Comment & Briefs

An “imperfect” International Code of Conduct can help establish and strengthen norms for responsible space-faring nations. We must make hard choices about which less-than-perfect approach can best serve national and international security.

The Indian government is now weighing several options to manoeuvre around the ever-tightening sanctions, including the provision of sovereign guarantees to oil tanker operators.

The main objective of the summit is to attract foreign investment in Afghanistan, particularly in the context of emerging opportunities in sectors like mining, hydrocarbons, infrastructure, telecommunications, agriculture, education, health services, etc.

Whatever may be the eventual outcome in Syria, there is no denying the fact that for all practical purposes the dream of establishing democracy and the rule of law and the institution of human rights in the Arab World is almost over.

Where does Pakistan figure in ‘Afghan good enough’ if Pakistan’s centrality in the Western approach is taken into account? Not working towards a ‘Pakistan good enough’ would simply mean that ‘Afghan good enough’ is not ‘good enough’.

Despite a humungous infusion of military-logistical support, MONUSCO has achieved little in terms of fulfilling its primary mandate of protecting civilians in the DRC.

The approach of GCC countries towards the Syrian crisis has shifted from appealing for political reforms to internationalising the issue to arming the regime’s opposition.

India will remain a card in the hand of any future Afghan dispensation (whether Taliban or anti-Taliban) to strengthen its negotiating position with Pakistan.

The EU’s Code of Conduct has been advertised as a mechanism to preserve the sustainability and security of space, but it is difficult to comprehend how a non-binding and voluntary mechanism could help achieve this.

The primary role of Israel’s current fleet of ‘Dolphins’ is likely to be limited to serve as instruments of ‘signalling’ strategic intent to potential enemies rather than as effective pre-emptive strike or competent second-strike platforms.