Patrick Bratton

Archive data: Person was International Visiting fellow at IDSA from September 11 – November 17, 2009

Dr. Patrick Bratton is an Assistant Professor of political science and the Program Chair for Political Science and International Relations at Hawai‘i Pacific University (HPU). At IDSA he is working on the use of coercive diplomacy during Indo-Pakistani crises.
At HPU, he teaches courses in international relations, comparative politics, contemporary France, national security, and foreign policy. His research focuses on strategic studies, security in Europe and Asia, foreign policy decision-making, and alliances and transatlantic relations.
He graduated from the University of Alaska, Fairbanks, and then completed graduate studies at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth (UK), and the Université de Rennes 2 (France). He finished his Ph.D. at The Catholic University of America, in Washington, DC. He has worked at The Catholic University of America, the National War College, and Washington College.
Publications
“Franco-American Relations and Implications for the Pacific,” Revue Juridique Polynésienne, forthcoming.
“11/9-9/11: The Brave New World Order,” Villanova Law Review (With Harvey Rishikof); Oct. 2005
“Coming to Terms: When Does Coercion Lead to Positive Long-Term Outcomes?” Naval War College Review, Summer 2005
“When Governments Collide in the Taiwan Strait,” Journal of Strategic Studies (With Wallace Thies); December 2004
“A Coherent Theory of Coercion?”, Comparative Strategy; Oct.-Dec. 2003
“France and the Revolution in Military Affairs,” Contemporary Security Policy, August 2002
He has just finished an article on coercive diplomacy and the Falklands War.
International Visiting Fellow
E-mail: pbratton[at]hpu[dot]edu
Phone: +91 11 2671 7983

Publication

The Creation of Indian Integrated Commands: Organisational Learning and the Andaman and Nicobar Command

India took an unprecedented step 10 years ago by setting up a joint theatre operational command for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANC). This article seeks to examine the following questions: why did India decide to establish its first joint operational command? Why has the creation of this and other unified commands been so incremental in the Indian context? What are the arguments for and against jointness, integration and joint operational commands in the Indian context?

Published: May 2012
Strategic Analysis

Signals and Orchestration: India’s Use of Compellence in the 2001–02 Crisis

How effective was the Indian government in sending clear, coercive signals and orchestrating them into coherent messages during 'Operation Parakram' in 2001-02? This study finds that compellence was hampered by three factors: (1) the government kept changing its demands; (2) the lack of adequate civil-military coordination; and (3) the government engaged in a dual-track policy of direct coercion of Pakistan, while simultaneously engaging the United States to put pressure on Pakistan. Ultimately, these two policy strands worked at cross-purposes to each other.

Published: July 2010
Strategic Analysis

Visitor No: 000058457