When the Cold War ended in 1989, many hoped that the emerging new world order would usher in an era of peace. A large number of nations sought to decrease their defence spending hoping to reap the so-called ‘peace dividend’. Many thought and wistfully hoped that the new era would be more permeable for an enlargement of the Western model of liberal political order. Francis Fukuyama, even argued that in the battle for ideas, liberal democracy has come out victoriously and has set out to conquer the dark world of authoritarianism and communism.
A new great game is under way in Myanmar. The huge offshore gas findings stretching from the borders of Bangladesh down to Thailand have resulted in a flurry of diplomatic manoeuvring with China, Thailand and other ASEAN countries as well as United States, India, the European Union, Australia and Russia all playing key roles. The equations are bound to change and many countries, for fear of losing influence with Yangon, are seeking a more 'pragmatic' approach.
The 'rise of China' discourse articulates the transformation of China's internal structure and growth of its comprehensive national strength. From a Chinese perspective, the 'rise of China' and 'peaceful development' are concurrent themes that express and blend with the twin trends of globalisation and multipolarisation. This article argues that by adhering to the processes of 'multilateralism' and promoting 'commercial diplomacy', China has consciously made efforts to improve its international image.
This paper explores the paradox of US policy on dual-use technology cooperation with China in the face of resistance from a strong section of the security establishment. The paper examines the factors contributing to the current level of dual-use technology business between the two countries. It finds that the US Cold War grand strategy of co-opting China by dividing the socialist bloc has resulted in embedded commercial interests that have been further bolstered by the strategic need for ties with China.
The magnitude of the threat from climate change is starting to be realized by the world's political leaders. A positive aspect of such a threat is that it could unite the world behind a common purpose, but this will require a drastic change in policy, primarily in the United States and the growth countries in Asia. This article argues that India and China could turn the threat from climate change into a political advantage by adopting a new development strategy, based on a demand for full access to all such technologies that may allow to quickly surpass from the dirty stage of development.
Russia's evolving 'energy ideology' and its approach to defining its role in the global energy markets with the particular focus on the interests in and intentions for Asia have drawn considerable attention. Russia's claim for the role of 'global energy security provider', advanced with much aplomb in the context of the G8 chairmanship, is, however, undermined by the stagnation in the oil and gas production and increasing shortages of electricity.
China's dependence on ship-borne energy resources forms the bedrock of its energy security. Critical to this is the issue of sea lane of communications (SLOCs) safety. SLOC safety is at once a non-conventional security challenge and a military one, which may trigger maritime conflicts. The difficulty in dealing with this challenge is that it is integral to geopolitics and hence subject to complicated major power relations. Geo-strategic politics will increasingly determine Beijing's SLOC policy of political cooperation and military hedging.
Mutual anxiety will dictate relations between Beijing and Washington over energy and related geo-strategic matters. There is little doubt that the United States cannot tolerate obstruction, real or perceived, to its access to sufficient volumes of foreign oil, now or in the future. Also, particularly between now and the 2008 Olympics Games in Beijing, China will find it a paramount imperative not to suffer from a major reduction in or deliberate disruption to its foreign energy supply.
The central thesis of this article is that the Asian energy consumers would serve their interests well if they look again at their energy frontiers and define them within the contours of Asian energy interdependence rather than triggering an Asian energy race. The three leading Asian consumers, China, Japan and India, are principal actors in the Asian theatre, and their needs, assessments and policies are going to be central in defining the regional energy security agenda. Their current approaches have placed them more as competitors, which could trigger conflict situations.
