Prime Minister Narendra Modi is scheduled to visit Bangladesh on 6 -7 June 2015. This is his first visit to Bangladesh. Last year, after assuming office, Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj had made her first foreign visit to Dhaka. India’s relationship with Bangladesh has been one of its best success stories in the neighbourhood. Since 2007, there has been a positive engagement between the two countries. And after the Awami League assumed power in January 2009, the relationship has scaled a new height. Both countries have witnessed high level visits in the past six years. The previous NDA government led by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee had tried to forge close ties with Dhaka, going beyond India’s preference for particular regimes in the neighbourhood to establish a broad-based relationship. But the BNP regime, which was in power during 2001-06, spurned the offer due to ideological reasons.
Given this background, Prime Minister Modi’s visit is a continuation of India’s existing policy towards Bangladesh. Yet, there is a lot of expectation from the forthcoming Modi visit. Modi has already made his mark by not just pronouncing the ‘neighbour first’ policy but also taking it to its logical conclusion by visiting most of the neighbouring countries and placing the relationships with them high on his government’s foreign policy agenda.
After the successful passing of the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) in Parliament, when all members voted in its favour and none against, expectations have risen in Bangladesh about Modi’s ability to generate domestic consensus on contentious issues and deliver on his commitments. In spite of initial apprehensions expressed in certain quarters in Bangladesh, all political parties in that country have welcomed Modi’s rise to power and have expressed their hope for a robust bilateral relationship.
Several initiatives have fructified between the two countries. Under India’s USD 800 million credit line and USD 200 million grant, Bangladesh has sought to upgrade its railway infrastructure and purchased wagons apart from building the Bhairab and Titas railway bridges. Both countries have established grid connectivity and Bangladesh-India Friendship Power Company (Pvt.) Ltd, a joint venture between the two governments, is now in the process of setting up a 1320-MW coal based power project. There is a MoU on renewable energy and the two countries have established social sector cooperation in health, environment and fisheries. India is also funding small development projects.
To improve border management and address border related incidents the two countries have revived interaction between the district magistrates or collectors of the border-districts who are now meeting regularly. In May 2015, a meeting took place between the Commerce Secretaries of the two countries to improve the quality of border infrastructure. India has already established a Land Customs Station (LCS) at Akhaura in Tripura, and similar initiatives are underway in Dawki and Petrapole. Several steps have also been taken under the BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal) framework to develop connectivity and facilitate electricity trade.
However, keeping in mind the high expectations in Bangladesh from Modi’s visit, the following measures may be taken into consideration:
While it is important to strengthen India’s relationship with Bangladesh and take the relationship to a higher level, the Prime Minister need not be encumbered by the existing ideological and political divide in Bangladesh and should meet leaders of all the main political parties including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). It is true that the Awami League government has played an active role in transforming the nature of the bilateral relationship. However, in the true spirit of a democracy, Modi should reach out to leaders of all major political parties and convince them of India’s intention to work as a partner in progress and development. This would generate popular goodwill and establish an across-the-board political relationship with a country that is vital to India both in bilateral and regional contexts.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India