India has been dealing with terrorism for several decades, and is therefore constructively involved in all genuine exercises for countering the menace. As terror groups are expected to use weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), India fully supports the legal and other operational measures and mechanisms adopted by multilateral and international organisations to mitigate the risk of WMD terrorism. A resolution has been steered in the United Nations General Assembly to gain international support for fighting WMD terrorism.

• Arvind Gupta , Rajiv Nayan
• March 2014
• Strategic Analysis

The issue of nuclear security has several dimensions including security of nuclear materials and facilities, export controls, security of technologies and development of technologies that are proliferation-resistant. Each of these dimensions needs examination from an applicable perspective. India looks at nuclear technology and nuclear materials primarily as a resource for meeting a part of its requirements for electricity.

• R.B. Grover
• March 2014
• Strategic Analysis

Disarmament and non-proliferation are rightfully viewed as two sides of the same coin: the two imperatives that need to be met if the prospect of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is to be realised. Although the existence of a link between the two concepts is obvious, the exact nature of this connection is perhaps not as clear. The central question here is whether it is politics or strategic realities that shape states’ nuclear options and by implication, the two-fold road to global zero.

• Dimitrios Machairas
• January 2014
• Strategic Analysis

On 11 May 1998, two events took place:

(1)India carried out nuclear tests; and
(2)India declared itself to be a state with nuclear weapons.1

• Jasjit Singh
• November 2013
• Strategic Analysis

India's relationship with the nuclear non-proliferation regime deteriorated sharply after its 1974 underground nuclear test which, according to India, was a peaceful nuclear explosion, but which was not accepted as such by the regime. That it did not follow up with immediate weaponisation challenged the core logic of the non-proliferation regime which operates on a Murphy's Law of ‘nuclear fatalism’, i.e. if a country has the know-how to produce nuclear weapons, it will certainly produce them.

• Jayita Sarkar
• May 2013
• Strategic Analysis

The 2005 US—India nuclear pact created ripples of controversy and debates within in a short period of time. In the US, the nuclear agreement was weighed vis-à-vis the non-proliferation regime—does it strengthen or weaken the regime? On the contrary, in India concerns were raised regarding the implications for India's strategic as well as civilian nuclear programmes. This article highlights the disjuncture in the concerns raised in the US and India.

• Vandana Bhatia
• July 2012
• Strategic Analysis

Currently, India's nuclear doctrine is one of inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ in case of nuclear first use against it or its forces anywhere. The problem with this is that at current levels of vertical proliferation it is liable to face a counter strike of equal proportions. This may not be in India's interests when viewed in relation to the inevitable setback to its trajectory of progress. Therefore, there is a case for terminating nuclear exchanges at the lowest possible level in case of nuclear first use of low opprobrium quotient or violence.

• Ali Ahmed
• July 2012
• Strategic Analysis

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR), ranging from the Suez Canal in the west to the Strait of Malacca in the east, is of crucial importance for Europe. However, Europe's interest in the region's maritime space and its security challenges is limited.

• Radu N. Botez
• May 2012
• Strategic Analysis

The Indo-US nuclear deal not only opened the gates of international nuclear trade for India, but it also showed that India was ready to take its rightful place among the comity of nations as an emerging power. For three long years from 2005 to 2008, the world's strongest and largest democracies were involved in intense diplomatic parleys. At stake in these negotiations was not only the normative order in the form of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT), but also the very existence of the ruling political dispensation in India.

• Yogesh Joshi
• March 2012
• Strategic Analysis

everal measures are being initiated by the international community to secure sensitive materials. Al Qaeda's open interest in acquiring nuclear weapons and the rise of terrorist activity in nuclear-armed Pakistan have triggered a global interest in the need to secure nuclear weapons and materials. In April 2010 President Obama invited some key countries and international organisations in Washington to frame a new regime for nuclear security. The emerging regime includes some older initiatives as well as some new mechanisms, and it must address a number of issues.

• Rajiv Nayan
• January 2012
• Strategic Analysis

India’s decision to reject the NPT was a display of astute statecraft with idealist posturing used to masquerade pursuit of national interests.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• September 25, 2020
• Issue Brief

As the focus and priority of the international community in recent years have been on averting nuclear terrorism and nuclear accidents, the nuclear experience of synergising safety and security can be highly useful in combating threats like COVID-19.

• Rajiv Nayan
• April 21, 2020
• Issue Brief

Even after five decades of its entry-into-force, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is largely seen as a Cold War era instrument that has failed to fulfill the objective of creating a pathway towards a credible disarmament process.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• March 31, 2020
• Issue Brief

The SIPRI report on the volume of international arms transfers during 2015-19 highlights the strengths of key strategic partnerships such as Russia-India, US-Japan and China-Pakistan, reinforced by arms trade.

• Kanica Rakhra
• March 25, 2020
• IDSA Comments

The Defence Minister’s recent statement on ‘no first use’ basically underlines the fact that India’s current nuclear doctrine is working well.

• Rajiv Nayan
• September 16, 2019
• IDSA Comments

Nuclear doctrines and postures are dynamic processes that evolve with the security environment. Twenty years after India’s nuclear doctrine was first drafted, the time is ripe for a comprehensive review and suitable revisions.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• August 27, 2019
• Issue Brief

The Arms Trade Treaty is flawed and requires strengthening. Ratified States need to take the lead in fortifying the Treaty before more member States are asked to join.

• Kanica Rakhra
• May 29, 2019
• IDSA Comments

An ASAT in itself is not a defensive system that could ‘safeguard’ any asset. Instead, it is an offensive system that could solely be used for retribution in response to an attack on India’s space assets. In that sense, the capability can only be used as a deterrent against a potential rival.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• March 28, 2019
• IDSA Comments

While Iran and its European interlocutors (along with Russia and China) can be expected to mount a tough challenge to continue to make the JCPOA work in the light of Trump’s May 8 decision to ‘withdraw’ from the agreement, it remains to be seen to what extent they can succeed.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv
• May 17, 2018
• Issue Brief

The standoffs in Doklam and North Korea offer insights on how crisis stability remains subject to the complexities of deterrence, especially in theatres with multiple nuclear-armed states, and what this entails for disarmament.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• December 29, 2017
• IDSA Comments