Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
मनोहर पर्रिकर रक्षा अध्ययन एवं विश्लेषण संस्थान

Al-Shabaab in Somalia: Terrorist Trends in the Pandemic Years

Saman Ayesha Kidwai
Saman Ayesha Kidwai is a Research Analyst (Counter Terrorism Centre) at MP-IDSA. She joined the institute in August 2021. She holds a Master’s degree in Conflict Analysis and Peacebuilding from… Continue reading Al-Shabaab in Somalia: Terrorist Trends in the Pandemic Years read more
Cover Story

Challenges, such as weak infrastructure and ill-equipped armed forces, corruption, pandemic, and drought, have become intrinsic to Somalia, mutually reinforcing each other. Additionally, they have been exploited by terrorists to advance their Islamist cause. While re-evaluating counter-terrorism strategies to defeat al-Shabaab, the allied partners should carefully consider these factors’ role in sustaining the insurgency and address the security crisis – state and human security – accordingly. The failure to do that will have catastrophic results for the Somali people and the internationally-recognised government.

A Historical Context

Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Youth Movement), infamously known as Al-Shabaab, formally came into existence in 2006. After Ahmed Abdi Godane’s death by an American drone strike in 2014, Ahmed Umar “Abu Ubaidah” assumed the organisation’s leadership. Nevertheless, the origin of its earliest leaders can be traced to jihadists who had travelled to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight the Soviets. Regardless of fault lines cutting across each group member’s individual objectives, their overall worldview remains centred around the creation of an Islamic state.

After returning home, those terrorists had remained active, especially throughout the civil war, ensuing after the collapse of President Barré’s administration in 1991. Among the key groups that emerged amid this crisis was the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a conglomeration of Sunni jihadist organisations, which seized control of Mogadishu, and Al-Shabaab emerged as a predominant faction. However, the Ethiopian-backed transitional government ousted the ICU in 2006 with minimal effort. Analysts like Rob Wise believe this external intervention was the fundamental reason for “transforming the group (Al-Shabaab) from a small, relatively unimportant part of a more moderate Islamic movement into the most powerful and radical armed faction in the country.”1

The formation of an Islamic state governed by Sharia remains at the core of its demands, cutting across the fault lines. Car bombs, gun and suicide attacks, and high-profile assassinations are recurring means through which al-Shabaab fighters have waged their insurgency. On the other hand, it has governed areas in Central and Southern Somalia through a harsh interpretation of Sharia.2

Their draconian governance has resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people from territories under their control. This occurred after the group disallowed contact with humanitarian workers and aid from entering those areas after the 2017 famine.3

The Protracted Insurgency and Counter-Response

Reportedly, some of its earliest fatal attacks are traceable to 2009; however, its deadliest attack on Somalian soil occurred on October 14, 2017. A truck bomb in Mogadishu detonated at a busy intersection; today referred to as the “October 14 junction,” killing at least 587 and wounding 1,000 individuals.4 As the “deadliest terror attack” in Somalia, it compelled the fragile government to contend with the horror that had engulfed the near-failed state. In one of its most recent attacks, a suicide bomber detonated a device inside a restaurant in Beledweyne, injuring 20 and killing 13 others on February 19, 2022, reportedly killing an electoral candidate and two deputy police commissioners.5

Its ability to wage a protracted insurgency is also visible in how it rapidly re-established control over the strategic town of Amara (Central Somalia) in August 2021, a town en-route to Harardhere, a coastal area and another Al-Shabaab bastion. The federal forces had ousted Al-Shabaab and seized control of Amara in July 2021.6 It has also entrenched itself in Somalia’s financial institutions. For example, it was reported in July 2021 that al-Shabaab controlled 85 per cent of the capital available in the International Bank of Somalia, an international bank with its headquarters in Mogadishu.7 Furthermore, according to the Hiraal Institute, a research group situated in Mogadishu, the group annually generates US $180 million, out of which US$ 24 million were allocated for procurement of weapons in 2021.8 Moreover, a humanitarian crisis, unfolding due to a rapidly worsening drought, provides Al-Shabaab a leverage against the state for intensified recruitment and indulgence in violence while setting up parallel power structures to undermine the government.9

On the other hand, matters of jurisprudence prove to be another obstacle for the efficient functioning of government institutions. The Somali courts, bogged down by clan-based sectarianism, corruption, and in-fighting, cannot deliver swift justice,   when compared with Islamic courts governed by Al-Shabaab that rise above ethnic divisions to deliver a broadly incorruptible verdict rapidly. This however does not take away from the brutality and authoritarianism associated with their interpretation of Sharia. By weakening the apparatus from within, these terrorists could continue to sow seeds for continued socio-economic and political unrest in the country. For example, the federal government’s slow vaccine rollout and challenges with vaccine availability even until August 2021, while Al-Shabaab continued to build on their existing social services network, presumably did not bode well for an administration facing mounting opposition to its political survival.10

Al Shabaab has also imported ammonium nitrate in vast quantities to make IEDs through licit and illicit channels, laying bare the inaptitude of the weak federal government to eliminate the rerouting of such materials in the hands of terrorist outfits.11 On the other hand, Amniyat, its much-feared intelligence network, acts as its backbone, spearheading intelligence gathering, planning and executing attacks.  It also takes the final call on all of al-Shabaab’s finance and health-related matters, and retribution against defectors. Hussein Sheikh Ali, Somalia’s former National Security Advisor, highlighted how “if the Amniyat was destroyed, there would be no Al-Shabaab.”12

In the past, Al-Shabaab stood accused of colluding with pirates to generate revenue, more so when their funds began to dwindle.13 The terrorists received monetary proceeds, for example, bribes from pirates, presumably to halt raids launched from areas under their control. The Yemeni war has also benefitted the Somali insurgency. According to a report unveiled by The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime in 2021, “Over the course of eight months, @GI_TOC research documented over 400 illicit weapons in 13 locations across Somalia, the presence of which serves as a fingerprint of the spillover of the arms from the Yemen conflict into Somalia.”14

Regional attempts to ward off the threat, including the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), an African Union-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia, operating with the consent of the United Nations (UN), have achieved limited success in ousting the terrorists from several of their strongholds but have proved unable to eliminate the group. Since 2008, the UN has adopted numerous resolutions, including in December 2021, to renew the mandate of international anti-piracy ships operating off the coast of Somalia to combat all manifestations of armed robbery and piracy in the maritime domain. However, the renewal of the mandate will only last three months because the Somali federal government, whose approval the UN requires, claims that no piracy-related events have occurred over four years.15

However, AMISOM is due to transition to the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), gradually transferring the security reins to the Federal Government of Somalia by December 31, 2023, under the Somalia Transition Plan (STP).16 This announcement by the African Union (AU) in January 2022 came amid mounting and renewed violence by al-Shabaab. However, one must remember that the contested and hurried withdrawal of the international coalition from Afghanistan served as one of the core precursors of the fall of Kabul in August 2021. The AU is therefore obligated to prevent a similar occurrence in Somalia or face the potential consequences of another civil war fuelled by arms trafficking, the emergence of competing centres of power, and a cataclysmic human security and refugee crises. 

Pandemic and Current Challenges  

The pandemic has strained the efforts of the AMISOM to conduct counter-terrorism operations.17 It has also made information sharing and intel gathering challenging for the deployed troops due to COVID restrictions. The surge in the pandemic has fomented opportune conditions for the terrorist group to use to its advantage. The socio-economic fallout, including costs of cooking gas in Mogadishu catapulting from $18 to$30, has threatened to undermine further the legitimacy of Somalia’s federal government.18

Continued violence underscores a stark reality – Al-Shabaab has no substantive plans to surrender arms and assimilate into mainstream society. Presumably, they remain convinced, more so after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021, that the federal government could be defeated through jihadist principles and guerilla warfare. Moreover, continued low-intensity but fatal targeted attacks have “frustrated” armed forces undertaking counter-insurgency campaigns.19 For example, in one of its most recent attacks, Al-Shabaab killed 4 AMISOM officers during a patrol, using twin IED blasts in Southern Somalia.20

On the other hand, in the eventuality of the AMISOM’s withdrawal, the empowerment of  national police and armed forces is crucial for avoiding an  Afghan-type fallout. Currently, there is an overwhelming dependence on regional forces to keep a modicum of peace and a worrying reliance on local militias to prevent the reversal of gains. This creates a further potential for instability as power brokers, such as local warlords, could transfer their allegiance to Al-Shabaab, should there emerge benefits in the potential newfound alliance.

India and the Somali turmoil

India has a growing interest in the stability of the African continent.  Somalia’s geostrategic significance, being positioned near the Gulf of Aden – one of the most vital trading routes worldwide, and thereby having an overarching bearing on the global supply chains – makes it all the more crucial for India to improve and build on its existing logistical and financial support, thereby ensuring the stability of the country. Its primary trading routes run through the Gulf of Aden, with the Ministry of Shipping estimating cumulative exports at US$ 60 billion and imports at US$ 50 billion.21

India has contributed US$1 million in 2021 to the AMISOM fund to enable it to continue its anti-terror activities further.22 The Indian Navy has also undertaken anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somalian Coast.

In June 2021, India and the European Union conducted their first joint naval exercise in the Gulf of Aden to ensure their navies “hone their war-fighting skills and their ability as an integrated force to promote peace, security, and stability in the maritime domain.”23

Conclusion

Challenges, such as weak infrastructure and ill-equipped armed forces, corruption, pandemic, and drought, have become intrinsic to Somalia, mutually reinforcing each other. Additionally, they have been exploited by terrorists to advance their Islamist cause. Nor has the country remained immune to arms trafficking fuelled by Yemen’s protracted war, which is responsible for exacerbating Somalia’s security crisis. Financial hardships, emanating from the pandemic, have also limited the federal government’s ability to pledge a hefty defence budget to eliminate terrorist threats as it attempts to balance its citizens’ socio-economic needs in an uncertain climate. On the other hand, AMISOM’s impending transition to ATMIS will introduce its own set of dilemmas. The AU’s announcement could embolden jihadists to intensify attacks, exploiting regional troops’ limited presence in the country. This would be the case as neighbouring countries seek to gradually sever ties with an insurgency of peripheral significance to focus on their domestic turbulence. 

Therefore, while re-evaluating counter-terrorism strategies to defeat al-Shabaab, the allied partners should carefully consider these factors’ role in sustaining the insurgency and address the security crisis – state and human security – accordingly. The failure to do that will have catastrophic results for the Somali people and the internationally-recognised government. Democracy’s survival is contingent on continued international and regional support to empower the national army genuinely. Otherwise, there will remain little or no difference between the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and an Islamist Somalia.

*Ms. Saman Ayesha Kidwai is a Research Analyst at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi.

Keywords: Terrorist
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