the last several years, in the lead-up to this visit, at least three terror attacks occurred, including the March 2024 suicide bombing that killed five Chinese engineers and one Pakistani in the restive Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.
During this five-day visit, President Xi Jinping reportedly underscored the need for Pakistan to safeguard Chinese citizens stationed to work on the US$ 62 billion China–Pakistan Economic Corridor project and ‘provide a safe, stable, and predictable business environment’.22 Public outrage was also expressed by Chinese officials such as Liu Jianchao (Head of the International Department of the CCP) when he stated that “in Pakistan’s case, the primary factor shaking the confidence of Chinese investors is the security situation”.33 Beijing apparently issued an ultimatum threatening to deploy around 1,200 personnel44 to safeguard its interests in Pakistan.
Islamabad’s announcement could be an effort to bide time and prevent further Chinese interference at the risk of providing an excuse to the jihadi entities at home to exploit its acquiescence to Chinese demands as another example of it being un-Islamic. It could also be seeking to deny further momentum to Baloch groups who have demonstrated growing hostility to Beijing’s expanding influence in Gwadar.
Simultaneously, Pakistan’s decision to rejuvenate its counter-terror framework was imperative to retain the much-needed Chinese investment to navigate the recurring economic turbulence and prevent isolating its closest partner in the United Nations Security Council, it frequently relies on to prevent the blacklisting of terror operatives backed by Islamabad.
Considering that similar campaigns, including the Zarb-e-Azb (Strike of the Prophet’s Sword or sharp and cutting strike or blow) operation launched in 2014 to neutralise terrorism in its tribal belts, proved futile, there is little optimism regarding Azm-i-Istehkam’s success in upholding Pakistan’s national security. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Chief Minister, Ali Amin Gandapur, allegedly accused the federal government of being kept in the dark about the counter-terror campaign, widening the fault-lines between Islamabad and a province that has been afflicted with decades-long violent campaigns and instability.
Where It Can Go Wrong
Pakistan’s military and political leadership faces multi-pronged challenges in ensuring the success of Azm-i-Istekham primarily due to the following factors.
Lack of Political–Civil Society Consensus
One of the most significant challenges facing the political–military leadership pushing for Azm-e-Istehkam is the lack of political and nationwide consensus on the scope and objectives of the counter-terror operation, largely due to the ambiguity surrounding this initiative. This will obstruct the nationwide support the government and military require to take swift and decisive measures due to the public criticism and condemnation that will inevitably follow, having their concerns dismissed to accommodate Chinese interests.
A major operation such as this requires support across political and ideological lines, including among the electorate that has borne the long-term socio-economic, physical and psychological impact of terrorism and violent extremism. On the one hand, there is deep-rooted mistrust among civilians (including civil society activists) about the state’s ability to contain the operation to specifically weed out terrorists and extremists as a result of the mass displacement and dispossession that has occurred in the past due to kinetic operations carried out by the armed forces.
Moreover, Asad Iqbal Butt, the Chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has flagged issues relating to the lack of transparency and the adverse impact the military operation could have on ordinary citizens. He noted that the operation should not be “used to justify further enforced disappearances, the use of interment centres or military courts, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, or custodial torture”.55
On the other hand, political parties, including Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and JUI-F, have criticised the government’s decision regarding the operation’s launch and its ambiguity. For example, JUI-F’s Chief, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, has, after holding a grand tribal jirga, declared that “the jirga expressed its lack of trust in the operation and declared that this was not Azm-i-Istekham, rather Adam-I-Istekham (Instability)”.66
However, there are also leaders such as Mahmood Khan Achakzai (Leader of the Opposition Alliance Tahreek-e-Tahafuz Ayin Pakistan) who have been critical of the government’s dismissal of the provincial concerns and refusal to work towards a nationwide consensus before formulating such a policy. He has warned77 Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s government that the opposition could internationalise a domestic policy by bringing it to the attention of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This announcement was made after holding a jirga, similar to the resistance tactic applied by JUI-F’s Chief, where a resolution88 against its implementation was passed.
Regardless of the legal challenges he would face pursuing this case, his statement appears to be a well-calculated move to extract concessions of some kind from the political leadership based in Islamabad. How far he and others standing in solidarity against the government can leverage the polarised socio-political climate remains to be seen. For now, anti-government rallies across provinces such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa continue to hinder the process of acquiring the nationwide legitimacy this refurbished operation requires to have even a modicum of chance of success. Opposition leaders might exploit the electorate’s concerns to further their agenda and consolidate greater power.
Ambiguity Concerning the Operation’s Mandate
Despite the initial announcement that the counter-terror operation involved a comprehensive kinetic action, Inter-Services Public Relations, the media wing of the Pakistani army, appears to have backtracked on this. Widespread expression of concerns about possible mass displacement and instability that would follow, as has been the case with earlier military operations like Zarb-e-Azb, appears to have compelled a shift in the armed forces’ rhetoric, which has avowedly denied99 Azm-e-Itehkam being a full-fledged military campaign, which could result in mass displacement of the local populace.
The federal government also had to step in and issue a clarification to mobilise the Pakistani society which finds itself more divided than ever and despite the multiple security threats emanating from Baloch rebels, Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), or TTP and disproportionate violence accompanying it. The following declaration issued by the federal government accepted the fact that population displacement was ‘required’ as part of its short-term strategy to combat terrorism and dismantle the hideouts of violent non-state actors in the past, but the army was no longer contemplating any such move today.
PTV News, the state broadcaster of Pakistan, announced on 25 June 2024 in a detailed post on X (formerly Twitter) that
At the same time, the framework outlined in a press release points to broad themes without underscoring the nuances, resulting in significant confusion about the long-term objectives and implications of yet another military operation. As per the document, the government emphasised that the operation would be:
However, there has been little indication of such assurances allaying the critics’ fears. This has mainly been the case, considering the precedent set by the earlier armed operations, which has provided the public with sufficient evidence about the socio-economic impact borne by civilians even as the government and law enforcement personnel have struggled to eradicate terrorism from its roots. Additionally, the state agencies have been unable to clarify how they would avoid civilians being targeted in the crossfire and correctly differentiate between them and terrorists who have constantly changed their locations to avoid the gaze of the law enforcement agencies.
The uptick in deadly violence, along with failed rehabilitation of those displaced and dispossessed due to past kinetic operations, signals to the locals in provinces such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan (worst affected by terrorism across Pakistan) about the adverse implications of Azm-i-Istehkam. It is also entirely possible that counter-terror operations might be used as a ruse to more brutally repress the Baloch insurgency, as transparency and civic liberties are likely to further backslide in the wake of any such operation.
Domestic Militancy Calculus
Any misstep on the state’s part could reignite the militancy wave akin to the period following the siege of and military assault on the Lal Masjid in July 2007 after former President Hu Jintao tasked Pervez Musharraf’s military government with rescuing Chinese workers who had reportedly been held hostage by students associated with Jamia Hafsa Madrassa. It could be construed as another example to mobilise the anti-Pakistan jihadis by calling on a state which claims to be Islamic yet cooperates with Chinese infidels,1212 a term frequently used by ISIS in its propaganda. Notably, China has faced acute criticism and threats from various terrorist groups for its reported mistreatment of the Uyghur community in Xinjiang Province.
Conclusion
Multifold hindrances remain in Islamabad’s path to eradicating terrorism. They range from the ambiguity regarding the scope, the desired end-state, no definite blueprint of the counter-terror operation, widespread criticism from political opposition and civil society critics, and the absence of any success in earlier operations, on which Azm-e-Istekham is modelled, to the growing Chinese pressure to safeguard its geo-economic interests and its personnel stationed in Pakistan. Given the military campaign’s deficiencies and low probability of success, it is expected to result in mass dispossession, displacement and civilian killings without achieving its primary goal.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.