Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: The Untold Story
Publisher: Manas Publications
ISBN 81-7049-315-3
Rs. 495 [Download E-Copy] [Buy Now]
- Virendra Gupta , Alok Bansal
- 2007
South Asia
About Centre
Members:
South Asia is one of the main areas of research focus at IDSA. The region has been going through a period of turmoil over the last few years. Definitive steps have been taken in the recent past towards the establishment of democratic governments in the region. Given the importance of developments in the region for Indian security, experts at IDSA keenly watch and analyse unfolding developments in each South Asian country.
Two projects that are currently under progress are ‘Developments in Pakistan’ and ‘Pakistan Occupied Kashmir’. In addition, individual scholars are engaged in researching various security related aspects pertaining to South Asian countries. The Centre has established bilateral institutional relations with leading think tanks in the region and proposes to undertake joint studies.
Publisher: Manas Publications
ISBN 81-7049-315-3
Rs. 495 [Download E-Copy] [Buy Now]
Publishers: Promilla & Co. and Bibliphile South Asia
ISBN: 81-85002-76-2
Rs. 295
US $ 14.95
Publishers: IDSA and Promilla & Co.
ISBN: 81-86019-50-02
Rs 1175
US $ 45
Publishers: IDSA and Promilla & Co.
ISBN: 81-86019-51-0
Rs 795
US $ 30
Publisher: Roli
ISBN: 81-7436-310-6
Rs 450
Publishers: IDSA and Shipra
ISBN: 81-7541-165-1
Rs 395
US $ 30
Publisher: IDSA and Knowledge World
ISBN: 81-86019-28-6
Rs. 650
Publisher: IDSA and Knowledge World
ISBN: 81-86019-20-0
Publisher: IDSA and Lancer Publications
ISBN: 1-89 7829-44-2
Rs. 495
US $ 28; £ 19.95
India’s current Prime Minister Narendra Modi is often touted as India’s Deng Xiaoping, expected to lead the country on a path of economic reform and accelerated growth.1 While Modi rose to power on an economic mandate, it is his foreign policy that has received the most attention in the media. Modi has been criticised by the media, the public and the opposition parties for taking several overseas trips in his short tenure in office.
India is often perceived as a regional power, but a closer look reveals that it is in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis China in South Asia. The first reason is that Indian governments never had the political, economic, and military capacities to pursue their regional power ambitions with their neighbours in the long run. South Asian countries could always play the China card in order to evade India’s influence. Second, India’s new South Asia policy with the focus on trade and connectivity has improved regional cooperation since 1991.
This article explores the backdrop of the engagement between the International Community (IC) and the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) over the conduct of the military during the last stages of its engagement with the secessionist Tamil militants which (especially from January to May 2009) led to a humanitarian crisis. The efforts of the IC to persuade the GoSL to halt the military operations and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to concede defeat, to ensure human security, were a failure.
This article argues that while the concept of peace building proved beneficial to Western society, it drew flak in pre-2014 Afghanistan for its inbuilt faults, the overarching US–Taliban conflict and the state failure towards meeting the prerequisites of the coalition strategy. It also argues that peace building in the immediate future of post-2014 Afghanistan is improbable due to the existing and likely conflicts between and among the Afghan government, the Taliban and the newly emerging Daesh or IS group for power, group and ideological domination.
Since the fall of the Mahinda Rajapaksa government, there has been an apparent foreign policy shift in Sri Lanka. There is a growing view that the new National Unity Government (NUG), which came to power in January 2015 with Maithripala Sirisena as President, has shown its proclivities towards India and the US and moved away from China, especially under Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe.
India’s engagement with its neighbours received a policy reinvigoration after the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government assumed power and announced its ‘neighbourhood first’ policy. The first sign of this policy was visible when Prime Minister Narendra Modi invited all the heads of state of the neighbouring countries for his oath-taking ceremony, on May 26, 2014. India’s interest and engagement with the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has also intensified in the past few years – from being a reluctant player to driving the regional economic agenda.
Intelligence sharing by the Pakistani National Security Advisor (NSA) with his Indian counterpart in early March 2016 came up as an interesting outcome of the ongoing engagement between them since December 2015. Such exchange of critical information has raised the levels of expectation among the peaceniks in the subcontinent about the prospects of peace talks between the two countries, after a whole series of false starts since 2008.
In 2015, when India and Pakistan are into their 69th year of independence, this is an occasion to look back on the lost plot of their strategic engagements. The partition of an undivided India, built upon a malicious traction of ‘two-nation theory’ was further firmed-up with Pakistan’s dealings with its neighbourhood through a consistent conflict-ridden worldview. More so, this idea turned into action—and further obsession, when matters would relate to India.
There are multiple levels of relationship between India and Nepal. This article deals exclusively with their bilateral transit relations, focusing on their negotiations in the context of Nepal as a landlocked developing country (LLDC). While LLDCs consider their free access to the nearest seaport through a transit country as a natural right, the transit countries often bargain with them from a position of strength.
Environmental crisis in the rural areas of developing countries is increasingly becoming an important cause of cross-border migration of population and South Asia is no exception to this phenomenon. Such movement of population in the Indo-Bangladesh context is generating a range of destabilising socio-political, economic, ethnic and communal tensions in India. It has embittered Indo-Bangladesh relations, causing tensions between the two countries.
As the civilian political space shrinks and the capacity of the state gets hobbled by political dissension and internal resistance from forces armed with an alternate blueprint for action, Pakistan is likely to rely more on its anti-India stance to build national unity, seeking especially to suck in the militant religious groups into its orbit.
Sheikh Hasina and her India-friendly policies are not liked by her domestic and international opponents. The Awami League government should remain vigilant to the designs of forces inimical to it, and not let them undo the progress in India–Bangladesh relations.
The recent statement by the former Amirs (chiefs) of Jama’at-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir, which was banned in 2019, seems to be a tactical move by the leadership to save the organisational structure from any kind of damage and to continue Islamisation of the society at the grassroots level.
The geo-strategic location of Afghanistan has tempted many dominant powers to intervene but no great power has been able to occupy or attain predominance in the country. The US failed to fulfill its geo-strategic objectives even after two decades of war and peace efforts aimed at either subduing or pacifying insurgency in the country.
US–Pakistan relations have witnessed upheavals in the past; the US’ exit from Afghanistan is the latest in the series of inflection points in their relationship. However, irrespective of the escalatory war of words sometimes, the nature of US–Pakistan relationship of convenience is likely to keep them strategically aligned in the future as well.
The relationship between TTP, or Pakistani Taliban, and Afghan Taliban will continue to be dictated by religious-ideological convergence, ethnic-fraternal linkages and the close camaraderie that emerged while they were fighting together against the foreign ‘occupying’ forces in Afghanistan.
India's emphasis on humanitarian crisis, concerns about possible misuse of Afghan territory by fringe elements, and silence on issues like how to deal with Taliban, and the prospect of India's recognition of new regime or lack of it, indicate that India's new Afghanistan policy is still in making.
Mired in controversies, the 2021 elections in the so-called Azad Jammu and Kashmir were heavily tilted towards the Kashmir issue, which overpowered all other issues including those concerning immediate local needs and the extant development lag.
The choice of words Taliban employs to communicate with the international community is symptomatic not only of the limits of inter-cultural communication, but also depicts how meanings move across geo-cultural spaces and that “right” vocabularies are being used indeed as a qualifier to join the community of nations.
The unfolding horror in Afghanistan appears foreboding for India, as for the rest of the world, considering that a war-ravaged Afghanistan can well become a global terrorism hub under the Taliban.
