The strategic outlook of the political, bureaucratic and military elites in Pakistan was shaped by historical exigencies, geopolitical location, Pakistan's self-perception, and its Islamic credentials. Pakistan's military-dominated leadership formulated strategies towards regional and extra-regional powers based on its threat perceptions. The strategies adopted have not necessarily resulted in fully achieving the objectives for which they were formulated.
India has announced ambitious plans to expand its nuclear energy programme nearly 15 fold in the next 20 years, from the current 4,500 MWe to about 62,000 MWe by 2032. By 2020, India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) plans to install 20,000 MWe of nuclear power generation capacity (the fifth largest in the world). The department has plans beyond 2030 too. According to these plans India will have the capacity to produce 275 GWe (Giga Watt of electricity) of nuclear power by the year 2052.
The Andaman and Nicobar islands are of immense strategic significance for India. The geographical configuration and the location of the island chain in the Bay of Bengal safeguards India's eastern seaboard as well the approaches to the Indian Ocean from the east. Its proximity to the Southeast Asian region enables India to forge friendly relations with its Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) neighbours. The physical isolation and remoteness of the archipelago, however, make it vulnerable to conventional and non-conventional threats.
Rampant piracy off the Somalia coast has brought the strife-ridden country back into attention. Economic hardship, and a deep resentment and anger against foreign exploitation of Somalia's maritime resources, have inspired the pirates to declare themselves 'coast guards of Somalia'. However, the growing attacks by the pirates have had an adverse impact on global commercial shipping. The international community has responded to this predicament by massive naval deployments in the Gulf of Aden.
The responses to the arguments that I forwarded in my initial essay, ‘China in SAARC? To What Effect?’, have introduced interesting dimensions to this debate. While most of the respondents have agreed with my proposition that it is premature to think about China's entry into the South Asian regionalist project and that it would introduce complex challenges that would be difficult to manage, they disagree with some of the reasons that I have cited.
The rising economic and political profile of India is making it to search for a new pattern of interaction with global forces. India's unique relationship with export controls is passing through a new and positive phase. In recent years, India is trying to integrate itself fast with global best practices for export controls. However, it is facing roadblocks in its integration with the existing system.
Is democracy a criterion for the membership of SAARC? It is not. One should not forget that it was General Zia ur Rahman, president of Bangladesh, who had initiated regional cooperation as a part of his strategy to diversify Bangladesh's Indo-centric foreign policy after Sheikh Mujib's assassination. The grouping in the beginning had two monarchs from Nepal and Bhutan, two military dictators from Pakistan and Bangladesh, and one authoritarian ruler from the Maldives, apart from India and Sri Lanka which were democracies as member countries.
