Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visits to North Korea and Vietnam have resulted in new military and economic agreements. Russia and North Korea signed the ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement’, which has put neighbours in the region, mainly South Korea and Japan, on high alert. During his visit to Vietnam, President Putin and Vietnamese President To Lam signed 11 agreements in areas such as oil and gas exploration and nuclear science and technology, among others.
North Korea: Old Friend, New Ties
Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) shared ideological affinity as communist states during the Cold War era. In 1961, the two countries signed the Russo-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which included provisions
for extending mutual assistance in the event of aggression.1
During the 1990s, the Russian-North Korean economic ties declined dramatically, with trade plummeting from US$ 2.35 billion in 1990 to US$ 65 million in 1998.2 Russia under President Boris Yeltsin leaned towards the Republic of Korea (ROK), anticipating it to grow to be a significant economic partner. During his visit to Seoul in November 1992, President Yeltsin signed the treaty on basic relations, which laid down the main principles of Russia–South Korean relations. With President Kim En Sam’s visit to Moscow in June 1994, exchanges at the ministerial level and between military delegations, and cooperation in areas such as education and culture, expanded.
In 2008, Russia and ROK upgraded their ties to the level of strategic cooperative partnership, with the aim to promote relations across security, energy and aerospace among other aspects.3 By 2015, the ROK had become Russia’s seventh-largest trading partner, albeit the mix of Russian exports to South Korea noticeably lacked diversity, with natural resources (exclusively oil and natural gas) accounting for roughly three-quarters of Russian exports to South Korea. On the other hand, the majority of South Korea’s exports to Russia were made up of cars, machinery and other technological goods.4 Bilateral relations though were hit in the aftermath of the start of the Ukraine war in February 2022 with South Korea implementing sanctions against Moscow.
Kim Jong Un’s September 2023 visit to Russia followed by Putin’s recent visit to North Korea and the signing of the strategic partnership treaty have noticeably increased the momentum of Moscow–Pyongyang ties. North Korea has emerged as a key supplier of conventional weapons, including artillery shells to Russia during the ongoing Ukraine conflict.5 Since 2023, North Korea has shipped an estimated 6,700 containers of munitions via rail and sea routes.6 In turn, Pyongyang secured resources, such as energy, food, raw material and parts used in weapons manufacturing. In 2023 itself, Russia sent more than 1,00,000 barrels of refined petroleum to Pyongyang.7 Additionally, since the start of 2024, Russia has supplied thousands of tons of flour and corn to North Korea.8
The newly signed Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between DPRK and the Russian Federation states in Article 4 that
If either side is attacked by an individual state or several states and enters a state of war, the other side will provide military and other assistance without delay by all means at its disposal.9
This is similar to the 1961 Treaty’s provision of mutual defence, where in Article 1 it mentioned:
Should either of the Contracting Parties suffer armed attack by any State or coalition of States and thus find itself in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.10
Analysts note that a likely consequence of the treaty could be an increase in collaboration in the production of munitions, with North Korea producing more weapons for Russia. In turn, Russia could offer more technical support for North Korea’s ballistic missile and satellite programmes, most likely including assistance in the ‘development of submarines capable of launching ballistic nuclear missile’.11
This would entail significant implications for the regional security landscape, especially for South Korea and Japan. The South Korean Foreign Minister, Cho Tae-yul and the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken have condemned the treaty and called it a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, stating that ‘the agreement poses a grave threat to the security of both the ROK and the U.S., as well as to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the broader region’.12
South Korea has provided humanitarian aid and other support to Ukraine, while joining U.S.-led economic sanctions against Russia. In August 2023, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol announced financial aid of 520 billion won (US$ 394 million) for Ukraine. This aid package includes 130 billion won for reconstruction, 260 billion in humanitarian aid, and another 130 billion won through international organisations.13 South Korea has not directly provided arms to Kyiv, citing a long-standing policy of not sending weapons to countries actively involved in combat. This could, however, change due to the recent Russia–North Korea treaty signing, with reports noting that South Korea is considering supplying arms to Ukraine.
Vietnam: Neutral, but Close
Vietnam’s robust ties with Russia date back many decades, owing to the military, economic and diplomatic support provided by the Soviet Union to the communist leadership in North Vietnam in the 1950s. As one of Asia’s fastest-growing economies, manufacturing powerhouse and leading exporter of goods, Hanoi has a multi-vector approach known as ‘Bamboo Diplomacy’, aimed at balancing Vietnam’s relations with the major powers by not taking sides, being self-reliant and demonstrating flexibility to maintain its agency and interests, helping it take advantage of economic opportunities created by major power competition.
Vietnam has upgraded its relations with important global actors such as the United States, Japan and Australia, demonstrating its growing influence on the world stage. While Russia’s agreement with North Korea has raised significant security concerns about the Korean Peninsula, the last leg of Putin’s Asia tour focused on strengthening the traditional Russia–Vietnamese relations. Both leaders have stated their aims to further the cooperation between the two nations in education, science and technology, oil and gas exploration and clean energy. The two nations agreed to collaborate on a roadmap for a nuclear science and technology centre in Vietnam.14
The Southeast Asian nation has chosen to abstain from various resolutions at the United Nations condemning Russia’s actions, yet maintained good relations with Ukraine and even sent some aid to Kyiv. In 2022, the Vietnamese government provided US$ 500,000 as humanitarian aid to support the people affected in the Ukraine conflict.15 Following its long-held foreign policy, Vietnam has maintained a neutral stance on the Ukraine conflict and is trying to court major powers equally. It is the only country to successfully host leaders from the US, China and Russia in recent times and is one of the largest importers of Russian arms. In the period 2016–2022, Vietnam bought 5.9 per cent of Russia’s weapons at US$ 1.7 billion.16 However, it plans to diversify its arms imports and reduce reliance on its traditional ally.
Amid tensions with China, these improving ties with Russia could also help Vietnam protect its disputed waters. With the aim to deepen relations in the energy sector, Vietnam has licensed Zarubezhneft, a Russian state-controlled oil company, to develop an offshore block on its southeastern coast.17 The so-called Block 11-2, however, appears to be inside the disputed nine-dash-line, a part of the area that China claims to be its own.18 Therefore, this offshore block might help Vietnam to maintain its claims in the contested part of the South China Sea.
Furthermore, Putin’s visit ahead of the October 2024 BRICS Summit under the Russian Chairmanship, also shows support for Vietnam’s keen interest in joining the group of emerging economies. Formally joining the grouping would benefit Vietnam by aligning their foreign policy of using multilateral diplomatic institutions to promote a multipolar world order and enhance economic ties with emerging economies.19
Key Takeaways
Amidst the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Russia has sought to strengthen its ties with DPRK and Vietnam in face of the growing isolationism due to the West’s sanctions. Russia and DPRK’s upgraded partnership broadens their collaboration across multiple areas and could lead to significant changes in the dynamics of Northeast Asian security. South Korea and Japan, the two non-nuclear powers, may further strengthen diplomatic and security cooperation with the United States as well as strengthen their own defence profiles to counter the threats posed by DPRK in the region.20 On the other hand, for Vietnam, Russia is an important source of military assistance and a valued partner in the former’s energy sector. While some analysts note that Russia–Vietnam cooperation in the hydrocarbon sector could strengthen Vietnam’s claims in the South China Sea, Russia is less likely to take measures that might jeopardize Chinese interests in this region, given the increasing robustness in Moscow–Beijing ties.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visits to North Korea and Vietnam have resulted in new military and economic agreements. Russia and North Korea signed the ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement’, which has put neighbours in the region, mainly South Korea and Japan, on high alert. During his visit to Vietnam, President Putin and Vietnamese President To Lam signed 11 agreements in areas such as oil and gas exploration and nuclear science and technology, among others.
North Korea: Old Friend, New Ties
Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) shared ideological affinity as communist states during the Cold War era. In 1961, the two countries signed the Russo-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which included provisions
for extending mutual assistance in the event of aggression.1
During the 1990s, the Russian-North Korean economic ties declined dramatically, with trade plummeting from US$ 2.35 billion in 1990 to US$ 65 million in 1998.2 Russia under President Boris Yeltsin leaned towards the Republic of Korea (ROK), anticipating it to grow to be a significant economic partner. During his visit to Seoul in November 1992, President Yeltsin signed the treaty on basic relations, which laid down the main principles of Russia–South Korean relations. With President Kim En Sam’s visit to Moscow in June 1994, exchanges at the ministerial level and between military delegations, and cooperation in areas such as education and culture, expanded.
In 2008, Russia and ROK upgraded their ties to the level of strategic cooperative partnership, with the aim to promote relations across security, energy and aerospace among other aspects.3 By 2015, the ROK had become Russia’s seventh-largest trading partner, albeit the mix of Russian exports to South Korea noticeably lacked diversity, with natural resources (exclusively oil and natural gas) accounting for roughly three-quarters of Russian exports to South Korea. On the other hand, the majority of South Korea’s exports to Russia were made up of cars, machinery and other technological goods.4 Bilateral relations though were hit in the aftermath of the start of the Ukraine war in February 2022 with South Korea implementing sanctions against Moscow.
Kim Jong Un’s September 2023 visit to Russia followed by Putin’s recent visit to North Korea and the signing of the strategic partnership treaty have noticeably increased the momentum of Moscow–Pyongyang ties. North Korea has emerged as a key supplier of conventional weapons, including artillery shells to Russia during the ongoing Ukraine conflict.5 Since 2023, North Korea has shipped an estimated 6,700 containers of munitions via rail and sea routes.6 In turn, Pyongyang secured resources, such as energy, food, raw material and parts used in weapons manufacturing. In 2023 itself, Russia sent more than 1,00,000 barrels of refined petroleum to Pyongyang.7 Additionally, since the start of 2024, Russia has supplied thousands of tons of flour and corn to North Korea.8
The newly signed Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between DPRK and the Russian Federation states in Article 4 that
This is similar to the 1961 Treaty’s provision of mutual defence, where in Article 1 it mentioned:
Analysts note that a likely consequence of the treaty could be an increase in collaboration in the production of munitions, with North Korea producing more weapons for Russia. In turn, Russia could offer more technical support for North Korea’s ballistic missile and satellite programmes, most likely including assistance in the ‘development of submarines capable of launching ballistic nuclear missile’.11
This would entail significant implications for the regional security landscape, especially for South Korea and Japan. The South Korean Foreign Minister, Cho Tae-yul and the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken have condemned the treaty and called it a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, stating that ‘the agreement poses a grave threat to the security of both the ROK and the U.S., as well as to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the broader region’.12
South Korea has provided humanitarian aid and other support to Ukraine, while joining U.S.-led economic sanctions against Russia. In August 2023, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol announced financial aid of 520 billion won (US$ 394 million) for Ukraine. This aid package includes 130 billion won for reconstruction, 260 billion in humanitarian aid, and another 130 billion won through international organisations.13 South Korea has not directly provided arms to Kyiv, citing a long-standing policy of not sending weapons to countries actively involved in combat. This could, however, change due to the recent Russia–North Korea treaty signing, with reports noting that South Korea is considering supplying arms to Ukraine.
Vietnam: Neutral, but Close
Vietnam’s robust ties with Russia date back many decades, owing to the military, economic and diplomatic support provided by the Soviet Union to the communist leadership in North Vietnam in the 1950s. As one of Asia’s fastest-growing economies, manufacturing powerhouse and leading exporter of goods, Hanoi has a multi-vector approach known as ‘Bamboo Diplomacy’, aimed at balancing Vietnam’s relations with the major powers by not taking sides, being self-reliant and demonstrating flexibility to maintain its agency and interests, helping it take advantage of economic opportunities created by major power competition.
Vietnam has upgraded its relations with important global actors such as the United States, Japan and Australia, demonstrating its growing influence on the world stage. While Russia’s agreement with North Korea has raised significant security concerns about the Korean Peninsula, the last leg of Putin’s Asia tour focused on strengthening the traditional Russia–Vietnamese relations. Both leaders have stated their aims to further the cooperation between the two nations in education, science and technology, oil and gas exploration and clean energy. The two nations agreed to collaborate on a roadmap for a nuclear science and technology centre in Vietnam.14
The Southeast Asian nation has chosen to abstain from various resolutions at the United Nations condemning Russia’s actions, yet maintained good relations with Ukraine and even sent some aid to Kyiv. In 2022, the Vietnamese government provided US$ 500,000 as humanitarian aid to support the people affected in the Ukraine conflict.15 Following its long-held foreign policy, Vietnam has maintained a neutral stance on the Ukraine conflict and is trying to court major powers equally. It is the only country to successfully host leaders from the US, China and Russia in recent times and is one of the largest importers of Russian arms. In the period 2016–2022, Vietnam bought 5.9 per cent of Russia’s weapons at US$ 1.7 billion.16 However, it plans to diversify its arms imports and reduce reliance on its traditional ally.
Amid tensions with China, these improving ties with Russia could also help Vietnam protect its disputed waters. With the aim to deepen relations in the energy sector, Vietnam has licensed Zarubezhneft, a Russian state-controlled oil company, to develop an offshore block on its southeastern coast.17 The so-called Block 11-2, however, appears to be inside the disputed nine-dash-line, a part of the area that China claims to be its own.18 Therefore, this offshore block might help Vietnam to maintain its claims in the contested part of the South China Sea.
Furthermore, Putin’s visit ahead of the October 2024 BRICS Summit under the Russian Chairmanship, also shows support for Vietnam’s keen interest in joining the group of emerging economies. Formally joining the grouping would benefit Vietnam by aligning their foreign policy of using multilateral diplomatic institutions to promote a multipolar world order and enhance economic ties with emerging economies.19
Key Takeaways
Amidst the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Russia has sought to strengthen its ties with DPRK and Vietnam in face of the growing isolationism due to the West’s sanctions. Russia and DPRK’s upgraded partnership broadens their collaboration across multiple areas and could lead to significant changes in the dynamics of Northeast Asian security. South Korea and Japan, the two non-nuclear powers, may further strengthen diplomatic and security cooperation with the United States as well as strengthen their own defence profiles to counter the threats posed by DPRK in the region.20 On the other hand, for Vietnam, Russia is an important source of military assistance and a valued partner in the former’s energy sector. While some analysts note that Russia–Vietnam cooperation in the hydrocarbon sector could strengthen Vietnam’s claims in the South China Sea, Russia is less likely to take measures that might jeopardize Chinese interests in this region, given the increasing robustness in Moscow–Beijing ties.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.