Strategic Analysis

This article examines the EU weapons embargo on China as a major foreign policy challenge that China’s new leadership has inherited. The article argues that the continuation of the embargo constitutes a failure of Chinese foreign policy to project China as a responsible global player. The article examines the legal framework and the political debate within the EU to emphasise that the embargo has been largely ineffective in its objective of denying advanced military technology to China.

• Sonika Gupta
• September 2013 |
• Strategic Analysis
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The United States dominates global defence markets, but the nature of this dominance is shifting. Strategic and budgetary considerations—the latter being constantly restructured by the rising relative cost of defence labour—drive US defence production towards international collaboration. In this essay, I examine the politics of a high-calibre international collaborative programme that has made headlines in recent years: the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). What motivated the US government to take on partners, and what influence, if any, have the partners had on the programme so far?

• Srdjan Vucetic
• September 2013 |
• Strategic Analysis
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Although the nature of warfare has changed beyond recognition since the 1920s and 1930s when Chairman Mao Zedong penned his main military writings, his military thoughts are still a point of reference for any discussion on military thinking in modern China. Developments in warfare have superseded Mao’s operational principles and tactics visualised in his three-stage warfare; however, his philosophical and political understanding of war has value that transcends time and space.

• Prashant Kumar Singh
• September 2013 |
• Strategic Analysis
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Over the past few years, ‘trilateral economic cooperation’ and ‘vibrant bridge’ have become buzzwords in Nepal’s foreign policy discourse, and have also caught the popular imagination at home in India. These proposals have generated both curiosity and anxiety in Delhi’s diplomatic and academic circles that are otherwise largely indifferent to Nepal. The Chinese diplomats in Delhi also raising the issue with the Indian officials has added to India’s anxiety all the more. With some notable exceptions (e.g., C.

• Post Bahadur Basnet
• September 2013 |
• Strategic Analysis
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Two new factors have appeared on the Tibetan political scene after the recent leadership change in China. First, the ‘spiritualisation’ of politics: paradoxically, the atheist Chinese Communist Party (CCP), also known as The Communist Party of China (CPC) seems increasingly interested in ‘spiritual’ matters. The CCP has started promoting reincarnated Lamas, known in China as ‘Living Buddhas’, in a big way. The purpose is to prepare for the post-Dalai Lama era. The second new development is the emergence of a ‘Tibet Gang’.

• Claude Arpi
• September 2013 |
• Strategic Analysis
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Integrating the restive Tibetan minority with China has been the primary domestic challenge for Beijing. Thus far, its Nepal policy has been crafted essentially to address the Tibetan question. The idea of trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China apparently floated by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) in April 2013 was, in effect, first made by the former Chinese ambassador to Nepal, Yang Houlan, in 2012.

• Abanti Bhattacharya
• September 2013 |
• Strategic Analysis
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In more than three decades, ever since the Islamic-oriented National Order Party was formed in 1969, Turkish politics has been analysed by many in terms of two straitjacketed views: Islamists trying to capture power on the one hand, and on the other hand the secularists or the state elite, with the help of the military, struggling to keep the country’s political orientation towards the West to protect Turkey as a secular state. This image of Turkey has created some confusion among strategic analysts abroad in understanding Turkey and its policies.

• Mehmet Ozkan
• September 2013 |
• Strategic Analysis
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Trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China needs to be seen from the perspective of how beneficial it is for all three countries. However, such cooperation cannot be divorced from India’s security concerns and its close relations with Nepal. Moreover, there are several issues that come into question, too. Are there any objectives behind this proposal? Does it involve only developmental cooperation? Does it undermine India’s security interests?

• Smruti S. Pattanaik
• September 2013 |
• Strategic Analysis
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INS Sudarshini, India’s Sail Training Ship (STS), was sent on a commemorative expedition to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries for six months along the monsoon trade winds route to trace India’s civilisational and cultural affinities and rejuvenate trade and maritime linkages with its neighbours in the East. The voyage was part of the commemoration of the successful completion of two decades of India’s Look East Policy, 20 years of dialogue relations with ASEAN, and 10 years of India–ASEAN summit-level partnership.

• Rahul Mishra
• September 2013 |
• Strategic Analysis
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Prachanda’s proposal for trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China seems reasonable on the face of it. However, both China and Nepal should be aware that it will create a lot of misunderstandings in India. The reasons for this are as follows:

• Arvind Gupta
• September 2013 |
• Strategic Analysis
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