The East Asia Centre is dedicated to study and research the domestic and foreign policies of individual countries of the region as well as India’s multifaceted relationships with these countries. With respect to China, the Centre’s research foci are its foreign policy (particularly towards the US, Russia, Central Asia and Asia Pacific), domestic politics, economy, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and India’s relationship with China in all its dimensions. The Centre’s research also focuses on Taiwan, its domestic politics, Sino-Taiwanese relationship and Indo-Taiwanese relationship, Hong Kong and India-Hong Kong relations. Japan and Korea are the other major focus of the Centre, with its research focused on their domestic politics, foreign policy and comprehensive bilateral relationships with India. The geopolitics of the Asia Pacific and the Korean peninsula are also studied in the Centre.
The centre brings out five monthly newsletters: East Asia Military Monitor, Japan Digest, China Science and Technology, Korea Newsletter, and China Military Digest.
No posts of Books and Monograph.
India and Indonesia, the two major regional powers, have in the recent past initiated intimate bilateral relations. With globalization as a key driver, the two countries have reconfigured their relationship particularly in the economic and defence spheres. The signing of the strategic partnership in 2005 has been critical to strengthening of the bilateral ties. Security relations are complimentary. While India needs to safeguard its interests in Southeast Asia, Indonesia needs a benign power like India for its security concerns.
China's efforts to build 'nodes' of influence in the Indian Ocean Region have been increasingly discernible in recent years. This endeavour, many argue, is driven by Beijing's military-strategic ends. However, such an argument remains a speculation, backed by frail and somewhat disjointed evidence. At least in the public domain, it may be too early to marshal tangible evidence to prove or dismiss the hypothesis.
Chinese military modernization and its resulting aggressive posturing have serious implications for Asian stability and Indian security. This article is an attempt to understand the main security challenges from a Chinese perspective; the kind of responses, especially military, that China has undertaken; and the way Chinese military strategy has evolved from Mao's People's War days to a modern hi-tech military force today.
The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are one of the variables of the distinctly pacifist security policy Japan has followed ever since the end of the war. Japan's ongoing 'normalisation' involves an enhancement of the role and functions of these forces. Although the SDF's role has considerably increased in the past decade, it cannot be characterised as Japan's remilitarisation because of strong domestic and external checks.
The traditional Sino-Pakistan friendship of 55 years now has a new objective—to improve the economic content of their relationship, which comprises trade, investment and energy co-operation within a bilateral framework. The result of this determination to implement the new economic agenda is visible in the quantum of Chinese investment in Pakistan.
The 'rise of China' discourse articulates the transformation of China's internal structure and growth of its comprehensive national strength. From a Chinese perspective, the 'rise of China' and 'peaceful development' are concurrent themes that express and blend with the twin trends of globalisation and multipolarisation. This article argues that by adhering to the processes of 'multilateralism' and promoting 'commercial diplomacy', China has consciously made efforts to improve its international image.
Japan is in denial mode about its role during World War II while China is attempting to gain legitimacy for its regional ambitions by leveraging the memory of its suffering in that war.
FIPIC-2 has added substantially to the package of projects and activities. This has now to be matched by delivery and implementation, which are challenging tasks for the Indian government.
While it is Japan’s responsibility to pave the road to reconciliation, but for any meaningful progress China and South Korea must reciprocate since reconciliation is a two-way process.
How did the Chinese media portray Prime Minister Modi’s May 2015 visit? And what does that indicate about official China’s perceptions of India given that the coverage of India in the Chinese media is overwhelmingly State-controlled?
For the 70th commemoration anniversary of the end of World War II to be meaningful, Japan, China and South Korea need to jointly address the issues involved through a combination of moral responsibility and political maturity.
By extending the notion of national security to the domains of space and the earth’s poles, the Chinese government has expressed its determination to undertake every measure to safeguard interests even in areas beyond the national border.
Even if China has not stated that it cannot settle the border question with India in the immediate future, its actions certainly hint at its preference for border peace and control over an early resolution.
Indian Navy must focus fresh attention on the challenge posed by the Pakistan-China maritime nexus in the Western Indian Ocean.
In China’s foreign policy setting, the logic of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘history’ are employed or applied selectively as is evident from its reservation on India’s oil exploration in the South China Sea and its own plans to implement the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor through Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir despite India’s reservations.
The revised defence guidelines have added value to the US-Japan partnership and the fundamental shift in Japanese security policy complements the US call upon Japan to shoulder greater security responsibility as a partner.