Comment & Briefs

The India-China relations in 2013, in spite Depsang incident, had a more positive than negative tone. Premier Li chose India as his first overseas stop and the pronouncement to deepen ties with India as “strategic choice” along with promise to make “greater efforts” to resolve boundary issue. Equally positive voice came from the Indian leadership for rejecting the relevance of “containment” in favour of “cooperation” that could bring more gains instead.

In a document entitled ‘Our Financial Policy’, the Maoists mention that they have three types of economic needs, viz. the needs of war, political propaganda and the people. To cater to these needs there are three broad categories of resources, viz. (a) membership fee, levy and contributions from the people; (b) confiscation of the wealth and income of the enemy; and (c) ‘revolutionary taxes’ collected in guerrilla zones and base areas.

MoD, according to news reports, has instructed the Army HQ that its permission will need to be taken before changing the structure or role of the units in future. This could easily be interpreted to mean that there are no existing instructions on such vital issues. But such an impression would be wrong.

In the last one year, Xi’s has consolidated his position within the Standing Committee of the Party Politbureau, elevated information security as China’s core concern and focused on internal security as a result of slowing of the economy. Taking a cue from Mao, Xi has promoted the spirit of nationalism in China and like Mao he is finding a foreign target for nothing subsumes internal dissidence as does the promotion of xenophobic tendencies.

While Choudhary’s judicial activism did restore a degree of sanity to Pakistan, it came at the expense of other institutions and created an imbalance of power. Pakistan, to become a normal state, at peace with itself and the world at large, may not need institutional tinkering but a wholesale rejigging of its institutional superstructure and substructure.

China’s border intrusions have been bolstered by a steady and committed expansion of its military hardware and infrastructure in Tibet and neighbouring provinces. The improvement of surface transportation near the LAC has resulted in larger military presence and augmented rapid deployment capacities of the PLA and the PLAAF.

The importance of the road network in the north-east needs no emphasis. India is now raising the 17 Mountain Corps to augment its strategic strike capability vis-à-vis China. The BRO is the key instrument to realise the road network objective and provide the required logistical capability to this Corps.

2013 witnessed the highest ceasefire violations in eight years, accompanied by a sharp increase in security force casualties. Some sections within the media and intelligentsia have misunderstood the army’s presence in disturbed areas as a reflection of its vested interests. It is time that the reality of its role and responsibility are better understood.

All major democracies have opted for the CDS and India cannot ignore it any further. In the prevailing battlefield milieu of joint operations, combined operations and even coalition operations, modern armed forces cannot be successful without a well-developed and deeply ingrained culture of jointmanship.

White House has sought to assuage the West Asian states’ feelings that the ties with Asia-Pacific would not be at their expense. On the other hand, there are strong prescriptions from within the US calling for quietly downgrading involvement in the sorry mess of West Asia as the problems there can at best be managed, but never solved.