Heading East, Security, Trade and Environment between India and Southeast Asia, co-edited by Sumit Ganguly and Karen Stoll Farrell, consisting of 11 chapters and one introductory note by the editors, broadly deals with India’s Look East/Act East Policy (LEP/AEP).
The result of the by-election clearly indicates the need for the NLD government to speedily engender trust among the ethnic minorities. A successful peace process and peace negotiations can be one aspect of it.
India’s ‘Act East’ policy has received a momentous push with recent incoming and outgoing visits by the high level delegations. Indian President Pranab Mukherjee visited Brunei and Thailand in February and New Zealand and Papua New Guinea in April. In July, Minister of State for External Affairs V K Singh visited Laos to attend the ASEAN-India Summit and Mekong-Ganga Cooperation Finance Ministers meeting. In August, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj paid a one day visit to Naypyidaw, the capital of Myanmar. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is moreover set to visit Vietnam en route to China for the G20 Summit this weekend.
At the same time, India has received several dignitaries from the region as well. In June, the prime minister of Thailand, General Prayut Chan-o-cha visited India. Dato’ Seri Dr. Ahmad Zahid Bin Hamidi, the deputy prime minister of Malaysia, came to India in July. The most recent addition to this list was the visit by U Htin Kyaw, the president of Myanmar, to India in the last week of August.
Myanmar holds a special position in India’s neighborhood vis-à-vis the ‘Act East’ policy. Besides being its closest Southeast Asian neighbor, Myanmar’s importance in India’s foreign policy is marked by its long porous international border with Northeast India, India’s quest for connectivity with East Asia, India’s search for alternative sources of energy, and its economic linkages with the region. Traditionally, India and Myanmar have not shared any extraordinary relationship, at least never one as special as the ties Myanmar and China for the last few decades. However, with the renewed emphasis on India’s ‘Act East’ policy, the bilateral relations between these two countries are now expected to gain some credentials.
During the recent visit, President U Htin Kyaw’s delegation signed four memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with their Indian counterparts. Two of the MoUs deal with the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway; of the other two, one focuses on renewable energy and one on traditional medicines. India has promised to help Myanmar in repairing the Kalewa-Yarggyi road segment and constructing or upgrading 69 bridges on the Tamu-Kyigone-Kalewa section of the Trilateral Highway. India may have larger plans for the project as well. At the recent MGC meeting, Minister V K Singh spoke about reaching Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia through the Trilateral Highway.
Modi, in his welcoming address to U Htin Kyaw, spoke about the early completion of the Kaladan Multimodal Transit and Transport project and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway. The current delays in these projects are already awkward for the stakeholder countries.
Myanmar’s Foreign Affairs Minister and State Councillor Daw Aung Saan Suu Kyi paid a visit to China in the third week of August and China’s Global Times reported that she has made positive gestures toward the Chinese leadership. As the leader of Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces, Suu Kyi had earlier objected to Chinese investments in Myanmar, but as many have noted, in her new role, she is now redesigning her calculations toward China. In fact, under her leadership, Myanmar has formed a high-level committee to examine the suspended Chinese hydropower project in Myitsone.
Given this context, India needs to show pragmatic enthusiasm toward the new government in Myanmar. Though Suu Kyi is believed to have close emotional ties with India, thanks to her childhood days in Delhi, as Myanmar’s foreign minister she prioritized China over India in her travel schedule and this says a lot about Myanmar’s neighborhood preferences. Chinese investments in Myanmar and its two-way trade with the country are huge in comparison to India’s trade and investment in Myanmar. Despite quite a few initiatives, India-Myanmar bilateral trade stood at roughly $2 billion in 2014-15; on the other hand, China, being the largest trading partner of Myanmar, enjoyed bilateral trade worth $25 billion in 2013-14.
In October, Aung San Suu Kyi is expected to visit India for the outreach summit of BRICS and BIMSTEC. This will be her first visit to India in the capacity of Myanmar’s foreign minister and state counselor. During Sushma Swaraj’s visit, Suu Kyi pledged that Myanmar would not allow any terrorist activities from its soil against India. This positivity needs to be continued. It is essential that both countries uphold their assurances to each other to define a proper shape for the future of their relations.
Sampa Kundu is a researcher at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She works on Southeast Asia, ASEAN, India’s Act East Policy and Myanmar.
The article was originally published in The Diplomat.
This backgrounder offers an overview of the two most challenging concerns for Myanmar’s democracy – ethnic unrest and economic hardships – and how the new government is planning to address these issues in particular and also more generally the influence of the Tatmadaw in politics.
The Hague Tribunal’s decision and China’s take on it are unlikely to compel Duterte to ignore economic interests that can be furthered through cooperation with China.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s whirlwind tour of Brunei, Cambodia and Laos during 22–24 April 2016 courted support for his country’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. But the issue of China’s policy in the South China Sea has created a fault line across ASEAN, complicating the unity and effectiveness of the regional grouping.
The most pressing issue on Wang’s agenda during his visits to Brunei, Cambodia and Laos was dispute resolution in the South China Sea, though political and economic cooperation were also discussed. In Brunei, his first destination, Wang emphasised China’s ‘dual-track approach’ as a way to solve territorial disputes between China and Southeast Asian countries. This approach endorses the handling of disputes bilaterally by the directly affected countries, and the joint maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea by both China and ASEAN.
Following his visit to Brunei, Wang spent one day in Cambodia and met Foreign Minister Prak Sokhon. The following day in Laos, he met Lao Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith, General Secretary of the Party Central Committee and President Bounnhang Vorachith, and Foreign Minister Saleumxay Kommasith.
Wang’s visit to Laos received wide attention in the region since Laos, as the Chair of ASEAN in 2016, is expected to play a key role in mediating China’s disputes with its Southeast Asian neighbours. Wang emphasised during his visit that China’s One Belt One Road initiative, which proposes a China–Laos railway link, would boost Laos’ agenda of transforming itself from a land-locked to a land-linked nation. For Laos’ part, Saleumxay Kommasith conveyed that, as the current Chair of ASEAN, Laos will try to further mobilise discussion on the execution of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and negotiations on a formal Code of Conduct.
Wang’s tour of the three countries underscores China’s eagerness to develop substantial backing within the region as The Hague prepares to give its verdict on the Philippines’ arbitration case against China’s ‘nine-dash line’ claims. Any public support from the region will add legitimacy to China’s position against allowing third parties to intervene in South China Sea disputes.
Following the visits, the Chinese foreign ministry published a four-point consensus that Wang claimed was agreed upon with his counterparts in Brunei, Cambodia and Laos. The consensus stated that, first, disputes over the Spratly islands are not an ASEAN–China issue and should not have any implications on China–ASEAN relations. Second, every sovereign state is free to choose their own way to resolve rows and no unilateral decision can be imposed on them. Third, dialogues and consultations under Article 4 of the DOC are the best way to solve the South China Sea disputes. Fourth, China and ASEAN together can effectively maintain peace and security in the region.
This four-point consensus, alongside Wang’s tour of Southeast Asia, reiterates that China has once again successfully capitalised on divisions prevalent among the ASEAN nations when it comes to South China Sea disputes. By supporting China’s four-point consensus, Brunei, Cambodia and Laos have expressed that they will neither join Vietnam and the Philippines (and increasingly Indonesia too) in their fights against China’s assertiveness in South China Sea nor seek multilateral dispute resolution.
The last point in the ‘consensus’ stresses that China and these three ASEAN countries do not want the involvement of outside powers (like the United States) in South China Sea disputes, as they believe only regional powers should manage peace and stability in East Asia. But China’s assertive diplomacy in Southeast Asia has raised questions about Laos’ ability to promote unity and open dialogue across ASEAN in 2016. In light of the United States’ insistence that it will continue its freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, and US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s recent announcement of joint patrols with Manila, China is likely be more assertive in pushing its dispute resolution agenda onto its allies in the region.
This was not the first time China has been successful in drawing dividing lines within ASEAN. During Myanmar’s tenure as Chair of ASEAN in 2014 the smaller economy had to face the challenge of considering the interests of Vietnam and Philippines on the one hand and China on the other. After Wang Yi’s three-nation tour, Lao President Bounnhang Vorachith attempted a conciliatory gesture towards the other members of ASEAN by immediately paying a friendly visit to Hanoi. But it remains to be seen whether this visit will be enough to assure Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian countries, of Laos’ ability to lead ASEAN with a pragmatic diplomatic attitude.
Some argue that China is too big a power for ASEAN’s smaller economies to raise a tough voice against its territorial claims and its rejection of third-party dispute resolution. Yet Vietnam and the Philippines are passionate about maintaining their demands in the South China Sea. The involvement of extra-regional powers suits their interests. The confluence of these opposing interests is making Southeast Asia one of the most unsettled regions in the world. Managing this tension will be a considerable challenge for ASEAN into the future.
The article was originally published in the East Asia Forum
The political systems in Southeast Asia often come under denunciation for not being capable enough to uphold the basic democratic rights. Questions may be asked about the governance in the region and whether it is transparent and accountable to its own people (Gonzalez)
In this given context, it would be worth to watch the challenges faced by the new governments that recently came into power in Southeast Asia or is expected to take over very soon. Vietnam and Myanmar fall under the first category as shift in power just happened in both these countries and Philippines comes under the second sort as it will undergo a change in power in the coming months.
The political system of Vietnam is such that its people do not enjoy the right to directly elect its prime minister and president. The Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) holds a national level congress in every five years where its delegates (1510 in number) participates and elects 180 members for the party’s central committee and 16 members for its politburo. Politburo of the VCP is the strongest political organisation in Vietnam. It elects the party’s general secretary, the most powerful person in Vietnam. This year, in the 12th National Congress in January 2016 the party chose Nguyen Xuan Phuc (who was earlier Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s deputy) as the new premier, Public Security minister Tran Dai Quang as president (which is more or less a ceremonial position) and Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan as the speaker of the House.
Nguyen Phu Trong was re-elected as the chief of the party for a second term at the January congress. Alexander L. Vuving believes that re-election of Trong would usher in a new era in Vietnam, but in ‘small steps’.
However, critics are of the opinion that the former Premier Dung was a reformer and considered as a business friendly leader in the US; thereby was useful for many economic interests. Trong, on the other hand, is a conservative leader and also reflected as a pro-China forerunner. Another observation is, though Trong maintains a pro-China stand in public, he has the capacity to take a firmer position against China’s assertive positions on disputed South China Sea islands if required. Trong has also launched an anti-corruption agenda in Vietnam during his first tenure as the party’s general secretary. Therefore, it is to be watched whether Trong will maintain a fine balance between the US and China in matters relating to South China Sea and not letting the big powers considering Vietnam as a pawn in their hands in their great game rivalry in the Asia Pacific. The other question remains, what will be the future of individual freedom (primarily driven by the internet revolution) with the conservative leadership coming to power in Vietnam? (Oliver Holmes)
Contrary to the political system in Vietnam which is a one -party system, Philippines has a multi-party system. The election in Philippines is scheduled to be held on 9 May. The next President of the Philippines will be Benigno Aquino III’s successor who cannot continue as the president for the second term, as observed in the constitution. The five candidates for this year’s presidential election are as follows; Grace Poe (47)- she is one-term senator and an adopted daughter of a movie star; Mar Roxas (58)- he was educated in the US and grandchild of a late president; Jejomar Binay (73)-he is a Vice-President and former mayor of Makati, the Wall Street of Philippines; Miriam Santiago (70)-he has experience in politics and has worked in government agencies and departments for years; and finally, Rodrigo Duterte, a mayor known as “Dirty Harry” and is known for his harsh anti-crime drives during his tenure as a mayor. Few observers express that either Grace Poe or Duterte is likely to win the race. (Avantika Chilkoti)
Poe represents aspirations of the new generation and change on the one hand and on the other, Duterte is accused for being unforgiving towards criminals and his sexist comments during his election campaigns have already raised concerns in the Filipino society. Coming to the challenges the new president will have to face as a legacy of Aquino, one may note that despite his fanciful relations with World Bank and other international organisations for his pro-Bretton Woods principles and relative economic growth in the country, President Benigno is censured by his critics for not giving proper attention to the core economic problem of Philippines, i.e. poverty.
Huge traffic, the question of resettlement of the Islamic extremists and corruption are other domestic concerns that should be addressed by the new president. The strained relations with China would be one of the major foreign policy agenda for the new government in Philippines. The arbitration case Manila has filed against China is expected to be settled by this year too. However, China has repeatedly mentioned that the tribunal court at The hague has no jurisdiction to settle a dispute in a territory which comes under its national border. Having said that, it must be remembered that few days back China’s ministry of foreign affairs spokesperson, Hua Chunying, criticised the US for being “instigating” towards Manila in the territorial disputes in South China Sea which only reiterates China’s dislike for any outside power involvement in the South China Sea dispute. (PTI)
Followed by the November 2015 election where the National League for Democracy (NLD) obtained a swiping majority in the parliament (255 seats in Pyithu Hluttaw and 135 seats in Amyotha Hluttaw), Myanmar elected Htin Kyaw as the first ever civilian president of the country in five decades. Though, critics are often arguing that Htin Kyaw would be a shadow of Daw Aung Saan Suu Kyi, who is the new foreign minister in Myanmar.
However, under the leadership of Suu Kyi and Htin Kyaw, Myanmar will hopefully experience a dawn of economic opportunities, civil rights and individual freedom. However, the new government in Myanmar will have to face a tough time in an order to fulfil its ambitions. First, only eight of the 18 armed ethnic groups took part in the nation -wide ceasefire agreement signed under former President Thein Sein. The NLD government will have to be cautious in its approach towards other ethnic groups and their armed wings as it surely wants to end the decades-old ethnic unrest in the country.
Second, the 2008 constitution of Myanmar which is still functional needs to be amended in order to facilitate Suu Kyi becoming the president herself. However, to do that, she has to confirm support from the Tatmadaw which is still enjoying 25% reservations in the parliament. Besides, the armed forces still occupy important folios like defence, home affairs and border affairs. Henceforth, for a smoother administration and governance, Suu Kyi and Htin Kyaw would have to ensure constant support from the military and this may force the NLD government to compromise on certain issues where conflict of interests emerge between the armed forces and democratic values. Resettlement of the former political prisoners and surrendered ethnic nationalities, freedom for media, economic freedom for all Myanmarese, the fate of the Rohingyas, trafficking, corruption and nepotism are only few domestic issues which require urgent attention from the new government. At the external level too, challenges are of varying degrees. To note the most important ones, Myanmar’s relations with China and Myanmar’s relations with rest of ASEAN should be factored in the new government’s foreign policy.
The suspension of Myitsone dam and the recent hiccup caused by the illegal movement of the Kokang refugees from Myanmar to China have already created an environment of mistrust in China-Myanmar bilateral relations. During the Junta rule, China was Myanmar’s stronger supporter and hence, though both Suu Kyi and Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi spoke about paukphaw friendship between the two sides in their meeting on April 7 (Michelle Guanzon) critics have their reservations about the future of this traditional friendship. Given the fact that Myanmar is now opening to the global market and not any more dependent on China for each and every economic necessity, it is expected that Myanmar will only diversify its sources of foreign investments. Its foreign policy too, will see more dynamism now rather than just being influenced by the Chinese. In addition, with Suu Kyi as the foreign ministry holder of Myanmar, the country’s relations with ASEAN too may experience some more ups and downs now. It may be remembered that in her early political life, she was not very welcoming towards ASEAN. A recent report by Kavi Chongkittavorn in The Straits Times has advised Ms. Suu Kyi to be ‘patient’ and ‘humble’ with ASEAN and mentioned that her international vision will be valuable for ASEAN. (Kavi)
The same author further reiterates,
“…although she is “above the president” in Myanmar, that does not mean she is above “all the Asean ministers” when she attends the AMM in July in Vientiane; there are certain protocols and procedures she has to follow. It is incumbent on her to separate her roles as foreign minister and as state counsellor in the discussions and decision-making” (Kavi)
At the end, it may be said that Southeast Asia is gaining new importance in the world affairs by its economic accomplishments, large market potential, geo-politics around South China Sea, formation of the ASEAN Community and its stakes in mega trade blocs as well as mega regional security mechanisms. Since the US has embarked on its ‘Pivot’ policy and Indo-Pacific has become a matter of strategic discussions, Southeast Asia can no longer be side-lined in the international geo-politics. The new governments in Southeast Asia need to understand the global significance of the region vis-à-vis the countries and act accordingly. They are expected to act wisely so that a balance between the domestic and country specific interests find a convergence with the larger international interests.
The article was originally published in The Dialogue.
Independent India was a typical continental power, mostly due to its difficult land border disputes with China and Pakistan. During the Cold War days, India wanted that the major world powers should withdraw themselves from the Indian Ocean, presence of whom was actually a threat to India’s ideological inclination to the non-aligned movement. 1 The end of Cold War brought few changes in Indian policy making, including economic liberalisation and enhanced supply of oil through Oceans and Seas in an order that increasing domestic demand for energy is satisfied. Approximately 80 percent of India’s energy imports traverse through the Indian Ocean and its different channels.2 In the 1990s, India became enthused about regional maritime cooperation as well, thanks to the increasing number of regional trading blocs across the world that played a stimulator for India’s integration with various regional groupings. Given this context, India’s interests in the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC, now Indian Ocean Rim Association- IORA) and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium are well understood. Fact of the matter is India should not and cannot ignore that it has a coastline of 7,500 km and is surrounded by Oceans and Seas in three sides of its international boundaries. As far as the Indian Ocean is concerned, its various channels are responsible for two-thirds of world’s oil shipment, one third of world’s cargo movement and nearly half of its container traffic movement.3 Marking the crucial role played by the Indian Ocean, Prime Minister Mr. Modi said,
“For us, it also serves as a strategic bridge with the nations in our immediate and extended maritime neighbourhood. In March last year in Mauritius, I had spelt out our vision for the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean Region is one of my foremost policy priorities. Our approach is evident in our vision of ‘sagar’4, which means ocean and stands for Security and Growth for all in the region”.5
There are several factors that are pushing India towards a more comprehensive maritime policy. China’s special emphasis towards Indian Ocean (through its Silk Road project and growing cooperation with the littoral nations) as well as its formation of the blue water navy was perhaps a direct hit to New Delhi that stirred the latter to strengthen its maritime capability in the Indian Ocean, considered to be its ‘strategic backyard’.6 Another motivation came from India’s own desire to play a significant role in the Indo-Pacific region, which is supported by regional powers like United States, Australia and Japan as well. During his 2015 visit to Mauritius and Seychelles, Prime Minister Mr. Modi underlined that India is now ready to mark its presence in the wider geographic region of the Indo-Pacific and India may even consider building military bases outside its own national territory. This was in stark contradiction of what India had been practising till then.7 This changed perception should be understood in the context of Mumbai 2008 attack, perpetrators of which came through the Seas and revealed that India still has to overcome few challenges in terms of safeguarding its coastlines and national interests. In order to garner regional cooperation in enhancing maritime security, at Mauritius, PM Modi said,
“Our goal is to seek a climate of trust and transparency; respect for international maritime rules and norms by all countries; sensitivity to each other’s interests; peaceful resolution of maritime security issues; and increase in maritime cooperation.”8
India’s new vision for maritime security is comprehensively articulated in Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, a 2015 document by the Indian Navy. The document clarifies that the Indian Navy’s interest areas now cover the Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, IOR Island nations, Southwest Indian Ocean and East Coast of Africa littoral countries among many other nations and areas. The South China Sea, East China Sea and Western Pacific Ocean and their littoral nations are included in the Indian Navy’s secondary priority areas. By these, one expert has argued that New Delhi is trying to satisfy ASEAN which advocates for a larger Indian role in South China Sea on the one hand and on the other, content US-Australia-Japan countries that want to see India as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean. The Joint Strategic Vision with the US, Japan’s inclusion into the Malabar Exercise, bilateral exercises with countries like Japan, Australia and Indonesia and re-engaging with the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and South Pacific island nations – all signal India’s preparedness for a critical role in the Indo-Pacific region. 9 To enable India for the same, India is considering indigenisation of defence capabilities, diversifying sources for its naval hardware, increasing number of joint exercises with IOR partner countries, blue economy and sustainable use of marine resources in a cooperative manner to name a few.10
However, one should not forget about the challenges that are still prevalent as India aspires to be a strong regional player in the Indo-Pacific. One of the challenges is of course posed by China. China’s ambition to control the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean and its creation of a chain of friendly island countries only escalates the existing bilateral tensions between India and China. 11 Another challenge emanates from Pakistan. Pakistan considers India as a constant threat which has to be deterred. Simultaneously, followed by the Osama episode, Pakistan’s relations with the US have also been strained. Therefore, it is only usual for Pakistan to enhance its closeness with China to counter-balance Indo-US partnership in the IOR.12 India’s poor record in forming multilateral mechanisms (example, SAARC, BIMSTEC etc.) is another concern as due to its failure in the aforementioned institutions India is mostly viewed as a country of bilateral choice.13 Holistic maritime cooperation, on the other hand, is based on multilateralism. Therefore, convincing the immediate and extended neighbours in the IOR may take few years of time and India has to showcase some concrete examples of actions to strengthen regional cooperation. In the International Fleet Review in February 2016 in Vishakhapatnam, India exhibited firm commitment towards intensified maritime cooperation with the IOR partner nations and it is only expected that New Delhi would work towards utilising its potential in the right way.
The article was originally published in The SARCist, South Asian Regional Cooperation
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has a population (600 million) larger than North America or the European Union; its total merchandise exports stand at $1.2 trillion. Stephen Groff, vice president of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), noted in a 2014 speech in Berlin that if ASEAN were one economy, with a combined gross domestic product of $2.3 trillion, it would have ranked as the seventh largest economy in the world by 2013. He added that it would become the fourth largest economy by 2050 if the existing level of growth continues. Fittingly, ASEAN is considered to be a growing hub for consumer demand and occupies a significant position in global trade flows.
Presently, ASEAN is taking the process of economic integration into serious consideration, though with some limitations and constraints. No other regional trading bloc in Asia is talking about a single currency at this moment, which sets ASEAN apart. Plus, ASEAN already has six trade agreements with its neighbors, which includes China, South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and India.
India is one of the strategic partners of ASEAN. With a total population of 1.8 billion and a combined GDP of $3.8 trillion, ASEAN and India together form an important economic space in the world. Besides an economic partnership, India expects to benefit geopolitically as well from its rejuvenated affinity with ASEAN and other regional countries. In order for India to gain a substantial position in East Asia, New Delhi has moved to an Act East Policy (AEP) now, an update to the 25-year-old Look East Policy (LEP). As ASEAN remains central to India’s AEP, India’s achievements from this strategy are worth watching. It is crucial to observe whether the Modi government will be able to overcome the challenges and give the Act East Policy a much-needed push.
The beginning of India’s Look East Policy could be marked in early 1990s. After the end of the Cold War, the force of regionalism began to divide the world into small trade blocs. Under these circumstances, the booming economies of ASEAN offered an economically liberalizing India an avenue that could serve its interests in many ways. Through ASEAN, India wanted to reap the benefits of economic integration and well as discuss security issues like cross-border movements from Myanmar. China’s expanding influence in Southeast Asia, especially in Myanmar, was another concern for India. All these led to the formulation of the LEP.
LEP has already gone through two phases since 1991. Phase I lasted between 1991 and 2002, when the primary thrust was toward renewed political and economic relations with ASEAN countries. India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1992 and full dialogue partner in 1996; that same year, it also joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
During Phase II (2003 to 2012), the scope of the LEP was broadened to include China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. India’s then-External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha mentioned in a 2003 speech that the new phase of LEP would focus on extensive economic and security issues, including joint efforts to protect the Sea Lanes of Communications and launch coordinated counter-terrorism activities. In 2012, India and ASEAN commemorated 20 years of their dialogue partnership; they became strategic partners and a vision document was released.
In between, in July 2011, the then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited India and advocated for India to play a stronger role in the Asia-Pacific. She coined the term “act East” instead of just “looking East.” LEP 3.0 got a momentum in the same direction under the Modi government as EAM Sushma Swaraj confirmed in 2014 that New Delhi is now willing to “Act East.” Under the AEP, India not only expected to bolster its economic engagements with the region; it yearned to emerge as a potential security balancer as well.
On the economic front, the rising two-way trade between India and ASEAN is noteworthy. It grew from $13 billion to $74 billion between 2003-04 and 2013-14. (See Table 1). However trade data between India and ASEAN shows a negative balance against India. The government had to face criticism for signing its Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN on the grounds that, though imports from ASEAN to India have been mounting, India’s exports to the region are not experiencing the same trajectory.
ASEAN, as a collective, occupies the fourth largest position in India’s total external trade, while India was only ASEAN’s 10th largest trading partner as of June 2015. As of 2015-2016, India’s exports to ASEAN stood at 9.79 percent of its total exports, and its imports from the region were approximately 10.51 percent of its total imports. So far as investment is concerned, as of 2014, India’s outward investment to Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam stood at a record $128 billion, which is even higher than Indian investment in China, some $119.56 billion. At the same time, approximately 12.5 percent of India’s total inflows of foreign investment come from ASEAN.
Table 1: India’s Trade with East Asia, Australia and New Zealand (All values in USD million)
| Country | Export | Import | Total Trade | |||
| 2010-11 | 2014-2015 | 2010-11 | 2014-2015 | 2010-11 | 2014-2015 | |
| Brunei | 23.07 | 41.99 | 234.17 | 840.88 | 257.23 | 882.87 |
| Cambodia | 66.94 | 142.53 | 8.01 | 17.96 | 74.95 | 160.49 |
| Indonesia | 5,700.78 | 4,043.32 | 9,918.63 | 15,004.64 | 15,619.41 | 19,047.96 |
| Malaysia | 3,871.17 | 5,816.55 | 6,523.58 | 11,117.74 | 10,394.75 | 16,934.29 |
| Myanmar | 320.62 | 773.24 | 1017.67 | 1,231.54 | 1,338.29 | 2,004.78 |
| Lao PDR | 13.11 | 67.31 | 0.22 | 85.28 | 13.33 | 152.58 |
| Singapore | 9,825.44 | 9,809.36 | 7,139.31 | 7,124.47 | 16,964.75 | 16,933.83 |
| Thailand | 2,274.21 | 3,464.83 | 4,272.09 | 5,865.88 | 6,546.31 | 9,330.71 |
| Vietnam | 2,651.44 | 6,257.88 | 1,064.90 | 3,003.35 | 3,716.34 | 9,261.23 |
| Philippines | 881.10 | 1,395.58 | 429.39 | 423.04 | 1,310.49 | 1,818.62 |
| ASEAN | 25,627.89 | 31,812.58 | 30,607.96 | 44,714.77 | 56,235.85 | 76,527.35 |
| China | 14,168.86 | 11,934.25 | 43,479.76 | 60,413.17 | 57,648.62 | 72,347.42 |
| Japan | 5,091.24 | 5,385.57 | 8,632.03 | 10,131.36 | 13,723.27 | 15,516.93 |
| South Korea | 3,727.29 | 4,602.95 | 10,475.29 | 13,529.11 | 14,202.58 | 18,132.06 |
| Australia | 1,713.02 | 2,782.13 | 10,789.00 | 10,247.24 | 12,502.01 | 13,029.38 |
| New Zealand | 190.59 | 322.10 | 625.21 | 591.40 | 815.80 | 913.49 |
Source: Export Import Data Bank, Department of Commerce, Government of India
Geopolitically, India has attempted to demonstrate its ability to play a dynamic role in the region. India sent a strong signal to China by mentioning the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea in the joint statement released by President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi during the latter’s 2014 U.S. visit. The idea of U.S.-India joint patrols in South China Sea has also been floated, after Defense Minister Manohar Parikkar’s visit to the U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii in late 2015 (this has, however not been confirmed from the Indian side). Freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is essential for India in order to ensure that its sea-bound trade continues uninterrupted.
Through these gestures and the Indian Navy’s proven capabilities in handling natural disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, India has embarked on a path of greater involvement in the affairs of Southeast and East Asia. In this regard, it is to be noted that India’s interests in the region converge with the interests of countries like Japan, Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan and, to some extent, Brunei and Indonesia. The very fact that all these countries share territorial disputes with China (or, in Indonesia’s case, uncertainty over an exclusive economic zone) stimulates them to forge closer relationships. Further, it has also become imperative for India to cultivate relationships in the Indo-Pacific region because of the economic and strategic benefits that China is likely to gain with even a partial materialization of its One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative.
On December 31, 2015, ASEAN officially declared the establishment of ASEAN Community. There are certain reservations about India’s prospective benefits from the ASEAN Community building process, just as the advantages of the India-ASEAN FTA are still unclear from India’s perspective. The ASEAN Community itself is marred with problems like intra-ASEAN divides based on the South China Sea disputes; the lack of an ASEAN identity; developmental gaps that prevailing within ASEAN; and many more.
For India, another challenge is that the government has not been able to decide the extent of exposure it wants to provide to its remote northeast through connectivity projects designed to create linkages between South Asia (vis-à-vis northeast India) and East Asia. Furthermore, the delays in completing the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway, the Kaladan Multimodal Transit and Transport Project, and the Moreh-Mandalay Bus Services have created negative perceptions in the region about India’s political will. India needs to be more watchful, as a balance between domestic concerns and its larger national interests is a prerequisite for India enabling itself for a greater extra-regional role.
The article was originally published in The Diplomat.
Notwithstanding the relatively lower death toll, the January 14 attack has caused alarm in the region given that it came as proof of the claim made by the IS in 2014 about intensifying its activities across Southeast Asia.
