Mr. Mohanasakthivel J., Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) made a presentation on “Ethiopia’s Maritime Aspirations and Regional Implications” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 29 April 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Abhishek Mishra, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA and the scholars of MP-IDSA attended and enriched the discussions.

Executive Summary

Tensions in the already volatile Horn of Africa have increased as a result of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Somaliland signed on 1st January 2024 that grants landlocked Ethiopia access to the Red Sea. Any international recognition of Somaliland is interpreted by Somalia as an affront to its sovereignty, because Somalia considers the autonomous region of Somaliland as an integral part of its territory. Consequently, Somalia rejected the Agreement and demanded that it be terminated. This declaration comes at a critical moment when attacks against commercial shipping by Houthi rebels in the Red Sea have increased, which has subsequently caused a severe reduction in marine traffic and commerce in the region. The Agreement is expected to impact Somalia’s bilateral relations with Ethiopia and neighbouring Somaliland, but also the Horn of Africa region as a whole. Regional organisations such as the African Union, Arab League, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have expressed concerns about the Agreement and the possibility of escalating tensions and regional instability. 

Detailed Report

In his introductory remarks, Dr. Abhishek Mishra underlined that the Horn of Africa is on the verge of rising geopolitical tensions and realignment with a number of deals like the Ethiopia and Somaliland deal and the Somalia and Turkiye Agreement taking shape. Mr. Mohanasakthivel J. commenced his presentation by mentioning Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s address to the Ethiopian Parliament in October 2023 on Ethiopia’s marine access. 

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed proclaimed that the Red Sea was Ethiopia’s “natural boundary” and that its people could not live in a “geographic prison.” He underlined the existential issues linked with access to the Red Sea region, which is becoming increasingly volatile and unpredictable, attracting more actors from far and near due to its strategic economic and political importance. Thus, the Speaker highlighted that being landlocked poses a risk to Ethiopia, as it relies on other littoral states for marine access, protecting its interests, and defending against any national security danger emanating from the Red Sea. Within a week after PM Ahmed’s speech, the Ethiopian Ministry of Peace issued an outline statement, declaring that Ethiopia will take all necessary steps to safeguard port access. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister agreed with protecting port access peacefully but cautioned that force may be used if required. 

Subsequently, on 1 January 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), giving Addis Ababa direct access to the Gulf of Aden. This strategic Agreement cleared the way for Ethiopia to construct commercial and military sites along the coastline. Under this arrangement, Somaliland has leased to Ethiopia 20 kilometres of its coastal land for 50 years. Ethiopia has agreed to provide Somaliland an interest in one of its profitable state-owned firms, Ethiopian Airlines. It is also considering recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. However, neighbouring coastal governments of Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea, have raised concerns regarding the Agreement. 

The Speaker highlighted the history of Ethiopia’s maritime quest by mentioning that since Eritrea’s 1993 secession from Ethiopia, the latter has remained landlocked, thereby putting an end to the Ethiopian Navy which was started in 1950’s. At first, Ethiopia was compelled to transfer its maritime resources to ports in Yemen. However, Ethiopia’s naval presence was completely disbanded by the mid-1990s due to its eventual ejection from Yemen and failure to uphold its leasing Agreement in Djibouti. 

Ethiopia remains reliant on the stability of its coastal neighbours due to a lack of its direct access to the sea. Since then, it has attempted a variety of methods to secure access to the ocean. It entered into an Agreement with Djibouti in 2002. As a result, over 95 per cent of its import-export traffic now passes through Djibouti’s port via the Addis-Djibouti corridor. Ethiopia also purchased a 19 per cent share in Somaliland’s Berbera Port in 2018 as a means of diversifying its maritime access points.

Mr. Mohanasakthivel J. emphasised on the importance of ports for Ethiopia, stating that Ethiopia’s trade is strongly dependent on access to ports for international commerce. This is owing to the bordering countries’ insufficient capacity to absorb Ethiopian goods. Despite having several potential ports, logistical obstacles prevent their use. In his overview of potential ports for Ethiopia, he mentioned the Ports of Sudan, Djibouti, and Tadjourah, Eritrea’s Massawa and Assab, Somaliland’s Berbera, Somalia’s Mogadishu and Kismayo, and Kenya’s Mombasa and Lamu. 

Ethiopia relies on the Port of Djibouti for 95 per cent of its foreign trade, with the Ports of Berbera and Sudan accounting for the remaining 5 per cent. Ethiopia’s principal economic channel has been the Red Sea port of Djibouti, giving Djibouti a virtual monopoly on Ethiopian trade. However, Djibouti costs Ethiopia over a billion dollars in port fees each year. This is a large sum considering that over one-fifth out of Ethiopia’s 120 million population relies on food aid. 

With respect to Somalia, the Speaker noted that the arrangement will have an impact on the dynamics of the country’s relations with its two neighbours – Ethiopia and Somaliland, with whom it has a history of intra-regional disputes and conflicts. The Somali Government asserts that Somaliland is an autonomous state within Somalia, and that only the Somali Government has the authority to lease its land to foreign forces. 

Somalia considers the Agreement to be an infringement of its sovereignty, and in reaction it has expelled the Ethiopian Ambassador and recalled its Ambassador from Ethiopia. The Somali Administration also insists that there is no intention of negotiation with Ethiopia and has threatened serious escalation if Ethiopia proceeds with the Agreement. However, a clash between Ethiopia and Somalia seems unlikely. 

While discussing regional dynamics, the Speaker mentioned that Egypt has been critical of the transaction as an obvious infringement of Somalia’s sovereignty. President Sisi emphasised that Egypt stands shoulder to shoulder with Somalia and has urged Ethiopia to seek benefits from seaports in Somalia and Djibouti through transitional measures rather than attempting to control another country’s territory. Egypt’s objection to Ethiopia’s deal with Somaliland is partly affected by its ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile River.

Furthermore, if this Agreement is implemented, Djibouti will experience a decrease in commercial transit as well as a loss of Ethiopian annual fees, as revenues from ports and foreign military bases are Djibouti’s principal source of income. Djibouti’s port handles more than 95 percent of Ethiopia’s trade, contributing to about 75 per cent to its GDP. Djibouti is dissatisfied with the fact that Somaliland has become Ethiopia’s preferred maritime and commercial partner. 

With regard to Eritrea, the Speaker mentioned that no other country felt the threat as much as the Eritreans did as both countries have a history of hostility. In 1998, both the countries went to war, which ended in 2000 with the signing of the Algiers Agreement. Nevertheless, tensions developed, as Ethiopia refused to abide by the Agreement, which required Ethiopia to cede territory to Eritrea.

Between 2002 to 2018, both countries were in a state of no conflict or peace. Eventually, Abiy Ahmed and Isaias Afwerki met in 2018, this signified the end of the state of war, resuming diplomatic ties, trade, and travel between the two states. However, cooperation deteriorated as unsolved issues and antagonism persisted. 

Ethiopia’s loss of the Red Sea coast to Eritrea fuels fear of encirclement by Arab powers as the Arab League members, including Egypt, Djibouti, and Sudan, control key ports. Potential Arab attacks from the Red Sea ports have seemed to heighten Ethiopia’s security concerns. Moreover, Ethiopia has been consistently denied an observer status by the Council of Arab and African Littoral States of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Since all the coastal countries have denied Ethiopia access to sea, the Speaker noted that the littoral states must develop a regional mechanism for the Red Sea rather than relying on their Arab neighbours, who may exploit the current rift. Although the Maritime Treaty may include certain concessions in favour of Ethiopia, the littoral states are unlikely to be interested in providing a naval base other than Somaliland.

It is worth noting that Ethiopia is the security guarantee for Somaliland, although it is yet to recognise Somaliland since the Agreement was signed. Formal recognition could strengthen the UAE’s relationship with Somaliland, potentially leading to increased investments and development projects in the region. Recognition by Ethiopia, Kenya, and the UAE may persuade other countries to consider Somaliland as a state. 

Lastly, the Speaker stated that there is no possibility of war in the near future because Ethiopia had lost many of its officers during the Tigray Battle. The country’s military is thinly scattered and faces numerous obstacles, particularly in the Amhara and Oromia areas. Its economy is still struggling to recover from a civil war in the northern Tigray region that ended in 2022. Moreover, it is facing a severe foreign-currency shortage.

Questions and Comments

Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy, congratulated Mr. Mohanasakthivel J. for providing a detailed picture of regional dynamics in the Horn of Africa, focusing on Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions. He stated that, in theory, landlocked countries have the right to reach the sea under Article 126, Clause 10. However, this must be negotiated and transit states must be confident in their own security. As a result, the issue boils down to negotiating with neighbouring countries. Amb. Chinoy inquired about India’s stance on the port, considering that the Agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland has significant complications. 

Dr. Deepika Saraswat,observed that the UAE plays an important role in the changing dynamics of the region.

Cmde. Abhay Singh explained the intricacies of the UNCLOS with respect to the status of the landlocked states and transit rights. In addition to that he further explained that Djibouti’s economic reliance on Ethiopia is 75% of its GDP.

Dr. Abhishek Mishra inquired about the international response to the port arrangement. He further enquired about the position of Somalia and the Arab Council on the Agreement. He also inquired how the citizens of both Somalia and Somaliland have reacted to the port arrangement. 

Mr. Mohanasakhtivel J. provided insightful answers to the questions and comments raised by the Director General and the MP-IDSA scholars.

The report was prepared by Ms. Anusha Khurana, Intern, ALACUN Centre, MP-IDSA.