Rajiv Nayan

Dr Rajiv Nayan is Senior Research Associate at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi. He has been working with the Institute since 1993, where he specialises in international relations, security issues, especially the politics of nuclear disarmament, export control, non-proliferation, and arms control. He was Visiting Research Fellow at Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), Tokyo, where he published his monograph “Non-Proliferation Issues in South Asia”. He was also Senior Researcher at Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Senior Visiting Research Fellow at King’s College, London and Visiting Fulbright Scholar at Center on International Cooperation (CIC), New York University. He holds a PhD and a Master of Philosophy in Disarmament Studies and a Master of Arts in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. In his doctoral dissertation, he studied the implications of Missile Technology Control Regime for Indian security and economy.

Dr Nayan has published books as well as papers in academic journals and as chapters in books. His single-authored book Global Strategic Trade Managementhas been published by Springer in 2019. His edited book The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and India was published by Routledge in 2012.

Select Publications

  • Export Controls and India, CSSS Occasional Papers 1/2013, King’s Colloge, London.
  • Limited Wars in South Asia: Against the Nuclear Backdrop, Defence and Security Alert, January 2012
  • “The Relevance of Sanctions in the Contemporary International System: An Indian Perspective,” in Greg Mills & Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, eds., New Tools for Reform and Stability? Sanctions, Conditionalities and Conflict Resolution (SAAIA, 2004).
  • “India and the Missile Technology Control Regime,” in Amitabh Mattoo, ed., India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran and Beyond (Har-Anand Publishers, New Delhi, 1998).
  • Non-Proliferation Issues in South Asia, Occasional Paper 32 (Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 2005).
  • “Trends of the Missile Technology Control Regime,” Strategic Analysis, September 1998.
  • “Chemical Weapons Convention: The Challenges Ahead,” Strategic Analysis, March 1998.
  • Senior Research Associate
  • Email:rajivnayan[at]hotmail[dot]com
  • Phone: +91 11 2671 7983

Publication

The Nuclear Agenda of the Obama Administration

After eight years of governance by a Republican Administration, the United States elected a Democrat as its president. The Democrat President, Barack Hussein Obama, assumed presidency and appointed several key officials to implement his agenda. Though some believe that democracy forces political parties to evolve a common agenda and towards consensus on several key issues, there are others who see differences between the Republican agenda and those of Democrats.

A Q Khan Release and Non-Proliferation

On February 6, 2009, the Pakistani judiciary acquitted Abdul Qadeer (AQ) Khan, the symbol of Pakistani involvement in clandestine nuclear commerce. Since 2004, he had been under house arrest after the proliferation network, linking several countries, including Pakistan, was uncovered. Though he has been put under ‘unspecified security measures’, yet the release of AQ Khan – dubbed by the United States State Department spokesman Gordon Duguid as a ‘serious proliferation risk’ – is considered to be a disturbing development for the non-proliferation regime.

Nuclear Weapons and War

The November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks that shook the world again had tangible links to the security and intelligence establishment of Pakistan. The emergent situation is forcing the policy-making community to take appropriate action so that the culprits are brought to justice and the elements sponsoring the terror attacks in India are adequately deterred. Several options were being exercised and explored for the purpose. As the Pakistani Government is undertaking only cosmetic and deceptive steps to ward off international pressure, the world and India appear far from convinced.

Is NPT Membership as a Nuclear Weapon State an Option for India?

Today, it is necessary for India to respond to the current crisis of the NPT and weigh its options vis-a-vis the Treaty. This paper is an attempt to explore answers to the question of what ought to be India's policy in the light of the new nuclear reality. It analyses three policy options that India could pursue and concludes that India must strive to join the NPT as a nuclear weapon country, because joining the non-proliferation regime by evading the NPT is likely to prove costly and is also unlikely to remove destabilizing irritants.

US Policy on Dual-Use Technology Transfers to China

This paper explores the paradox of US policy on dual-use technology cooperation with China in the face of resistance from a strong section of the security establishment. The paper examines the factors contributing to the current level of dual-use technology business between the two countries. It finds that the US Cold War grand strategy of co-opting China by dividing the socialist bloc has resulted in embedded commercial interests that have been further bolstered by the strategic need for ties with China.

United States and the North Korean Nuclear Test

With the not so unexpected North Korean nuclear test on October 9, 2006 the world has entered into yet another nuclear age. Regional tension is the inevitable corollary of the new nuclear situation. Many apprehend East Asia may become a nuclear flashpoint. Quite naturally, the international community is closely watching the emergent situation. The United States (US) as a major and traditional stakeholder both in the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and security management in East Asia is actively involved in diplomacy to deal with the fallout of the North Korean nuclear test.

The Indo-US Civil Nuclear Co-operation Agreement in the House of Representatives

On July 27, 2006, the US House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the bill HR 5682 for United States and India Nuclear Co-operation Promotion Act of 2006. This bill was submitted to the House by its International Relations Committee, after modifying the bill HR 4974 which was referred to the House by the US Administration. The House in an "up-or-down vote" passed this bill by a wide margin, with 359 members voting for and 58 opposing it. A number of amendments seen as killers were defeated on the floor of the House.

Agni-III

On July 9, 2006, the long awaited Agni-III ballistic missiles test finally took place. This was the first test of this version of Agni designed with a range of 3,000 km. This missile used two-stage solid propellant. It took off successfully but failed to cover its determined course completely. Apparently, the missile developed a snag while entering into its second stage. Admitting the snag the Indian minister of defence said that it was not a major failure. Scientists are quite confident that the error will be rectified, and the missile would be ready for testing in the near future.