For the 70th commemoration anniversary of the end of World War II to be meaningful, Japan, China and South Korea need to jointly address the issues involved through a combination of moral responsibility and political maturity.
Despite the generational change, the war memories continue to adversely affect foreign policy and feelings of slight, disrespect, and disparagement could well assume a latent credence that ignites national outrage and dislocates the fragile power equilibrium in the region.
The Kingdom of Cambodia, chair and host of the 10 member-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), hosted the second ASEAN Summit in its Peace Palace building at Phnom Penh from July 9-13. The Summit convened its signature assemblage—the 45th ASEAN Foreign Minister’s Meeting (AMM)/Post Ministerial Conference (PMC). Apart from this annual feature, the Summit also saw the participation of ASEAN partners from 17 countries under the aegis of 19th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 13th ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and the 2nd East Asia Summit (EAS).
The March 2011 triple disaster in Japan obligated a response from the US, its long-time ally. The US disaster assistance to Japan went beyond the customary nature of the countries’ relationship, and was conspicuous for the scale of military involvement that was embedded in the US-Japan alliance. The success of the US asistance programme Operation Tomodachi is attributed to interoperability between the defence forces of the two allies.
Kim Jong-Il’s death on December 17, 2011 has not only provoked concerns regarding security and stability on the Korean peninsula, but has also raised hopes of improved engagement with North Korea’s new leadership.
The 'Cheonan' incident has prodded and expedited the strategic comeback of the US in East Asia. The US offer to mediate the territorial disputes over islands and seabed minerals in the South China Sea at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in July 2010 has provoked harsh criticism from the Chinese. This US diplomatic move appears to be a premeditated one to substantially diminish the influence of China in the region, to re-secure its own strategic forward military presence and to signal that it is not yet time for China to acquire absolute control over this critical waterway.
