Bhabha’s Relevance to India
Bhabha and his Magnificent Obsessions by G. Venkataraman
University Press, Hyderabad, India, first printed 1994, reprinted 1997, 2004, 2005, 2009 (twice), pp. 206, Rs. 200, ISBN 978-8173710070
- Published: May 2010
Bhabha and his Magnificent Obsessions by G. Venkataraman
University Press, Hyderabad, India, first printed 1994, reprinted 1997, 2004, 2005, 2009 (twice), pp. 206, Rs. 200, ISBN 978-8173710070
It is unlikely that the Revcon will be able to agree on a credible roadmap for nuclear disarmament although there may be some marginal progress on some issues.
The Nord Stream Project will further strengthen Prime Minister Putin’s vision of positioning Russia as a major power in the world.
Though the Indus Water Treaty apportions 80 per cent of the waters of the Indus River Basin to Pakistan and only 20 per cent to India, Pakistan is engaged in baseless allegations to inflame public opinion and project India as its number one threat.
Karzai’s use of the word ‘proxy war’ in relation to India’s reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts can only be understood in view of the West’s fatigue in Afghanistan and the growing importance of Pakistan
This article lists the major issues before the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference and goes into the politics behind them. It concludes that as long as the treaty remains iniquitous, it will not be able to prevent nuclear proliferation. The forthcoming nuclear summit in April 2010 provides an opportunity for all countries to work towards a nuclear weapons convention, which outlaws nuclear weapons and promotes genuine nuclear disarmament.
Russia has considerably enhanced its international position by leveraging Western weaknesses stemming from the unwinnable war in Afghanistan and the adverse impact of the financial crisis, as well as Western dependence in dealing with Iran and North Korea.
This is a good time for India to review its Afghan strategy taking into account increasing war weariness of the Western forces and President Karzai’s policy of reintegrating the ‘good Taliban’.
The Copenhagen Accord is weak and a step back from the Bali Action Plan which talked about four pillars of negotiations – mitigation, adaptation, financial support and technology transfer.