Mr. Niranjan Oak, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA, made a presentation on “China’s Nuclear Arsenal: An Assessment” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 8 July 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Rajiv Nayan, Senior Research Associate, MP-IDSA.  The scholars of the Institute were in attendance.

Executive Summary

The growth of the Chinese nuclear arsenal is on account of threat perception coming from the US. China is moving away from a minimum deterrence policy, although the minimum is a subjective term; the sheer number of estimated warheads is huge and is increasing every year. The character of the stockpile is changing, and is getting diversified which in turn is reflected in all three legs of the triad. There is a marked improvement in both conventional and nuclear capabilities in terms of precision, mobility and technology. 

Detailed Report

Before introducing the Speaker, Dr. Rajiv Nayan introduced the topic by providing important background details about the release of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report on the nuclear stockpile in the world.

Mr. Niranjan Oak began his presentation by explaining the organisation of the Chinese nuclear force structure. Among the four services of the People’s Liberation Army, PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) is in charge of nuclear and conventional land-based missiles, which in turn is commanded by the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, currently held by President Xi Jinping. Following Xi Jinping’s arrival at the helm of affairs, the name of the Second Artillery Force was changed to PLARF.

Subsequently, Mr. Oak explained the expanding capacity of PLARF in terms of its increasing number of bases and brigades, as well as the evolution of China’s land-based missiles, the mainstay of which is the Dongfeng series of missiles. Regarding sea-based missiles, China has fielded six Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Each of these SSBNs can carry up to 12 three-stage solid fuelled JL2 and JL3 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM). In addition, China is also developing next-generation Type 096 SSBNs with carrying capacity of up to 24 SLBMs.

Mr. Oak also explained China’s aircraft and aircraft delivered missile capabilities, supposedly the weakest link in the Chinese nuclear triad. The H-6N is China’s first nuclear-capable bomber with the capability to be refueled in mid-air. To arm H-6N, China has been developing two new air-launched ballistic missiles. The Chinese bombers can carry CJ-20 air launched cruise missiles with conventional and nuclear warheads. China is said to be developing its first long-range strategic bomber H-20 with an anticipated range of more than 10,000 kilometers and a stealth design.

Mr. Oak then touched upon Chinese Hypersonic missile capabilities. There are two types of hypersonic missiles- hypersonic boost glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles. China has been carrying out tests of DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicles since December 2014. It is reported to possess a range of 1600-2400 kilometers. China has deployed a DF-17 medium-range missile system equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles since 2019. According to reports, China has conducted a successful flight test of an intermediate-range ballistic missile DF-27 with hypersonic traits, thus, increasing range and delivery capacity of China. Additionally, China reportedly conducted a test of the Starry Sky 2 Xingkong-2 hypersonic cruise missile. This system is believed to have a range of 700-800 km and a top speed of Mach 6 with a specific feature of wave rider flight vehicle after the launch.

Mr. Oak detailed another important military technology, the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). In 2021, China conducted a test of FOBS equipped with a hypersonic boost glide vehicle. Regarding the 2021 revelation of missile silos (through satellite imageries), reports indicates that China has built approximately 350 silos. Considering that China has Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology, it can store more than 1000 missiles. As SIPRI data puts it, the Chinese nuclear stockpiles are 500 nuclear warheads. The same report claims that the number of Chinese ICBM’s is likely to reach or even exceed the number held either by Russia or US, which is around 400 ICBMs. 

Subsequently, Mr. Oak talked about the changing Chinese nuclear posture.  The emergence and relevance of the Launch on Warning system in Chinese nuclear strategy was explored. The studies by both western and Chinese academia corroborate this development. The Science of Military Strategy 2020 discusses how the US and Russia maintain a state of high alert when it comes to strategic weapons, and therefore, even China should maintain a state of high alert. Mr. Oak, then, elaborated upon the drivers of China’s changing nuclear profile.

First and foremost in this category is the US’s improved conventional capability. The collapse of INF Treaty along with development of more advanced missiles like land based Tomahawk missiles and SM-6 missiles is threatening to China. Secondly, a section of experts in China believe that US conventional counter-force capabilities, together with tactical weapons would degrade or even eliminate China’s secure second strike. The third factor is Taiwan. China wants to annex Taiwan, if necessary, by force. Most recently, Xi reiterated his reunification pledge in April 2024. The fourth factor is Great Power status wherein Mr. Oak concluded that China has resources and material wherewithal to go for nuclear modernisation, thus achieving great power status.

After describing the drivers of change in China’s nuclear posture, Mr. Oak shared his own assessment. The growth of the Chinese nuclear arsenal is due to the threat perception from the US. China is moving away from the minimum deterrence policy, although minimum is a subjective term; the sheer number of estimated warheads is huge and is increasing every year. The character of the arsenal is changing in all three legs of the triad, and is diversifying. There is a marked improvement in both conventional and nuclear capabilities in terms of precision, mobility and technology. Technological advances are making the PLA develop and deploy hypersonic weapons, MIRVs and FOBS. At the operational level, nuclear forces are on high alert, leading to compressed timelines for decision making.

In the end, Mr. Oak explained what the above developments meant for India and what India could do in order to gain a competitive edge. Even if India has numerically fewer nuclear warheads than China, India needs to disperse its nuclear warheads and launchers innovatively throughout the country to survive the first strike. 

The India-China nuclear dyad has already entered a classic stability-instability paradox. There is less likelihood of nuclear confrontation. But there are increasing chances of conventional confrontation. With nuclear stability at the strategic level; India needs to improve its conventional capabilities.

Before opening the floor for questions and comments, Dr. Nayan made pertinent observations with respect to a range of issues related to FOBS, China’s defence modernisation in terms of nuclear advancement, the Chinese ‘no first use’ policy, China-Russia collaboration and growing US-China confrontation essentially pushing up the world’s defence budget.

The Report is prepared by Mr. Abhishek Verma, Research Analyst, Internal Security Centre, MP-IDSA.