Dr. R. Vignesh, Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on “Maritime Dimensions of the Ukraine War” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 11 September 2023 at 1000h in Seminar Hall I. Cmde. Abhay Kumar Singh (Retd.), Research Fellow, MP-IDSA, moderated the Session. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA, and scholars of the Institute attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

At the beginning of the war, the Russian Navy played a critical role in turning the tables in favour of Moscow. As the war progressed, the application and role of naval power became peripheral. The Ukrainian Navy was always inferior in front of the Russian side. It was always a mosquito fleet. Despite superiority, the Russian Navy has not been able to make any difference in the outcomes of the land battle. The war planners in the Kremlin did not envisage a clear role for its navy before initiating their special military operation. Ambiguity in Russia’s War objective resulted in its Navy’s failure to make optimum use of available assets. Despite suffering considerable losses Russia continues to dominate the critical Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOC) in the Black Sea. The maritime theatre of this war will have a lasting influence on the history of naval warfare.

Detailed Report

Cmde. Abhay Kumar Singh (Retd.) commenced the meeting by offering insights about the Ukraine War. He stated that the navy’s role in the short war is difficult to discern. But when the war is prolonged, the role of naval power can make a decisive difference to the result of the war. However, the Ukraine War is an exception to this proposition. At the beginning of the war, the Russian Navy played a critical role in turning the tables in favour of Moscow. As the war progressed, the application and role of the naval power became peripheral. The Ukrainian Navy was always inferior in front of the Russian side. It was always a mosquito fleet. Despite superiority, the Russian Navy has not been able to make any difference in the outcomes of the land battle. With these initial comments, Cmde. Singh (Retd.) called upon Dr. Vignesh to speak on the subject.

Dr. Vignesh began his presentation by introducing the strategic geography of the Black Sea to the audience. He said that the maritime theatre of this War was confined to the Black Sea. The Black Sea is a large enclosed sea which can be accessed through the straits of Marmara and Bosporus, both of which are located within the sovereign territory of Turkey. He mentioned the Montreux Convention, of 1936, which governs the maritime traffic passing through these straits. Further, he briefly spoke of the Russian sense of glory vis-à-vis Crimea and Sevastopol, and the Russian threat perception about North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) presence in the Black Sea.

The Speaker spelt out that enclosed geography and restricted access to the maritime theatre as the main reasons behind the limited scope of application of Sea Power by Russia. Further, the role of Turkey in closing the Straits of Marmara and Bosphorus; the restrictions imposed by the Montreux Convention prohibiting warships above 15,000 tonnes from transiting through the Turkish Straits; shallowness of waters and the narrow passage of the Turkish Straits were additional factors behind limited use of the Russian Navy. Dr. Vignesh brought out the asymmetry between Russian and Ukrainian Navies and the historical reasons behind the same. According to the Speaker, the roots of this naval asymmetry lies in the 1997 Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet. The Ukrainian Fleet was only sufficient for promoting good order at sea rather than fighting conventional wars.

After 2014, the US and NATO became actively involved in rebuilding the capabilities of the Ukrainian Navy which marked the Ukrainian Navy’s transition from Soviet Naval Philosophy to that of the West. As a result of which Ukraine’s Naval Strategy, 2018, identified the Mosquito Fleet Strategy as the most realistic and cost-effective solution for countering Russian naval supremacy. The term Mosquito Fleet is used to describe a naval fleet consisting predominately of small, fast and cheap platforms. Such fleets are often raised by lesser naval forces to deny command of the sea to a superior naval power through the use of asymmetrical tactics.

Dr. Vignesh called attention to the importance of Snake Island in the Russia-Ukraine War saga. Alluding to the developments throughout the war, he explained how Russians took over Snake Island from Ukraine but could not hold on to it in the ensuing months. The retaking of Snake Island was a tactical victory for Ukraine as it diminished Russia’s ability to dominate the North-Western part of the Black Sea. Furthermore, the Speaker touched upon amphibious operations by Russia against Ukraine. He explained how amphibious landings near Mariupol from the Sea of Azov played a crucial role in the capturing of Mariupol by Moscow. However, Russia did not carry out similar amphibious landings in Odesa due to several reasons including inadequate amphibious lift capability of the Russian Navy, challenges in maintaining air superiority over beachheads, logistical issues arising due to the distance between Crimean ports and Odesa, rough weather and sea conditions of the Black Sea and lack of Landing Sites due to terrain of Odesa’s Coast.

Dr. Vignesh claimed that the sinking of the Russian warship Moskva, the flagship of the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet, was not only a pivotal event in the Ukraine War but also in the history of naval warfare because it is the largest warship to be sunk since the sinking of an Argentine cruiser by the Royal Navy during the 1982 Falkland Wars. The sinking of Moskva was a major blow to the Russian Navy as the Black Sea Fleet lost its protective air cover and became more vulnerable to aerial attacks from the Ukrainian coasts. As a result, the Russian warships were forced to operate further away from the Ukrainian Coasts. The Speaker, also, mentioned Ukrainian Uncrewed Surface Vessel (USV) attacks against Russian naval targets. Although these attacks had not yet inflicted any major damage, they effectively challenged the Russian Warship’s ability to operate freely in the region. Touching briefly upon the attacks on the Crimean Bridge and the Black Sea Grain Initiative, Dr. Vignesh inferred that the war planners in the Kremlin did not envisage a clear role for its navy before initiating their special military operation. Ambiguity in Russia’s War objective resulted in its Navy’s failure to make optimum use of available assets.

Talking about Ukrainian naval operations, the Speaker claimed that the Ukrainian Navy’s primary objectives had been to restrict the Russian Navy’s operations at the farthest from its coasts. They effectively used USVs, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and Coastal defence missiles as a part of the Mosquito Fleet Strategy. In the forthcoming days, the Ukrainian Navy would attempt to severe Russia’s connectivity with the Crimean Peninsula. While concluding, Dr. Vignesh said that despite suffering considerable losses Russia continues to dominate the critical SLOCs in the Black Sea. The maritime theatre of this war will have a lasting influence on the history of naval warfare.

Question and Answer Session

Ambassador Chinoy observed that the Ukrainian Mosquito Fleet Strategy can be of help to countries like North Korea and Iran. Thus, there will be lessons drawn by these countries rather than naval historians. Further, Ambassador Chinoy raised the point of use of naval assets in the Black Sea when the enclosed space can be easily covered by shore-based air power, shore-based batteries, or the USVs/UAVs launched from the land. He said that the control of the Black Sea by Russians would give them leverage to open a new front on the southern flanks of Ukraine. Additionally, the naval battle in the Black Sea did not seem decisive but it was hurting the food security of the world, especially Africa.

Dr. Vignesh said that Russia not conducting the amphibious operations was a missed opportunity. Commenting on some of the issues raised during the discussion, Cmde. Singh (Retd.) asserted that naval ships provide persistent air defence cover potently. Thus, even if, shore-based air cover is effectively employed in an operation, one needs capable ships to provide an air-defence umbrella. One should use a shore-based air defence system in combination with the air defence by the naval assets. Further, Cmde. Singh (Retd.) observed that Russia agreed to the Black Sea Grain Initiative because Moscow wanted to trade their products and did not possess the ability to completely blockade the Ukrainian shipments through the Black Sea.

Report prepared by Mr. Niranjan Chandrashekhar Oak, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA.