The East Asia Centre is dedicated to study and research the domestic and foreign policies of individual countries of the region as well as India’s multifaceted relationships with these countries. With respect to China, the Centre’s research foci are its foreign policy (particularly towards the US, Russia, Central Asia and Asia Pacific), domestic politics, economy, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and India’s relationship with China in all its dimensions. The Centre’s research also focuses on Taiwan, its domestic politics, Sino-Taiwanese relationship and Indo-Taiwanese relationship, Hong Kong and India-Hong Kong relations. Japan and Korea are the other major focus of the Centre, with its research focused on their domestic politics, foreign policy and comprehensive bilateral relationships with India. The geopolitics of the Asia Pacific and the Korean peninsula are also studied in the Centre.
The centre brings out five monthly newsletters: East Asia Military Monitor, Japan Digest, China Science and Technology, Korea Newsletter, and China Military Digest.
The revised National Security Strategy makes a cogent case of Japan’s evolving character as a decisive security actor. The conversation in Tokyo demonstrates a renewed sense of urgency in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Sino-US strategic contest, and post-pandemic mainstreaming of economic security.
China's deployment of nuclear forces are diversifying in an effort to achieve effective deterrence against its adversaries. Whereas the robustness of its nuclear posture might mean that it is moving away from its limited arsenal, however, its strategies and patterns of deployment indicate the PLA Rocket Forces are focused on improving its response and coordination for a seamless and rapid counter-strike, updating its strategy of deployment of missile systems to reduce its vulnerabilities in the post-missile defence nuclear environment and integrate its nuclear responses to portray an effective deterrence.
China has considerably improved its missile defence capabilities which is generally thought as a way to counter the US nuclear superiority after the abolition of the ABM Treaty. However, the Chinese responses show a broader understanding that the US nuclear superiority is more than a competition to reduce the efficiency of the Chinese deterrence.
Xi Jinping’s rise has led to a paradigm shift in many aspects of China’s domestic and international politics. A key element of this has been the ideological vision shorthanded as the 'Chinese Dream', combining elements of nationalism, Confucian ideology, and economic expansionism. Singh evaluates the various changes in China’s nominally communist ideology in the post-Mao era, with an emphasis on the implications for China’s economic and security relations with other countries. He particularly focusses on China’s approach to South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region, key elements of China’s strategy.
An insightful guide to understanding the direction of China’s foreign and security policy, and especially its impact on India–China relations.
The aim of the book is two-fold. First, this book is an effort to analyse China’s contemporary perceptual image about India primarily through the analysis of Chinese publications on the subject. Second, this book questions the prevalent notion of characterising India-China rivalry as ‘one-sided’ or ‘asymmetric.’
Unarguably, power asymmetry, with substantial Chinese advantage, has been a persistent characteristic of India-China relations and is likely to remain or even grow further. India, being weaker in this dyad, naturally has a greater threat perception vis-à-vis China. However, this apparent power asymmetry does not provide China with an overwhelming advantage over India.
The book argues that India has been and continues to be a ‘strategic rival’ in Chinese perception even though it is not categorised by China as its ‘principal rival.’ In the contemporary period, as India expands its defence capabilities, extends its regional outreach and deepens its engagement with major powers, Beijing has begun to factor New Delhi into its strategic calculus even more seriously.
Contributors address three critical perspectives of India and China in Asia which are increasingly shaping the future of Asia and impacting the Indo-Pacific power balance. First, they examine the mutual perceptions of India and China as an integral part of Asia’s evolving politics and the impact of this on the emerging Asian order and disorder. Second, they assess how classical and contemporary characteristics of the India–China boundary and beyond-border disputes or conflicts are shaping Asia’s political trajectory and leaving an impact on the Indo-Pacific region. Additionally, contributors observe the prevailing power equations in which India and China are currently engaged to reveal that they are not only geographically limited to the Asian region. Instead, having a strong global or intercontinental character attached to it, the India–China relationship involves extra-territorial powers and extra-territorial regions.
This book will be of interest to academics, students and policymakers working on Asian studies, international relations, area studies, emerging powers studies, strategic studies, security studies and conflict studies.
A game theoretic analysis for Ladakh standoff is presented in this article. Starting with Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, a more flexible game, known as De-escalation game is derived by incorporating the concepts of retaliation and non-escalation probabilities in the PD game. It is shown that by including these concepts, many new possibilities open up for India, which permit it to impose penalty on the aggressor.
‘Security’ and ‘status’ complexities are critical impediments for any state’s foreign policy; and India is no different. This article argues that as the China threat looms large, New Delhi will not be in complete repudiation of an ‘Asian NATO’ (or “Indo-Pacific NATO”), despite strategically refraining from being party to a definitive military alliance and an age-old non-alignment principle. However, India’s support will be contingent on the future trajectory of its ties with Beijing.
While a worrying disrepair in the political-military strand of the equation between New Delhi and Beijing prevailed through the 2010s, its economic component witnessed contrasting instances of convergence.
The turn of the twenty-first century brought with it the miraculous economic rise of China in Asia and beyond; American strategy towards the region, denoted by the ‘pivot to Asia’ and acceptance of a ‘Pacific Century’ for the US,1 became increasingly China-centric. Building partnerships, forging security and commercial pacts with Asian countries and enhancing maritime presence across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) eventually became the fulcrum of America’s Asia strategy, with mainstream strategic perception in the United States on China becoming increasingly negative.
On October 6, 2020, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (parliament) passed two important Resolutions, moved by the main opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT). These sought to ensure ‘US military aid in combating aggression by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’ and ‘a resumption of diplomatic relations between the US and Taiwan.’1 The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) supported the Resolutions. Such a bipartisan consensus is rare in Taiwan’s deeply divided politics.
The article looks back on China’s proposal and promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to Vietnam, as well as Vietnam’s official position and response to this initiative. The implementation of agreements between the two countries is analysed by evaluating two key areas of the BRI in Vietnam, namely facilities connectivity, and trade and investment. China was active in promoting the BRI, whereas Vietnam welcomed the initiative with caution. Cooperation in the two key areas has been promoted.
