Mr. Vishal Chandra, Research Fellow, South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA, spoke on ‘India’s Engagement With Taliban-ruled Afghanistan: Three Years On’ at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 9 September 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Priyanka Singh, Associate Fellow, South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA. MP-IDSA scholars attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

India’s approach towards Afghanistan has evolved pragmatically in response to shifting power dynamics in the country over the past decades. India’s commitment to developmental projects and humanitarian assistance has remained consistent, and its people-centric approach continues to foster ties with Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic groups. These long-lasting ties with the Afghan people have endured, with India adapting to another power shift in Kabul in August 2021. Looking ahead, India needs to broaden its engagement, recognising that Afghanistan will remain a critical cog in the broader interplay of geopolitics and geoeconomics around it.

Detailed Report

The session began with moderator Dr. Priyanka Singh highlighting India’s historically fraught relationship with the Taliban, notably influenced by the execution of President Najibullah, who was an ally of India, in 1996, and the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC–814 in 1999. India had aligned itself with the Northern Alliance, opposing the Pakistan-backed Taliban’s rise to power in the late 1990s. Dr. Singh stated that these events, among others, have shaped India’s cautious approach towards engaging with the Taliban-led interim government. Over the past two years, diplomatic engagements with the Taliban have occurred, signalling that India is open to dialogue while ensuring that its national interests are safeguarded.

Mr. Vishal Chandra’s presentation revolved around India’s evolving approach towards a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan over the past three years. His presentation highlighted India’s continued humanitarian outreach and assistance to the people of Afghanistan; reflected upon the security landscape of Afghanistan, the state of India’s relations with an Islamist Kabul, and the level of bilateral trade; and India’s approach moving forward. The Speaker, Mr. Chandra, began his presentation by quoting Prime Minister Narendra Modi from his address delivered at the inauguration of the India-constructed Afghan Parliament building in Kabul in December 2015, where he emphasised the centuries-old ‘timeless relations’ between the peoples of the two countries. Mr. Chandra was of the opinion that the Prime Minister’s speech aptly captured the spirit of what is termed as “Indo-Afghan”. Elaborating on the point, he stated that “Indo-Afghan” is a much broader historical dynamic, and has its momentum, than the formal state-to-state “India–Afghanistan” relations. It has long guided India’s people-centric approach towards Afghanistan, particularly in times of political uncertainty and instability in the country, and is well-reflected in India’s current policy pronouncements.   

Reflecting upon the state of relations with Kabul, Mr. Chandra noted that the Taliban regime has variously signalled its interest in building ties with New Delhi. A working understanding of sorts on non-interference and non-threat appears to have been attempted over the past two years. He also referred to visits by Indian delegations to Kabul in June 2022 and March 2024, and the deployment of officials and staff at the Indian mission in Kabul in June 2022 to coordinate the delivery of much-needed humanitarian aid and assistance to the Afghan people. He referred to the people of Afghanistan as India’s longest-standing partner in the country.

On the changed security landscape in Afghanistan, Mr. Chandra remarked that from Herat in the west to Peshawar in the east, one finds only Pashtun Sunni Islamist groups—the Afghan Taliban; Haqqani network (both as a distinct entity and as part of the Taliban ‘emirate’); the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), mainly comprising of former elements from Pakistani and Afghan Taliban; and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or the Pakistani Taliban—collaborating, competing and warring to establish their power dominance and ideological hold in the region. He further noted that the underlying interlinkages, and convergences and divergences among them and their global and regional affiliates, point to a complex maze of resurgent Sunni Jihadist entities seeking to dominate and transform the social and political landscape in the region.

Mr. Chandra highlighted India’s pragmatic approach to Afghanistan, adapting to shifts in power and priorities. He pointed out the faultlines within the Taliban and their so-called ‘emirate’, which is marked by competing power centres. The Taliban chief, Hibatullah Akhundzada, governs from Kandahar, where there is an extreme concentration of power, while the Haqqani Network holds sway in Kabul. Additionally, prominent figures like Sirajuddin Haqqani (acting Taliban interior minister and leader of the Haqqani Network) and Mullah Yaqoob (acting Taliban defence minister and son of founder chief Mullah Omar) have questioned some of Akhundzada’s governing policies and decisions, including the restrictions imposed on girls’ education. Mr. Chandra informed that the Taliban have allowed women to work in select sectors, particularly health and education. However, it cannot be regarded as a major policy shift, for the Taliban had allowed women to work in these sectors earlier during their first regime in the late 1990s.

Mr. Chandra underscored India’s broad-based role in Afghanistan, spanning two decades of developmental projects and aid delivery. He informed that between 2002 and 2021, India committed USD 3 billion in aid and assistance, making India the largest regional development partner of Afghanistan. India’s reconstruction assistance was multi-sectoral: education, health services, transportation, telecommunications, civil aviation, agriculture, irrigation, power generation & transmission, industry, and rural development. After the power shift in Kabul in August 2021, India quickly resumed humanitarian aid and relief assistance, dispatching 50,000 metric tonnes of wheat, 50 tonnes of essential medicine, and 28 tonnes of disaster relief assistance. India has also supplied 1100 units of female hygiene kits for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime female rehabilitation centres in Afghanistan.

Mr. Chandra added that India continued to annually allocate a budget of Rs. 200 crore for ‘Aid to Afghanistan’ through the financial years 2022–23, 2023–24, and 2024-25. The annual trade between the two countries stood at USD 889.85 million in 2022–23 and USD 997.74 million in 2023–24. As per the World Bank’s latest data, India remains the second-largest export market for Afghan products.

He further informed that educational ties continue through initiatives like the 1,000 online annual scholarships for Afghan students in undergraduate and postgraduate courses offered by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations. The New Delhi-based South Asian University, through a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation initiative, continues to give admission and provide scholarships to Afghan students in postgraduate and doctoral courses.

In his concluding observations, Mr. Chandra stated that India must step up its people-centric engagement with Afghanistan to deal with the long-term impact of the changed political and security landscape in the country. He also highlighted the fact that none of India’s projects or diplomatic properties were harmed by the Taliban, underscoring the Taliban’s intent to normalise relations with New Delhi. He argued that the Taliban regime may not come across as a relatable entity or authority, but an independent Taliban is preferable to one exiled and under Pakistan’s tutelage. He noted that India’s development assistance and capacity building programmes facilitated engagement with Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic groups, including Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Pashtuns. This outreach helped counter anti-India propaganda by certain state and non-state actors. India needs to constantly monitor and assess the evolving ground situation in Afghanistan.

Looking ahead, Mr. Chandra argued that if the engagement is to expand, then developments in Afghanistan will have to be viewed in its social-political context, which has been upended multiple times over the past five decades, to better deal with its layered complexities.

Questions and Comments

The presentation was followed by comments and questions from the floor, focussing on India’s national interests in Afghanistan; prospects of Indian investment in Afghanistan’s mineral resources and access to Afghan and Central Asian markets; and Taliban’s regional diplomacy. The approach of Central Asian Republics, particularly that of Tajikistan, and China’s growing engagement with the Taliban regime were also discussed.

The Speaker, Mr. Chandra, responded to the questions and comments from the MP-IDSA scholars.

Report prepared by Ms Puspa Kumari, Intern, South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.