Shruti Pandalai

India’s NSG Bid: Let’s Set the Record Straight

Membership in the NSG is essential to safeguard future Indian interests in nuclear commerce, even if it is not a necessary condition for India to engage in nuclear exports.

• Published: July 06, 2016
• Issue Brief

ISIS in India: The Writing on the (Facebook) Wall

It was a small blip on television news screens at the end of April. Reports of the death of Mohammad Shafi Armar, the head recruiter of the Islamic State (IS) in India, in a U.S. drone strike in Syria, got buried in the din of India’s domestic news. No surprise, considering parliament is in an uproar over scandals and the heated state election season is in full swing. All is business as usual — until, God forbid, India is hurt by another heinous terror attack.

The death of the Islamic State’s head recruiter in India is worth more than a news flash.The ISIS flag has been waving for over two years now. The Indian government too, after the 2015 Paris attacks, has moved beyond the rhetoric of ISIS as a distant problem.The spate of arrests of Indian sympathizers this year alone has proved that ‘Brand ISIS’ has found its foothold in India. The threat is manifold because the Islamic State is winning supporters via social media, the most potent weapon in their arsenal. With the IAMAI-IMRB numbers pegging social media users in India at 143 million, and a 100 percent jump in users in rural India from 2014 to 2015, the Indian audience is ripe for the picking.

According to media reports, Shafi, the Islamic State’s chief recruiter in India before being killed in a drone strike, was close to ISIS chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Intelligence agencies believe that Shafi was putting together an ISIS unit in every Indian state. He had reportedly recruited 30 youngsters and was in touch with 600-700 potential recruits via Facebook, Whatsapp, and other social media platforms. In fact, Muddabir Sheikh, the ISIS recruiter arrested by the National Investigative Agency during its countrywide raids, was radicalized by Shafi, who promised a promotion and additional money for Indian operations if Sheikh successfully carried out his first assignment. Sheikh reportedly had been unemployed since October 2015 and spent most of his time on the internet, combing through ISIS propaganda.

Indian authorities are clearly concerned with ISIS recruitment via social media. A Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) advisory released after the Paris attacks reiterated the Islamic States’ “success of online radicalization of youth (…) and the possibility of piggybacking on terror groups operating in India, opened up the possibility of IS-sponsored terrorist action on Indian territory.” As of December 2015, close to 150 Indian youth from the south were under surveillance for their alleged sympathies toward IS, apart from 30 odd preventive arrests of Indians seeking to join ISIS in the Middle East. These concerns led the MHA to announce in December that it is examining the feasibility of a multi-agency 24/7 Social Media Analysis Center to monitor online recruitment.

While these efforts, supplemented by the center’s de-radicalization program, are steps in the right direction, they face the mighty challenge of scale — both the target audience and the amount of ISIS propaganda online.

Terror: now armed with a tweet

Gone are the days of Osama bin Laden-style long sermons; ISIS has mastered the art of selling terror and ideology instantly. Social media is a tool so powerful and untamed that counter narratives just can’t seem to keep up. Today the group’s “lone wolfs,” armed with smart phones, run “DIY Terror forums,” virtually scouting for recruits across the globe. The growing number of foreign fighters in Islamic State are proof that its gruesome propaganda has an audience. Many in India may not know much about ISIS ideology or the rank and file, but most would have heard of “Jihadi John,” the now deceased British Arab, would became infamous for beheading ISIS captives in the group’s propaganda videos, which were viewed millions of times across the globe.

ISIS has made brutality fashionable by exploiting the medium. YouTube videos edited in fancy Hollywood-esque sequences show jihadis as regular Joes, interested in sports and movies — while unflinchingly posing with the decapitated heads of victims who went against ISIS decrees. These videos use gaming language, graphics, and effects coupled with trending hashtags, to target their global audience — disenchanted youth who are spoiling for a fight . ISIS speaks to them in a language they understand.

Studies on the Islamic States’ social media expertise have made interesting comparisons with corporate marketing techniques, where new brands seek to disrupt established ones by changing their target audience. ISIS employs this practically by promoting profiles of its teenage recruits, encouraging them to publicize the outfit’s brand. In essence they are investing in a ‘young force’ to ‘disrupt’ the old order. The average underdog fighting for a cause and a new identity is a story which often resonates with the age group that IS targets; confessions of Indian ISIS sympathizers apprehended by the NIA are a case in point.

A Brookings Institution study of ISIS propaganda on Twitter alone, found that group puts out 18 media releases a day and has up to 90,000 dedicated twitter handles, which helped it recruit over 20,000 followers – including 3,000 teenagers and over 200 women. These numbers may have shot up since the study was released in March 2015.

This social media strategy truly gains a global audience thanks to the convergence of social media and traditional media. ISIS understands this. It generates shocking, brutal content, playing on the emotions of disenchantment and fear, which then get amplified by both organized groups on social media and, consequently, reporting by the traditional media.

The Western press is full of stories from defected recruits describing the media war games of the Islamic State. A Washington Post investigation revealed just how much value ISIS ascribes to its propaganda agents:

Senior media operatives are treated as “emirs” of equal rank to their military counterparts. They are directly involved in decisions on strategy and territory. They preside over hundreds of videographers, producers, and editors who form a privileged, professional class with status, salaries and living arrangements that are the envy of ordinary fighters.

It is grand production, which very few governments can match in resources or scale.

Lessons for India

The West’s experience tackling ISIS holds lessons for India. Despite larger coffers and media specialists in play, the counter response has been lacking, says the former chief of the U.S. Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. He recently told CBS News, “There is a fantasy in Washington that if you somehow put magic social media or public diplomacy pixie dust on a problem, it will go away. “It’s not that ISIS is so great. It is that the response against ISIS is both limited, and weak.” He reiterated that dismantling the group’s Twitter feeds was a temporary solution; the challenge remains the wide range of audiences to target with counter propaganda.

For companies who host these social-media platforms, the Damocles sword hangs perpetually overhead. The sheer volume of propaganda that needs to be sifted through, not to mention the precarious balance between enabling people to discuss and access information about ISIS without being a distribution channel for its propaganda, becomes challenging.

India has worked on a multi-layered response, from surveillance and monitoring to involving religious heads in de-radicalization programs designed to reach out to disenchanted youth. Yet the scale of the challenge requires an institutionalized, not ad-hoc, response. Agencies warn that ISIS propaganda is already fueling competition between terror groups on social media, driving other non-state actors to bandwagon on the Islamic State brand and even prompting insurgent groups to copycat recruitment strategies.

ISIS has complicated the theater for warfare into a battle of ideas which it, at least in perception, seems to be winning. It is time to be aware and fight this “spam.”

The article was originally published in the The Diplomat.

• Published: 6 May, 2016

When India found a leader, but lost a statesman

Reading through the archives of The Hindu from September 23, 1965, you get a sense of the relief and euphoria of a nation, now united around a leader who braved immense criticism and led from the front in its time of crises. An excerpt reads: “Tributes to Shastri’s leadership: The Prime Minister’s announcement in Parliament today of a cease-fire in the fighting between India and Pakistan had an electrifying effect on the Members of Parliament and on the people.(…) (…) Members belonging to all political parties (…) praised the PM for the firm, determined and able manner in which he handled the worsening India-Pakistan relations, which finally erupted in an undeclared war.”

It is interesting then that narratives often understate the tragically short-lived Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri’s significant contribution to the handling of the 1965 conflict. It is ironic that he’s often accused of “losing the war on the diplomatic table at Tashkent” or remembered for the intrigue surrounding his death. Apart from political appropriation, very little ink seems to have been spent on examining his diplomatic and political acumen which made India stronger domestically and helped regain its international stature post the 1965 crises.

Quiet strength

Shastri’s mandate was not an easy one. There was a fractured consensus within the Congress party around his ability to lead the nation after Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s demise. India was demoralised after the 1962 defeat and battling an acute food crisis. Pakistan’s adventurism in 1965, historians argue, wanted to take advantage of this alleged “weakness in leadership”.

In hindsight, Shastri’s handling of the war has many lessons for contemporary leaders. His biographer C.P. Srivastava, in “A Life of Truth in Politics”, recalls that Shastri’s slight build was often mistaken for a lack of ability, but really concealed a very sharp mind.

This plays out from the first meeting between Prime Minister Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan, says former ambassador M. K. Rasgotra, who was a war book officer at that time. The former diplomat recalled a conversation between Gen. Khan and his Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto soon after meeting Shastri in Karachi in October 1964. Gen. Khan had reportedly remarked, “This little man. What will I speak to him?” This was “a total miscalculation as time would prove,” Mr. Rasgotra says. Shastri’s observations, however, were quite astute. He assessed Khan as practical, but described Bhutto as “someone who could throw the spanner in the works for Indo-Pak relations,” records his biographer. A prophetic observation given how 1965 played out.

Firm stand

Contrary to expectations, Shastri had responded to Pakistani provocations on the border through speeches in Parliament from the very beginning, making India’s red lines clear, says Srivastava. He was determined to convince President Khan that ‘India had no desire whatsoever to acquire even one square inch of Pakistani territory [...] [but] would never allow any interference by Pakistan in Kashmir which was an integral part of India.’

During the Rann of Kutch incident, a probing exercise by the Pakistani forces in early 1965, Shastri withstood immense pressure from the opposition to resolving the issue through an international tribunal. Having agreed to the ceasefire, his government survived a no-confidence motion to defend the decision of arbitration. Very few knew, reveals Srivastava, that Army Chief J.N. Chaudhuri and Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh were against escalating the conflict, as the terrain was unsuitable for large-scale operations by India.

Politically, arbitration was seen as capitulation and many demanded its rollback. Shastri stood his ground, arguing India would not be a ‘irresponsible nation”, reneging on an “international commitment”, records Srivastava — a stance that would later bolster India’s position in the UNSC ceasefire dialogues.

Shastri’s ability to lead and carry the nation in the face of surprise attacks was exemplified during the failed attempt by Pakistan to stir an uprising in Kashmir in August 1965. Shastri responded with a clear policy response: India would not approach the UNSC and defend its territorial integrity; no interference from Pakistan would be tolerated; contingency plans — especially vis a vis China — would be prepared; and the nation would be kept abreast of all government decisions. He articulated this in a public address on August 13, 1965, which assured the nation that ‘force will be met with force’. There was no room for speculation.

Indian forces had to capture the Haji Pir Pass and the Kishen Ganga bulge, the two supply routes for infiltration into the valley to thwart the attacks. This operation required crossing the Cease Fire Line. In another bold first for India, the forces were assured of the firm backing of the Prime Minister and told the government would handle the consequences, records Srivastava.

The boldest decision came in September 1965, when Pakistani Patton tanks rolled into Chambh in J&K, aiming to capture Amritsar and more. When advised that to defend Kashmir, a diversionary attack in West Pakistan was needed to push enemy forces on the defensive, Shastri’s iron will came into play.

Srivastava, then joint secretary to the Prime Minister, recalls Shastri pacing up and down in his office on September 1, 1965. He says “All I heard him say was:ab toh kuch karna hi hoga (now something has to be done)”. He then convened an emergency cabinet meet “to carry his colleagues with him in his decision” and prepare for repercussions to India’s stand. On September 3, Shastri asked the Indian forces to march to Lahore, the first time that India would take the battle to the invader’s territory.

Through all of this, Shastri had ensured India’s able representation in the UNSC and convinced the big powers of India’s response as proportionate to Pakistani aggression, was briefed constantly by military commanders, consulted the opposition, and even organised regular press briefings to inform the people and instil confidence in the leadership.

Even his much-criticised decision to “return Haji Pir pass” during the Tashkent Conference, it is argued, was not done under pressure. His biography reveals that Shastri knew international opinion would shift if India refused, as it was a pre-requisite to the UNSC ceasefire resolution.

He was also aware that giving up Haji Pir would invite scathing accusations of betrayal domestically. Before Tashkent, records Srivastava, the military chiefs had told Shastri that while they would not want to vacate, “it could not come at the cost of peace in the subcontinent”. Perhaps Prime Minister Shastri became the fall guy to circumstance.

1965 clearly has lessons for conduct of government and diplomacy for the present day establishment. We both found a leader and lost a statesman, perhaps a little too soon.

This article was originally published in the The Hindu

• Published: 26 September, 2015

Recounting 1965: War, Diplomacy and Great Games in the Subcontinent

‘Stalemate’, ‘futile’, ‘forgotten’—the descriptions of the 1965 War between India and Pakistan often do injustice to its profound Impact on the history of the Indian subcontinent. It was a war that altered the fates of India and Pakistan both politically and militarily, and officially began the new great game for Asia. For India, it was a test of leadership post Nehru and banishing the demons of 1962. For Pakistan, it was about Kashmir and testing India, playing roulette with the superpowers, and sealing its friendship with China.

• Published: July 2015
• Journal of Defence Studies

Challenging Stereotypes: Reinventing the national discourse on the North East

If the larger goal is to understand the challenges of the North East, it would require a strong national narrative which reconciles its many identities and adds to the peace process. Till development in the North East is achieved the stereotypes will continue to gain traction in policy approaches.

• Published: May 16, 2014
• IDSA Comments

India’s Defence Budget: Trends Beyond the Numbers

In the larger scheme of things, fiscal prudence is a good trait and the reduction in deficits desirable, yet an overtly ambitious approach of reducing deficits into a number game may lead to developments that may hurt us not only in the security arena but in economic growth as well.

• Published: March 04, 2013
• IDSA Comments

Enduring Legacy of 1962: Cementing the Conflict of Perceptions in Sino-Indian Ties

Fifty years since the 1962 war, India and China have moved on to become world powers with engagement and competition characterizing their relationship in keeping with the rules of realpolitik. Both sides argue that the past has been forgotten, yet the border dispute remains unresolved. Despite the rapprochement and robust economic engagement undertaken, the relationship has a constant undercurrent of tension and is often described as fragile.

• Published: October 2012
• Journal of Defence Studies

Don’t Shoot the Messenger: The ‘Un-Social’ Strategy

The raging controversy on social media regulation post the violence in Assam has left the government in a losing perception battle. It is time to engage with the new media and exploit its potential to communicate strategically and not shoot the messenger

• Published: August 28, 2012
• IDSA Comments

Lessons from 2011: The New Media Revolution is a Strategic Asset

What was new in 2011 was the idea of a new media revolution: the convergence of various forms of media—television, social, and online networks which, when combined together, became a powerful weapon in the hands of the common man.

• Published: January 13, 2012
• Issue Brief

The Olive Branch from Pakistan, in its Time of Crises

India’s recent encounters with Pakistan show surprisingly warm diplomacy, with an open declaration from Islamabad of “mending the trust deficit.” This upswing in relations however comes with no guarantees.

• Published: November 17, 2011
• IDSA Comments