Towards A Just Peace – Understanding Mali’s Multifacted Challenges

The recent spurt of analysis and reportage relating to the West African state of Mali and the Sahel region in the media reveals familiar patterns of conflict and terror. The most common perception is that Mali is merely a new front in the war on terror. This analysis makes quick assumptions about the actors involved, ignores their congruent yet conflicting interests, and shows little understanding of the reasons for the growth and spread of the conflict in the region.

Such thinking only scratches the surface of the Malian problem, ignoring in particular, the entrenched post-colonial structural problems and the failure to achieve a credible internal political process. It is the failure of governance compounded by the lack of inclusive socio-economic development in the region that has provided a fertile ground for terrorism and the further weakening of the state. Hence, significant internal issues of poverty and development, the prevailing power vacuum, institutional disarray, porous borders and ethnic tensions need to be addressed in conjunction with acknowledging the mushrooming of terrorism and other external threats. This is why understanding the depth and overlapping nature of Mali’s multifaceted challenges is prerequisite to analysing the present-day manifestation of old troubles afflicting the country.

Security Challenges

Considering the French reluctance for a long-term commitment in Mali, the threat of renewed insurgency is very real. Despite the claimed military successes, the character of the conflict has so far seen the rebels give up and retreat into their hideouts in the tough desert region or the rugged hills in the northeast. Several hundred fighters formed convoys, which then escorted the leaders, weapons and fighters1 away from their strongholds. The past few weeks have seen fresh hostilities arise with residual jihadist rebels launching attacks on patrolling Malian and French forces, so much so that the French defence minister Jean-Yves Le Drian labelled the conflict a “real war”2. Moreover, concerns regarding the protracted fighting spilling over to neighbouring states have already led to Niger, for instance, allowing the US to deploy drones to police the difficult vast desert terrain3. With the imminent French withdrawal, the African troops need to be prepared to deal with targeted attacks from militants emerging from their hideouts and using unconventional methods and guerrilla warfare to regain their previous spheres of influence. Mali’s armed forces need to be better trained and equipped to tackle increased resistance from the rebels. Their past failures, despite assistance from the US in the form of military training, have indeed discredited them, and their ability to defend and secure the Malian state.

Militancy across North Africa, particularly in Mali, Algeria, Libya, Niger and Mauritania has long been linked to local grievances and negligible governance in the region, with the numerous armed groups splintering, shifting goals, colluding and contesting against each other for dominating the booming drug trafficking, banditry and ransom trade. The interventionist anti-jihadi understanding of the situation is subversive and could convert these blurred identities and complex motives into something more unified and radicalised4. These need to be kept in mind as the French military progressively hands over responsibilities to an African military presence. After all, it is Mali’s security scenario than any resource potential that defines its strategic value.

Social Challenges

According to Dr. Judith Scheele, a social anthropologist, social life in northern Mali is organised in ascribed hierarchies by descent and some people with a historically low-status have recently grown rich through smuggling and trade. Given that religious practice is also an important social marker, Islamic extremism may simply be a case of opportunism, as a connection with any kind of religious movement or family enables social mobility.5 While the desecration of Sufi shrines and introduction of Sharia law in strongholds of the Ansar Dine and Mujao along with the increased presence of the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) cannot be entirely ignored, they need to be contextualised in the background of serious economic turmoil and underdevelopment. As one Bamako based blogger writes: “At its core, the conflict in Mali is not between Muslims and non-Muslims; it’s between Muslims with different visions of Islam, and religion is by no means the most important issue at stake”.6

The capital has over the past few decades experienced a total disintegration of governance with a multitude of alliances allegedly developing between the political elite and smugglers and drug dealers, wrecking any prospects of economic and political stability. Further, Mali is similar to several other post-colonial states that have diverse ethnic groupings spread across borders. The Tuareg like other minorities in the Sahelian states have long been stigmatised and marginalised which has lead to militancy and radicalisation. However, ethnic groups in the region have a tendency to cast certain visions of the past that opportunistically highlight their particular victimhood and therefore, fundamentally diverge from other groups’ perceptions. For instance, the Tuareg community is itself divided on the basis of racial and lineage categories and are hostile to one another with little or no interest in Tuareg nationalism.7 There are numerous reports of the abuse and torture of the Tuareg by Malian forces just as there are reports of war crimes committed by the MNLA as well as other rebel groups. Thus, the binary attitudes of popular media need to be changed as one of the central challenges in the post-conflict resolution phase will be to overcome the systemic violence8 and race-based injustices9 in the Malian state.

Political and Humanitarian Challenges

Critical to Mali’s security concerns should be the restoration of its political process and the effective reconstitution of its failed government. The Malian people have witnessed a steady weakening of the state into a hollow democracy with rampant corruption in the administration and the absence of any legitimate economy, in addition to last year’s military coup. . Without the formation of an accountable government based on free, fair, inclusive, transparent and periodic elections, the Malian state is bound to lose its sovereignty to opportunistic nonstate actors – terrorists, criminal networks, rebels and extremist insurgents. Further, a renewed political process has to be conducted within the framework of a national reconciliation process as different communities need to hold a dialogue to discuss their expectations from the state and each other. Malians will be able to hold onto their homeland only if they address the toxic environment of racial violence and religious extremism. If such a process is not initiated, the country will not just become a failed state but yet another pawn in the machinations of international terror networks and face the consequences of further foreign interventions. External actors have been wreaking havoc on its society and economy for too long but without national reconciliation leading to electoral democracy and social cohesion, such manipulation by rebel and foreign terrorist alliances will continue to nullify any prospective developmental and reconstruction efforts. The conflict has birthed a terrible humanitarian crisis exacerbating the long-term suffering in the region due to chronic food insecurity with poor harvests, drought as well as flooding.

More than 400,000 people have become refugees or internally displaced since the start of the conflict in Mali and include10:

• 282,548 people displaced within Mali11;
• approximately 175,211 refugees in Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Algeria;
• 22,000 new refugees who have fled Mali12:
• more than 14,000 newly displaced persons within Mali since the extremist offensive and Operation Serval13

In view of such mounting challenges, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has issued a consolidated appeal for $370,434,258 to help 4.3 million vulnerable Malians of which only 0.75 per cent ($2.8 million) has been committed as of January 29.14 The food situation is steadily deteriorating due to disrupted food supplies, restricted market supplies, dwindling food stocks, increasing prices and diminishing cash resources.15

Moving Forward

A government based on free and transparent elections that is responsive to the burgeoning needs of the vulnerable and conflict ravaged Malians is crucial for the nation to successfully counter its problems, build its economy and achieve a confident peace. The recent offensive against the extremists and rebels provides a window of opportunity to the Malian government to re-assert civilian rule and strengthen its institutions. The political road map as approved by the Malian

National Assembly on January 29 is a vital step in the right direction as is the interim president Dioncounda Traore’s commitment to implement this roadmap and hold presidential elections by July 31, 2013. The framework states that members of the current transitional government are not eligible to run for office, as called for by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)16. Mali’s political stakeholders need to commit themselves on propelling the political process forward based on social and legislative legitimacy; any intimidation or interference by military or other forces will only serve to herald past mistakes and repeat their ugly consequences. This will be the only way to address the country’s multiple and overlapping challenges, and secure a just peace based on the people’s sovereignty.

• 1. “Mali: The worst is yet to come”, The Guardian Africa Network, February 20, 2013 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
  world/2013/feb/20/mali-worst-yet-to-come
• 2. “As Mali Fighting Persists, France Vows to Exit in Weeks”, The New York Times, February 2, 2013 at http://
  www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/world/africa/france-mali-militants.html
• 3. “Mali: The worst is yet to come”, The Guardian Africa Network, February 20, 2013 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
  world /2013/feb/20/ Mali-worst-yet-to-come
• 4. “Why the Sahara is not the ‘new Afghanistan’, BBC News, February 5, 2013 at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
  world-africa-21299153
• 5. Ibid.
• 6. “Behind Mali’s Conflict: Myths, Realities and Unknowns”, Bridges from Bamako, January 16, 2013 at http://
  bridgesfrombamako.com/2013/01/16/behind-mali-conflict/
• 7. “Understanding Mali’s ‘Tuareg Problem’”, Bridges from Bamako, February 25, 2013 at http://
  bridgesfrombamako.com/2013/02/25/understanding-malis-tuareg-problem/
• 8. Ibid.
• 9. Ibid.
• 10. Johnnie Carson, “The Crisis in Mali: U.S. Interests and the International Response”, U.S. Department of State,
  February 14, 2013 at http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2013/204778.htm
• 11. “Mali – Complex Emergency Situation Report No. 30”, ReliefWeb, April 10, 2013 at http://reliefweb.int/report/
  mali/mali-complex-emergency-situation-report-no-30-10-april-2013
• 12. Johnnie Carson, “The Crisis in Mali: U.S. Interests and the International Response”, U.S. Department of State,
  February 14, 2013 at http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2013/204778.htm
• 13. Ibid
• 14. “Mali – Complex Emergency Situation Report No. 23”, ReliefWeb, January 29, 2013 at http://reliefweb.int/sites/
  reliefweb.int/files/resources/Mali%20Complex%20Emergency%20Situation%20Report%20No.%2023
  %20%28as%20of%2029%20January%202013%29.pdf
• 15. Ibid
• 16. Johnnie Carson, “The Crisis in Mali: U.S. Interests and the International Response”, U.S. Department of State,
  February 14, 2013 at http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2013/204778.htm