Should India ‘Be East’ or Be Eurasian?
The recent fad among Western security commentaries is to portray India as a natural member of East Asian political life.
- Zorawar Daulet Singh
- January 2012
East Asia
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The recent fad among Western security commentaries is to portray India as a natural member of East Asian political life.
The central focus of this article is to understand the evolution of the Chinese People's Liberation Army's engagement with UN peacekeeping operations in the light of China's military diplomacy. The article underlines that the PLA works as a foreign policy instrument in UN peacekeeping operations and furthers China's foreign policy agenda in many ways.
The responses to the arguments that I forwarded in my initial essay, ‘China in SAARC? To What Effect?’, have introduced interesting dimensions to this debate. While most of the respondents have agreed with my proposition that it is premature to think about China's entry into the South Asian regionalist project and that it would introduce complex challenges that would be difficult to manage, they disagree with some of the reasons that I have cited.
Is democracy a criterion for the membership of SAARC? It is not. One should not forget that it was General Zia ur Rahman, president of Bangladesh, who had initiated regional cooperation as a part of his strategy to diversify Bangladesh's Indo-centric foreign policy after Sheikh Mujib's assassination. The grouping in the beginning had two monarchs from Nepal and Bhutan, two military dictators from Pakistan and Bangladesh, and one authoritarian ruler from the Maldives, apart from India and Sri Lanka which were democracies as member countries.
‘China in SAARC: To What Effect?’ is a detailed article and the author has elaborated the modest achievements of SAARC despite its 25 years of existence. One of the foremost problems in the regional grouping has been a restricted charter which desperately needs a revision.
Sujit Dutta's article, ‘China in SAARC? To What Effect?’ is a thought-provoking essay. It raises an appropriate and timely debate on a theme that is of vital significance for the peace and prosperity of South Asia. Sujit has given a sound conceptual background on regionalism and has strongly argued against supporting China's membership in SAARC.
A recognised China specialist like Sujit sees the writing on the wall in view of the proposal of some of India's neighbours to include China in SAARC.
The debate on giving the People's Republic of China full membership of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is primarily seen in the context of positive and negative thinking. While China has an observer status in SAARC along with Australia, the EU, Japan, Iran, Mauritius, Myanmar, South Korea and the United States, its case for full membership is primarily advocated by Nepal and Pakistan but not supported by India.
There is a common tendency among analysts and policy makers to compare SAARC with the EU and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). This is not fair. There are significant differences among these three regional groupings. Geo-strategically India looms too large in SAARC in a manner incomparable with Indonesia in ASEAN or Germany and France in the EU. Economically, SAARC started with a poor economic base and there were no large investments from outsiders like in ASEAN and the EU to boost economic cooperation.
Professor Sujit Dutta's article, ‘China in SAARC? To What Effect?’ has made an excellent case for the desirability of regionalism as it offers public commons to members of such institutions. Indeed the EU and ASEAN are prime examples of such cooperation as they generate political, economic and security benefits for their members, though to different degrees.
Over the past few years there has been a move by some of the member states of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to induct China into the regional organisation. China, in turn, has indicated its desire to join. Since other extra-regional states were also keen to be involved, SAARC has opened its doors since 2007 for out-of region states through a new arrangement.
Xi envisions China as a key player in shaping the new global order with Chinese characteristics. His grand strategy is in consonance with the Chinese strategic culture of ‘thinking deep and far’
The inclusion of the Belt and Road Initiative in the Charter of the Communist Party of China indicates that it is not merely an economic policy but rather a ‘political project’.
China and to a lesser extent Pakistan have helped North Korea with its nuclear and missile development programmes.
The various connectivity projects put forward by India show its involvement as an investor in capacity-building efforts in the recipient countries across sectors of their particular needs and choices, not as an overarching and imposing economic power.
While the crisis has been defused for the time being, the probability of a future flare up cannot be ruled out. A holistic strategic review ought to be carried out over a wide spectrum and in a multi-dimensional manner with specific timelines.
The India-Japan ‘action-oriented partnership’ is founded on the pillars of mutuality of interests, shared universal values and commonality of vision in the Indo-Pacific.
The crisis over North Korea’s reckless but successful pursuit of nuclear- weapon capability and the misguided response thereto by the United States is taking the world nearer to an unnecessary and perfectly avoidable catastrophe.
Will the next meeting between PM Modi and President Xi at the Xiamen BRICS Summit lead to what Foreign Secretary Jaishankar has described as a new equilibrium?
Before selectively invoking historical contexts and postulates such as Panchsheel, Chinese officials need to ask themselves “do we have the right to say this.”
Unfortunately, the incoherence in US policy under Trump makes one fear that the probability of a disastrous miscalculation is truly worrisome.
