Jagannath P. Panda

He worked at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses from 2006 to 2022

Publication

UNSC Resolution 2321 and the DPRK?

In a strong response to the nuclear warhead test of Pyongyang on September 9, 2016, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) at its 7821st meeting, held on November 30, 2016, adopted Resolution 2321 (2016)—officially known as S/RES/2321—imposing fresh sanctions on the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). The Resolution specifically imposes restrictions on the DPRK’s exports that assist Pyongyang in generating revenue for its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.

Institutionalizing the African Reach: Reviewing China’s and India’s Multilateral Drives

Research Fellow, IDSA, Dr Jagannath Panda's research article, titled ‘Institutionalizing the African Reach: Reviewing China's and India's Multilateral Drive’ was published in the Journal of Asian and African Studies (Sage).

Abstract

China and India have for quite some time been participants in African politics and have employed persuasive strategies to make their presence felt in that continent. The main objective of their current participation and presence in Africa is to exploit energy resources and establish greater political connections there. The Chinese strategy is to be generous with loans and financial aid; the Indian strategy has been to employ populist and democratic measures, highlighting its historical and cultural connections with Africa. Pursuing stronger bilateral relations with African countries has been the principal medium of their continental reach. But bilateral bonding has been taking a backseat recently in their approach vis-à-vis multilateral relations, for which institutional and organisational bonding is being used as the prime medium. South Africa is a conspicuous illustration of this approach. Both China and India share strong bilateral ties with South Africa, which is the frontier state for their outreach to Africa. Their engagements with that country through multilateral forums like the AU, BRICS, BASIC and IBSA exhibit how multilateralism is becoming for them a leading approach relative to bilateralism. Their objective, besides enriching and influencing their bilateral understanding with that country, is to achieve their global ambitions and objectives in tandem with the African continent on a whole. This paper examines the instrumental approach that the two countries employ towards Africa where multilateralism is becoming a prime channel of contact over bilateralism. To what extent this approach has advanced their strategic interests in Africa commercially and politically also needs analysis.

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  • Published: 11 March, 2016

Future of India–China Boundary: Leadership Holds the Key?

Will India and China resolve their boundary dispute during the tenure of Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping? The strategic communities in both countries are optimistic, particularly after the high tension prevailing along the border during President Xi Jinping’s tour of India in September 2014. Both Prime Minister Modi and President Xi are seen as decisive leaders.1 Both are expected to hold power in their respective countries for a few years to come. Personalities and personas matter greatly for scoring political brownie points. The boundary dispute, quintessentially, is political in nature.

India-China Ties: Between Personalities and Principles

President Xi Jinping’s visit to India is a new opportunity for infusing momentum in the bilateral relations. Economic dealings would be one aspect of the talks; but neither country can afford to bypass the sensitive security and strategic issues that dog their efforts to bring peace and stability.

China’s Tryst with the IORA: Factoring India and the Indian Ocean

Engaging with a multilateral body requires constructive foreign policy forethought, especially for a country that is not a fully fledged member of that body. China’s overtures to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) exemplify this approach. The Indian Ocean and India are the two most immediate elements in China’s policy approach to the IORA. With 20 member states, extra-territorial major powers as important dialogue partners, and the increasing importance of energy politics in the region, the IORA today is a significant multilateral body in China’s calculus.