S. Samuel C. Rajiv

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Dr S Samuel C Rajiv is Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi. Prior to joining MP-IDSA in November 2006, Dr Rajiv worked at the publication India’s National Security Annual Review (from 2002-2005) and was a Visiting Scholar at the BESA Centre for Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University, Israel (October 2005-September 2006). Dr Rajiv earned his PhD from the School of International Studies, JNU. He has published on issues related to India’s foreign and security policies in Strategic Analysis, Foreign Policy, Business Standard, The Jerusalem Post, among other publications. He is the author of The India-Israel Strategic Partnership: Contours, Opportunities and Challenges (Pentagon Press, 2023) and Co-Editor of India-Israel: The Making of a Strategic Partnership (Routledge, 2020). Dr Rajiv is a recipient of the President MPIDSA’s Award for Excellence for Young Scholars in 2013, 2014 and 2017, for the best peer-reviewed articles published in Strategic Analysis. He has been a member of the MPIDSA Website editorial team since August 2016 and Editor, MPIDSA Website, since January 2023. His current fellowship project is on ‘India’s Defence Exports: Issues and Challenges’.

  • Research Fellow
  • Email:cherian[dot]samuel[at]gmail[dot]com/li>
  • Phone: +91 11 2671 7983

Publication

Revisiting Nuclear India: Strategic Culture and (In) Security Imaginary, by Runa Das

Following a critical social constructivist approach, Runa Das affirms in Revisiting Nuclear India that India’s nuclear decisions are a product of the state’s strategic culture, which is generated by its ‘security community’ not only as a response to ‘real politics’ but also are articulated and re-interpreted within an ‘political-ideological-cultural space’ carved out by the discursive practices of the security community. For Das, strategic cultures are not culturally-conditioned or historically determined but socially constructed.

Jerusalem Calling

Modi visiting Jerusalem would be a re-affirmation of India’s diplomatic ability to pursue multiple national interests by manoeuvring between countries who have difficult or non-existent relationships among themselves but who share important relationships with India.

Growing Ties between India and Israel under Prime Minister Modi

Ties between India and Israel have their origins in 1992 when India decided to establish full diplomatic relations with the Jewish state. While the decision in India was taken by a Congress-led coalition government, subsequent governments, especially those led by the right-of-centre Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), have continued to nurture the relationship. In 2014, the BJP secured an absolute majority following an overwhelming victory in the Indian general elections.

Under BJP Prime Minister Nerendra Modi, ties between the two nations have gained momentum. The party expressed strong views on national security issues while in opposition for a decade. As holders of an absolute majority since 2014, BJP has not been constrained by the views of coalition partners, which may have been less favourable towards Israel.

The relationship between India and Israel has a largely non-partisan background. The dominant aspect of the relationship remains defense, with Israel emerging as a strong partner in times of need. Israel’s support during the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan was critical. The Jewish state subsequently provided cutting-edge equipment like Phalcon AWACS to the Indian military. Similar systems were denied to the Chinese military due to American pressure.

“Developing ties between Israel and India, based on the latter’s growing defense needs and Israel’s rich experience in the field, are expected to prosper in coming years.”

New Delhi has sought to downplay the strategic aspects of the relationship in the public domain. This was observed in Parliament, where Congress as well as BJP defence ministers refused to divulge details about the nature of the relationship. Nevertheless, robust institutional interaction takes place between the national security establishments of both nations. These include visits by the respective chiefs of the defence forces, port calls by Indian naval ships at Haifa and joint working groups (JWG) on a range of issues.

Given the extensive ties between the two nations, the lack of an Indian Defense Ministerial visit to Israel stands out as jarring. While then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon visited India in September 2003 (during the premiership of BJP stalwart Atal Bihari Vajpayee), there has been no reciprocal visit from an Indian Prime Minister to date.

Since 2014, there have been conscious efforts to correct this anomaly. Prime Minister Modi and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have been in regular contact, having met at international fora like the side lines of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2014 and the Climate Summit in Paris in December 2015. President Pranab Mukerjee visited Israel and the Palestinian Teritories in October 2015, followed by Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj in January 2016. Modi is expected to visit Israel in the near future.

The article was originally published in the Israel Public Diplomacy Forum

  • Published: 18 May, 2016

Deep Disquiet: Israel and the Iran Nuclear Deal

Associate Fellow, IDSA, Mr S. Samuel C. Rajiv's research article, titled ‘Deep Disquiet: Israel and the Iran Nuclear Deal’ was published in the March 2016 issue of Journal - Contemporary Review of the Middle East (Sage).

Abstract

The Iran nuclear issue has been the most significant regional security challenge that Israel had to grapple with in the recent times. Israel was skeptical of the efficacy of the dominant diplomatic strategy (pursued by the P5+1) to address the Iranian nuclear challenge. Israel continues to express its concerns on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of July 2015 to effectively address its core concerns vis-à-vis Iran. Significant policy differences with the United States over Iran did not prevent both countries from maintaining a steady stream of high level contacts. While both sides are currently negotiating the terms of the 10-year defence cooperation agreement that would improve its qualitative military edge (QME) vis-à-vis Iran and regional rivals, Israel’s Iran dilemma would play out to uncertain consequences.

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  • Published: 6 April, 2016

JCPOA and the IAEA: Challenges Ahead

Three issues of contention have animated the debate about the role of the IAEA vis-à-vis the JCPOA. These relate to resolving concerns relating to PMD, those governing ‘anytime, anywhere access’, and the IAEA’s ability to ensure Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA.

Iran-P5+1 Lausanne Framework: Issues and Challenges

This Issue Brief looks back at the implementation of the JPOA and examines the extent to which the recent framework (JCPOA) agreed upon at Lausanne adheres to the letter and spirit of the JPOA, specifically as it relates to the pledge to treat the Iranian nuclear programme “as that of any non-nuclear state party to the NPT”.

Bargaining on Nuclear Tests: Washington and Its Cold War Deals by Or Rabinowitz

In Bargaining on Nuclear Tests, Rabinowitz examines aspects relating to the US entering into informal deals with Israel, South Africa and Pakistan in order to prevent them from testing nuclear weapons. These informal understandings turned a ‘blind eye’ to these countries’ nuclear quests as long as they did not test. The testing of nuclear weapons was seen as overtly harming American non-proliferation goals and potentially embarrassing the US administrations, given that these were America’s Cold War allies.